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Foreword
David J. Danelski
Goldwin Smith Professor of Government, Cornell University
This book provides a rare view of a creative scholar at work during a
highly productive phase of his career. It shows him as an innovator, theorist,
methodologist, “missionary,” critic, and scientist, but he remains, withal, in
his fashion, a humanist. He believes that institutions and processes—partic-
ularly law, politics, and scholarship—are best understood in human terms.
With Holmes, he believes that law is a prediction of what courts will do; hence,
to understand law it is necessary to understand judicial behavior. A full expla-
nation of a judge’s behavior would take into account his health (both physical
and mental), his personality, his culture and society, and his ideology. Glendon
Schubert concedes this but focuses primarily on ideology because he believes
the other variables are sublimated in it. Therefore, to him, ideology—attitudes
toward human values—is the basic explanation of judicial behavior, and ju-
risprudence is necessarily human.
The genesis of innovative ideas is usually rooted in a dimly remembered
past. This is not the case in regard to Professor Schubert’s ideas. He remem-
bers clearly his undergraduate days at Syracuse in the late 1930s when he
climbed the steps to Leonard Brown’s home on “the Hill” to participate in
Brown’s seminar on literary criticism. The use of Marxian and Freudian para-
digms in that seminar to study literary behavior led Schubert some twenty
years later to use other paradigms to study judicial behavior. Schubert shares
with Brown the humanist-scientist connection, but unlike Brown he was not
influenced by the thought of Marx and Freud; indeed he rejected their ideas.
Instead, he was influenced by the work of rigorous social and behavioral sci-
entists—C. Herman Pritchett, Louis L. Thurstone, Milton Rokeach, Hans J.
Eysenck, Louis L. Guttman, and Clyde H. Coombs.
The studies in this volume are important in the study of judicial behavior,
for they broke new ground, and some were forerunners of major books, such
as The Judicial Mind, which was published in 1965. Each shows Professor
Schubert’s concern at the time they were written, and taken together they
show movement and growth of his ideas and interests.
The first part of the book shows Professor Schubert reaching out to other
disciplines, doing missionary work, explaining the importance of research
on judicial behavior. Each of the articles is addressed to a different audi-
ence—practicing lawyers, law professors, and social scientists. The heading
under which these articles appear—“From Legal to Behavioral Realism”—is
significant. Legal realists like Jerome Frank had preceded Schubert in
proclaiming that judges are human, and judicial behavioralism might be re-
garded as neo-legal realism. But there is an important difference between
legal realism and judicial behavioralism. Legal realism, in Holmes’ words,
sought to “wash the law in cynical acid”; it destroyed legal myths, it pro-
claimed that the Emperor had no clothes, but it did not consciously seek to de-
velop empirically verifiable theories that would explain law and its operation
in society, nor did it seek to develop research methods. Judicial behavioralism,
with Schubert as its chief spokesman, seeks to do both.
The second part of the book presents some of Professor Schubert’s
most important contributions to understanding judicial behavior. The first
article sets forth an ingenious solution to Thurstone and Degan’s early
factor analysis of Supreme Court voting behavior. Thurstone and Degan
showed that judicial voting behavior is susceptible to factor analysis, but
they were unable to interpret the positions of the justices in factor space.
By positioning scale axes of voting behavior of justices on specific is-
sues—that is, political and economic liberalism—Schubert was able to show
that their positions in factor space were closely related to their positions
on the scale axes, strongly suggesting that the principal dimensions in the
factor analysis measured ideological components of voting behavior. In the
same article Schubert developed his theory of judicial voting behavior and
methods he later used to test it. In the next article he tested the theory us-
ing data from a single Supreme Court term, and later, in The Judicial Mind,
he expanded the study to cover sixteen terms. Schubert’s study of Justice
Jackson deals with a question raised in the previous studies, namely, does
correspondence of the justices’ positions on a Guttman scale with their po-
sitions in factor space mean that attitudes underlie votes? In the case of
Jackson, at least, Schubert offers persuasive proof that the answer is yes,
for Jackson’s values, which were ascertained by content analysis of his opin-
ions, were significantly related to his voting behavior. Professor Schubert’s
study of Australian High Court behavior reflects his interest in comparative
judicial behavior and illustrates his ability to adapt his approach and meth-
ods to study a court that operates somewhat differently than the American
Supreme Court. Yet his concern remains the same throughout, and it is to
show that the law, whether in the United States or Australia, is a manifesta-
tion of human behavior. His Jackson study was the basis of a book entitled
Dispassionate Justice: A Synthesis of the Judicial Opinions of Robert H.
Jackson. When asked about the title, Professor Schubert acknowledged that
it was an intentional pun. “Several of the opinions that I have included,” he
said, “reecho the phrase ‘dispassionate justice,’ an ideal that Jackson de-
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lighted in positing for other persons (such as colleagues, including Black
and Murphy, whom he particularly disliked). My wish is to present Jackson
as a very human judge, whose writings as a Supreme Court justice reflect
directly the human values that he cherished most dearly. Hence, his pas-
sionate defense of these values; and hence it seems fitting to suggest the
antonym as a most suitable epitaph for his literary testament.”
In the third part of the book, Professor Schubert’s concern goes be-
yond judicial ideology. In his article on ideological distance, he compares
cross-culturally the attitudes of judges and non-judges. And in the two pre-
ceding articles he deals with academic ideology. If the behavior of judges
is greatly influenced by ideology, so too, says Schubert, is the behavior
of scholars who study judges. But he does more than make a statement;
he gives proof. The article on academic ideology and the study of adju-
dication when published was bitterly criticized by some and dismissed by
others, but it raises serious questions about objectivity in research and
commentary about research. My proximity to Schubert in ideological space,
as shown in that article, is, of course, related to my view of his work.
That should be taken into account in reading this Foreword. But that is
precisely Schubert’s point—ideology is important in explaining all human
behavior. Indeed, when I read the article originally, I thought it was imagi-
native pedagogy, an attempt to teach two things: (1) the importance of the
relationship between ideology and behavior, including scholarly behavior;
and (2) the appropriateness of the methods like factor analysis and small-
est space analysis to show ideological proximity. If Professor Schubert was
unsuccessful in teaching these lessons, he may have taught another lesson,
namely, certain beliefs may be so strongly held by some persons that even
empirical proof will not convince them.
The fourth part of the book is firmly rooted in the preceding pages, yet it
goes beyond them and in a sense makes a full circle. “Three Models of Con-
stitutional Change,” “Future Stress,” and “Justice and Reasoning” provide a
series of paradigms for understanding judicial behavior and a great deal more.
It is in this part of the book that the influence of Leonard Brown shows. Pro-
fessor Schubert, reflecting on his careful empirical studies, generalizes and
discusses models of constitutional change, future stress in the constitutional
system, and a model of judicial reasoning. In all of Professor Schubert’s work
there is discernible progression; one study suggests and anticipates the next.
In the final article of this book, Professor Schubert’s current research interest
is suggested—the biological basis of political behavior.
In places in Human Jurisprudence, the human side of Glendon Schubert
shows. Much of the work presented in the book was and is controversial. It
has been criticized and even attacked, and when it was, Professor Schubert
unhesitatingly entered the polemical lists and argued forcibly in defense of
his ideas and findings. Like Robert H. Jackson of whom he wrote, he is not a
dispassionate man. His most remarkable quality is his passion for honesty in
research and everything else. To the extent that his publishers have permitted
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him, he has published his data so that others can replicate his work and if pos-
sible disprove his findings. He has never covered his tracks, and that has been
indeed fortunate for the scholars who have followed his lead.
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Preface
In the early autumn of 1939, I was fortunate in associating myself with the
work of what without doubt was the most challenging, and to me the most
interesting, course in which I enrolled as a university student. This was Leon-
ard Brown’s seminar in literary criticism, at Syracuse University.1 There was
a group of about twenty persons, mostly senior majors or graduate students in
English or American literature, but with a scattering minority of others whose
major work lay in disciplines ranging from forestry to physics. In at least this
respect I was a quite typical member of the seminar, working in it first as an
undergraduate English major and then as a graduate student (otherwise) in
political science, for a total of two full years until the advent of World War II
brought an abrupt hiatus of several years in my academic activities. When I
knew it the class used to meet weekly, for the evening, in the L-shaped living-
and-dining room of Brown’s modest residence, perched on a crag (at least fifty
or sixty almost vertical steps above the sidewalk) near the crest of one of the
drumlins which surround, to the south and east, a campus that is itself re-
ferred to locally as “the Hill.”
Brown’s approach to literary criticism involved an endeavor to guide his
students to an understanding of what he believed to be the most intellectu-
ally significant interpretations of human experience that were predominant
1. Leonard Stanley Brown (1904–1960) was born in Belvidere, Nebraska, and he was a grad-
uate of Cotner College (B.A., 1924) and the University of Nebraska (M.A., 1925). He taught on
the faculty of the English Department of Syracuse University from 1925 until his death almost
thirty-five years later, with the exception of a year of resident graduate work at the University of
Chicago. According to a colleague and friend who knew him well, “He was a marvellous teacher
[with] an original and highly stimulating mind. The best things he did, academically, were to vi-
talize the teaching of criticism and to bring the twentieth century into a curriculum that had
previously stopped short with, say, Thomas Hardy. His course in criticism (which well may be the
one of the greatest duration around, for it has been continued since his death) was a remark-
able achievement indeed, bringing students into close touch with ideas, old and new, in a way
that animated their own thinking…. To me Leonard’s greatest quality was a kind of intellectual
charm—and I think he practiced this on his classes. Without committing himself beyond a point,
he could get one engaged, animated, extending himself.” Brown was the editor of and a contrib-
utor to a literary magazine, Avenue (c. 1934–1935); the editor (1929, 1947) or coeditor (Brown
and Perrin 1935) of three anthologies; the author of a collection of stories and verse (1928) in
addition to other verse (1935a) and fiction (1944); and the author of five critical articles or notes
(1933a, 1933b, 1934a, 1934b, 1935b).
in the America of the middle decades of the twentieth century—and so our
models included such figures as Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. We would then
use the Marxist (cf. L. Brown 1935b; or the Freudian, or some other) paradigm
as a guide to both theoretical and methodological approaches to the investiga-
tion of a problem posed by some aggregation of empirical phenomena—which
for him typically would be an endeavor to correlate a person’s writings with
the personal, social, and cultural experiences which the writer sought to in-
terpret through his art. Hence writing was best conceptualized as art; while
criticism of it was best conceptualized as science, and to be more explicit, as
a particular kind of social science. And what Brown had in mind was what we
would refer to today as the life sciences. So my own socialization into the sci-
entific temper came virtually not at all from my graduate education per se in
political science after World War II,2 but stems instead from my education in
English before the war.
The group worked collectively, allocating an entire semester or more to
such an important writer as Thomas Mann or Ernest Hemingway. Our method
was to read everything that had been published by, and about, our literary
subject; then we would bring to bear in our analysis of this writer both the-
ories and methods that had been developed in what we would today call the
behavioral sciences, as well as borrowing our theories of criticism from such
leading exponents as Malcolm Cowley and Kenneth Burke. A seminar paper
might, for example, seek to explain some aspect of an author’s work by re-
lating changes in the content or style of his writing to changes in his life
experiences (e.g., Hemingway’s adolescent physicalism and death-wish fanta-
sies, and his guilt over his father’s suicide: one paper based on the Freudian
metaphor predicted, and over a score of years before the event, the ultimate
suicide of the man who by his middle years had acquired the appropriate
cognomen of “Papa”—the latter was not predicted, but it certainly fits the
analysis.) Another paper was a content analysis of Mann’s use of color images
(e.g., red was always and only a prelude to direct physical action). Among the
group during my own first year were some people whom I recognized to be
pretty good, but it was not until somewhat later that I came more fully to ap-
preciate why the competition seemed to be so rough, as well as rewarding.
The late Shirley Jackson and Stanley Edgar Hyman were not yet married then,
but I believe that the seminar was not unrelated to their subsequent partner-
ship in private life, just as it must have affected their subsequent individual
2. Even that was before the “impact of the behavioral revolution” had been felt in the po-
litical science department at Syracuse University, with the conspicuous and solitary exception
of Herman Carey Beyle, with whom I found it virtually impossible to do graduate work for rea-
sons quite independent of his approach to political science. That was most unfortunate, because
Beyle was a product of the “Chicago school” of political science of the twenties—a subject that
we shall consider at greater length in the introduction to Part I—and his major published work
(1931) was a study in legislative behavior that was methodologically a direct antecedent of what
later became one of my own principal interests in judicial behavior, as much of the present vol-
ume exemplifies.
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careers as (respectively) a gifted writer, whose fiction ranged from domestic
comedy to Gothic tales of the psychology of horror,3 and a distinguished lit-
erary critic of the fifties and sixties,4 who was for many years on the staff of
The New Yorker magazine and associated with Kenneth Burke on the English
faculty at Bennington College.
Brown called his course one in “scientific” literary criticism, and he was
himself that rare humanist who, without feeling any need to express the in-
tense defensive feelings that permeate the columns of such parochial journals
as The [Phi Beta Kappa] Key Reporter, embraced both art and science as
equally appropriate approaches to guide his own, and his students, under-
standing of great literature.5 Because this book owes at least as much to my
literary apprenticeship with Leonard Brown as it does to my subsequent train-
ing and experience in political science, I have dedicated the volume to his
memory.
A
In applying, for example, the Marxist paradigm (L. Brown 1935b) as the ba-
sis for critical literary analysis, Brown’s seminar not only read and discussed the
original sources, but also the secondary literature in which others had attempted
to apply that paradigm to criticize art. Of course that secondary literature is enor-
mous (and itself the subject of an extensive tertiary social-scientific critique), so
I should like to specify the kind of work that seemed useful for purposes of this
literary behavioralism. At a time before most contemporary political radicals had
been born, Kenneth Burke was prototyping both their social role and their private
life-style for them, by criticizing the conventions and institutions of the society
around him while living on a farm in New Jersey with both his then present and
his former wives (sisters) and their combined offspring.6 The fellow-traveling was
a phenomenon of the times (cf. Aaron et al. 1966), and corresponds to the middle
3. Shirley Jackson (1919–1965) was the author of (inter alia) The Lottery (1949), The Haunting
of Hill House (1959), as well as Life among the Savages (1953), and Raising Demons (1957).
4. Stanley Edgar Hyman (1919–1970), whose better known works include The Armed Vision:
A Study in the Methods of Modern Literary Criticism (1948) and The Tangled Bank: Darwin,
Marx, Frazer, and Freud as Imaginative Writers (1962), edited (with Barbara Karmiller) two col-
lections of the writing of his colleague Kenneth Burke, Perspectives by Incongruity (1964a) and
Terms for Order (1964b).
5. Cf. Merle E. Brown’s remark (1969: 10) that “In contrast to most of the New Critics,
Burke would accept the science and technology of his environment and would strive to redeem
it with a poetic rhetoric. That, indeed, is what is going on in most of his books.”
6. I have never met Burke personally, but Brown knew him well. See Burke’s acknowledgement
of Brown in the foreword to The Philosophy of Literary Form (1941: xiv), in which Burke mentions
having delivered a course of lectures to Brown’s seminar, shortly after the advent of World War II had
brought about my own departure from the campus. Almost twenty years later came another near-
miss in my getting an opportunity to become personally acquainted with Burke: he was a Fellow at
the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences during 1957–1958, while my own fellow-
ship period there was 1960–1961.
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of the three periods in terms of which Burke’s work now has come to be clas-
sified.7 But he never joined the Communist party, and repudiated it after the
outbreak of World War II; and during the period since then he has emerged as a
leading American man of letters. According to his biographers, “Kenneth Burke
is probably the most controversial literary figure of the past fifty years in Amer-
ica,” (M. Brown 1969: 5), and now “Burke is the foremost critic of our age, and
perhaps the greatest critic since Coleridge” (Hyman and Karmiller 1964a: vi; and
cf. A. Frank 1969 and Rueckert 1969).
That part of his work that I found most useful in the seminar was his two-
volume Attitudes toward History (1937), which stemmed from the middle of
his experience with leftism, following on the heels of Permanence and Change
(1935) and constituting at once a critique of forms of literary art, a politi-
cally radical commentary upon then (and still) contemporary modes of social
behavior, and an ethical analysis of social attitudes. Burke argued, for ex-
ample, that the distinction between comedy and tragedy (as art forms) is an
essential one to make because, although both “warn against the dangers of
pride,” in comedy the “emphasis shifts from crime to stupidity.” Thus “Com-
edy deals with man in society, tragedy with the cosmic man.” And in that sense
“The best of Bentham, Marx, and Veblen is high comedy.” Burke suggests that
the most useful social attitude (or, in his vocabulary, “acceptance frame” for
“the charting of human motives”) is comic, because “The progress of humane
enlightenment can go no further than in picturing people not as vicious, but as
mistaken. When you add that people are necessarily mistaken, that all people
are exposed to situations in which they must act as fools, that every insight
contains its own special kind of blindness, you complete the comic circle, re-
turning again to the lesson of humility that underlies great tragedy.” (1937,
vol. 1: 51–53, emphasis in the original.) This is a very different methodology,
and approach, to the study of attitudes than one finds in contemporary so-
cial psychology (e.g., Jahoda and Warren 1966; Rokeach 1968; and Summers
1970); and because so much of the research presented in the present volume
is explicitly concerned with the study of social attitudes (of both judges and
academicians), I feel that candor compels the admission that my own intro-
duction to the subject came not from a computer, nor even from the course in
the subject that was taught by Floyd Allport8 during the years of both my un-
dergraduate and graduate education at Syracuse University and which I (not
really perversely, but simply out of ignorance) never took. Instead, my baptism
into attitudinal analysis came through Kenneth Burke.
7. Thus “by 1935 (Permanence and Change) Burke’s primary interests had shifted from literary
to social criticism, and by 1945 (A Grammar of Motives) from social criticism to linguistic analysis as
a way of confronting the world.” Rueckert (1963: viii); cf. Krutch (1935).
8. Floyd was the older brother of the somewhat better known Harvard psychologist Gordon
Allport. Among Floyd Allport’s major contributions to the study of attitudes were his Social Psy-
chology (1924) and Institutional Behavior (1933). See also Katz and Allport (1931), a work that
he coauthored with one of his graduate students who subsequently became a leading contribu-
tor to the field of attitude psychology.
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In the present volume I have sought to emphasize four themes in par-
ticular, and each of these finds reflection in one of the parts into which the
chapters are divided. The first part is concerned with the continuities between
legal and political research, and with the extent to which and the ways in
which lawyers and political scientists have interacted in the concern—which
they clearly do share—to comprehend the processes by which judges make
law and the effect of judicial policies upon the society, economy, and polity.
All three of these chapters were written to communicate with audiences of
lawyers or sociologists of law; hence they assume the standpoint of someone
who is inside the profession of political science, looking outside and attempt-
ing to explain to outsiders what has been on-going within the field of judicial
process and behavior. A few other political scientists have engaged in similar
missionary-type activities,9 and an even smaller number of law professors has
attempted to play the role of ethnographer of political science society;10 but
much less has been done by either lawyers or sociologists to interpret their
activities to political scientists.11
Part 2 shifts focus to several examples of the kind of research that
political scientists have been carrying on in their investigations of judicial
behavior. The selections that I have chosen to include here are in no sense
a representative sample of work during the sixties in the more general
field of judicial process and behavior, nor do they purport to accomplish
any such purpose. They do constitute, I believe, a fair sampling of the kind
of studies that I have done during the past couple of decades. And these
chapters do typify what has been a core focus of political science research
in constitutional law since before the founding of political science as an
academic discipline: the analysis of the policy content of Supreme Court de-
cisions, which generations of distinguished political science forebears have
thought important because of the peculiarly influential political role that
the Supreme Court has played in the American constitutional polity since
the founding of the republic (Schubert 1967c). Beyond that, the empiri-
cal focus of these chapters upon the values articulated by Supreme Court
judges certainly is consistent with the theme of what has consensually been
perceived to be the most important book published in the field of judicial
process and behavior, during at least the past three decades—the subtitle
of that book was: “A Study in Judicial Politics and Values” (Pritchett 1948).
Hence the chapters in Part 2 can properly be viewed as an endeavor, on
my own part, to carry on an unbroken tradition that runs through Ameri-
can political science, a line of succession that by no means is limited to but
certainly includes at least Frank Goodnow, Charles Grove Haines, Edward
Samuel Corwin, Robert Eugene Cushman, Carl Brent Swisher, Rodney Mott,
9. For example, Shapiro 1964b; Nagel 1965; and Sheldon 1969.
10. Jones 1963; Miller 1965a; and Lewis 1970.
11. Skolnick 1968; and Jones 1965.
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and Charles Herman Pritchett. There is, I believe, a still-strong current of
adolescentlike father-rejection12 running in contemporary political science,
a current which finds expression in such behaviors as vying for place in
exposing the shortcomings of such former intellectual leaders of the pro-
fession as David Truman and Robert Dahl. Having felt slight allegiance to
such established figures when they were ascendant, it is perhaps natural
that I feel less repugnance (than some of my colleagues seem to) toward
them now that they have been deposed. But I do feel appreciative of the
contributions of Goodnow, Haines, Corwin, Cushman, Swisher, and Mott,
and I do wish explicitly to create this opportunity to acknowledge the very
substantial intellectual debt that I owe to them all. (I am also, of course,
continuously indebted to a good many of my own contemporaries [includ-
ing, certainly, Pritchett] and to various of my students; but them I can tell
directly and personally.)
In Part 3 the focus shifts again, and this time from values to valuation.
It is of course impossible to segregate theory from facts and methods, ex-
cept for analytical purposes; and it is only in that limited sense that it is
possible to describe Part 3 as the most “theoretical” segment of this volume.
But there is also a second respect in which its focus is constrained: the the-
ory with which it is concerned is that of attitudes, and in particular of the
interrelationships among the sets of attitudes, for both any given individual
and for a group of individuals. Moreover, the discussion is deeply concerned
with the question of to what extent and how the attitudes of any person (in-
cluding myself) who undertakes to study the attitudes of judges, wittingly
or otherwise, influences what he reports as findings, due to the extent of
his own involvement in the research enterprise because of his own attitudes
toward the subject studied. Some of the avant-garde among my graduate
students and younger colleagues act and talk as though to them alone has
been revealed the great secret of analyst bias (possibly as a reward for
their loyal subservience to the ideology into which they happen to have
been socialized). But policy science was not the issue of any virgin birth;
it was proclaimed with all his (very considerable) might by Harold Dwight
Lasswell, an exceptionally vocal political scientist and one who thought of
himself as a political behavioralist, at a time (Lasswell 1947; Lerner and
Lasswell 1951; and Lasswell 1951) when many of those who have just re-
cently heard the good news were suckling their mothers (or were not yet
even born). My own rather contrary conviction is that what political science
(and other behavioral sciences) today need is less affect and more effect;
instead of merely exhibiting our biases proudly we should understand how
and why they affect our behavior, whether as scholars or in other of our
manifold roles as human actors, so that to the extent that we may wish to
do so, we shall be better able to establish statistical (if not psychological,
social, or cultural) controls over that particular source of error variance in
12. Cf. Jerome Frank 1930, part 3, chap. 1.
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our research equations. Those who insist that social life is a blob are almost
certain to leave it precisely as they purport to find it.
Part 3 develops also another facet of the study of the integration of
values through attitudes and ideologies: their variance across national cul-
tures. That emphasis is perfectly consonant with what became increasingly
a major theme of American political science generally during the sixties:
the attempt to reconsider the knowledge that had been developed out of
studies in America, by subjecting such propositions to the test of cultural
variance. My own interests were of course affected by the force of such
social currents, which provide the underlying explanation for such more
discrete events as a Fulbright year in Scandinavia, or a series of research
residences in the explicitly cross-cultural setting of the East-West Center
in Hawaii, or a teaching residence of two years in the fratricidal acade-
mic atmosphere of Canada, or research residences of half a year each in
Switzerland and South Africa, all of which certainly are directly related
(both before and after the event) to the development of a cross-cultural di-
mension to my own work in judicial behavior. One cannot become involved
in logomachy with a drunken Norwegian communist, or have a militaris-
tic Swiss James Bond enthusiast snatch one’s interview schedule (so that
xerox copies can be turned over to the local prosecutor), or have an irate
Afrikaner supreme court judge substitute an inquisition for a scheduled
interview (with loud accompanying assertions that one is a “phony,” chal-
lenges to prove that one has any kind of academic degree, and demands
that one admit his C.I.A. sponsorship) without becoming impressed with
both personal and cultural variation as a phenomenon within as well as be-
tween societies.
The concluding part of the volume brings us back into closer rapport
with Leonard Brown’s seminar because these closing chapters are largely
concerned with an attempt to understand the process of legal-social-political
change, by invoking the guidance of selected cosmological paradigms as the
basis for interpreting complex empirical phenomena. Three such paradigms
are explicitly postulated and discussed; these correspond to points of view
according to which social action is analogized to be like unto a (by definition,
inanimate) machine, a (by definition, living) organism, or a nuclear system
(of which, at least at certain submicroscopic levels, it is difficult to be sure
what the difference between life and nonlife can be understood to mean).13
The first of these concluding chapters undertakes a relatively straightforward
exposition of the three points of view, and undertakes to demonstrate how
they necessarily lead to differing conclusions about both the meaning of law
and the forms that appropriate political action, to change law, should assume.
One of the remaining two chapters undertakes to develop, more particularly,
the implications of the biological model for predicting change in judicial sys-
tems; the other chapter attempts to use the nuclear model to predict how
13. Cf. Monod 1971, which is among the works discussed in my review article (1973e).
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the discipline of political science should be changed the better to meet the
needs of the world it will be confronting during the next generation.
C
The composition of this volume leaves me directly obligated to only a
few persons, but indirectly to many more than I can possibly list. My deepest
obligation is to David J. Danelski, a friend with whom I have collaborated in re-
gard to other projects and whose advice and suggestions in regard to this one
proved most helpful. Danelski shares with two other friends and sometime col-
leagues of mine, Robert Vance Presthus and Yasumasa Kuroda, and one of my
current doctoral candidates, David John Gow, a concern for the significance
of what Abraham Kaplan calls the “logic-in-action” (1964, esp. pp. 3–18) of a
research inquiry, which entails its placement as a historical event within the
context of the personal, social, and cultural fields whose intersection created
it. Their continuing affirmation of the importance of this dimension to an ade-
quate social accounting for one’s responsibilities in the reporting of research
has encouraged me to give prominence to that emphasis, given the fortuity
that the situation under which the present publication takes place can toler-
ate and accommodate to this kind of unorthodoxy far more readily than could
the dozen different editors of almost as many different journals whose idio-
syncratic policies and requirements tended (to what I felt at the time was a
completely unreasonable degree) to determine the form as well as (in respects
such as this) the content of the original publication of these papers. Never-
theless I am grateful to those now responsible for the management of these
various journalistic enterprises for their kindness in permitting me to reprint
material concerning whose use they are, in most instances, the owners of the
respective copyrights. To the extent that more explicit expression of that legal
indebtedness is appropriate or requisite, signification of it appears on the title
page of each chapter.
For more detailed information concerning Leonard Brown’s career than I
was able to retrieve from either my own memory or the local libraries at my
present residence, I am indebted to Donald A. Dike, professor of English at
Syracuse University; and for putting me in touch with Professor Dike, I thank
a longtime mutual friend of both Leonard Brown and myself, President Frank
P. Piskor of Saint Lawrence University.
For the typing of the manuscript I thank my secretary, Mary Grayson, and
for their toleration of yet another book (which from their point of view we
need like we need another visit by the plague), I thank my family—a social
system that is (like judicial systems) much more biological and nuclear than
mechanical.
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PART I
From Legal
to Behavioral
Realism
THE BEHAVIORAL REVOLUTION in political science—as certain enthusiasts (e.g.,
Truman 1955) described what seemed to be the central thrust of change
in the profession a generation ago—was a misnomer. It was no more (and
no less) a revolution for the discipline than adolescence is for an individual
person: both are no doubt better understood as natural stages of devel-
opment. Certainly political behavioralism has neither a beginning nor—at
least so far—an ending. It is dubious whether behavioralism ever has de-
fined an ethic acceptable to a majority of the members of the American
Political Science Association (APSA); and it is clear that behavioralism al-
ways has been, and that it remains today, a minority point of view among
those political scientists whose particular interests include constitutions,
law, courts, and legal processes. At a time when fashions in academic
ideology are such that one-upmanship requires those who value social ac-
ceptance to define their position in terms of postbehavioralism (Baker et al.
1972), the “revolution” interpretation holds a certain attraction because it
enables veterans to exhibit their purple hearts and good conduct medals,
whilst they close ranks with yearlings who can know of the relevant events
only through story and myth, and with whom they can look back with no re-
grets upon an era that history has foreclosed (and which was, after all, not
much worse to have endured than a bad cold). It is attractive, as I say, but
like so many other of our most cherished beliefs, it is not true (in the sense
that if it were true the proposition would find more support than disconfir-
mation in observations of the empirical events that it purports to denote).
It has been full half a century since Charles Merriam (1925) stated the
case for a science of political behavior. Merriam spoke as a founding father
and leading member of the profession, as an experienced and skillful acad-
emic politician who worked hard to gain support for his views, and as the
chairman of a department that from the mid-twenties through the mid-thir-
ties was the first-ranking department of political science in the country.1
Merriam put before the profession a program and justification for a behavio-
ral approach to the study of politics, and he did this with both an intellectual
and a political vigor that no one else has equalled, let alone surpassed, in
the intervening decades. But Merriam was a prophet—a prophet with both
honor and disciples in his own time, it is true, but not himself among those
who lived to experience the promised land. Another generation, and another
world war, were to elapse before some of Merriam’s students, and more par-
ticularly the students of those students, would produce during the fifties the
political writings and research literature that tend to be associated with the
behavioral approach to the study of politics (Kirkpatrick 1962). Even then
it was not until the sixties that it became common for graduate students to
be educated in the substantive lore and with the research skills appropriate
to the practice of political behavioralism (Luttbeg and Kahn 1968)—that is,
1. Foreword by Barry D. Karl to the 3rd edition of C. Merriam, New Aspects of Politics,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970, pp. 1–32. Cf. Gosnell 1971.
2
with cognate study in psychology and anthropology and sociology (instead
of history and philosophy and classical economics), and with training in sta-
tistics and computer technology (instead of the smattering of French and
German that used to suffice). And it has really only been during the seven-
ties that persons trained as behavioralists have taken over the editorship of
the American Political Science Review (together with at least some of the
regional association journals), and that a majority of the articles in those
journals have become adorned with tables, charts, and figures of statistical
curves and mathematical functions, for the very good reason that the analy-
sis in these articles focuses upon the discussion of relationships that have
been measured (and, therefore, quantified). The route from Charles Mer-
riam’s presidency of the APSA in 1925 to that of Heinz Eulau in 1972 marks
a gradual and continuing (though by no means uniform, complete, nor uni-
versal) process of growth and development, whose sources lie in a much
more remote past and whose effects are not likely to become obliterated
during the lifetimes of those who presently are active in the profession.
A
Merriam’s best-known student, and the most renowned product of the
Chicago department during the twenties, was Harold Lasswell, a compleat
behavioral scientist who legitimately could claim competence in—and be
claimed as a member by—half-a-dozen different life science disciplines,
ranging from psychiatry to anthropology, in addition to law and political
science (Rogow 1969). But since 1945 his institutional affiliations have re-
mained as a law professor; and Lasswell’s impact upon the behavioral study
of law has been felt (in company with that of his longtime colleague Myres
McDougal) primarily among lawmen (and, especially, other law professors)
as an exemplification of a somewhat latter-day legal realism,2 rather than
as a well-spring of behavioral jurisprudence among political scientists. The
latter role, that of godfather to the judicial process and behavior movement
among political scientists during the fifties and sixties, was played by C.
Herman Pritchett, who had been a student of both Merriam and Lasswell
at Chicago, and who had taught at Chicago for more than a quarter of
a century, much of that time serving also as chairman of the department
over which Merriam had reigned as “The Chief.” Like Merriam (but unlike
Lasswell) Pritchett’s career remained anchored in the mainstream of the
profession; and taken together, Merriam and Pritchett span the entire life
of the APSA, from its earliest days of organization in 1905 up to the pre-
sent time of writing (some two-thirds of a century later).
2. Arens and Lasswell 1964; McDougal 1966. See also the recent remark in an essay by
A. S. Miller and D. S. Sastri that “there still has been no sufficient jurisprudential effort in
the United States—other than, perhaps, the policy-science or configurative jurisprudence of
Lasswell and McDougal—since the legal realists first ripped the facade off the Blackstonian
conception of the judicial process several decades ago” (1973: 805).
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A behavioral science of history must go beyond the doings of kings
and generals (Landes and Tilly 1971), and I do not mean to imply that one
can adequately discuss the evolution of either political behavior or behav-
ioral jurisprudence by tracing the aspirations and accomplishments of only
two or three persons, however great their distinction. I invoke their names,
rather, as symbols of the careers of the many other persons—hundreds, in the
aggregate—whose activities in professional research, teaching, and commu-
nications do account for the changes within political science that constitute
the objective content of the behavioral approach to the study of politics and
law.
B
At the same time that Merriam was building a behavioral political sci-
ence at Chicago, and a few other pioneers were similarly occupied elsewhere,
the movement that came to be known as “legal realism” erupted in a few
law school faculties, of which the main axis developed chronologically from
Columbia to Yale to Chicago (Rumble 1964). Legal realism was, like polit-
ical behavioralism, a completely indigenous American development, and both
emerged, as major issues for discussion within their respective professions, at
about the same time in the early twenties. But there the similarities end. Af-
ter a flurry of disputation in the pages of leading law journals, a few seminal
books, and a small but promising output of empirical research reports, the le-
gal realist movement had spent its force: some of its protagonists became first
administrative adjudicators and then judges, like William O. Douglas (1956)
and Jerome Frank (1942); some (like Llewellyn: Llewellyn and Hoebel 1941;
Llewellyn 1960; and cf. Hayakawa 1964) changed their interests, and ulti-
mately their mind; and others (like Hutchins) left legal education behind to
become pre-occupied with very different kinds of pedagogical experiences. A
few, like Underhill Moore, kept on working, but their example failed to induce
enough others to follow in their footsteps, so as to stem the advancing tides of
legal rationalism.
Legal study in the United States failed to become scientific because of
its preemptive fascination with policy and the empirical consequences of such
policy having been made; and the changes in legal education that erupted dur-
ing the sixties involved not so much a change in theory or methodology as a
switch in topics deemed meritorious: a generation that grew up during a de-
pression valued economic security for itself, and hence Wall Street firms and
corporations and federal taxation and mineral law and things like that; the
modern generation of younger lawyers and law professors—persons who have
never experienced economic insecurity—worry instead about poverty law and
the plight of minorities (however defined) and the representation of indigent
criminal defendants rather than (or at least more than) the social objects of
criminal behavior.
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C
The field of judicial process and behavior within contemporary political
science stems, most directly and immediately, from the publication of two
books, Pritchett’s The Roosevelt Court in 1948,3 and Jack W. Peltason’s
Federal Courts in the Political Process in 1955.4 Pritchett’s book was antic-
ipated and foreshadowed by half-a-dozen articles, as he has recounted;5 all
were strongly empirical in tone and content, although his work was guided
explicitly by the theory of attitudes prevalent in psychology at the time
he began his studies. Peltason had published a prior article (1953) which,
like his monograph, was programmatic in tone and ideological in character:
Peltason explicitly repudiated the desirability of interdisciplinary collabora-
tion between political science and other social or behavioral science fields,6
with the explicit exception of sociology, which supplied the basis for the
theory of group interests (and of interest groups) that he recommended
to the profession for analyzing the judicial process. Pritchett’s work laid
the groundwork for the subsequent investigations that employed cumulative
scaling, factor analysis, and smallest space analysis of the voting behav-
ior of justices of both the federal and state supreme courts, in the United
States and an increasing number of other countries as well. Ironically, there
has been an almost perfect but negative correlation between the direction
of Pritchett’s own research since 1948 and that of the judicial behavioral-
ists who have built upon his beginnings: while research into judicial values
and attitudes has grown, both in depth and in scope, Pritchett himself has
retreated more and more into the traditional constitutional law work that
had constituted virtually the exclusive content of the field at the time he
began his own work. Peltason, on the other hand, went on (1961) to carry
out an extensive field survey of the attitudes and social backgrounds of all
fifty-eight of the federal district judges who were legally responsible for the
interpretation and carrying out (or frustration) in the South of the Supreme
Court’s School Segregation decision. But by that time there were at least
a dozen other political scientists actively involved in research, including
Schmidhauser and Nagel, who were exploring the social backgrounds of
judges; Tanenhaus and Ulmer and Spaeth, who had begun to scale judicial
attitudes; Danelski, who was investigating judicial ideology; Kort, who was
making content analyses of judicial opinions as a basis for predicting de-
cisions quantitatively; and myself: I was venturing experimental forays in
all of those directions, plus a few (such as game theory) for which at least
temporarily I established a corner on the political science market in judi-
3. Reprinted in 1969 as a paperback by Quadrangle Books, Chicago. Cf. Wolf 1970.
4. Originally published by Doubleday; subsequently reprinted and distributed by Ran-
dom House.
5. Pritchett (1970) cites four of these articles.
6. His concluding sentence urged political scientist public lawyers to give up “trying to ‘out-his-
tory’ the historian, ‘out-law’ the lawyers, or ‘out-psychology’ the psychologist” (1953: 56).
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cial behavior. Out of these eclectic inquiries I undertook during the middle
fifties came an article (1958e) that was just as programmatic as Peltason’s
(but with advice in direct opposition to his on virtually all counts save one);
a book (1959) that undertook to exemplify (in much greater detail than
had been possible in the article) both what to do and how to do it; and a
text-casebook (1960a) that was intended to do for teaching what the other
book was supposed to do for research—to help other persons with simi-
lar (however inchoate) interests to bridge the gap between constitutional
law and the study of judicial politics. The one exception upon which Pelta-
son and I could agree was that it had long since become inappropriate
for political scientists to continue making legalistic analyses of courts and
law: on this point I could and did quote him often, and with approval. We
agreed also that the study of law should become “political,” but this seem-
ing coincidence in the prescription (as well as in the diagnosis) was quite
spurious, because our respective understandings of what “political” should
mean remained so very different. To Peltason political meant interest group
interaction, following the now classical sociological theory that had been
advanced a full half century earlier by Bentley and popularized after World
War II by Truman. This was a research perspective that I had then only re-
cently had occasion to examine in some depth, and to criticize in a work
on political theory which—for reasons that are extraneous in the present
context—I happened to write at about the same time, in the late fifties. To
me political meant not abstract institutional fallacies such as “groups,” but
rather people—discrete, usually identifiable, humans acting in roles that di-
rectly affect the making or the carrying out of public policy choices. And to
study law from such a perspective required that political scientists get off
their ramparts and scale the interfaces separating them from the life sci-
ences: anthropology, psychology, social psychology, and modern sociology;
and although I clearly mentioned biology also back at this earlier time, and
had indeed by the mid-sixties made it the very core of my paradigm of the
behavioral sciences, I should now (cf. my 1973e, 1975a) want to insist upon
a much greater emphasis on the necessity for including ethology (and espe-
cially primatology), population genetics, ecology, and other major subfields
of human biology as essential components of a behavioral approach to the
study of politics (including judicial politics).
The difference between Peltason and myself is a fairly important one,
not because of anything involving either of us personally, but rather be-
cause each of us was then espousing (and still advocates) a perspective that
has considerable social importance, because it has served and continues to
serve as a focal point for organizing the time and energies of a substantial
number of other political scientists. It is evident that what Peltason advo-
cated as the “judicial process” approach finds expression in linkages with
legal sociology such as, for example, the Law and Society Review under
the recent editorship of political scientist Krislov, or sociologist Selznick’s
administration of the Center for the Study of Law and Society at the Uni-
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versity of California, Berkeley. Three of the twenty-odd individuals who
comprise the faculty of the Department of Political Science at the Univer-
sity of Hawaii would be identified by their colleagues with the study of law
and courts; and two of these three would certainly be associated by other
knowledgeable persons in the field—and would identify themselves—with
the judicial process approach, rather than with the judicial behavioralism
that I am understood to represent. One convenient objective test of the
proposition that I have stated is found in the circumstance that about a
dozen years ago Peltason (1968) and I (1968e) were engaged, completely in-
dependently of each other, in writing essays that were to appear (when that
opus eventually became published) in the revised edition of the Interna-
tional Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences; his topic was “Judicial Process”
and mine was “Judicial Behavior”; and as I have remarked elsewhere, “the
two articles, although they do include some of the same authors, are al-
most completely independent in the specific works that they cite; the only
common references are to Jerome Frank [Law and the Modern Mind] and
two genuflections, one in which Peltason cites Schubert [Judicial Policy-
Making] and the other vice versa (citing Peltason [Federal Courts in the
Political Process]) (1972c: 74). An alternative but perhaps equally objective
test is found in the circumstance that at the end of the fifties, Peltason was
out in the field, conducting an empirical survey of the facts (his study of
Southern federal judges [1961]), while I was first off to Scandinavia for a
year, studying contemporary legal realism there, and then off to the Center
for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, trying to learn
something about behavioral science theory and methods.
D
The three articles that comprise the first part of this book all were writ-
ten as a direct response to events that arose out of the interrelationships
between law and political science as academic disciplines, reflecting in turn
the influence of the scenario, of which I have attempted to sketch a few
relevant fragments in the preceding paragraphs of this introduction. All
three essays are directly concerned with the relationship with law school
work that overlaps with that of political science, in particular regard to the
analysis of court processes and interactions. All three were written within a
period of less than two years, but in different locales (and therefore subject
to the impact of differing local academic environments). None of the three
is based directly upon empirical research of my own, and I never planned
to write any of them—each was, instead, written at the explicit request of
another person whom I respected, so that the impetus for the writing was
directly social, even if (and it is for others to judge) the product did turn
out to be intellectual. All three were published in law journals, which means
that none has probably been read by more than a very small minority of
either lawyers or political scientists—the former because not even a law
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professor can begin to keep up with the more than a hundred (counting
American alone) law journals published from quarterly to monthly, and the
latter because only political scientists working in the judicial process/be-
havior field would be likely to have checked the most directly relevant law
journals closely enough to have, perhaps, stumbled across even one of the
three essays. Hence part of my motivation in including them herein is to
make them accessible to a larger number of political scientists and political
science students, as well as to the much larger audience of other life scien-
tists who also are cut off from the law journals for the same reasons.
In several ways, the invocatory essay draws together several of the
themes that already have been stated. It began, in a sense, with the es-
tablishment of a newsletter by the Special Committee on Electronic Data
Retrieval of the American Bar Association (ABA): these were a small group
of law librarians, law professors, and practicing lawyers, who shared an
interest in the use of computers, most of them for purposes of the stor-
age and retrieval of legal data (e.g., Franz 1967), but some for purposes
of legal research (as distinguished from legal search). An early chairman
of the committee was Reed C. Lawlor, a Los Angeles patent lawyer whose
friendship with political scientist Fred Kort resulted in the production of
a considerable amount of experimentation, joining Boolean algebra with
computer technology in an attempt to specify the equations and variable
weights (under differing sets of empirical circumstances) that describe how
courts (and especially the United States Supreme Court) make decisions in
regard to particular subjects of public policy. Kort’s side of the work led
on to his statement of one of the more sophisticated mathematical models
of decision-making to appear in the research literature of political science
during the sixties (Kort 1963, 1966, 1973); while Lawlor attracted National
Science Foundation support for his activities, which had as one by-prod-
uct a provocative contribution to the theory of stare decisis (Lawlor 1967,
1969). The committee chose as its editor Layman Allen, then a young law
professor (and former student, as well as a colleague, of Harold Lasswell)
at Yale, whose interests (in a sense, paralleling Lawlor’s) lay in develop-
ing deontic logical models of legal arguments and norm structures. The
newsletter circulated (though rather irregularly) for several years under
the title of M.U.L.L. (Modern Uses of Logic in Law), and was just in the
process of becoming converted to a more regular quarterly (under the
sponsorship of the American Bar Center, with the new title of Jurimetrics
Journal, and after a publication hiatus of almost a year) at the time my
own article was published in it. I had previously published an article in the
second volume of M.U.L.L., and had been a subscriber and reader since its
establishment. So when the ABA scheduled its annual main convention in
Honolulu during the summer of 1967, at a time when I planned to be in res-
idence there anyhow, and when Reed Lawlor asked me to discuss political
science research for the Special Committee on Electronic Data Retrieval,
I accepted. But in view of some of the committee members’ overweening
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concentration (as it seemed to me) upon computer technology, as distin-
guished from what I considered to be the far more important matter of
the kind of theory being tested, it seemed to me to be most appropriate
to have my remarks focus upon the difference between what I understood
to be their concerns, and the typical interest of political scientists in the
use of computers—which with some few exceptions was primarily for com-
plex data processing in support of theory testing and building, rather than
data storage and retrieval, and the prediction of decisional outcomes. In
order to sharpen the point, consideration is given in the article to the
possibility—suggested (albeit with tongue in cheek) by Harold Lasswell
(1955)—that the Supreme Court of the United States be replaced by a com-
puter, and this leads to an examination of both the pros and cons of such a
sociotechnological innovation.
The second article was not prepared for oral delivery, but instead
was written in response to the invitation to contribute the Centennial
Essay to an issue of the volume commemorating the founding of the
George Washington University Law School. The inspiration for that re-
quest had come from a member of that university’s law faculty, Professor
Arthur Selwyn Miller, whose work I then had been reading and admir-
ing for over a dozen years, since his days as a faculty advisor to the
fledgling Journal of Public Law. Miller is something of a latter-day legal
realist himself, echoing in his work an iconoclasm that one finds in such
well-known New Deal lawyer-authors as A. A. Berle and Thurman Arnold.
Hence Miller has been what Jerome Frank called a “rule skeptic,” with
a strong orientation toward progressivism in matters of socioeconomic
policy and national programming. Clearly he was preeminent among a
very tiny number of law professors (or, at least, of contemporary legal
writers) who have made a special effort to familiarize themselves with
not only welfare economics, but also the judicial process-and-behavior
literature in political science, and his own prolific essays on political
economy reflected a much broader base, in both social science theory
and data, than the usual rehash of appellate court language that con-
tinues to adorn the pages of most law journals. Ironically, Miller was
already by the mid-sixties starting to mend his ideological fences, by
repudiating (1967) his then still-recent mesalliance with judicial behav-
ioralism (1965a), in response to the riptide of humanistic antiscientism
which (to paraphrase Cardozo [see p. 45 n]) does not pass professors by,
but sweeps them along in its currents together with other men. There
were some who chose to swim against the current (e.g., Kort 1972), and
I happened to be one of them (Schubert 1969f); but awareness of the
extent to which my relationship with Miller could no longer be symbiotic
came somewhat later.7 It is noteworthy however, that Miller’s movement
toward increasing radicalism—including both the explicit rejection of sci-
7. Cf. his article with D. S. Sastri (Miller and Sastri 1973) and my comment (Schubert 1973c).
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ence and the preoccupation with the instrumental use of policy analysis
to subserve goals of social reform—was strictly in phase with changes
that took place in the ideological line of the modal group of “judicial
process” workers (Peltason’s heirs at public law, whom I shall describe
as the “conventional” group in Part 2 of this book).
In view of the circumstance that Miller himself a few years earlier had
authored an article in which he had examined the place of public law in
American law school curricula at the end of the fifties, and incidentally had
urged a closer liaison between law school and political science work in ad-
judication processes, I thought it would be most appropriate to investigate
in the essay a most neglected subject: the history of public law within polit-
ical science, its relationship to the legal realist movement in American law
faculties, and the subsequent developments (from the early thirties onward)
in both law and political science. And given my opinion that public law in
political science was about as healthy as the Cardiff giant (cf. Somit and
Tanenhaus 1964: chap. 6, esp. Tables 7 and 8 at pp. 54 and 56; Dixon 1971;
Schubert 1972b), it is understandable that, once the outline of the subject
had been decided, the model of Dickens’ Christmas Carol came irresistibly
to mind as the most appropriate poetic paradigm in which to envelope my
essay. My doctoral dissertation had been written under a man who had him-
self been a student of Ernst Freund, and Freund was one of the founding
fathers, not only of American political science (having been the eleventh
president of APSA), but also of the subfield of administrative law (within
public law). Yet it was apparent, only a few years after I had left gradu-
ate school, that many aspects of public law (as it had been taught to me)
already were disappearing from political science curricula. This subjective
impression was confirmed, at least in regard to administrative law, by sur-
vey data (Schubert 1958b); and in regard to constitutional law, I have done
my share in helping to convert the observation into a self-fulfilling prophecy
(cf. Shapiro 1972a and Schubert 1973a).
But I had long been puzzled by the neglect visited by legal and political
science writers alike upon the question of the common roots and entangled
destinies of the two disciplines. Writers on jurisprudence generally have ig-
nored political science completely (as though they were afraid they might
catch something noxious).8 The eminent Julius Stone did unburden himself
of a polemical attack on behavioral jurisprudence (1964b), as the fruit of his
own fellowship experience at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behav-
ioral Sciences; but such activity on his part certainly was more affective
than effective in helping to satisfy the lament, which he expressed elsewhere
at about the same time (and indeed, through an alternative publication
outlet of the same university), over the dearth of awareness, as between
jurisprudes and “behavioural scientists specialising in law,” concerning the
8. There are three conspicuous exceptions: Ingersoll 1966; and Kawashima and Ishimura
1964; and Lloyd 1972.
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substance of their respective work.9 The only two books, authored by politi-
cal scientists and directly in point, that have appeared thus far since the end of
World War II have little or nothing to say concerning the impact of legal realism
upon political science. It happens that the first book I ever reviewed profession-
ally (1952b) was one of these two, and it ignores the subject; the other (Rumble
1968: 169–179) devoted a few pages to describing contemporary developments
in behavioral jurisprudence within political science, but it relies upon my own
previous assertions concerning the linkages (e.g., Schubert 1964a: 9–13). Evi-
dently the matter was wide open for closer and more sustained scrutiny; and that
is what I endeavored to provide in the ensuing essay.
The third article was a by-product of the Shambaugh Conference on Judicial
Research which was convened at the University of Iowa in October 1967. The
purpose of this conference was to bring together well over a score of persons
active in judicial research, most of whom were American political scientists but
who included also a few law professors from Canada and Japan, plus several
American law professors, social scientists from disciplines other than political
science, and political scientists identified primarily with subfields other than ju-
dicial research. Among the conferees was Richard D. Schwartz, then a professor
of sociology at Northwestern University and the incumbent editor of Law and
Society Review (and now the first nonlawyer to serve as dean of a major Ameri-
can law school, the State University of New York at Buffalo); and at a breakfast
meeting he asked me to prepare for his journal an article that would discuss
recent theoretical developments in political science research into judicial behav-
ior, and also to attempt to forecast the trend of research developments in the
field during the short-run future of the succeeding five to ten years. By now, of
course, the near end of that future already is at hand, so the door is open for any
knowledgeable reader to determine his own verdict on the merits of the ques-
tion of the goodness of fit between the future that I describe in the essay and the
present that we can observe. Although I am not above auditing my own earlier
predictions, when the latter have been so quantified and the test of the stated hy-
9. In reporting a survey of “Innovators in the Study of the Legal Process,” Alfred de Grazia and
Charles L. Ruttenberg had suggested, as a possible explanation for the unexpectedly low level of
familiarity with each other’s work on the part of those deemed to be innovators, that “Perhaps they
are like the avant garde poets who read Shakespeare but not each other” (1963: 50). Evidently the
suggestion struck a responsive chord in Stone, who intruded a contextually quite gratuitous foot-
note to misquote the above remark—Professor Stone brands as a “conclusion” what the authors
of the survey were themselves careful to state as an hypothesis, since their evidence was inferen-
tial rather than empirical—and to raise the query “whether many of [the 120 leading ‘innovators’
(Stone’s quotes) in work on law as a behavioral science] could name a commonly-recognized ‘Shake-
speare’ [also Stone’s quotes] for law” (Stone 1966b: 26n. 53a). In the survey, Professor Stone is
listed neither among the 10 persons deemed “most innovative” nor among the 120 persons who
were considered by the authors of the survey to be leading innovators; instead his name appears
in a list of 134 “other innovators.” Nevertheless, his preeminence in the field of jurisprudence is
beyond cavil, and one can only wonder whom he may possibly have had in mind as an appropriate
Shakespeare for law? It is, after all, his question.
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potheses is so objective that analyst bias would be exceptionally difficult (either
to engineer or to allege), the predictions of the present essay are stated in such
verbal terms that I think it unseemly for me to say more than that I can reread
the closing pages of the essay without experiencing future shock. To the extent
that I feel disappointment, it is because the rate of change, in the directions indi-
cated, has been slower than I had thought probable, certainly slower than I had
hoped.
The original title of this essay for Law and Society Review, at the time I
wrote it, was “Human Jurisprudence,” a concept that I initially had thought
appropriate not only because it invokes the remembrance of one of the great
manifestos of legal realism (Jerome Frank 1931), but also, and more impor-
tantly, because it directly analogizes the study of legal theory to the perspec-
tive provided by the life sciences. Such an ascription would of course have
been a signpost pointing to the future, whereas “behavioral jurisprudence”
would be much more a road map charting the present. For reasons that no
longer impress me as very persuasive, I decided that it would be more useful,
at that time and in the context of the particular forum in which the essay was
scheduled to appear, to invoke a title that would be unambiguously descriptive
of its contents. But I’m glad that I made the change, because the prescrip-
tiveness of “human jurisprudence” strikes just the tone that I now want to
symbolize the present collection of my past work: not a record of what hap-
pens to have been done, but rather an invitation to join in the construction of
a theoretical edifice that remains to be built.
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1
On a
Computer Court
A major influence upon modern political science has been the impact of
the behavioral sciences, particularly that of sociology and social psychology.
The resulting mode of political inquiry has become known as the political
behavior approach (Eulau 1963, 1966). The behavioral movement has re-
cast into a more scientific posture the work in all fields of political science,
but the timing and the rate of change have been different for the various
subfields of the discipline (Kirkpatrick 1962). Those to cling longest to the
work ways of the past were the subfields of political philosophy and public
law, and their intransigence is reflected in the judgment of their colleagues
who rated philosophy and law as the subfields of least importance to the
contemporary study of political science (Somit and Tanenhaus 1964). But
the yeast of behavioralism already had begun to ferment within the oak
staves of traditional doctrine encapsulating—from each other, as well as
from the rest of political science—both political philosophy and public law;
and, at least within public law, the reformulation of research orientations
(Schubert 1967b, 1967a) to bring them into line with the rest of the disci-
pline already was well advanced at the time of the survey upon which the
ratings were based (Schubert 1963f).
It is possible to denote seeds of potential change that had been sown at
an earlier time, but these were cast upon barren ground and remained in-
fertile: The time was not yet ripe for other political scientists to respond to
This chapter was originally published, in slightly different form, as “The Importance of Com-
puter Technology to Political Science Research in Judicial Behavior” in Jurimetrics Journal 8
(March 1968): 56–63. It was earlier presented in oral form at a meeting of the American Bar
Association’s Special Committee on Electronic Data Retrieval on August 6, 1967, in Honolulu,
Hawaii.
the intellectual leadership of such isolated pioneers as Charles Grove Haines
(1922) and Rodney Mott (Mott et al. 1933; Mott 1936). (At about the same
time, lawyers were turning equally deaf ears to the importunities of Underhill
Moore [Moore and Sussman 1932], Edward S. Robinson [1935], and Felix Co-
hen [1935].) It was not until after World War II and the appearance of C.
Herman Pritchett’s book on The Roosevelt Court (1948),1 to be followed af-
ter a gap of more than half-a-dozen years by Jack W. Peltason’s monograph
on the federal judiciary (1955), that public lawyers, at least among political
scientists, began to pay serious attention to theoretical and methodological
approaches to the study of courts and judges (alternative to the traditional
approaches of history, law, and philosophy) such as those provided by small-
group and interest-group analyses—the former proposed by Pritchett, the
latter by Peltason. Even then, sustained and continuous activity by several per-
sons, working largely independently but simultaneously, did not begin until
about the time that Joseph Tanenhaus ventured a preliminary report to the
profession on his exploratory quantitative studies under a grant from the
Social Science Research Council (1956).2 Although to some extent parallel
modifications have been on-going in the orientations of some law professors to
the study of law (Mayo and Jones 1964; Miller 1965a), the impression gained
by an outside observer is that behavioral jurisprudence has thus far secured
a much more tenuous beachhead in the law schools than in political science
faculties (Schubert 1966a; and cf. Ralph Brown 1963).
Readers of this journal are quite familiar with the uses of computer
technology for such purposes as document retrieval and the logical analysis
of norm concepts in the content analysis of such documents; here I wish
to direct attention, instead, to the quite different function that computers
have been assigned by political scientists working in the field of behavioral
jurisprudence. The difference is symbolized, indeed, by the disparate de-
grees of sympathy and antipathy that lawyers and political scientists have
shown toward describing their respective activities by invoking the rubric
which distinguishes this journal: “jurimetrics.” Jurimetrics is a lawyers’ con-
cept, and the reasons which explain why it has come into vogue in the legal,
but not in the political science, profession lie deep in the roots of the two
academic cultures. Put most simply and perhaps crudely, lawyers are (at
least some of them) interested in the measurement of law; political scien-
tists are not. Public law scholars in political science do not want to measure
anything; they are practitioners of an ancient and long-respected art. Judi-
cial process proponents want to describe court systems, within the context
of larger political, social, and economic systems. As long, at least, as quan-
tification remains relatively unsophisticated and does not begin to dominate
the structure of the design of empirical research projects (to say nothing
1. Subtitled: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 1937–1947.
2. The changes that occurred in the following decades can conveniently be observed by com-
paring two articles of mine: 1958e and 1968a.
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of the design of research theory and hypotheses), advocates of the process
approach are amenable to the use of measurement in the study of politics.
But for these political scientists law is policy, and they are much more inter-
ested in trying to measure its sources and consequences in the form of social
action than in measuring policy as substantive content. This leaves the polit-
ical behavioralists, and, although they are the most supportive (among these
three subgroups of political scientists) to the systematic measurement of
data, they reject the implication that the study of law is the object of their
inquiry. They want to understand human behavior in the context of sociopo-
litical situations that involve the professional roles of lawyers, and they are
much more interested in understanding such political behavior at the level
of systematic theory than they are in the empirical description—even the
quantified description—of the same class of events. For students of behavio-
ral jurisprudence, “jurimetrics” gives too much emphasis to law (instead of
to behavior) and to measurement (instead of theory).
In political science of the modern, computerized era—that is to say, in
the political science of the last half-dozen years or so—computer technology
has been important primarily as an instrument to facilitate the processing and
statistical analysis of data for purposes of research. The primary function of
computers has been to generate new information, rather than to try to keep
track of (or even to gain access to) information that previously has been or
currently is being produced. I do not wish to seem to demean the latter task
or its intrinsic importance, particularly in relation to the very different profes-
sional needs and practices of law from those of political science; rather, I seek
to make the point that the use of computers in political science to facilitate
research is a quite different emphasis than appears to have been given to the
use of computers thus far in legal work.
The difference in the instrumental application of computers in behavio-
ral jurisprudence reflects the characteristics of the behavioral approach as
a scientific mode of inquiry: (1) The behavioral approach seeks to develop
systematic theoretical knowledge, relying upon the use of controlled meth-
ods of observation, operationalized concepts, and the testing of hypotheses
that are formulated before data are collected. Such an approach stands in
contradistinction to one, frequently found in legal research, in which data
are collected and analyzed and then post hoc “explanations” offered as pos-
sible interpretations of the relationships denoted (e.g., Nagel 1963b). (2)
The behavioral approach is interdisciplinary and cross-cultural in the scope
of its affiliations and interests; it seeks to focus upon and to understand what
is common in human action, transactions, and interaction across both space
and time. Adjudicative behavior is of interest precisely to the extent that the
understanding of judiciallike decision-making can contribute to more gen-
eral decision-making theory. But this stands in sharp contrast to the typically
intradisciplinary, subcultural (viz., parochial) focus of legal method. As Lo-
evinger (1966–1967) has pointed out, “the dialectic method of law stands
as a formal, flexible, clinical approach to data gathering which is suitable
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to the investigation of individual cases but not to group or mass phenom-
ena.” (3) The behavioral approach is empirical in its orientation toward data;
the reality in which it is interested consists of the consensual perceptions
of equivalently trained observers. Its “facts,” that is to say, are functions
of interpersonal agreement. Legal study, to the contrary, seems much less
concerned with what people do than with statements about what some per-
sons think others ought to do, and the “facts” with which it is concerned are
determined (also contrariwise) as functions of interpersonal disagreement.
But it is nonetheless in its emphasis upon empiricism (as distinguished from
ideational sources of data) that the behavioral approach finds its closest link
with legal method, in the research activities of American legal realists. (4)
The behavioral approach seeks to quantify its data: The goal is theoreti-
cal statements in mathematical form, and empirical statements in statistical
form. (There is no need to belabor the point that the legal approach shares
neither of these aspirations.) The reason for quantification has been well ex-
pressed by an English historian of physical science:
I shall distinguish first between quantified procedures and quantified concepts,
and I shall take a quantified procedure in science to be one that aims at measure-
ment, that is, any procedure that assigns numbers in a scale. To be complete such a
procedure must comprise both mathematical techniques for operating the scale theo-
retically and measuring techniques for using it to explore the world. Technology need
contain little more than procedures of these kinds, which provide for the measure-
ments and calculations with which it is concerned. But most sciences aim beyond
these at providing explanations by means of a system of theory. So a quantified sci-
ence, as distinct from quantified technology, comprises not only quantified procedures
but also quantified explanatory concepts, each applicable to the other within a the-
oretical system. The development of a science then takes place through a dialogue
between its theories and its procedures, the former offering an exploration of the ex-
pected world through predictions and explanations made by means of the technical
procedures, and the latter confronting these theoretical expectations with the test of
quantified data.
A dialogue of this kind requires that both sides should speak the same language.
We are so familiar with the close and precise adaptation of conceptual and procedural
language to each other in modern physics that it may come as a surprise to find au-
thentic scientific systems in which this is not the case. Yet we do not have to look very
far to find examples. In the contemporary social sciences and in psychology, they are
notorious. We do not have to go many decades back in the history of modern genetics
to find a very incomplete and interrupted dialogue between theories and procedures.
Somewhat earlier, in the eighteenth century, we find the same situation in chemistry.
The main interest of medieval physics in this context seems to me to be that it pro-
vides the earliest example in the development of modern science in which we can
study the state of affairs when the dialogue between concepts and procedures was
incomplete or absent. Then we can study the difference it made when clear and ex-
act communication was opened, as it was in the seventeenth century. (Crombie 1961,
emphasis added)
The implication of the last sentence—that the birth of Albert Einstein re-
mained two full centuries away, as a possible (but certainly improbable)
event of a remote and uncertain future, even at that point in space and time
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when isomorphism developed between physical theory and method—may
bring some slight comfort to the many contemporary observers who purport
to experience dismay (and whether with positive or with negative affect
matters not) over the crudity of current efforts at quantification in the be-
havioral sciences. As Felix Cohen remarked, apropos of earlier attempts to
infuse the behavioral approach into legal pedagogy, “The first steps taken
are clumsy and evoke smiles of sympathy or roars of laughter from critics of
diverse temperaments. The will to walk persists.” (1935: 834.)
The computer is a useful instrument in research in behavioral jurispru-
dence because (1) It facilitates inquiry by reducing time costs, thus freeing
the investigator for less routine operations. (Anyone who has ever cal-
culated a forty variable correlation matrix, which contains 380 different
coefficients, by means of pencil and paper, or with a mechanically operated
desk machine—to say nothing of factor analyzing such a matrix using the
same procedures—will readily appreciate the difference that computers
make in this regard.) (2) It makes feasible many types of inquiry that
could not have been undertaken heretofore. (See, e.g., Somit, Tanenhaus,
and Wilke 1960, a recent study of judicial sentencing behavior, in which
a set of samples of about 150,000 cases was drawn from a universe of
about 2,000,000 cases.) (3) And it provides, increasingly, better data (in
the sense of empirical observations that have been transformed by the
researcher into quantified units suitable for measurement manipulations
[Coombs 1964: chap. 1]) by making feasible a greatly expanded reper-
toire of alternative modes of analysis. (Antecomputer factor analysis, for
example, was largely confined to such relatively gross and approximate
procedures as those of the complete centroid method, with relatively few
iterations and—usually—graphical procedures for rotation; principal axes
factor analysis is now routine, coupled with extensive iterations, a choice
among various orthogonal and oblique rotational solutions, and with a plot-
ting subroutine for whatever output one may choose to specify.)
But the computer, notwithstanding these manifest advantages, is not
without its limitations: Among others, the computer (1) asks no questions;
(2) provides no answers; and (3) solves no problems—and it is a disservice
to scientific inquiry to tout the contrary, as some enthusiasts appear to have
done. In order to explore the implications of these dogmatically phrased
assertions, I should like to discuss an example gleaned from an article
by Harold Lasswell (1955) published at the very threshhold of the tech-
nological revolution that the computer was to bring to behavioral (along
with other branches of) science. Lasswell might seem to be an appropriate
choice as a spokesman, for present purposes, because he is one of the
world’s most renowned behavioral scientists, he is one of the few political
scientists who is a member of a faculty of law, and in this article he
explicitly is concerned with the development of creativity in a society whose
decision-making processes will become increasingly computerized. Lasswell
explicitly raises the question, in this article, that the time might soon be at
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hand when engineers could construct a “bench of judicial robots”—as Pro-
fessor Lasswell, characteristically, chose to express it, juxtaposing a novel
idea with rather old-fashioned words. The Supreme Court, he suggested
(1955: 398), might be an appropriate object for simulation (cf. Schubert
1972f). But after a suitable period of experimentation, during which the
engineering problems would be resolved and techniques perfected, the com-
munity would be given an opportunity “to develop a rational consensus on
whether to use [the judicial] robots or not”—that is, by the substitution of a
computer for the Supreme Court.
From the standpoint of 1967 the proposal seems to be at least as anti-
quarian as it is audacious. Note that the metaphor “bench of judicial robots”
is, like its second substantive (robots), explicitly anthropomorphic. But robots
had had it, even by 1955, except for purposes of entertainment (as in Bob
Cummings’ “living doll”) rather than for those of science. Manlike machines
were displaced by less romantic, but more functional, models. As one of the
few persons who, at least thus far, has been disanthropomorphized and deper-
sonalized into the image of a computer (by an evidently unhappy and doubtless
misanthropic lawyer [Rosenthal 1966]), I feel that it is important to make a
clear distinction between people and computers. I have argued elsewhere, in-
cidentally, my opinion that both humans and computers have their strong and
weak points and that, in a more rational world, efforts would be made so to
structure decision-making processes—including research investigations—as to
maximize the strengths and to minimize the weaknesses of both computers
and their human masters (Schubert 1963e).
It may well be that, as one student of Professor Lasswell’s work has sug-
gested to me, in this particular passage of the article the author was merely
indulging some free association, and with tongue in cheek at that. Doubtless
this is the correct interpretation to make, particularly in view of the evident
thrust of the rest of the article in favor of creativity rather than of automation.
Even so, there are plenty of others around who would not blink at the pro-
posal, once the technology can be demonstrated to be adequate to the task.
I intend, therefore, to take the proposition at face value and to consider the
question of feasibility from a more extensive and behavioral point of view that
goes beyond its merely engineering and technological aspects.
It certainly seems correct that already, within a dozen years from Lass-
well’s writing, a fairly good start could be made in the programming of judicial
values (Lawlor 1963; Schubert 1965c). (Note that I do not speak of “feeding”
these values to the computer, as appears to be the mode of discourse among
many contemporary commentators who write about interactions between hu-
mans and machines. For one thing, my sensitive nature is appalled by the
thought of pushing too far the explicit analogizing of computers to the alimen-
tary canal; for another, my reading several years ago of a particularly seminal
article by Martin Landau (1961) has made me skeptical of the degree of intel-
lectual clarity that is to be gained by the maladroit mixing of biological with
mechanical metaphors.
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Certainly there are available on today’s market several different comput-
ers that would probably be adequate to store and manipulate the requisite
data. Merely documentary judicial inputs such as briefs and records of lower
court proceedings evidently could be filed, with the Computer Court, as tapes.
Oral argument should present not much greater challenge than does the pro-
gramming of teaching machines. And a number of advantages can readily be
visualized.
“Delay in the court,” a problem which lawyers have found troublesome
(at a somewhat earlier time, in the Supreme Court itself; and in most
metropolitan civil courts today), could be cut to the few hours that might
be required for “turnaround time” in making as many runs as might be
necessary—and usually only one would suffice—to produce a decision in a
case. Actual decision time would be a few seconds, or a few minutes at
the most, and quite possibly microseconds would suffice for the more rou-
tine decisions as the technology improves. And the Computer Court could
tremendously expand the number of decisions made on the merits each
year; perhaps there would need to be only a single decision day per year
instead of the twenty to twenty-five now required, and the costs of adminis-
tration for the Court could be greatly reduced. The Computer Court could,
for example, be completely installed in a small room, approximately of the
same dimensions as the one in the basement of the old Capitol building
in which the Supreme Court used to meet under John Marshall, thus ob-
viating the need for maintaining the opulent Marble Palace which houses
the present Court and its (superfluous) accouterments. Contrary to the pre-
sent state of uncertainty which is associated with at least a portion of the
work of the Court, predictability of the decisions of the Computer Court
would be perfect—for those privy to the programming and data inputs, of
course. Not least, the decision-making procedure that was established for
the Computer Court could readily be generalized, with only slight technical
modifications, to include at the very least all of the United States Courts
of Appeals as well as the Supreme Court, with consequent bigger savings
in the federal budgetary allocations for both judicial personnel and house-
keeping (since the same machine could probably be required to perform
this somewhat expanded task, and without moving it from whatever base-
ment room had been established for its domicile).
Regrettably, there would be a few undesirable side effects, most of
which can be traced directly to the Computer Court’s inhuman character-
istics. Indeed, a mere listing of some of the most obvious of these side
effects impels one to the conclusion that, however successful the Computer
Court might be from a legal point of view, the results of its establishment
would be politically disastrous. To start with some that seem relatively in-
nocuous, we might note that however unphotogenic one might deem the
annual opening-of-the-term portraits of the Supreme Court that are pub-
lished in the New York Times, ones of the Computer Court are not likely to
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be perceived by most readers to be more attractive. After all, the Computer
Court cannot be constructed as a mobile, and there may be a psychological
problem for readers who discover that, as they grow older, the Court will
be—and will seem to be—newer in its aspect (as technological innovation
proceeds) with each year that passes. The Computer Court’s decision-mak-
ing process will not enjoy the prestige of the present Court; it seems
improbable that thousands of high school seniors from throughout the land
will pass—even in single file—through the basement door to observe the
quiet efficiency of the console in operation. The Computer Court, even if
constructed in literal accord with Lasswell’s metaphor, would lack some-
thing in the way of human interest for the masses: it could, of course,
produce articles on the side for popular magazines, and be listed on the
letterheads of various organizations, but on the other hand it would never
climb mountains, or fall off horses, or take brides. It will be easy to provide
for minority interest representation in the Computer Court, but difficult to
symbolize that this has been done, as some think may be the effect of the
visible presence of justices such as Thurgood Marshall, Abe Fortas, and
William Brennan.
The Computer Court would have limited value as a scapegoat target in
political billboard advertizing, although its impeachment and removal from of-
fice would remain open as a technical possibility. The odds are, however, that
most Computer Courts would be replaced on grounds of technological, rather
than of political, obsolescence. We could not expect the Computer Court to
be creative, in its political leadership role, in quite the same way in which
we sometimes observe creativity in the decision-making of the present jus-
tices—in the redefining of situations, that is to say, by the posing of novel
alternative possibilities for the solution of conflicts—but the programming of
random components in the decision-making process (which would be easy to
do) might to some degree function as a substitute for human creativity (Aubert
1959; Lasswell 1955: 387, 398). At the same time, such a modification would
entail the disadvantage of precluding perfect prediction of the Court’s de-
cisional outcomes. It might well be argued, however, that the achievement
of perfect predictability would be not an unmitigated virtue, but rather the
Computer Court’s greatest flaw, and that the greatest defect of a tested and
perfected bench of judicial robots, whether in anthropomorphic or in the more
conventional console form, would be its lack of uncertainty. Indeed, our ex-
amination of the implications of the Computer Court suggests the hypothesis
that the ideal of certainty in law is tolerable only in the context of an empirical
world in which forces inducing change are so manifold that the attainment of
the goal is never possible.
Lasswell concluded his article with the suggestion that the development
of an expanded computer technology posed no threat to, but rather increased
the need for, human creativity. The events of the past dozen years in political
science research in behavioral jurisprudence certainly confirm his expecta-
tions.
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2
The Future
of Public Law
To speak of the future of “public law” is to trace out the denouement of
an anachronism. To be sure, public law has a past, one that extends back
almost a century in American intellectual life among academicians and law-
yers. But it has an uninteresting present, and no future—or at least, not as
public law. Under these circumstances, an attempt at postdiction seems to
be a psychological (as well as a chronological) prerequisite to any sensi-
ble venture in prediction about the subject. Those who are ignorant of the
past are not doomed to repeat it; they are just doomed to ignorance. That
fate alone, however, is sad enough to justify some inquiry into the develop-
mental relationship between public law and the professions of law and of
political science, before we turn to the Ghosts of Public Law Present and of
Public Law Yet to Come.
I. THE GHOST OF PUBLIC LAW PAST
In the Beginning
Public law is not even an American legal concept, let alone one derived
from the common law; it was imported from the Continent in the postbellum
decades when the German university circuit was having its maximal impact
upon the men who were to shape and direct higher education in the United
Reprinted in slightly different form from The George Washington Law Review 34 (May
1966): 593–614. Copyright 1966 The George Washington Law Review. This article was the Cen-
tennial Essay of the issue.
States during the closing decades of the nineteenth century.1 The alien con-
cept soon was engrafted upon American legal and political thinking; no doubt
one encouraging factor was the widespread emphasis, following the crisis of
the Civil War, upon instruction in the Constitution in order to inculcate civic
loyalty. Indeed, there is deep irony in the circumstance that it was exaggerated
demands for super civic loyalty during the First World War—by then directed,
however, against Germanophiles—which catalyzed Charles A. Beard’s resigna-
tion from the first department of public law to be established at any American
university.2 As John Millet has pointed out, the first great change in that
department (since its establishment in 1887) had come with Beard’s appoint-
ment in 1907.3
The establishment of the Department of Public Law and Jurisprudence at
Columbia University represented a stage of structural differentiation in an in-
stitutional movement that began with the appointment of John W. Burgess to
the faculty of law at Columbia in 1876. Although the incumbent (and longtime)
dean of Columbia’s then quasi-proprietary School of Law, Theodore Dwight, had
abetted the recruitment of Burgess from Amherst, the two men soon became,
and remained, in fundamental disagreement over precisely this question: What
is the appropriate place of public law instruction in a law school curriculum?
Dwight wanted to, and did, provide what was for its day considered to be suc-
cessful and high quality vocational training. Burgess wanted to add a compulsory
third year to the law school curriculum, to consist of public law courses taught
by men who were trained broadly in the social sciences.4 Eventually, both were
forced to accept a compromise that neither wanted: Columbia established in
1880 a School of Political Science, which in another decade differentiated into
the nuclei of several social science departments, including Public Law and Ju-
risprudence. Throughout the period 1890–1910, the four leading members of
that department were Burgess, Munroe Smith, Frank Goodnow, and John Bassett
Moore. All held joint appointments in the law school, and their courses were
taken both by law students and candidates for advanced degrees in political
science. Indeed, “Students in the School of Law could take courses in consti-
tutional law, administrative law, Roman law, and international law only from
professors of the Department of Public Law and Jurisprudence” (Hoxie 1955:
258, emphasis added). These courses, plus those in criminal law and in com-
1. Austin (1869) 1: 69–71 and 2: 770–787; Walz 1934. Neither Austin (of course) nor Walz,
a German professor at the University of Marburg, had anything to say about public law in the
United States. In sharp contrast on just about all relevant dimensions stands the article on Amer-
ican public law by David Danelski, a political scientist at Yale University (1968).
2. Beard resigned for reasons of academic freedom; there was never any question raised
concerning his personal support of the war. See Hoxie 1955: 106–108.
3. As quoted by Hoxie (1955: 264).
4. “The two-year course offered in the School of Law furnished an excellent preparation for the
practice of private law; but, in Burgess’ eyes, as a school of jurisprudence, to impart knowledge and
develop law as a science based on history, economics, sociology, ethics, and philosophy, it left much
to be desired” (Haddow 1939: 178–179n. 25). Cf. Hoxie 1955: 8–19.
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parative jurisprudence, were intended to supplement the courses in history and
economics offered by other departments of the School of Political Science “and
‘to give with them a complete system of political science’” (Haddow 1939: 181n.
32). In practice, however, it was Dwight’s rather than Burgess’ vision that be-
came a reality. Burgess, Smith, Goodnow, and Moore all were broad-gauged
lawyers,5 who continued throughout their careers to teach law to law students
and at the same time had a hand—and particularly was this true of Burgess and
Goodnow—in shaping the early development of political science as a discipline.
But their successors were increasingly oriented toward law rather than toward
political science; and after the pioneers had retired and the department in 1926
had moved out of the law school building (Kent Hall) into quarters of its own, the
identification of “public law” with the law faculty became so complete that only
a handful of law professors (Joseph Chamberlain, Hyde, Jessup) offered a few
courses (legislation and international law) that were taken by political science
as well as by law students.6 In 1937, at least a generation after the change in
symbols would have been appropriate, the name of the department was changed
from Public Law and Comparative Jurisprudence to Public Law and Government;
and it remains the latter today, a designation that evidently pays more respect to
sentiment than to accurate description.
The golden years at Columbia spawned the Golden Age of American
public law. But to encounter a vigorous discipline of public law of which we
might speak (with at least metaphorical validity) as being in the prime of in-
tellectual life, it is necessary to go back that far, a full half century, to the
era before World War I. In 1905, Frank Goodnow became the first president
of the American Political Science Association (APSA). Various of his students
5. The first three had followed graduation from Amherst with Continental tours before going
to Columbia. Burgess studied law for a year (1867–1868); Smith and Goodnow received LL.B. de-
grees from Columbia Law School; and Moore, though self-taught in law, was the first great American
scholar of international law and a judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The
Hague.
6. As noted above, Dwight had helped to recruit Burgess, but the two men divided over the ques-
tion of how broad legal education should be just as soon as they came to understand the extent of
the difference in their ideological standpoints. Similarly, and although Goodnow had been his student
and early protege, Burgess refused upon his retirement to recommend Goodnow as Burgess’ own suc-
cessor to the Ruggles Professorship of Political Science and Constitutional Law, and explicitly on the
ground that Goodnow was much too deeply oriented toward political science, and too little toward law
and constitutional history. As a consequence, Goodnow resigned in 1914 to become president of Johns
Hopkins University, and he was replaced by one of his own students, Howard Lee McBain, whose de-
grees and training and interests lay in political science rather than in law. However,
McBain’s death in 1936 had interrupted the unbroken [sic] line of instruction in constitutional
law which had started with Burgess sixty years before. An adequate replacement could not be
found, and thereafter for nearly twenty years the Department relied for instruction in this field
upon Noel T. Downing, Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law in the School of
Law, who was given a seat in the Faculty of Political Science in 1937. We may note here that in
the same year Walter Gellhorn of the Law School faculty also became a member of the Faculty
of Political Science in recognition of his work in providing instruction in administrative law for
graduate students. (Hoxie 1955: 278).
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attained equal eminence as public lawyers and as political scientists: of par-
ticular note were Ernst Freund, Thomas Reed Powell, and Charles Grove
Haines.7 Each of these three emphasized in his own work a different aspect
of the subject; but collectively (administrative law, constitutional law, consti-
tutional history) they replicated the central understanding of public law, as
this was taught in the department in which they were trained.
Of course, Columbia was not the only university in which political science
developed out of an extension of public law; nor did political science by any
means derive exclusively from public law (Haddow 1939). But it is the public
law strand that is of crucial relevance to the present paper; and it was at Co-
lumbia that the most important roles were being played in the parturition of
political science from public law. As an example of a parallel but alternative
form of development, let us consider briefly what happened at a neighbor-
ing university. Perhaps the most important fact of relevance is that Princeton
does not now have, and never has had, a law school. For reasons that are no
doubt equally as sentimental as Columbia’s, but with ties to a very different
pattern of remembrance, Princeton continues to call its department of politi-
cal science a Department of Politics. The courses offered by the department in
1890–1892 were in two groups: the first group, taught by Professor of History
and Political Science William Sloane, included Constitutional and Political His-
tory of England, American Political History, History of Political Theories, and
Contrasts between Parliamentary and Congressional Governments; the second
group, taught by Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Economy Woodrow
Wilson, included Public Law, General Jurisprudence, American Constitutional
Law, International Law, Administration, and English Common Law (Haddow
1939: 184–185). Wilson, it may be recalled, had failed to complete the law
course at the University of Virginia and had failed in his subsequent attempt
to practice law in Atlanta, before undertaking the Ph.D. in history and politi-
cal science, which he completed at Johns Hopkins in 1886. His early writings,
ranging from his precocious essay on public administration (1887) through
7. Ernst Freund received his Ph.D. from Columbia in 1897 and taught there as acting pro-
fessor of administrative law during 1892–1894, after which he taught until 1932 on the Chicago
political science and law faculties. Freund stepped into the shoes of his former colleague, Good-
now, as the leading American scholar of administrative law; and he served as the association’s
eleventh president in 1915. Thomas Reed Powell (Harvard, LL.B., 1904; Columbia, Ph.D., 1913),
the thirty-second president of the APSA in 1937, was sufficiently more under the aegis of Burgess
to be appointed to the Ruggles Professorship that was denied to Goodnow. He taught constitu-
tional law at Columbia from 1907 to 1925, and then returned to his alma mater to become lion
of the Harvard law faculty until his retirement in 1949—and in saying this I am not unmindful of
the fox who served as his sometime colleague for over a dozen years. (For an appraisal of the lat-
ter’s nonacademic contributions to publiclaw, see Grant 1965.) Charles Grove Haines (Columbia,
Ph.D., 1909), a leading constitutional historian, was the thirty-fourth president of the associa-
tion; he taught as a political scientist at several colleges and universities during the two decades
before he joined the political science department of U.C.L.A. in 1925, where he remained until
his death in 1948. [See Kraines 1974.]
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his dissertation on the legislative process (1885) and his pioneering text on
comparative government (1889), all are characterized not by legalism, but
rather by the evolutionary Zeitgeist of the natural science that predomi-
nated during his era. He taught courses in public law, but to students of
social science rather than to students of law. A professor of jurisprudence
teaching nonlaw students in a department of politics acts in a very different
environment than does a professor of public law teaching law and nonlaw
students together in a school of law; and this was the difference between
Princeton and Columbia in the 1890s. Before leaving Princeton, Wilson re-
cruited his successor to the McCormick Professorship of Jurisprudence and
Politics, Edward S. Corwin, who for most of the forty years after his appoint-
ment in 1905 was recognized as the doyen of American public law scholars.
Corwin’s Ph.D. was in history, from the University of Pennsylvania. He fol-
lowed Wilson (after some two decades) in the association presidency, but
he confined the interests of the McCormick chair within much more recog-
nizably “public law” bounds than had Wilson, specializing in the political
history of the Supreme Court and of the Presidency and in constitutional
law (Mason and Garvey 1964). In 1947, Corwin was succeeded, in the
McCormick Chair of Jurisprudence, by Alpheus Thomas Mason (Princeton,
Ph.D., 1923), who had been first Corwin’s student and then for over twenty
years his colleague. Mason has been a leading contributor to judicial bi-
ography (Brandeis, Stone, and Taft), as well as to constitutional law and
the modern political history of the Supreme Court.8 Clearly, public law at
Princeton developed along very different lines than did public law at Co-
lumbia, where it was captured back by the law school to become basically
certain courses in a program of vocational education. Princeton, having no
law school to compete (or to deal) with, has instead continued the Wilsonian
tradition of public law defined as political history and political jurispru-
dence.
These sketches of the public law orientations of two leading American
universities are relevant to our present concern primarily because of the
extent to which they symbolize more general movements in law and in polit-
ical science during the past half century. In the days of Burgess, Goodnow,
and Wilson, law and political science and history were joined in a secular
trinity—and their unity was called public law. That unity was already gone
by 1914 (with Burgess retired, Goodnow moving up to academic adminis-
tration, and Wilson having accepted an even higher calling); and the second
generation of public law scholars (Freund, Corwin, Haines, Powell) showed
a distinct proclivity for greater specialization than had the pioneers. It is
true that a third generation (William Anderson, Minnesota; Robert Cush-
man, Cornell; Carl Swisher, Johns Hopkins; and Mason) already has reached
the age of retirement; but however distinguished they are—and they are
distinguished—personally, the definition of public law that they symbol-
8. See the Festchrift volume (Dietze 1965) presented to Mason by his students.
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ize constitutes “the last long-drawn-out gasp of a dying tradition.”9 All of
these men (but most particularly the pioneers) were great public lawyers,
renowned as scholars, as teachers, and as counselors on the public policy
issues that loomed large during their lifetime. It is literally true that none
has emerged to fill their shoes, in either the political science or the law
faculties of the present generation; and one does not need to be a romantic
to observe that we shall know their like no more. The reason is not hard
to discover. Great men tend to be attracted to great causes (or vice versa);
and public law has not been a noble subject, let alone a great one, in the
academic hierarchy of values for a long time.
In the Law Schools
In considering what has become of public law during the past half century,
there are really two quite distinct histories to relate because law and political
science followed separate and diverging paths after the brief but spectacular
period of their partnership around the turn of the century. It is true that men
trained as lawyers continued to teach political science courses (and especially
such “public law” courses as constitutional law and administrative law), some-
times with, but often without, any formal training in political science. Usually,
those with both a law degree and a doctorate in political science chose to teach
as members of political science faculties; and usually such persons acquired
their law degree first. Sometimes practicing lawyers, resident in or near a col-
lege community, taught as adjunct lecturers political science courses in public
law; and sometimes law faculty members offered such courses as a “service” for
political science departments—even such a major university (and political sci-
ence department) as Yale gave up such a practice only a couple of years ago. But
these arrangements by no means should be interpreted to have implied a happy
symbiosis between law and political science. Quite to the contrary, to the extent
such arrangements existed, they meant that the political science departments
had completely given up the attempt to integrate the “public law” subfield with
the rest of the discipline; and having concluded that the subjects concerned were
exotic and technical, these departments handled the problem by fencing off the
public law work in isolation from what otherwise constituted their major con-
cerns and interests. And the almost unthinkable reciprocal relationship—that is,
to expose law students to instruction by a person who had had no formal legal so-
cialization, but merely a political science background—simply never happened.
Or rather, it happened only once,10 in the very special case of Harold Lasswell’s
cooptation by the Yale Law School at the end of World War II.
9. Paraphrasing Felix Cohen’s characterization of the American Law Institute’s attempts
to “restate” the principles of the common law (Cohen 1935: 833).
10. Conceivably twice, if one were to include Walter F. Dodd, who preceded Lasswell at Yale. It
was expected that Dodd, who was a Chicago Ph.D. in political science, would broaden the content
of instruction due to his interest in comparative government. Instead, Dodd became the very model
of a modern legal gentleman.
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The history of public law instruction in the law schools, since about 1915,
is pretty much a story of rigor mortis. The law casebook already had achieved
its classic form in the decade following that date; and one need only compare,
say, the fifth with the first edition of Dodd (1932) to observe how miniscule have
been the subsequent changes in conceptualization and in approach during the
thirties, forties, and fifties. Constitutional law is still today defined, by the typical
law casebook on the subject, as an extensive form of the constitutional document,
with practically all of the extension consisting of some writer’s (either the edi-
tor’s or that of some essayist whom he reprints) impressions of what the justices
of the Supreme Court say in their opinions about the Constitution.11 Administra-
tive law remains basically what it was in Freund’s day: the study of how courts
keep administrators in line; and what some legal writers like Davis call “infor-
mal” administrative processes reflect a crude mode of structural description that
had become passé in political science study of public administration over a gen-
eration ago.12 (The principal reason why the legal experts on administrative law
failed to recognize how stodgy their “new” revelations were,13 one suspects, is
that they could not or would not read the modern research literature in such sub-
jects as decision-making theory.)14 It seems almost certain that a better political
education might have helped to avert some of the more egregious blunders, such
as those (revealed in his own confessional) of one professor of administrative law
who made the mistake of attempting to put his theories to the test of personal
practice (Schwartz 1959).
Let us consider the advice of a research manual on the subject how to in-
vestigate an aspect of administrative law:
When you, a student, wish to become familiar with some phase of
governmental activity—let us take, as an example, the Interstate Commerce
Commission—you have two ways of acquiring this information. The first and most
generally used method is to go to the library and secure a book which describes
the Interstate Commerce Commission. This plan has several serious defects. For
11. See Schwartz 1963. “If the Supreme Court Justices are the high priesthood of the Constitu-
tion, then the Founding Fathers … are the saints in America’s hagiology. We worship our ancestors as
well as the Document. The analogy can be pressed further. The law clerks of the Justices are the altar
boys; the lawyers are the acolytes. Law professors (and some political scientists) are the Pharisees.
The high priests, aided by the altar boys, produce exegesis on the sacred text. The acolytes pay re-
spectful court (though sometimes not so respectful), while the Pharisees grind out heavily footnoted
critiques of what the high priests have said.” (Miller 1965c: 155).
12. See, e.g., Lepawsky 1949; Simon 1947; Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson 1950.
13. See Davis 1953. Cf. the subsequent exchange of views between Davis, Gellhorn, and various
political scientists (Symposium 1954a, b). Evidently Professor Davis did not profit much from that
encounter, as was exemplified by the subsequent exchange: Grundstein 1964; and Davis 1964.
14. See, e.g. March 1965; March & Simon 1958; Presthus 1962; Simon 1957. Cf. Wasserman &
Silander 1958; 1964; Thomas Jefferson Center for Studies in Political Economy 1964. There have al-
ways been a few exceptions, such as Walter Gellhorn and Ralph Fuchs, among law school professors
of administrative law, just as men like John P. Frank and Arthur Selwyn Miller would be exceptions
to an equivalent generalization about law school instruction in constitutional law, and Thomas A.
Cowan would be for jurisprudence.
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one thing, it limits your investigations to those matters about which books have been writ-
ten. Then, too, the value of knowledge acquired in this manner is limited by the author’s
familiarity with his subject, his ability to express his thoughts, his desire to tell the truth,
and the number of words his publisher would accept.
The other way to secure information about the Interstate Commerce Commission
is more cumbersome, but much more accurate and complete. It involves finding
and reading the act which created the Commission, and examining the debates
in Congress concerning it. It also includes an inspection of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission’s rulings and reports, and of court decisions affecting its powers.
These laws, administrative reports, legislative debates, judicial decisions, and similar
documents are known as original sources, because they form the basis for all investi-
gations. (Macdonald 1928: 1–2)
The above advice comes from a political scientist, but almost forty years ago.
It is almost inconceivable that any political scientist who could obtain a pro-
fessional audience would recommend such an approach today; and if he did so
before an audience of political science graduate students at any of our leading
universities, he would almost certainly be laughed at.15 But this is the very
approach that law school instruction in administrative law still considers, ap-
parently, to be highly relevant to the acquisition of important knowledge about
the subject. To be perfectly blunt, legal research remains today at the primi-
tive level of development, as a science, that generally characterized political
science one or two generations ago. By and large, legal method is no more
in phase with modern science than it was in the days of Austin, or (better)
Aquinas, or (best) Aristotle, all of the talk about “legal science” and computer-
ized methods of retrieving legal data to the contrary notwithstanding.
It might be objected that the legal realists of the 1920s and 1930s
were—as many of them claimed to be—legal scientists; but such an objection
misconceives both the requirements of science and the accomplishments of
the realists. Science requires both theoretical models from which operational-
ized hypotheses can be inferred and methods for testing such hypotheses with
data derived from empirical observations. The realists, with rare exceptions,
such as Walter Wheeler Cook and Underhill Moore, had neither theory nor
methods; Llewellynisms about “getting at” facts and “polishing them” until
they “shone” were nothing more than advocacy of barefoot empiricism. The
contribution of the realists lay in the mood they created, through the attention
attracted by the iconoclastic essays that several of them wrote (e.g., Jerome
Frank 1930, 1931; Cohen 1935; Loevinger 1949); but lacking the technical
training to do scientific research, they rarely followed through with the sub-
stantive findings to confirm (or refute) their often provocative, and sometimes
brilliant, cues and hunches (Rumble 1964, 1965; Hayakawa 1964). Most of
their work remained at the verbal level, in perfect harmony with the traditions
of the profession of which they were a part.
15. See the series of Handbooks for Research in Political Behavior which Northwestern Uni-
versity Press began to publish in 1963, including Backstrom and Hirsch 1963; Janda 1965; and
North 1963. Cf. Rummell 1970.
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If we disregard, for the moment, the few political scientists (such as
Haines and Powell) who sometimes have been classified among the realists,
none of them was primarily interested, in any event, in the reform of public law
sectors of law school instruction. On the contrary, the law professors who were
identified with public law teaching were proponents of the sociological school
of jurisprudence; and it seems appropriate, for present purposes, to accept the
distinction between sociological and realist approaches that spokesmen for
both insisted upon. Sociological jurisprudence really made no pretense of be-
ing either sociological or scientific.16 Pound and Frankfurter taught and wrote
prolifically about public law subjects, but their approach was that of the hu-
manities, not that of modern social science.
One aspect of the realist movement does merit our attention, however.
This is the endeavor, and most conspicuously that of Robert M. Hutchins dur-
ing his brief dynamic tenure as dean of the Yale Law School about forty years
ago, to reform the law school curriculum by deliberately building into the fac-
ulty the kinds of competencies which, though essential if law were to become
a science, were so conspicuously lacking in the training of law school teach-
ers.17 Thus, if law professors were not trained as economists, sociologists,
statisticians, historians, psychologists, or as political scientists, the way to get
such points of view into the law curriculum would be to employ such nonlegal
specialists to teach in the law school. How this idea would work in practice
we can only guess, because it has never really been tried. When only one or
two such persons are put into a group of a score or more of law professors,
the principal effect of interaction seems to be for the majority to socialize
the minority, so that (as one experienced observer has put it) the “outsiders”
become even more legalistic, in their point of view and approach, than are
the law professors. But even such token integration of social scientists with
law faculties has taken place in only a very few instances. To take an almost
contemporary example, we might consider the widely publicized program in
“Law and Behavioral Sciences” at the University of Chicago Law School. The
1964–1965 catalogue lists three social scientists (out of a regular faculty of
twenty-seven)—two economists plus Hans Zeisel; and Zeisel, consistently with
the view expressed above, has been just as rabid a critic of behavioral re-
search as his legally educated public law colleague Kurland (which is saying a
great deal). The behaviorally trained and oriented persons “on the law faculty”
(such as Strodtbeck and Haggard) have been used as consultants or adjunct
research personnel in conjunction with such specific research program areas
as the jury project and the arbitration project. And the published results of
such cooperative research, although of high interest, are to date of such lim-
ited quantity that their impact upon the legal profession, in the context of the
copious outpourings of traditional legal writing, remains small.
16. Ehrlich is a possible exception. See Cahill 1952: chap. 4.
17. Much of the information in this paragraph is based upon, or was confirmed in, an inter-
view with Robert M. Hutchins, February 23, 1966.
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The underlying problem with which Hutchins was concerned is, of
course, the same issue that divided Dwight and Burgess fifty years before
Hutchins became dean at Yale: Should training in the law be vocational or
educational? One possible solution is to broaden the law curriculum; and in
this endeavor Columbia probably went much further (relatively speaking)
from the 1870s to World War I than did Yale from the 1920s to World War
II. The other solution is to give up on the law school and establish a sepa-
rate school of jurisprudence; and having failed to reach the first solution at
Yale, Hutchins tried at Chicago to achieve the second alternative, but again
without success. In fact, John W. Burgess’ School of Political Science proba-
bly went as far in the direction of such a jurisprudence school as American
experience has produced.
If it had proved possible for any of several things to have happened that
did not—if the realists had produced something other than discrete facts and
unverified hypotheses; if law professors themselves could have been educated
as social scientists; or if social scientists could have been imported into law
teaching and research in sufficiently large numbers that it might have been
possible for them to have established, and to have maintained, some intellec-
tual beachheads—then it is not inconceivable that law school instruction in
public law courses also might have been affected and forced as it were out of
the tried and true familiar grooves in which it has been running for so many
years. Lacking such rejuvenation from the larger setting in which it was pro-
duced, law school public law has remained in the same old rut.
In Political Science
While law school instruction in public law remained in rigor mortis after
the Burgesses and the Goodnows passed from the teaching scene, political
science work in public law went through a long period of degeneration, in
which the gains achieved by the preeminence of a few outstanding figures
(e.g., Corwin, Cushman, Haines, Mason, and Swisher) could not compensate
for the bland mediocrity that characterized the field generally. Most of the
persons who taught political science courses in public law during the long
period spanned by the two world wars either were themselves lawyers or
(which was often worse) were imitators of lawyers whose pedagogical ideal
was the stereotyped law-school-type course in public law, of which they offered
a watered-down version for political science undergraduate students. Such
persons did little research, and what little they did was in the legal tradition
and was published mostly in law rather than in political science journals. No
wonder other political scientists ignored their public law colleagues. No won-
der that, as recently as 1951, an official committee of the APSA, which had
been appointed at the end of World War II to take stock, complained:
We recommend that the profession work toward a balanced development
of the field and avoid the recurring enthusiasms which lead to new emphases
and the neglect of old ones. We are convinced, for example, that political
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science suffered untold harm during the period in which public law was ne-
glected. Any outsider [lawyers? who else?] knows that public law is [NB: read
“ought to be”] one of the strongest areas of proficiency within the field of
political science; we overlooked this fact for a while, and we are only now
taking steps to restore the balance. (Dimock 1951: 128–129)
No one knows what specific steps to restore the balance Chairman Dimock and
his distinguished colleagues on the committee may have had in mind, for they
suggested none, and the restorative step that took place in fact—the emer-
gence of the behavioral approach toward the study of public law (cf. Schubert
1963d: 1–3)—was doubtless the last kind of emphasis that they would have fa-
vored.18
It is not that the political science profession was unaware of the source
of the problem. Almost two decades earlier, William Anderson had focused at-
tention directly upon the effects and the implication of relying upon lawyers to
teach political science courses:
To what extent does the training now offered in American law schools for the
LL.B. degree fit men for their responsibilities as teachers and research workers in
the field of political science? … It is not “law in action” or the work of the courts
that is studied, but rather the law as crystallized in rules and principles by judges in
the highest courts who have rendered past decisions…. The stress in legal education
must of necessity be on the preparation of private practitioners, men who are to
advise and represent private clients. The purpose is not to train teachers of govern-
ment. It is probably not unfair to say, therefore, that in most cases even the courses
in public law are taught with an eye to the needs of the practicing lawyer. Every-
one at all familiar with the subject knows how differently courses in constitutional
law, for example, can be taught by teachers having essentially different purposes.
Because most constitutional cases encountered in private practice will deal with the
due process, contract, and commerce clauses, it is not surprising to find these topics
strongly emphasized in law school courses in constitutional law. One teaching the
same subject for the purpose of giving students some understanding of government
will give emphasis to very different topics.
Other dangers in an exclusively legal education for the teacher of political
science are not hard to indicate. The main subjects of a modern political science
curriculum are not covered in the law school…. There is danger, also, in a merely ju-
ristic approach to the study of government. All the new developments in the study of
politics are going toward the enrichment and the rounding-out of the whole subject,
not toward the narrowing of it, and particularly not toward further emphasis upon
the legal phases. History, economics, psychology, anthropology, and other disciplines
offer just as interesting and fruitful approaches to the study of politics as does the
law.
There is, finally, another characteristic of the present-day training of legal
practitioners which makes it inadequate as a training for research and teaching
in political science. The most commonly employed research method is that of
18. It hardly seems possible today that an official committee of the American Political
Science Association could have produced, a scant fifteen years ago, a report of over three
hundred pages in length which barely mentions, and devotes less than a single page to,
the discussion of political behavior, but Dimock’s group succeeded in such a tour de force.
See Dimock 1951: 139.
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looking up cases in point, finding the principles embedded in them, and testing these prin-
ciples by logic or “dialectic techniques.” There is no time or demand for training in other
research methods, no urge to apply statistical and other techniques to the materials, and
often no desire to go outside of the decisions in order to test the results of the operation
of legal rules on social or economic life, or on personal conduct. (1934: 740–742)
Except in some very small departments that were run or dominated by senior
men whose training was exclusively as lawyers, the lawyers-acting-as-political
scientists always were a minority in any department, and the trend definitely
was toward reducing their influence in relation to the rest of political science.
There was an important difference between political science and law school
faculties, however: the former were relatively much more heterogeneous, and
consequently much less effective agencies for socializing lawyers to conform
with the diversified group norms of political science, than were the law schools
for remolding social scientists into law professors.
Over the course of the past half century, there have been five surveys of
the political science profession, four official ones (in 1914, 1923, 1930, and
1950) and one unofficial inquest in 1964. We can trace the decline of public
law through the eyes of these observers of and for the profession.
The first audit was made by a committee whose chairman was Charles
Grove Haines. We have already noted Haines’ preeminence in and identifi-
cation with the field of public law; and it seems plausible to assume that, if his
committee’s report showed any bias, it was in favor of public law. The Haines
committee classified the political science of its day into four fields, saying that
one of these consisted of
the work offered in constitutional law, administrative law, commercial law, Roman
law, elements of law, and jurisprudence. These courses mark the dividing line
where the technical phases of law merge into the realm of public policy, ethics
and custom and thus constitute a common vicinage in which the departments of
law and political science are equally interested and involved. It is in this latter
type of course that the question arises whether they should not be offered primar-
ily as law courses to which advanced undergraduates might be admitted instead of
being offered under departments of political science and admitting law students.
(Haines 1915: 372)
Among the list of “queries relative to instruction” that the committee thought
it important to raise for discussion were several concerning “law and law
courses,” including the following:
Should Roman law and jurisprudence be offered in the law school rather than in the
college department?
Should administrative law and administrative methods be given more attention in el-
ementary courses?
Is it necessary to omit judicial procedure from elementary courses because of the
technical nature of the subject?
Is it advisable to offer commercial law in undergraduate departments of political sci-
ence? (Haines 1915: 373)
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By and large, the report provides substantial evidence of the continuing im-
portance of public law at that time; but it also contains many suggestions
that public law already was on the way out as a core area of political sci-
ence (Haines 1915: 356–357, 366, 371–373). In the polite phrasing of the
Dimock Committee, who began their own report with a commentary upon
their predecessors, “The [Haines] report also shows the extent to which po-
litical science ha[d] broadened since outgrowing its public law beginnings
inherited from Europe and since the establishment of the Association in
1906” (Dimock 1951: 8).
Although less than a decade separated the Haines report from that au-
thored primarily by Charles E. Merriam in 1923, at least two generations
of professional work and development lie between the two conceptions of
political science articulated in them. The Haines report was a workmanlike
description of the then status quo, while the Merriam committee filed a state-
ment of aspirations so deviant from the reality of the political science of the
early twenties that, after the lapse of forty-three years, his ideals finally were
beginning to describe the activities of a substantial minority of the profession.
But Merriam’s report, according to Dimock, did correctly predict the course
along which future development of the profession lay:
it pointed out how the field of political science, which originally consisted almost
entirely of constitutional and administrative law, had developed new emphases and
new absorptive capacities extending in the direction of economics, statistics, his-
tory, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and geography…. In his list often prominent
trends Merriam drew particular attention to the tendency toward more general use
of quantitative measurement of political phenomena and toward a decided empha-
sis on social psychology as one of the foundations of an expanding political science.
(1951: 9)
Merriam’s euphoric prelude to the study of political behavior, however sound
strategically as a prescription, seems in retrospect to have been some-
what—thirty years somewhat—premature as a description. For the same rea-
son, his report’s intimations of the demise of public law doubtless were slightly
exaggerated. But the committee’s recommendations did lead directly to the
establishment of the Social Science Research Council and hence to the cre-
ation of an institutional godfather to foster the growth and development of the
interdisciplinary definition of political science that Merriam anticipated.
By 1930, in sharp contrast to the Haines report of 1914, there was not
only no separate report on public law (as there were for other fields deemed
by the Reed committee to be of greater importance to the profession); the
Reed report (1930) gave little or no consideration to public law as a subject
that might be of interest to political scientists. Twenty years later, however,
the Dimock report recognized public law as one-and-a-half units of the “eight
subdivisions of political science,” which it considered to be a listing “appar-
ently still acceptable to the profession” (1951: xv, 18–19). Constitutional and
administrative law were together counted as one unit; and international law
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as half of another unit described as international law and relations. The Di-
mock committee also noted that to obtain a “background for law” was the
primary reason why students (according to the professorial respondents who
spoke for their students) major in political science, although the committee
felt it important to point out that “law has long been a steppingstone to poli-
tics” (1951: 27–28).
The most recent report, in 1964, suggests that, if it remains true that the
primary reason why students major in political science is to prepare for law
school, such prelaw students must be making their preparations in some other
fields of political science than public law. Analysis of the 1961 Biographical Di-
rectory of the American Political Science Association showed that, for the six
fields recognized by this classification of almost all of the members of the as-
sociation, public law was listed by far the fewest persons as a field in which
they worked (Somit and Tanenhaus 1964: 54). Similarly, of seven fields that
were listed in a questionnaire administered to a sample of several hundred po-
litical scientists, public law was chosen by the fewest respondents as the field
with which they identified themselves (Somit and Tanenhaus 1964: 52). An-
other question used in the same survey asked the respondents to identify the
fields of political science in which they felt that the most and the least signifi-
cant work was being done. The replies showed that
In the esteem of the profession, comparative government and general politics almost
tie for first place. International relations, public administration, and American government
and politics constitute, in that order, a middle group. The bottom of the ranking almost
replicates the top, with public law and political [philosophy] running neck and neck—if this
is the appropriate figure of speech—for last place.
A comparison of the actual scores earned by the several fields is even more revealing.
The ratio of favorable to unfavorable mentions for the two top fields runs about 300 per
cent higher than for the middle group and almost 1,000 per cent greater than for public
law. (Somit and Tanenhaus 1964: 55–56, and cf. p. 58)
It might seem surprising, in view of the glum perceptions one receives
from the 1923 and 1930 reports about the foreboding lack of any future for
public law as a field of political science, that public law was still around to
be counted as a field in 1951 and 1964—even though the best the Dimock
committee could say about public law was to lament its neglect, and Somit
and Tanenhaus were compelled to report how low its status is compared to
other fields. There is, however, a ready explanation why public law survived
into the second half of the twentieth century instead of quietly disappear-
ing from view in the midst of the doldrums into which it had drifted. In
the first place, administrative law has (as we shall note below) disappeared
from political science curricula; and international law seems rapidly to be
following suit. What saved constitutional law from a similar fate, more than
anything else, was the constitutional crisis of 1937 and the high degree of
public attention generated in the Nine Old Men, the Court-packing episode,
and its aftermath. No political scientist could really ignore the key role
of the Supreme Court as a national policy-maker, particularly in regard to
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such sweeping issues as racial integration during the fifties and legislative
reapportionment during the sixties. Political scientists and their students
may not have been terribly interested in constitutional law, but they were
vitally interested in constitutional politics; and the most convenient way to
work consideration of such issues into existing curricula was through the
available courses in constitutional law. Not only that: the neglected politi-
cal science professors of constitutional law were thereby enabled to enjoy
the heady experience of being looked up to as experts of a kind, about a
subject of some importance. So the United States Supreme Court gave the
political scientist public lawyers a shot in the arm, which kept them in busi-
ness for another decade or so, until about a dozen years ago when other
and more exciting approaches to the study of adjudicatory decision-mak-
ing processes began to command the attention of the profession. In recent
years, the burden of work increasingly has shifted from traditional public
law work to the conventional and behavioral orientations, for reasons to
which we shall now turn.
II. THE GHOST OF PUBLIC LAW PRESENT
The contemporary understanding of public law is, understandably, not
the same in law schools as in political science departments. There would
be agreement upon constitutional law and (in principle, if not in prac-
tice) upon international law and administrative law. Beyond that, political
scientists probably would concede the relevance of constitutional history;
but those who did so would doubtless also assume that this is a major
aspect of the subject subsumed by the course in constitutional law. The
law schools, however, entertain a much more expansive notion concerning
the metes and bounds of public law as a field. One law school, for ex-
ample, listed twenty-one courses in the subgroup of public law, including
one or more of the following “public law” subjects: administrative law, civil
liberties and civil rights, constitutional law, criminal law and procedure,
federal jurisdiction, federal taxation, international economic relations, in-
ternational law, labor relations and law, military law, regulated industries,
urban renewal, social legislation, state and local government, trade regula-
tion, workmen’s compensation, and world law. An examination of the course
descriptions typically associated, in law school catalogues, with courses
such as these suggests two conclusions. In general, it appears that the ar-
guments stated over a century ago by Austin, against the usefulness of a
conceptual distinction between public law and private law, continue to be
pertinent. Turning more particularly to the “core” courses in constitutional,
international, and administrative law, one would have to conclude that, if
any important changes have occurred during the past half century in the
type of content and in the approach used in teaching these courses, it is
impossible to infer this from their description in the catalogues.
In the light of the discussion to follow, concerning political science devel-
opments, it is relevant to note that what is both literally unprecedented and
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exceptionally rare, in contemporary law school curricula, are behaviorally ori-
ented courses such as Thomas A. Cowan’s seminar in Decision Theory at
Rutgers or the University of Denver College of Law’s seminar in Law and Be-
havioral Sciences.
The only public law course that is really standard in political science
curricula today is constitutional law. Frequently, such courses include a
substantial amount of material on constitutional history, particularly as sup-
plementary reading. Otherwise, constitutional history courses, as such, are
taught by history departments and rarely by political scientists. Interna-
tional law courses are taught in the larger colleges and universities, but
they are less common than the constitutional law courses; and it seems
probable that courses in international law are less common today than
they were twenty years ago. Courses in international law are almost al-
ways taught by different persons from those who teach constitutional law;
and one apparent reason why the international law course is less popular
today is that political scientists identified with the international relations
field have shown increasing interest, during the past couple of decades, in
international organization and international politics; courses in these lat-
ter subjects have tended to take the place of the earlier emphasis upon
international law. Administrative law has largely disappeared from the con-
temporary political science curriculum. A survey conducted in the late
fifties (Schubert 1958b) showed that many departments that had formerly
offered the course during the thirties and forties had dropped it because of
“lack of student interest” (i.e., low enrollments); even those departments
that continued to teach it did so to small classes averaging (then) thirteen
to fourteen students and in almost half of the instances on an alternate
year basis. Political scientists who taught the course identified more with
public administration than with public law. There is no evidence to suggest
that the status of administrative law within political science has improved
in recent years. In the political science department with which the author
of this article is affiliated, for instance, a full-year course in administrative
law was taught every year a decade ago. It is now a one-quarter course
that has been offered once in the last five years. None of the political sci-
entists in the department is interested in teaching the course; and so far
as is known, no students wish to take the course in any event. Certainly
none has protested its being dropped or asked that it be offered again. To
some extent, courses in governmental regulation, in regulatory administra-
tion, and in public policy have been substituted for the former courses in
administrative law. But a much more important development has been the
increasing tendency to introduce into the political science curriculum new
courses in the judicial process, in the Supreme Court as a political (or as
a decision-making) institution, and in judicial behavior. Usually, these new
courses coexist with courses that continue to be called constitutional law,
although it seems likely that the content of the latter is changing, too, in
response to the same influences that are responsible for the establishment
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of the new courses. In fact, political science now has reached a stage of de-
velopment such that, in considering political change, the focus of attention
is upon policy analysis in the context of decision-making groups (includ-
ing, but by no means typified by, the Supreme Court and other clusters of
judges and the persons with whom they interact in the functioning of ad-
judicative processes [Schubert 1965d]). To get discussion focused on the
Constitution as a central element in political change today, it is necessary
to leave the mainstream of significant academic inquiry and enter the arena
of political debate about current issues of public policy. It is doubtless true,
however, that in many departments of political science, the courses in con-
stitutional law are still taught by persons who use their classes as havens
for constitutional doctrinal disputation. But the point is that, yesterday,
there was no alternative to such an approach, while today there is (Schu-
bert 1965d: 158–165; 1967a; 1967b; 1967d).
The older alternative, in the context of modern political science, is the
traditional approach that remains committed to the study of constitutional
law, doctrine, and history. The public law men in political science are uninter-
ested in either systematic theory, quantitative methods of research, statistical
measurement of data, or observations of courts and judges—pursuits that
would make it possible to study adjudication in the context of the larger
political process. Their own intellectual roots lie in the humanities rather
than in the social or behavioral sciences; the cognate academic disciplines
with which they empathize are law, history, and philosophy. The focus of in-
quiry in their writing—because it is not research in any rigorous or scientific
sense—consists of generalizations about verbal statements in normative form:
i.e., law. Persons of this orientation probably predominate, if we take as our
reference group all political science teachers of courses about courts, judges,
and adjudication, but they are clearly a minority among the active leaders of
the field today.
Beginning about the early fifties, the approach that is now conven-
tional in political science emerged, initially as a protest against and as a
critique of the formalism, the lack of realism, and the lack of relevance (to
the rest of political science) of the traditional approach and its scholarly
fruits. Conventionalists seek to emphasize courts as political institutions
and judges as political actors, enmeshed in the same struggle among con-
flicting group interests as are legislators, administrators, presidents, ward
heelers, and so forth (Jacob and Vines 1962; Peltason 1955). Courts (i.e.,
institutional groups) are the proper object of inquiry; but courts are viewed
as being in the midst of the political process, and it is insisted that courts
should be studied in the same manner that political scientists investi-
gate other political phenomena (Shapiro 1964b, 1965). The conventional
approach articulates with the social sciences rather than with the humani-
ties; the cognate academic disciplines that are perceived to be closest are
sociology, economics, and, of course, the rest of political science. Conven-
tional spokesmen exhort their colleagues to give up their ivory towers in
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favor of excursions out into the field where political life can be observed
in action and described. Scorn is manifested with perfect impartiality for
traditional and behavioral rivals alike, since both are perceived as clois-
tered visionaries who prefer to dally (with their law reports and quill pens,
or cumulative scales and Hollerith punch cards, respectively) rather than
to enlist in the phalanxes of the group struggle. These enthusiasts for po-
litical jurisprudence now constitute the plurality position in the field that
they would rather call “the judicial process” than public law; and since
their point of view is isomorphic with that which predominates in political
science generally today, it seems appropriate to call this the conventional
approach.
The behavioral approach to the field is scarcely a decade old. It is true
that Pritchett’s pioneering work, and major contribution, came in the forties
(Pritchett 1941, 1942, 1943a, 1943b, 1945a, 1945b, 1946, 1948); but it was
the middle fifties before other and younger men began to argue in behalf of
a point of view that Pritchett himself (by this time) no longer was interested
in asserting (Tanenhaus 1956; Kort 1957; Schubert 1958e). The most relevant
cognate fields are social psychology, psychology, biology, anthropology, and
statistics. Behavioralists focus their inquiry upon judges (rather than upon
“courts” or “law”) as well as upon lawyers and other actors in socially defined
roles as decision-makers; and although behavioralism accepts both the norms
of the traditional approach and the empirical observations of political action
of the conventional approach, it is interested in these instrumentally, as data
that may help to contribute to more valid, more reliable, and more widely
applicable generalizations about how and why humans act as they do when
cast in adjudicatory roles (Eulau 1963). Judicial behavioralists remain a mi-
nority voice; but already they include about the same number of persons from
among the leaders of the field as do the traditionalists. Two considerations
have tended to make the behavioral approach much more influential than the
traditional has been in shaping the development of the profession in recent
years. The behavioral position is much closer to the conventional than either is
to the traditional one, and this has tended to make the traditional spokesmen
appear to be aligned in dissent against a majority of their (visible) colleagues,
at convention panels, in the professional journals, and in the books in the
field published by political scientists during the sixties. Moreover, the behav-
ioralists, due perhaps in part to their age and in part to their (necessarily)
iconoclastic writing, have pre-empted considerably more than equal time in
the forums of the discipline in recent years.
Naturally, the behavioral work provoked rebuttal from both the traditional
(Roche 1958; Berns 1963) and the conventional (Becker 1964; Shapiro 1964a)
camps. There has even begun what might be described as the preface to a
serious debate about the possible contribution that the behavioral approach
might make to the study of law by lawyers. Some of the lawyers who have
entered this discussion have argued the affimative (Hayakawa 1964; Mayo
and Jones 1964; Miller 1965a; Nagel 1965), others, the negative (Blawie and
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Blawie 1965; Stone 1964b; Weiner 1962); and at least one first-round bout has
occurred, in regard to administrative law.19 Perhaps the present article will
contribute, in some modest way, to the acceleration of the debate of the more
general question.
III. THE GHOST OF PUBLIC LAW YET TO COME
Public law, in political science, is a rapidly dying tradition; and it seems
certain that, no matter what happens in the law schools, students of politics in-
creasingly are going to study the judicial process and judicial behavior instead
of constitutional doctrine. It is by no means certain, at this time, what direc-
tion legal study will choose, although the prognosis cannot be very favorable,
if one is to judge in the light of the governing precedents of the past half-dozen
decades. On the other hand, if we answer the question:
Are these the shadows of the things that Will be,
or,
are they the shadows of things that May be, only?
then it is clear that the shape of the future of public law, in American law
schools, remains undetermined. The outcome may well depend upon what
kind of a job the universities do in educating the next generation of law school
professors, before they ever get to law school.
One or two explicit suggestions seem pertinent to both the theme of
this essay and the setting in which it appears. Law schools might well con-
sider the important contribution that could be made if instruction in public
law were given up, by leaping a generation ahead and remodeling in the
image of a school of political jurisprudence and legal behavior. Yale, with
the help of a very few persons, still projects the image of legal realism
and political liberalism that reflect the impetus of Hutchins’ deanship forty
years ago; the Yale Law School dared to be different. If law schools were
to adopt the dynamic orientation proposed, it would surely be controver-
sial, but controversial because they had assumed a role of leadership in
the never-ending task of bringing legal research and pedagogy into closer
correspondence with an even more dynamic criterion: the human life that
supplies both the sole and the sufficient justification for the existence of
law schools and legal study.
Groundwork already has been laid for the kind of studies that most fruit-
fully could be followed up in the program for teaching and research in the
kind of school of political jurisprudence and legal behavior that has been
19. See Davis 1964 and Grundstein 1964. In regard to this exchange between Grundstein
and Davis, it is hardly surprising to discover that the professor of public administration is on the
opposite side of the dispute from the professor of law; or that the latter, having by far the larger
interest vested in the status quo of law school pedagogy in his subject, should have elected to
defend his stake.
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proposed.20 It is only in the context of an instructional program that maxi-
mizes the integration of legal study with the social and behavioral sciences
that there is any justification for a law school being a part of a great uni-
versity.21 Vocational training in how to practice law, or how to pass bar
examinations, has no need for a university—nor does the university either
need, or have an excuse for supporting, that kind of law school.
Understandably many law schools will continue to exploit their proximity to
the various law-making processes. Very properly, however, this kind of emphasis
should not exclude—and has not excluded—concern for the even broader study
of law in transnational and cross-cultural terms; and one assumes that courses
in comparative law, Russian law, and Chinese law are intended to contribute to
the realization of these broader goals. It happens, however, that the most inter-
esting kinds of developments, from the point of view of building a comparative
dimension into the work of the proposed schools of political jurisprudence and
legal behavior, have not necessarily taken place in the countries that have been,
or that are, most significant from the very different point of view of international
politics. Neither in France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, nor the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China is there any interesting work going on that contributes to
the scientific study of law-making processes. But there is in several of the Scan-
dinavian countries (Aubert et al 1952; Eckhoff and Jacobson 1960; Aubert 1963a;
Eckhoff 1960, 1965; Torgersen 1963; Blegvad 1966) and in Japan (Kawashima
and Ishimara 1964; Hayakawa 1962; Kawashima 1968b); and increasing atten-
tion should be given to the comparative political sociology of law, as schools
reshape their own programs. The kind of law school program that has been pro-
posed would seek for leadership on a global, as well as on a national, basis.
It should not be assumed, however, that, even if these proposals should
successfully be carried into effect, a solution will have been found for the
problem that has provided the theme of this essay. Society has need for both
generalists and technicians, and no doubt there is a need for both legal gen-
eralists and legal technicians. At the present time, when so much of legal
education seems (from a modern perspective) to be so narrowly vocational,
there is little room for doubt that the direction in which blows for change
20. Arthur Selwyn Miller of the Graduate School of Public Law of the George Washington
University Law School has attempted to relate legal study to the social studies generally, and
to political science in particular, in a series of articles that range deeply into the interrelation-
ships between legal study and the political process, the other social sciences, and behavioral
research in law. See particularly the following articles by Professor Miller: 1958, 1962, 1963,
1964, 1965b, 1965c; Miller and Howell 1960.
21. See Miller 1965a. His earlier article (1960) argues persuasively in behalf of a major theme
of the present essay—a closer rapprochement between legal and political science study of adju-
dication processes. A casual reader might perceive contradiction between Miller’s advocacy of an
expanded concept of public law (which would pretty much gobble up private law in the process of
being extended conceptually) and the emphasis of the present essay upon doing away with public
law as a concept. It is submitted, however, that the disagreement is at a semantic rather than at a
substantive level, and relates to strategies rather than to goals. [Postscript: I was wrong about this:
cf. Miller and Sastri 1973, and Schubert 1973c]
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ought to be struck is toward the education of more, and of more general, gen-
eralists. This will not solve the conflict between the humanities and behavioral
science because these are points on a shifting continuum in a moving field of
space; and hence the gap—and the tension—between them always is relative
to time and place. Nonetheless, the time may be ripe for quite a bit more of
Burgess, and a little less of Dwight. If that were to happen, the public law yet
to come, for American law schools, might be considerably less ghastly.
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3
Behavioral
Jurisprudence
For over two thousand years, the science of law has been a dull esoteric
subject, with traditional logic its long suit and syllogism its ace in the hole
(Pound 1932). The erudite tended to empathize with Socrates, who could de-
fine justice only in metaphysical terms, and to scorn the occasional iconoclasts
in the Thrasymachian tradition, who would have operationalized the concept
of justice on the basis of political interrelationships of power and influence.
Throughout these two millennia, jurisprudence was a “science” only in the
sense of “moral science,” that is to say, it was a branch of philosophy. It was
concerned with prescriptive norms rather than with descriptions of human ac-
tion, and therefore it dealt almost exclusively with ideals for, rather than with
the realities of, the behavior of judges, lawyers, jurors, and litigants.
The emergence of social science during the nineteenth century was both
the precursor and the cause of significant changes in the “scientific” com-
ponent of legal science. Particularly under the influence of the historical
approach then dominating legal study on the Continent, and the indigenous
American pragmatic philosophy developed by Charles S. Peirce and William
James, a new approach—now termed legal realism—arose in the latter part of
the century. The pioneers of the realist approach included the Boston lawyer-
scholar Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and political scientist Frank Goodnow at
Columbia. At its height during the twenties and early thirties the realist move-
ment included primarily law professors, along with a few lawyers, political
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scientists, and historians; associated with the movement are such names as
Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, Underhill Moore, Robert Maynard Hutchins,
Charles Grove Haines, and Felix S. Cohen.
The realist movement in American jurisprudence, like the social science of
its day, was highly pragmatic and empirical in its orientation, but not overly bur-
dened or concerned with the development of systematic theory.1 More recently,
as one of the fruits of the shift in emphasis (and in scope) that is involved in
the difference between social and behavioral science, a really new approach to
jurisprudence has evolved (Handy and Kurtz 1964). In political science, where
much of the new work has been done, it has tended to be identified as the study of
judicial behavior (Schubert 1963a, 1968e) or as “political jurisprudence” (Shapiro
1964b), while lawyers with analogous interests have tended to use the rubric
“jurimetrics” (Loevinger 1949, 1961, 1963) to describe their work. Among both
lawyers and political scientists, there have been some whose primary interest lies
in the endeavor to work toward a cumulative and systematic body of theoreti-
cal knowledge, based upon and guiding further inquiry through empirical studies
(Danelski 1964). Others, in the tradition of legal realism, have been more con-
cerned with an attempt to provide case studies which offer a realistic political
description of facets of the decision-making of courts and lawyers (Pritchett and
Westin 1963; Murphy 1965). Still others have been particularly interested in col-
lecting data which would lend themselves readily to quantification and to re-
search designs amenable to computer processing and analysis (Lawlor 1963). All
have agreed, however, that the proper subject of study is not “law” in the classical
sense of verbal statements purporting to rationalize the content of constitutional
and statutory documents, or appellate court opinions (Stone 1964a). Inquiry has
instead focused on what human beings, cast in socially defined roles in certain
characteristic types of decision-making sequences which traditionally have been
identified as “legal,” do in their interactions and transactions with each other
(Murphy 1964a; Eulau and Sprague 1964).
The new human (i.e., behavioral) jurisprudence has had an important in-
fluence in redirecting research, publication, and teaching in political science.
It has, however, had much less effect thus far upon work in the law schools (R.
Brown 1963; Miller 1960; Schubert 1966a; Loevinger 1966–1967); and candor
compels the admission that the older mechanical jurisprudence (Haines 1922)
remains the overwhelmingly dominant metaphor among judges themselves,
practicing lawyers, journalists, and the public. Among the many dimensions
useful in distinguishing between the approaches, four are of particular impor-
tance: their respective stand-points toward theory, toward data, toward the
object of inquiry, and toward the importance of culture.2
1. For a more sanguine appraisal of the methodological sophistication of the realists, see Rumble
1966.
2. I recognize, of course, that other dimensions, such as those representing methodology
and quantification, might also be deemed of equal significance as differentiating characteristics.
See Schubert 1967a.
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The new approach seeks to relate what we think we know, and what we
can learn, about how persons behave in adjudicatory roles and institutional
relationships, to a general body of theory about human decision-making
behavior (March 1956). The traditional approach emphasizes, quite to the
contrary, what are considered to be the unique and indeed the idiosyncratic
aspects that are said to characterize “law,” “courts,” and the decisions of
judges; and the objective therefore is to build a segregated theory of adju-
dication which will distinguish judicial from other forms of human behavior
(Becker 1963a).
The new approach defines its data on the basis of observations of what
kinds of factors influence adjudicatory decisions, what kinds of values are pre-
ferred in such decisions, and how the decisions affect the behavior of other
people (Danelski 1966). The old approach defines as its data the verbal state-
ments of opinions that are written to justify the decisions of appellate court
majorities, and seeks to discover the effect of such opinions upon a metaphys-
ical essence which is called “the law” (Wasserstrom 1961).
The new approach focuses upon humans who act in adjudicatory roles,
and is interested in understanding judges as people—or, better put, people as
judges (Schubert 1969b). The old approach studies institutions which it calls
courts, and what courts do purports to be the objective of investigation.3
The new approach is very much concerned with understanding the effect
that cultural—and subcultural—differences have upon adjudicatory behavior
(Schubert 1967c). The old approach recognizes that cultural variation results
in institutional differences among courts, but it is not concerned with cross-
cultural analysis as the basis for identifying both the communalities and the
differences that can be observed to obtain among courts in differing cultures
(Abraham 1968: chaps. 2, 6).
The traditional approach has undoubtedly contributed many important in-
sights into the nature of judicial institutions, and the relationships of these
institutions among themselves and with other sets of institutions in the Amer-
ican polity. But the theories of judicial decision-making that have been asso-
ciated with this approach have not led to any new understanding, or even
generated any new hypotheses, for a very long time. The highly formal, ab-
struse images suggested by the traditional approach are descriptive of a static
universe of political organs in which human beings appear to play a rela-
tively insignificant part.4 Nevertheless, the traditional theoretical structures
continue to provide the basis for almost all teaching about courts and law, in
courses taught by both political scientists and other academic specialists.
In the discussion that follows, I should like to present, in rudimentary
form, the outline of a behavioral model of adjudicatory decision-making.
3. See, e.g., Kurland 1964a, 19646, and the various annual volumes of the Supreme Court
Review, which Kurland has edited, beginning in 1960. Cf. Kommers 1966.
4. For discussion of the implications of premising analyses upon mechanical, biological, and
configurational jurisprudential models, see Landau 1961, 1965b, 1968; Schubert 1967d.
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It will then be possible to specify the kinds of data that we would need
in order to be able to discuss the questions which the model suggests as
important. This will permit us to appraise the major trends in contempo-
rary research and probable future developments in relation to what we
shall need to do if we are to construct an empirically based theory of ad-
judication, which articulates with the findings and theories of the rest of
behavioral science (Berelson and Steiner 1964).
I. A BEHAVIORAL VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Figure 1 depicts in an elementary way the kinds of structures, functions,
and interrelationships that from a behavioral standpoint are important to the
understanding of the judicial system, and indeed, to any other kind of politi-
cal system. The concepts which denote the important variables are sufficiently
general so that the figure bears no particular relation to judges and courts. It
should therefore be at least equally relevant to the analysis of other political
roles. Indeed, if it were not so, then we ought to question whether it is suf-
ficiently general to be of much help in constructing the kind of theory I have
postulated as desirable. As Cardozo pointed out almost fifty years ago5 and as
Jerome Frank insisted, judges really are human, and inescapably subject to all
the ills (as well as the satisfactions) to which flesh is heir. It must therefore
be assumed that for judges and others active in the adjudicatory process, as
well as for people in general, each human biological subsystem establishes pa-
rameters within which personality may function, and which affects how it will
function within those bounds (Ulmer 1969). Three major psychological func-
tions of a personality subsystem are perception, cognition, and choice-making.
Relationships among other persons with whom an individual comes into
contact constitute the social system. Without intending to adopt his com-
plete schema, I shall borrow from Gabriel Almond (Almond and Coleman
1960: 17; Almond and Powell 1966: chaps. 4, 5, 7) certain concepts which
I shall designate as input functions: interaction and communication, and in-
5. I have spoken of the forces of which judges avowedly avail to shape the form and content of
their judgments. Even these forces are seldom fully in consciousness. They lie so near the sur-
face, however, that their existence and influence are not likely to be disclaimed. But … deep
below consciousness are other forces, the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the
prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the
man, whether he be litigant or judge…. There has been a certain lack of candor in much of the
discussion of the theme, or rather perhaps in the refusal to discuss it, as if judges must lose
respect and confidence by the reminder that they are subject to human limitations. I do not
doubt the grandeur of the conception which lifts them into the realm of pure reason, above
and beyond the sweep of perturbing and deflecting forces. None the less, if there is anything
of reality in my analysis of the judicial process, they do not stand aloof on these chill and dis-
tant heights; and we shall not help the cause of truth by acting and speaking as if they do. The
great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and
pass the judges by. (Cardozo 1921: 167–168)
Cf. Jerome Frank 1930, 1931.
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terest articulation and aggregation. These are represented by the residual social
space “C.” The cultural system represents widely accepted patternings of beliefs
and social values, such as myths, customs, and law. The content of this system is
ideational rather than any directly observable activity.
The sociopsychological segment (2), which represents the overlap be-
tween the personality system and the social system, is concerned with the
individual’s socialization and recruitment, and with his attributes and atti-
tudes; the psychocultural segment (3), where the personality and cultural
Figure 1. A Behavioral View of the Subsystems of any Political (including
any Judicial) System
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systems overlap, represents the individual’s conception of his role(s), and the
ideologies which he accepts. The sociocultural segment (4) of overlap between
the social and cultural systems represents the patterning of institutional roles,
and the output functions of accommodation and regulation of the behavior of
others.
An individual’s physiological system will affect his political relationships
with other persons and their ideas only indirectly, through the functioning of
his personality. Therefore, only the three subsystems, personality, social, and
cultural, share a space of mutual intersection (which is also, necessarily, the
area of mutual intersection among the three joint segments of sociopsycholog-
ical, psychocultural, and sociocultural functions). This central space, segment
5, represents the individual’s decision-making, that is, his choices among po-
litical alternatives.
One can infer from Figure 1 that when any individual is cast in a political
role, his choices among alternative possibilities for action will depend upon
complex (and doubtless shifting, through time) interdependencies among sev-
eral different sets of variables. In order to understand, and perhaps ultimately
to be able to predict with some accuracy, how any individual acts or is likely
to act in such a role, it is necessary that we observe and examine data which
bear upon operations involving each of the relevant variables. It should be
emphasized, however, that each of the concepts denoted in the figure (e.g.,
“attributes” and “institutional roles”) is itself a complex configuration of sub-
variables. Anyone who has ever attempted to do either field or experimental
research involving an attempt to measure the effect of any one of these
subvariables upon behavior is well aware of the magnitude, complexity, and
long-range implications of the research task that Figure 1 implies.6 The des-
ignated segments and residual spaces correspond to areas of our fragmentary
knowledge and substantial ignorance.
The process of decision-making may be understood as taking place
within the context of certain input structures (components of the personality
system usually associated with an ego), input functions (certain facets and
effects of interactions with others), and conversion functions (psychologi-
cal processes of the ego). Table 1 suggests that an individual’s socialization
and recruitment into his political role will provide the basis for the ar-
ticulation and aggregation of his interests, which in turn will set limits
for his interaction and communication with others. The counterpart input
structures, to these functions, are the individual’s attributes (or his “social
background characteristics”), his ideologies, and his attitudes; the table in-
dicates that his attitudes are influenced by his ideologies, which in turn
6. As Cardozo pointed out in his introductory apologia to what remains a brilliant qualitative
analysis of the subject, “We must apply to the study of judge-made law that method of quantita-
tive analysis which Mr. [Graham] Wallas has applied with such fine results [in his Human Nature
in Politics] to the study of politics. A richer scholarship than mine is requisite to do the work
aright [, however].” (1921: 13)
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are influenced by his attributes. The individual’s perception, cognition, and
choice-making are psychological conversion functions. His perceptions are the
basis for his cognitions, which he then integrates, in relation to his attitudes, in
making choices among decisional alternatives. Perceptions are also influenced
by his attributes, which in turn are affected by his socialization experiences.
Similarly, an individual’s “social expression” of his interests (interest artic-
ulation and aggregation) affects his ideologies, and what he “knows”—his
cognitions—depends upon what he believes as well as upon what he perceives.
There is an equivalent lateral linkage between interaction and communication,
attitudes, and choice-making; likewise his attitudes are affected jointly by his
social interactions with other people, and by his beliefs.
In Table 1 the relationships of interdependence among the variables be-
come increasingly complex as we trace paths from the upper left to the lower
right corner of the table. It should be noted, also, that in terms of the concep-
tualization that lawyers traditionally have utilized to discuss decision-making,
the column of “conversion functions” delineates the route by means of which
“facts” enter into human choice-making, while the bottom row traces the path
by which “values” are admitted. In the older terminology also, decision-making
is an integration of facts and values; but the significant differences are that
Table 1 implies that both facts and values are defined in terms of analytical
concepts that can be (and have been) operationalized (Kort 1966; Danelski
1966), so that empirical study of how and why and when “facts” integrate
with “values” becomes possible (Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Schubert 1962c).
We do not (and need not) speak of legal facts and legal values, thereby let-
ting the adjective suggest a mystique which is beyond analysis—at least, by
nonexperts (i.e., by nonlawyers), and which both explains and justifies the
necessity for leaving the actual processes of choice-making unexamined, ex-
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Table 2. Some Behavioral Parameters of Outputs
Standpoint
Role
Concepts
Output
Functions
Output
Structures
Feedback
Concepts
Psychological Individual Decision-
making
Votes and
opinions
Commitment
Sociological Group Accommodation
and regulation
Decisions Reinforcement
Cultural Institutional Policy-making Policies Norms
cept at the formal level of what institutions (rather than humans) do.7
Table 2 presents three alternative modes of conceptualizing some of the
more important outputs of individual choice-making, from the varying points
of view of focus upon the individual, upon groups of individuals, and upon
institutions. From the point of view of psychology, the individual makes deci-
sions, which are in the structural form of his votes and opinions, and which
entail for him the feedback effect of commitment. From a sociological point
of view, a group undertakes to accommodate and to regulate conflicting in-
terests by making decisions, the feedback effect of which, for the group, is
reinforcement. From the cultural point of view, institutions sponsor policies
which provide feedback, for persons living in a particular culture, in the form
of norms.
We are now in a position to return to Figure 1, and to examine the circular
order among the major system variables. These are the sequence of alternat-
ing residual and overlapping spaces which surround the central space which
symbolizes decision-making. Table 3 suggests that this circular relationship
among the behavioral spaces can be interpreted from the points of view of
three differing concepts of rationality: logical, psychological, and nonlogical.
The concepts denoted in the column for logical rationality correspond very
closely to the traditional wisdom: judges are persons who, as the result of le-
gal training, acquire special skills which they apply to the analysis of socially
determined facts, and acting under the procedural decision-making norm of
stare decisis, they dispense justice between the parties and reaffirm the law
which is supposed to control the behavior of all persons in the society (Howard
and Summers 1965). From a perhaps equally extreme point of view at the
other tail of the postulated continuum of rationality, judges are ordinary hu-
mans who are controlled by their neuroses; they therefore react to social
stress by displacing their inner anxieties upon outer (viz., social) objects (Lass-
well 1948). This displacement is a process of rationalization, which judges
articulate in conventionally acceptable arguments, or “rationales,” in order to
attempt to bring about homeostasis in the balance of their own inner lives (i.e.,
tensions).
7. Cf. Becker: “The judicial process is verily a vehicle by which revealed truth is discov-
ered through skill in logic” (1964: 11).
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Table 3. Three Types of Rationality in Adjudicative Decision-Making
System variables Logical Psychological Nonlogical
Social Facts Interest articulation
and aggregation
Interaction and
communication
Stress
Sociopsychological Legal training Socialization and
recruitment
Attributes
Attitudes
Neuroses
Personality Skill Perception
Cognition
Choice
Displacement
Psychocultural Stare decisis Ideologies
Individual roles
Rationalization
Cultural Justice Norms Rationales
Sociocultural Law Accommodation
Regulation
Homeostasis
Psychological rationality is in a modal position between the other two
types of rationality. According to this theory, judges receive certain informa-
tion concerning cases they are expected to decide, as a consequence of social
input functions of interest articulation and aggregation, and of interaction and
communication. (These correspond to argument between counsel, the exam-
ination of witnesses in trials, and the sequence of interim decisions, by the
judge, on questions of procedure that arise during the course of the trial, or
also, in appellate courts, to briefs filed by counsel and to discussions among
the judges.) To be distinguished from this proximate information about the
pending case is the more stable and enduring kind of information which the
judge has accepted, at earlier stages of his career, as the result of his social-
ization and recruitment experience.8 Sociopsychological structures such as
a judge’s attributes and his attitudes are causally related to, and dependent
upon, the input functions of socialization and recruitment. Both kinds of in-
formation—the proximate data about the case, and his predisposition or bias
toward the kind of policy question that it raises for decision—are of critical
importance to the choice that he will make, and both kinds of information are
produced primarily as the result of his interaction with other people (Murphy
1966).
8. As Almond and Coleman have noted,
political socialization produces the basic attitudes in a society toward the political sys-
tem, [and the] political recruitment function takes … members of the society out of
particular subcultures … and inducts them into the specialized roles of the political sys-
tem, trains them in the appropriate skills, provides them with political cognitive maps,
values, expectations, and affects. (1960: 31)
Cf. Almond and Powell 1966: Chap. 3.
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Perception, cognition, and choice-making are personality function con-
cepts which purport to distinguish sequential states in a continuous and
continuing process. Their utility is for purposes of analysis. For example, both
the logical and the nonlogical types of rationality also assume—although usu-
ally with no discussion of the matter—that perception takes place before,
in the first instance, skill can be exercised or, in the second instance, dis-
placement can occur. But neither cognition nor choice-making are necessary
elements in the logical, or in the nonlogical, theories of personality. The per-
sonality structures which will affect one’s choice-making are ideology and
role. The former is his pattern of beliefs, expectations, obligations, and related
knowledge about life and the world, and the latter is his understanding of oth-
ers’ expectations, and his own expectations, concerning how he shall make
his choices and what they should be (Herndon 1964; Jaros and Mendelsohn
1967; Vines 1969; and generally, see Biddle and Thomas 1966). The latter
point in particular—the psychocultural concept of role, in comparison to the
logical concept of stare decisis, and the nonlogical concept of rationaliza-
tion—illustrates the advantages that the psychological theory offers, even if
we speak for the moment only in terms of greater flexibility. There is nothing
to preclude either stare decisis or rationalization from supplying the content
for the concept of role, for any particular judge or group of justices; but
both stare decisis and rationalization are limiting cases, and the psychological
theory does not require that either of these provide a monistic definition of ju-
dicial role.
The output functions of a judge’s decisions are, from a cultural point of
view, the policy norms associated with his choices, and, from a sociological
point of view, output functions include the accommodation and regulation of
the interests of the litigants, and of other persons directly affected (Dolbeare
1967a, 1969).
No doubt, the psychologically rational approach to judicial decision-mak-
ing involves considerable oversimplification of the multidimensionality of em-
pirical reality, but the circular two-dimensional ordering does offer a much
more complex model than does either of the alternative linear schemes
(Guttman 1954). It seems likely, moreover, that it may also offer some promise
of affording a better fit to the relevant empirical data than does either of the
other two alternatives. The present difficulty in testing the utility of the model
is that most of the relevant empirical data remain to be observed, analyzed,
and reported. But, however inadequate it might prove to be when data be-
come available to appraise its “goodness of fit,” the theory of psychological
rationality may in the meantime be of some use in guiding the very research
efforts which can result in its disconfirmation. At least, it offers two consider-
able advantages over the conventional wisdom about judges: it is not fettered
with the idiosyncratic parameters of the American politicolegal culture; and
it offers some promise of forging a theory about judges and courts which can
articulate with what otherwise is known scientifically about human behavior.
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II. BEYOND THE FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH
What are the implications of the standpoint of behavioral jurisprudence
for the development of research in judicial process and systems? The answer
to that question depends in part upon what are the present trends in this
subfield, in political science as an academic discipline, and in the behavioral
sciences generally. One can make certain inferences about present trends on
the basis of a recent national conference which focused on the frontiers of ju-
dicial research.9 Four emphases in particular were explicit in the papers and
discussions there:
(1) Transnational comparison;
(2) Inquiry into mass behavior beyond the boundaries of judicial systems,
to analyze the inputs that may lead to litigation, and the consequences
of judicial policy choices;
(3) Acceptance of quantification as an indispensable component of empir-
ical scientific inquiry; and
(4) Agreement upon the importance of interdisciplinary contributions to
theory construction and empirical knowledge.
A fifth point, which was made by C. Herman Pritchett, the keynote speaker
at the Shambaugh Conference, and which seems to be amply supported by
empirical evidence, is that the field of judicial process and behavior has
become (at last) an integral part of political science inquiry. Political scien-
tists in such other fields as legislative behavior, comparative politics, and
international behavior take an active interest in what their colleagues in
the adjudicative field have to say—and about theory and method as well as
about substantive findings. As Professor Pritchett pointed out, the isolation
of the field, as an exotic enclave within the discipline, is no more. In choos-
ing the term “political jurisprudence” to refer to the judicial process and
behavior approaches, Pritchett was emphasizing the reciprocal intradisci-
plinary contributions that now obtain among political scientists who study
judicial systems and decision-making, and political scientists who study
other aspects of political behavior.
My own answer to the question takes the form of hypothetical statements
in a developmental analysis, projecting into the near future these present
trends, in relation to the needs for empirical data relevant to the variables
and relationships that I have hypothesized to be important to behavioral ju-
risprudence. I shall discuss my prospectus in terms of three facets: substantive
inquiry, theory, and methods.
Considerably more work will be done on interest aggregation and ar-
ticulation as inputs to, and at the boundaries of, judicial systems. The
studies by Vose (1958, 1959), principally of the NAACP, were products of
9. The Shambaugh Conference on Judicial Research, convened at the University of Iowa,
Iowa City, Iowa, October 5–7, 1967.
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the fifties; and Hakman’s occasional interim article reports (1957, 1966,
1969) on his continuing studies of what he calls litigation sponsorship
and management, although directly relevant, are by no means sufficient
to guide understanding concerning the extent of empirical support for the
Bentleyan thesis, as it relates to the judicial process. Early attempts to
study the relationship between the background characteristics of judges
as gross ideological categories, by means of direct and simple (bivariate)
correlation, yielded few significant findings (Bowen 1965; Goldman 1965:
chap. 8). This phase is over; instead there will be much greater concern
for studying the socialization (Warkov 1965; Lortie 1959) and recruitment
(Grossman 1965; Jacob 1964) of judges, and for the use of causal modelling
techniques (Alker 1966; Blalock 1967) to investigate hypotheses concern-
ing the relative strength and the direction of relationships among attribute,
ideological, attitudinal, and decisional variables (Schubert 1964a, 1969a).
Such work on input analysis will take into account such facets of logical
rationality as legal training, occupational skills, and stare decisis (though
defined in psychocultural terms); and indeed there will be a continuing
concern for investigation of such other facets of logical rationality as facts,
law, and justice: such efforts will come, however, primarily from nonbehav-
iorally oriented law professors, from those political scientists who continue
to identify their interests as the study of public law, and from normatively
oriented sociologists of law (Selznick 1959; Skolnick 1965). But the major
focus will be upon work at the boundaries of the social and the biological
sciences in investigations of the interplay among the human mind, body,
and personality (Tomkins and Izard 1965; Knutson 1965; Campbell 1966)
in the conversion processes of decision-making postulated by the models
of both psychological rationality and—to the extent that it proves possible
to operationalize and to make systematic empirical observations that relate
to its key concepts—nonlogical rationality.
Thus, what lawyers call “stare decisis” will be studied not only from
the psychocultural point of view of the way in which a judicial actor defines
his individual role, stare decisis will be studied also as a function of such
psychological variables as commitment and identification, and of such so-
ciopsychological variables as reinforcement and reference group behavior
(Schubert 1960a; Lawlor 1963). Considerable attention will focus upon
group interaction processes, and upon judicial attitudes as dependent vari-
ables influenced by such independent variables as the frequency, affective-
ness, and propinquity of interpersonal contacts, in relation to preferences
among alternatives of substantive policy content (Ulmer 1965, 1970). There
will be inquiry into the differences in individual judicial performance, when
the individual is placed in the shifting social context of differing ad hoc de-
cisional subgroups, as in the panels of the national courts of appeals. The
description of most trial courts in the United States as “single-judge” in-
stitutions for purposes of decision-making will be treated as a hypothesis
rather than as a self-evident truth; and studies will be designed to analyze
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not merely trials—which so evidently are group performances—but also the
trial judge as the (by institutional role) leading actor in a social system,
with various other judgelike actors (referees in bankruptcy, commissioners,
clerks) sharing in the accouterments of the judicial office (viz., wearing
robes, being addressed as “judge” or “your honor”) and participating ac-
tively in specialized aspects of the “court’s” decision-making function. Also
within the American judicial system, there will be emphasis upon compara-
tive (i.e., cross-subcultural) study of the structuring of institutional roles in
relation to differences in the sociocultural content of inputs, policy outputs,
and the policy effects of judicial decision-making.
Although there have been impact studies of national judicial policy-mak-
ing, these have tended to be case studies of the responses of individual
communities to discrete Supreme Court decisions (Patric 1957; Sorauf 1959;
Wasby 1965; Birkby 1966). In the future there will be much more broadly
gauged and systematic investigations into the relationships among judicially
pronounced policies as stimuli, the response of governmental and other elites
who constitute (variously, depending upon the policy content) the Supreme
Court’s audience, and mass responses either to the Court directly or, as seems
much more probable, to the cues provided by the Court’s elite audience (Mur-
phy and Tanenhaus 1969). Such studies will involve extensive inquiry into the
correlation between judicial manipulation of cultural norms and the extent of
change in relevant mass behavior; and these surveys will go beyond corre-
lational to causal analysis. The kinds of questions that will be examined will
include: What is the relationship between the Supreme Court’s obscenity de-
cisions (beginning in the mid-fifties) and the contemporary liberalization of
artistic expression in magazines, books, movies, and supper clubs? What is
the relationship between the Supreme Court’s postulation of greater proce-
dural rights for defendants in criminal cases and changes in the behaviors
of police, criminals, and other populations such as students seeking institu-
tional procedural due process from their universities, or persons who oppose
current governmental policy in regard to such matters as the Vietnam war
or the regulation of LSD and marijuana? What is the relationship between
the new constitutional policy of racial equality and integration and the rise
of social movements advocating racial segregation and black power? Judicial
policy-making, that is to say, will be viewed as falling within the mainstream
of development and change in national social movements and mass behaviors;
and it will be studied accordingly.
As Harold Lasswell long has urged ought to be done (1955; and cf.
Schubert 1968d), the judicial policy-making process will be studied from the
perspective of its past and potential contribution to political creativity, that
is, to the postulation of new alternatives—and frequently, these will be the
very ones that have been screened out of public view, by the legislative and
administrative processes—which thereby become possible options of choice
for other actors in both the public and private sectors of the society. (Racial
integration and reapportionment are recent judicial policies which might be
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viewed as examples of creative contributions to the redevelopment of Amer-
ican political society.)
The policy output of courts will also be studied from the points of view
of institutional differentiation, specialization of function, and the partition-
ing of local populations into functionally oriented clientele groups. To what
extent, for example, do national district courts in metropolitan areas ar-
ticulate their work with the major national urban policy programs in such
areas; and how do the policy decisions of such national district courts re-
late to those of state courts in regard to the same metropolitan population
(Dolbeare 1967b, 1969)?
Feedback, as a response to judicial policy-making and as an aspect of
both elite and mass behavior, will be studied in relation to perception (“aware-
ness”), the structure of cognitions, and psychological involvement with ju-
diciaries at all levels of hierarchical differentiation of such judicial systems
(Murphy and Tanenhaus 1968a, 1968b; Dolbeare 1967a; Kessel 1966; Dol-
beare and Hammond 1968). A by-product of the more widespread recognition
that there is an important and continuing interrelationship between judicial
process and behavior and such other political science fields as public opinion
will be much closer intradisciplinary integration, with the probable conse-
quence that the study of judiciaries will increasingly come to be viewed as
one among several facets of the study of domestic politics, as distinguished
from comparative (“transnational”) politics, or as distinguished from interna-
tional politics. But there will also be much closer cross-disciplinary integration
between political science students of judicial process and scholars in other
behavioral disciplines. In part, this will involve the development of new ties
with biologists and psychologists, and particularly with scholars in the health
sciences: senescence, for example, will no longer continue to be considered
merely at the rhetorical level of analysis in studies of the decision-making of
(typically) elderly judicial elites. There will, however, be even closer collabora-
tion with the social sciences of anthropology, economics, and sociology.
The current interest in transnational comparison of judiciaries, one of
the major emphases of the Shambaugh Conference, will lead to multi-cultural
(horizontal) analysis of adjudicative processes and functions, as well as to
the development of systematically designed vertical descriptions of the role
of judiciaries, in both European and non-Western political systems. One con-
sequence of this development will be that the field of study of adjudicative
behavior no longer will remain one which is monopolized by scholars in the
United States.10
In terms of theory, the major emphasis in the near future—in behavioral
jurisprudence as in political science generally—will be various types of sys-
tems analysis. Some of these will directly reflect the biological models from
10. Already there have been important research contributions by colleagues abroad. See
Aubert 1963a, 1963b; Torgersen 1963; Hayakawa 1962; Peck 1967a, 1967b; Samonte 1966. Oth-
ers will be forthcoming soon. See Schubert and Danelski 1969.
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which they are borrowed (Landau 1965a, 1965b); others will be presented in
a rhetoric which borrows heavily from the new sciences of information theory,
cybernetics, and semiotics, and from computer technology (Deutsch 1963; Ul-
mer 1969). Even today the systems vernacular has none of the novelty which
it presented, at least as applied to the study of judiciaries, as recently as a
couple of years ago (Schubert 1965d); and tomorrow systems analysis will be
the conventional mode of discourse in the field. Strong emphasis will also be
placed, however, upon continuation of the present work in decision-making
theory (Robinson and Snyder 1965), role theory (Vines 1969), and transac-
tional theory (Danelski 1964). Game theory, which has seemed to offer such
considerable promise for studies of legal decision-making processes, provid-
ing as it does a measure of the deviation of empirically observable behaviors,
from what would be strictly rational behavior, will receive greater attention
now that more political scientists are becoming increasingly familiar with con-
temporary research in economics.
From the methodological point of view, future work in the adjudicative
field will see much greater emphasis upon present predictions of future events
(Schubert 1963e: 102–108, 137–142; 1964a: 575–587); and the effect will be
to strengthen tremendously the power of behavioral jurisprudential theory.
Accompanying the shift in emphasis to predictive work will be much greater
reliance upon experimentation (Becker et al. 1965), simulation (Grunbaum
1969), and field surveys (Becker 1966b) as methods of inquiry than has been
evident heretofore. There will also be an acceleration of the present trend
away from linear and toward multivariate analysis, in phase with both the
longstanding recognition that the questions of interest to the field are bet-
ter fitted to multidimensional models, and the growing capacity of scholars in
the field to take advantage of computer technology in their research (thereby
freeing them from the limitations of time and competence imposed by manual
routines of statistical analysis). And especially in the latter regard there will
be a dramatic change in the standards of literacy in the profession and con-
sequently in what are accepted as the conventional modes of professional
practice. Even today the ratio of persons working in the field who have had
any mathematical or statistical training beyond the freshman undergraduate
level is very small; but graduate students now entering the field are required
to have had such training as part of their education as political scientists; and
the impact of such better education, upon the level of sophistication in the
quantitative work to be done in the next several years, will be considerable
(Gerard 1961).
The most general projection that one would make, on the basis of pre-
sent trends, is that beyond the frontiers of judicial research lies the field of
behavioral jurisprudence: empirical in its approach toward data collection;
quantitative in its methods of data manipulation; eclectic in its intradiscipli-
nary ties within political science; pandisciplinary in its theoretical orientation;
and cross-cultural in the scope of its interests.
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PART II
An Empirical
View of
Judicial Values
THE FIRST SYSTEMATIC effort to employ quantified decisional data as the basis
for discussing differences in the attitudes of Supreme Court justices was
undoubtedly that of Pritchett, in his several articles that appeared during
World War II (1941, 1942, 1943a, 1943b, 1945a, 1945b, 1946), and in his
book (based on the same research) on the Roosevelt Court, which was pub-
lished in 1948.1 Pritchett presented basically two types of data in the book.
He grouped decisions according to broad policy issues (such as “state regu-
lation of business” and “freedom of speech”) and reported the percentage, of
the total votes of each justice concerning the issue, that the justices voted in
support of the issue. Pritchett didn’t exactly describe them as such, but in ef-
fect for respondents these tables were the columns of marginal frequencies
that would have been one parameter of a cumulative scale of the issue—if
he had undertaken to construct such an array of his data. Furthermore, pre-
suming that the ordinal relationships in conjoint voting by his respondents
were sufficiently transitive (i.e., that the proportion of inconsistent voting
was sufficiently low), then a sequencing of the justices according to the per-
centages of their support of the scale value ought to correspond very well
to their rank order in a cumulative scale of the same data. Hence, what he
reported in these tables were potential scales: he could not know (and he
certainly did not say) whether they were scales, but at the same time there
was also no reason to assume that they were not. It should be remembered,
of course, that the basic reference on the theory and method of cumulative
scaling (Stouffer et al. 1950) was not published until two years after Pritch-
ett’s book, and was therefore not available to him at the time he wrote. The
other principal format upon which Pritchett relied for presenting and ana-
lyzing his data was the matrix of agreement scores: here he ignored subject
matter differences, and aggregated all of the dissensual decisions for a given
term of the Court, observing and cumulating votes by dyads. Given dichoto-
mous scoring of decisions, there are four possible ways in which two persons
can relate to each other in a given decision; and if we signify a majority
vote as (+) and a dissent as (–), these are + +, + –, – +, and – –. Pritch-
ett was interested primarily in patterns of agreement; hence, he reported as
frequencies dyadic term totals for joint dissenting (– –); and proportions of
overall agreement (+ + plus– –, divided by the sum of + + and + – and – +
and – –) he expressed as percentages. Evidently he had available all of the
information that one needed to calculate phi correlation coefficients, a more
sophisticated statistic that takes account of patterns of both agreement and
disagreement as well as of their totals; and in this instance the procedure
was reasonably well known and accessible at the time his work was done (cf.
Yule 1912). But as we noted above to have been true in the case of his in-
choate scales, so also his matrices were measures that, because of their ad
hoc character, were inherently limited in their utility to support other and
more sophisticated analyses (such as, for example, factor analysis). At the
1. Reprinted as a paperback by Quadrangle Books (Chicago, 1969).
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same time it should be noted that, from a public relations point of view, Pritch-
ett’s decision to use either simple matrices of raw frequencies or percentages
had one great virtue over even such a relatively uncomplicated statistic as
a correlation coefficient: persons untrained in statistics could understand (or
could at least feel that they understood) Pritchett, so that although they were
still turned off by his use of numbers, they were not completely shut out.
The audience for whom Pritchett wrote consisted primarily of political
scientists, but it included also lawyers, historians, and journalists—none of
whom generally were educated, a quarter of a century ago, in statistical
methods. (Pritchett’s audience included also a few sociologists [e.g., Sny-
der 1958], and they did of course know factor analysis [Bernard 1955].)
As it was, the criticism of his work was not addressed to his substantive
findings, which were almost universally accepted and even applauded. Crit-
icism focused instead upon his “boxscores” and was not even concerned
with him particularly; rather it was levied against the very idea of quan-
tification in such an arcane context. Much of this criticism was quite
indignant, and very self-righteous, and was uttered in the spirit of a letter
that I recently received from a sitting judge of the Supreme Court of the
Republic of South Africa, who informed me that anyone (like myself) who
used the word “vote” to describe what judges do in making decisions would
in South Africa be fined for contempt of court, and properly so! So under
the circumstances it is doubtless true that Pritchett attracted a good many
more flies with his bittersweet honey than a more austere approach, which
peddled straight vinegar (however much denatured), would have done.
We have some direct evidence on the latter point, and therefore we do
not need to rely upon supposition. Only two years after the appearance of
The Roosevelt Court there was published a brief, tightly written, erudite,
methodologically sophisticated, and conceptually revolutionary factor ana-
lytic study of a biennium of the Supreme Court’s decisions (Thurstone and
Degan 1951). Its senior author was about as competent a person, in the
methodology and in the relevant psychometric theory generally, as existed
in 1950: he was the American discoverer and proponent of the multiple
factor analysis approach, Louis L. Thurstone, the founder and at that time
still the head of the Psychometric Laboratory at the University of Chicago,
which published the study in its series of occasional technical reports. Of
course it is not surprising that few political scientists at that time would
have stumbled across the study in such an outlet; but it was also reprinted
in the proceedings of the National Academy of Science—though even so,
few persons interested in judicial process and behavior (and probably none
interested in public law) make systematic and periodic searches of such
reference works as Psychological Abstracts in order to attempt to avoid
the possibility that, if something like the Thurstone and Degan study of the
Supreme Court should appear (at a probable frequency of, say, once in a
generation), they will not miss seeing it. I believe it is correct to say that
I happen to have been the person to bring the Thurstone and Degan study
AN EMPIRICAL VIEW OF JUDICIAL VALUES . 59
to the attention of the profession, about a decade after it was originally
published, and that few other political scientists (at least) or lawyers have
seen fit to cite it (to say nothing of to use it) since then. But I can claim no
particular acumen in the matter; it was, rather, a social by-product of my
more general efforts (at the time) to become better educated in behavioral
science. My recollection is that Frank Pinner, who was then my colleague
at Michigan State University, had shown or possibly given to me a copy
of the original Psychometric Lab Report, probably sometime in 1958, but
too late for me to do more than footnote it in a book of mine (1959: 78n)
which was then in press. Pinner had been, as a then quite recent doctoral
graduate from the University of California at Berkeley, a member of the
initial group—which included also, incidentally, Harold D. Lasswell—at the
Center for Advanced Study of the Behavioral Sciences (CASBS), in Palo
Alto. Pinner and I had worked together throughout 1956 in a national field
survey of local civil defense, the report of which was sufficiently critical
of federal policies and procedures that it was promptly classified and sup-
pressed (Schubert, LaPalombara, Pinner, and Presthus 1956). In 1958 he
was the director of the Bureau of Social and Political Research at Michigan
State; and the report had been brought to his attention by a social psy-
chologist friend in a different department. (Unfortunately, neither Pinner
nor I understood factor analysis at that time.) So I put the Thurstone and
Degan study aside for several years, while I went off to Norway for cross-
cultural education on a Fulbright appointment, and then to Palo Alto for
further interdisciplinary education at the CASBS. It was while I was at the
latter center, engaged in a research project that was designed explicitly
to (inter alia) articulate with and update Pritchett’s The Roosevelt Court,
and incidentally learning factor analysis, that I experienced a genuine (if
unexpected) need for Thurstone and Degan. Then, of course, I did read it
with care, and put it to use.
The need arose because my principal goal at the center was to develop
a multidimensional psychometric model of the Court that would combine
cumulative scaling, factor analysis, and the theory of psychological choice
that had been developed by Clyde Coombs (a former student of Thurstone,
and my then colleague at the center who was engaged in the writing of the
book that expounded his theory [Coombs 1964]). I probably never would
have constructed the model under other circumstances (of either time or
space); but a combination of environmental and personal vectors coalesced
and coaligned sufficiently to thrust me almost irrevocably into the en-
terprise. (Another colleague, William Riker, wrote his Theory of Political
Coalitions [1962] in the same fellowship year; and yet another, Abraham
Kaplan, was in at least the early stages of work upon what became his Con-
duct of Inquiry [1964]; and I have never entertained the slightest doubt
that I acted properly, when I dedicated “To the Fellows of ‘the Class of ‘61’
and to the Staff of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sci-
ences” the book that I wrote based on my own research that year [1965c:
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v.].) But constructing the model was one thing; believing in it—that is to
say, establishing an empirical basis for sufficient confidence in its proba-
ble validity to justify one in committing substantial resources of time and
energy to its use in guiding further research—was quite another matter. I
attempted to satisfy myself by several procedures, of which two are worth
mentioning here. First, I ran a comprehensive experimental test of the
procedures, simulating a set of decisions for a hypothesized term of the
Court by plotting on graph paper the positions of both cases and justices;
then I observed the geometric relationships among both types of points, as
the basis for calculating a set of cumulative scales and also a correlation
matrix; factor analyzed the correlation matrix to recover the two-dimen-
sional configuration of points for the justices; and finally I compared the
plot of factorial positions of judges with their known (i.e., predetermined)
positions on the initial graph (Schubert 1965c: chap. 4: “An Experimental
Factor Analysis of Simulated Data”). This experiment convinced me that the
technique would faithfully reproduce the kind of relationships that I hypoth-
esized to obtain in real life; it did not and could not, of course, provide any
assurance that such relationships did, in fact, obtain (in the minds of the
relevant justices). A different kind of (thus far, indirect) proof would be re-
quired for the latter validation. But I wanted also to assure myself that my
claim of continuity with The Roosevelt Court could not be impeached—that
is to say, I wished to prove that, notwithstanding the greater complexity
of my methods and the more precise articulation of the theory that I had
invoked, Pritchett had studied exactly the same kind of relationships in his
book, and his findings could therefore be assimilated as an approximate
statement of what would also be found by using my model, if my empiri-
cal data were projected backward in time for an additional sixteen years.
(My own data were not immediately deposited in a data bank, but they
were on punch cards and I did make them available to several individuals
upon request during the next several years until 1969. By then I had up-
dated them [to include the period September 1946 through June 1969] and
extended them [to include unanimous decisions as well as nonunanimous]
and made them available for general public use on either magnetic tape or
cards [through the Survey Research Archive of the Inter-University Consor-
tium for Political Research located at the University of Michigan].2
Neither the data banks nor the practice of exchanging data for reanaly-
sis had yet been established in political science when Pritchett wrote; and
I guess I just assumed that his data were not on cards—although I never
asked him, and I still don’t know for sure. It would have been a little eas-
ier, and somewhat more accurate, to have had access to his coding sheets;
but there was one distinct advantage in not having such access. What I pro-
posed to do, as a further test of my own model, was to combine Thurstone
and Degan’s factorial data with Pritchett’s scaling data for the correspond-
2. P. O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48106. See also Ryan and Tate 1974.
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ing terms, and to use the scales derived from Pritchett’s data as the basis for
providing the substantive interpretation of the factors which Thurstone and
Degan had reported, but had been unable to explain in substantive terms. I
thought then that this would provide an unimpeachably objective test of my
own theory, because both studies upon which I planned to rely were entirely
independent of each other; both had been published over a decade earlier,
and therefore there was no way in which (whatever anyone might wish to
assume concerning my research ethics) I could possibly fudge in the employ-
ment of either half of the data. Another full decade elapsed before I learned,
through correspondence with Pritchett, that it was indeed his data for the
1943–1944 terms that Degan (as it also turned out) had factor analyzed.
Consequently, I was correct about the methodological independence of the
two studies, which was really the point of importance so far as concerns as-
suring the objectivity of my own test; but I was wrong in the presumption
that Degan had coded his decisional data directly from the United States Re-
ports. It was, I suppose, a fortunate mistake, because the use of Pritchett’s
data assured that the observations which generated the scales and the fac-
tor configurations would be, although methodologically independent, made
of the same universe of decisions. If a psychologist, relatively unsophisti-
cated in the empirical characteristics of the decisional sources, had made
the observations upon which the factor analysis was based, it is entirely pos-
sible that I would have been forced to conclude that the test of my model
by interpreting Degan’s factors with Pritchett’s scales had failed—and for
the quite spurious reason that not only the observations of them, but the
data sets themselves, might then have been based upon partially indepen-
dent samples of decisions.
The initial essay in this part is my report of the experiment that
demonstrated that the factors which Thurstone and Degan had left un-
interpreted were functions of Pritchett’s scales, and vice versa. Stated
otherwise, what the model stipulates is that if matrices of agreement
scores are analyzed by some method (such as factor analysis) which par-
titions the variance among one or more dimensions, and if the resulting
dimensions are used as reference dimensions to locate the configuration
of points representing the judges in the space (of whatever dimen-
sionality) they define, then that same space will be transected by the
set of cumulative scales among which the decisions have been appor-
tioned according to the substantive content of the scale variables. Stated
alternatively, the decisions are classified into nonoverlapping subsets ac-
cording to their subject matter; each of these subsets of decisions is
scaled linearly; and the set of these linear scales will then provide an
extrinsic criterion for oblique rotation of the reference dimensions of
the space generated by the pooling of all decisions and by their classi-
fication according to no substantive (subject matter) criterion at all, but
rather according to the procedural criterion of participation/nonpartici-
pation in the majority that determines the outcome of each decision. The
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theory states that if what has been described can be done (as measured
by some appropriate statistical test of goodness-of-fit), then it must be
because the agreement and disagreement of judges in their decisions
is due to their attitudinal differences, as measured by the linear cumu-
lative scales. The crux of the argument rests upon an insight—which
certainly was not my own, but rather was gleaned from one of Coombs’
lectures at the center—concerning what seem prima facie to be two com-
pletely different techniques for data manipulation and representation,
Guttman’s method of linear cumulative scaling and Thurstone’s method
of multiple factor analysis. The former of these originated out of ef-
forts by army management to comprehend the psychology of soldiers
confronting combat experience, while the other developed out of efforts
by educational psychologists to discover what was cognitively common
among various tests designed to measure imputed mental “traits” and
skills. Coombs had demonstrated (1964: 23, and chaps. 11, 12) that
cumulative scaling and factor analysis—whatever their historic and su-
perficial differences—both are alternative ways of measuring the same
fundamental psychometric relationship; and once I could assume that, I
could and did put the rest of the model together.
Because the model purported to deal only with psychological relationships,
it was evidently suitable to provide the basis for only a partial explanation of
Supreme Court decision-making; and I never thought of it as more than that
(see chapter 3, above). The imputed cause for both factorial and scale positions
was not only psychological, but also limited to a very special aspect of psychol-
ogy: that aspect, of belief systems about public policy issues, that I have called
ideological. To the extent that judges are also influenced by such matters as belly-
aches or high blood pressure, or the infidelity of loved (or hated) ones, or social
considerations arising out of their interaction with each other or with other per-
sons in their bureaucratic entourage, or by aspects of their professional ideology
functioning as role constraints such as belief in stare decisis, we ought to expect
that such other independent variables will over a sufficient period of time affect
a set of cumulative scale variables either in a constant or else in a random fash-
ion, so that their overall effect will be to either cancel or wash out. This is not the
same thing as saying that these other variables (of health, affection, and social in-
teraction) are unimportant to the determination of the outcome of decisions; but
it is to say that however important these other variables may be, that does not
preclude us from examining the effect of the psychological variables that do pur-
port to measure ideological differences. If A always votes with B on a particular
issue, or on all issues, not because he shares whatever opinion B may have, but
because he does not want to seem to disagree with B, then it is perfectly true that
scaling will attribute to A beliefs about public policy that he does not entertain.
The observation of what men are willing to do (including their formal speech)
for public consumption cannot assure what is in either their conscious or their
subconscious minds. Scaling tells us not what judges believe, but what they are
prepared to say they believe. To get at the effects of genetic special fortune or
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disability, or physiological disturbances serious enough to entail psychic conse-
quences, or role distraints,4 or other social interaction effects (such as, to put it
most crudely and in terms of what may be a frequently inappropriate legislative
analogy, logrolling votes), one must design and carry out research that will mea-
sure the effects of these other phenomena; and my ambition, back in 1960, was
not to solve simultaneously (as some critics seem to have felt I should have done)
all possible problems involved in the modeling of Supreme Court decisions, but
rather to attempt to isolate and to focus upon one aspect, that seemed to me to
be important to clarify, of the more complex general situation.
The model is explicated briefly in chapter 4, but the weight of the discus-
sion there is upon the accommodation of two sets of empirical data. It is rather
chapter 5, which deals with what was (at the time of its publication) the most
recently completed term of the Warren Court, that provides a more detailed
and discursive exposition of the theory and model. Chapter 5 also provides
(as the Thurstone-Degan paper does not) a discussion of both the phi correla-
tion statistic and the method of factor analysis, so that it can function as an
introduction to those subjects for readers who may not previously have en-
countered them. Chapter 5 presents also, in extensive form (as, again, chapter
4 does not) the set of linear cumulative scales for the term.
The scales are in the basic format that has become conventional in the
field, stemming from the initial paper that brought the method to the atten-
tion of the political science profession (Tanenhaus 1956). There followed
a period of exploration, during which several political scientists employed
the method of judicial scaling to investigate a variety of different kinds of
hypotheses. The initial forays dealt with hypothesized variables that were
narrowly defined but that nevertheless related to postulated political con-
cepts and tended to cut across the orthodox legal categories under which
the cases, attributed to the scale, would have been classified (e.g., Schubert
1959: chap. 5, “Scalogram Analysis”). In order to get samples of adequate
size it was necessary to extend the scope of the analysis chronologically
over several terms of the Court, thereby paying the side cost of increasing
respondent nonparticipation (and therefore scale indeterminancy) due to
personnel changes. All of the scaling studies made during the late fifties and
early sixties continued to deal exclusively with the United States Supreme
Court, although at least one of these skipped a century and focused imag-
inatively upon the Taney Court in the antebellum period that produced the
Dred Scott catastrophe (Schmidhauser 1961); and this study, which inter-
relates political party and sectional differences to judicial attitudes toward
the major policy issues of the time (slavery and industrialization), remains
the only behavioral study of the Supreme Court during the 19th century.
4. See the recounting of how Frankfurter conned Frank Murphy into suppressing his intended
dissent in Hirabayashi v. United States, purportedly in the name of enhancing the reputation of the
Supreme Court—but with what was clearly, in fact, the opposite effect (Murphy and Tanenhaus 1972:
157–158).
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Then, beginning in 1960, Sidney Ulmer published the first article which
combined all of the civil liberties cases decided by the Court during a single
term (1960). This was an important advance, because it identified what has
proved to be the most important single attitudinal scale in the decision-mak-
ing of the United States Supreme Court, term in and term out for the past
third of a century (at least). Shortly thereafter Harold Spaeth published a
scale of the labor decisions of the first six terms of the Warren Court; and
when I learned that he was also collecting data on the business regulation
decisions for the same period, I suggested that he combine the labor and
business regulation scales into a combined E scale (Spaeth 1963b: 82–83).
It was apparent that the pooled data would have to scale acceptably, be-
cause I already had completed scaling E for sixteen individual terms, from
1946 through and including the 1961 term.5 Since then linear scaling of
these and other variables has been extended to subsequent terms of the
United States Supreme Court (Schubert 1974b); to the United States Courts
of Appeals (Atkins 1972); to several state supreme courts (Brown and Had-
dad 1966–1967; Beatty 1970; Ulmer 1966; Feeley 1971; Fair 1967); and to
the supreme courts of several other countries, including Australia (Schubert
1969d; Blackshield 1972), Canada (Peck 1967b, 1969; Fouts 1969; Slay-
ton 1971), India (Gadbois 1970a, 1970b), Japan (Hayakawa 1962), and the
Philippines (Samonte 1969; Tate 1973).
Chapter 6 stemmed from a different and prior research project, which
began in the early fifties when Robert Jackson was on the United States Su-
preme Court. I was then teaching constitutional law, and Jackson interested
me (as he has likewise several other persons) because of the exceptional
felicity of his style and mode of self-expression. I began work on the Jack-
son project at a time when I knew that I was dissatisfied with traditional
public law as an approach to either teaching or research, but when the
implications of behavioralism for work on the judicial process remained un-
defined. Jack Peltason had not yet come forth with his call for a sociological
(interest-group process) jurisprudence; and Fred Kort’s initial foray into
mathematical prediction of the Supreme Court’s right-to-counsel decisions
(Kort 1957) was then itself an even less predictable event than Peltason’s
brochure. I looked upon the Jackson project as both a learning experience
for myself and as a bridge to a possibly more satisfying research future.
What I planned to do was to read all of his opinions as a judge, and to
analyze systematically their value content (as normative rather than empiri-
cal propositions). I intended also to classify the voting decisions of Jackson,
which his opinions were intended to justify, on the basis of the same content
categories that would be used to analyze his associated opinions. Hence, it
would be possible to correlate his value articulations, not only with each
other, but also with his voting behavior, so as to ascertain to what extent
his verbal (opinion) behavior was consistent with his decisional (voting) be-
5. The E scale for the 1960 Term is reported in chapter 5 below.
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havior, both in any given decision (and for any specified period of time) and
also dynamically (that is, longitudinally throughout his baker’s dozen years
of service as an associate justice of the Supreme Court). Such results could
of course be reported statistically; but I aspired from the very beginning of
my conceptualization of the project to do much more than report the quan-
tified results of an extensive exercise in content analysis. I wanted to report
the opinion evidence in context, which would have to be discursively; and in
view of the consensual opinion (which I shared) that Jackson was well worth
reading for his style alone, I wanted to select a sample of his opinions that
could go both ways—the same opinions would exemplify typical articulations
of his key value assertions, and they would also constitute his best judicial
writing from a strictly literary point of view.
Execution of this idea entailed certain modifications, invariably in the
direction of complicating my procedures and adding to my costs (in terms
of both time and data processing). As a graduate student, I had had no
training in content analysis, statistics, computer programming, or any of
the other skills that proved to be important to carrying out the proposed
analysis; so things like these I had to learn as I went along, during the
decade and a half that separates the inception of work and the publication
of the book that presents Jackson’s opinions. I soon learned, for example,
that there was a problem of reliability, concerning the data that would de-
note Jackson’s expressed values, if I were to attempt to rely exclusively
upon my own reading of the opinions (of which there were about three hun-
dred at the time I began reading them all for purposes of the project); so it
became necessary to fund, recruit, train, and work with several academic
generations of graduate student assistants, who comprised the membership
of the panels of three other persons who also read and independently eval-
uated Jackson’s opinions and votes.
Jackson died during the early stages of the project, of a heart attack
at the age of sixty-two (and quite contrary to the prediction that one
would have made, based on mortality tables, in the previous year). One
reader for The University of Chicago Press, to which I subsequently (in
the late fifties) submitted for consideration in regard to publication the
book manuscript which at that time was the fruit of the project, ob-
jected to my statistical approach and deplored my failure to undertake
a lawyerlike case-by-case discussion of the opinions of all of the partic-
ipating justices in the decisions I had analyzed, instead of attempting
to quantify Jackson’s opinions alone (cf. Kommers 1966). Such a focus
would have resulted in a very different book than that I had in mind,
and it would not have taken into account my own particular interest
in Jackson, the individual, as a literary stylist. Frankfurter, for exam-
ple, voted most frequently like Jackson (and vice versa) during the last
eight of the terms that they were together on the Court; but no one who
had ever read many of their respective opinions would ever suggest that
Frankfurter’s legal needlepoint could serve as an adequate substitute
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for Jackson’s “trenchant, concrete, Saxon vigor (Bar and Officers of the
Supreme Court 1955: xxxv; Schubert 1969b: 6–10).”
I was about the only person privy to my original manuscript on Jackson
who liked the mixing of the behavioral and humanist components of the
book. Another reader for The University of Chicago Press advised me to
separate the quantified, statistical analysis of Jackson’s votes and values
and publish that independently from whatever I might do with his opin-
ions. This I was reluctant to do; but I felt that there were other, technical,
problems involving the statistical analysis, so I put the manuscript aside
for a couple of years, while I went on leave, first in Norway, and then at
the CASBS at Stanford. Near the end of my fellowship year at the center
I retrieved the manuscript and made plans for a reanalysis of the data, in
view of the fact that by then I had begun to acquire a better grasp of the
multivariate research methods necessary to a more appropriate (and so-
phisticated) analysis than I had initially undertaken. This work was carried
out after I returned to Michigan State University in the fall of 1961; and
I then wasted another couple of years in a fruitless endeavor to publish
the rather long resulting article in any of several outlets sponsored by the
American Psychological Association. They didn’t like the design, and were
even more troubled by the fact that I wrote like a political scientist instead
of a psychologist; they advised me to send it off to a political science jour-
nal. So eventually I sent it to the American Political Science Review, which
did publish it, and that is the article that appears as chapter 6, below.
After the article had been out for the better part of a year, I raised
with a publisher the question of bringing out the opinions as a strictly
literary book, with no numbers at all; so on the basis of a contract
with him I then went ahead and completed the work that seemed nec-
essary to round out the enterprise. Primarily that consisted of reading
the not inconsiderable corpus of Jackson’s nonjudicial writings, plus the
literature that had appeared during the previous thirty years about him;
theretofore, I had read much, but by no means all of this related liter-
ature, because it was not essential to the content analysis work that I
had been doing. The upshot is a book that presents some fifty-odd of his
best opinions, in each instance with an introduction that explains the
decision of the rest of the Court and appraises its political and social sig-
nificance. I attempted also, in introductory and concluding chapters, to
place Jackson himself in the context of his political and social times, and
to evaluate his significance as a legal spokesman. A variety of additional
delays (including, but by no means limited to, a neurotic copyeditor [who
unbeknown to me was working on contract, rather than on salary, with
the publisher] who disappeared for several months with the manuscript
of my book—she didn’t like the first chapter of it at all) forestalled actual
publication until late in 1969 (1969b), by which time I was living abroad
again. It had been sixteen years since I began; and I suppose a dispas-
sionate observer would have to conclude that the ultimate publication
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of the article and the book were a greater tribute to perseverance than
to prudence. But I still wish they had been published together; the dis-
junction in their format seems to me an excellent symbolization of much
of what has been wrong with both the social sciences and the humani-
ties. Jackson’s behavior, in the form of both his policy and his linguistic
choices, was unified in life, and I think it would have been better if they
could have become joined in my discussion of their interrelationships.
The seventh chapter also is drawn from a large, long, and complex
(though different) project, which began in the summer of 1962 when I com-
menced a luckless correspondence with Geoffrey Sawer, research professor
at Australian National University in Canberra and the doyen of public law-
yers in Australia. Sawer upholds the spirit of legal realism in his country,
and he has written a very good book on legal sociology (1965), plus fre-
quent commentaries upon the High Court and its justices, generally from
a political perspective that would place him in this country in the conven-
tional camp (as I shall call it in Part 3, below). What soon became clear
was that we differed about methodology: he is a legal humanist, with a
considerable vested interest in his status as the authoritative expositor
of judicial behavior on the High Court. He became very much opposed
to the idea of having anybody undertake to interview Australian judges,
or to collect systematic information about their social and political back-
grounds, and most particularly to have such data classified and analyzed
statistically; and he professed to be strongly opposed to having me come
to Australia to undertake such study, because of his certainty that any such
research would be infeasible (because of the lack of judicial cooperation),
doomed to failure (because of inherent defects in the method), and fruit-
less (because of the impossibility that it could lead to meaningful results).
This did not all become clear immediately, but rather over a period of sev-
eral years, in the course of which it also became clear that without his
cooperation there was no suitable means of funding field research in Aus-
tralia, during the early sixties when I was interested in undertaking such
research. So I didn’t do it.
Instead, I limited the inquiry to the library research (that I had in-
tended originally to be preliminary to the field research), supplemented by
a none-too-successful endeavor to collect social background data (unavail-
able in the United States) on High Court justices. The consequence was
distinctly another compromise, and a settling for second (or third) best;
but at the end of a decade there was something (where before there had
been virtually nothing; but cf. Playford 1961) in the way of behavioral re-
search on Australian judges.
During the same decade social science inquiry into the judicial process
was also beginning to take place in Canada, Japan, India, and the Philippines.
My own interest in undertaking cross-cultural research in judicial behavior
stemmed from my Fulbright year in Norway (1959–1960); and so once the
project on the United States Supreme Court was substantially completed at
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the CASBS the following year, and research on the American judicial process
seemed well underway (1963f), I chose Australia in preference to Canada (on
the basis of theoretical criteria, which I have articulated elsewhere [1966b])
as the best place to begin a program of research in comparative judicial be-
havior. As it turned out, I was wrong—at least from a pragmatic point of
view—because the Canadian academic culture was much more receptive, dur-
ing the sixties, to research in judicial behavior. (The irony of life is exemplified,
again, by my own experience: at the close of the fifties I had been forced
into debt by the Fulbright-sabbatical combination, and during the early sixties,
when I would have welcomed an opportunity to do field research in Australia
on a shoestring budget, I was unable to arrange even that; but by the end
of the sixties, I rejected the offer of a very large grant to do field research
in Canadian judicial behavior, because by that time my interests and prior-
ities had shifted and I preferred, instead, to undertake similar work but in
Switzerland and South Africa—even though it meant going back to a shoe-
string budget once again.)
I selected Australia first because it seemed to present a minimum
of cultural variance from the United States, and therefore an opportu-
nity to undertake research in judicial behavior similar to that which had
been and was being done in the United States under circumstances in
which one could expect to have relatively good control over research
comparisons. I decided to begin by reading and coding a sample of the
then most recent decade of the decisions of the High Court of Australia.
For reasons that are discussed in chapter 7, it soon became apparent
that differences in both the style of voting and opinion behavior, and
in the content of policy issues, were going to necessitate changes in
certain aspects of the research design that seemed appropriate for the
United States. The High Court, for example, acted mostly through com-
mittees, and rarely decided issues as a group; opinions were customarily
given individually, if with great collective redundancy; and virtually no
civil liberties claims were considered. Samples of votes were, conse-
quently, relatively much smaller than for the Supreme Court, and there
were forbidding problems of missing data (from the points of view of
either cumulative scaling or correlational analyses). It was also neces-
sary to acquire access to an at least partial set of the case reports,
none of which was available initially at or near either of the universi-
ties where I was resident when I began work on this project. Neither
was there even sketchy biographical information available for the nine
judges who were members of the High Court during the period covered
by my proposed study; and although a projected national biographical
dictionary was in process during the sixties, that publication never be-
came available in time to do me any good. Contrary to the situation in
the United States, where judicial biographies and autobiographies were
plentiful (and in some instances, rife) for Supreme Court justices, a
counterpart literature for Australia was virtually nonexistent (see Pan-
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nam 1961; the only apparent exception is Cowen 1967). But by the time
my need seemed pressing, I had established communication with quite a few
Australian academics besides Geoff Sawer; and one of them, Professor Henry
Mayer, very kindly offered to engage and supervise a research assistant to at-
tempt to collect such information on my behalf. The resulting data were not
ample, but they were adequate to my then limited, and relatively crude, pur-
poses. But no foreigner could expect, on the basis of having read a few books,
to avoid mistakes in judgment in the interpretation of indices to social status
in an alien culture, as I was only too well aware; so I felt no particular chagrin
at the fact that in the use of these biographical data I did make a couple of
judgments that Australians were quick to pounce upon as mistakes (e.g., Vin-
son 1968, reprinted here as an addendum to chap. 7). These I corrected at the
first opportunity (1969d), and went on with the other aspects of the work.
As the research proceeded, I planned to write a series of some half-dozen
reports upon it. As originally projected, these included (1) an initial prelim-
inary, summary, and general discussion, the first draft of which was presented
to a meeting of the fellows at the East-West Center and a subsequent draft to
a panel session of the American Political Science Association (1966b); (2) an
article6 which presents and analyzes in detail the cumulative scales that were
derived—by inductive rather than the customary deductive categorization; (3)
a factor analysis of the same voting data from which the scales were derived,
and a discussion of the ideological dimensions defined by the scales (1968g);
(4) the analysis of opinion behavior and social deference that is reprinted here
as chapter 7; (5) a comparative factor analysis of both voting and opinion data,
demonstrating that the same ideological dimensions were defined by either
votes or opinions, and that votes and opinions are alternative modes of behav-
ioral response representing the same underlying value choices (1969a); and
(6) a causal analysis of the relationships among background characteristics,
decisional participation, attitudes toward policy issues, and (as the dependent
variable) opinions—I chose opinions rather than votes for the dependent vari-
able because they provide a better sample for statistical analysis (1969g). I
6. Schubert 1969d. This paper became the last (instead of, as I had intended, the first) to be
published, due to a manifestation of Australian humor. One T. B. J. Steele, a person purporting to
be the literary editor of the Summons, a law journal at Melbourne University, and writing to me
from the law school there, stated that a copy of the article had “come into [his] hands”—which
seemed plausible, because I had previously submitted it to the Melbourne University Law Re-
view—and that he would be grateful if I would give him permission to publish it in his journal,
which he described as “a magazine which circulates to practitioners and law graduates as well
as to students within the University of Melbourne.” So I sent him the manuscript of what I sup-
posed would be the initially published article, on scale analysis of the Dixon Court’s decisions.
It took many months to confirm that the person who had written to me, and to whom I had sent
the freshly revised and retyped ribbon copy of my manuscript, was, purportedly, unknown at the
University of Melbourne. I never did retrieve the manuscript that I had sent to Melbourne; and
the episode delayed publication of the article by almost two years. It was obviously a great prac-
tical joke.
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also wrote two cross-cultural studies, one comparing the political leadership
role of the High Court of Australia with that of the Supreme Courts of Japan,
the Philippines, and the United States (1967c), and the other the importance
of institutional role concepts in the Philippines compared to that of the state
of Hawaii (Flango and Schubert 1969); but both of these were by-products of
the research, rather than a part of the original design. Evidently, the latter pair
were among the earliest studies of the judicial process to rely upon systematic
empirical analysis, employing a common design, of data for more than a sin-
gle country; at least these are the only two that Murphy and Tanenhaus (1972:
216n.) could find to cite as examples of such an approach.
By 1969 when the last of my own reports on the High Court was pub-
lished, the initiative already had passed (as I had expected and hoped)
into the hands of Australian scholars, drawn from political science and law
faculties alike (R. Douglas 1968; Gow 1971; Neumann 1971; Blackshield
1972). These scholars, who were personally products of the legal and po-
litical cultures about which they wrote, were in a far better position than I
to make valid and sensible judgments about judicial behavior in Australia.
The initial work continued to focus, like my own had done, upon the High
Court; but this indulgence in what some American critics have called the
“supreme court fallacy” has been an invariable characteristic of judicial
process and behavior research in every country concerning which such
work has been done during the past two decades; and it reflects, I have
long been convinced, not some perverse or willful blindness, but rather
a natural expediency, with pioneers in the behavioral approach turning
first to the same institutional subject that had been featured in traditional
research. This initial preoccupation with the country’s supreme court is
followed by a broadening of focus to include the courts at the next level
below, which interact with the supreme court; and then inquiry is extended
to trial and specialized courts and adjudicative processes in other agencies.
It is most likely that this is what will happen in Australia during the seven-
ties. So chapter 7 here should be viewed as a relatively crude enterprise in
cross-cultural research, by a foreigner who lacked both substantive insight
and access to data that alike were needed to support a more sophisticated
study; but at the same time the article succeeded, I believe, in directing
the attention of Australians to a line of inquiry which they had theretofore
neglected. (There was then, after all, no English model of this sort that
they might have followed.)
As an illustration of how the publication of my article called attention to
what was for its Australian legal readers a novel approach (and for its Aus-
tralian sociological readers a novel subject for sociological investigation), I
have appended to chapter 7 the comment by an Australian that appeared
in the same volume of the same journal later in the same year. Evidently,
among the many other American customs that Australians do not follow is
that of inviting an author to reply to such entailed critique of his work, be-
cause I first learned of the Vinson comment when a friend sent me a copy
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of the published version of it. But all questions of courtesy aside, there isn’t
much I could (or should) have said other than to thank Mr. Vinson for his
interest. Beyond the additional details that he provides concerning certain
judges and their families, Vinson corrects two of my mistakes about matters
of attribute classification, at least one of which, involving Justice Kitto, af-
fected my findings and interpretations. I agree that where a judge was born
is far less important than where he grew up and became socialized; and I
had blundered in my classification of Kitto according to domicile, because of
inadequate information about him. But for the other mistake I cannot even
plead ignorance: my own, however limited, data show (Schubert 1969d) that
there is no justification for inserting the qualifier “lower” to modify the
middle-class origins that I attributed to the High Court judges. The phrasing
and choice of adverb suggest that I may have been humming tunes from My
Fair Lady to myself, and became carried away by that muse instead of the
one that I purported to be following. Who knows? Certainly I no longer do,
so I’m not even sure that the adjective was ever consciously employed. On
the other hand, Vinson is a bit hyperbolic himself when in one sentence he
concedes my use of the adverb “typically”, and in the next he asserts that my
use of “lower” “appears to refer to all nine justices covered in the study.” At
least in American usage, “typically” implies “for the most part” or “generally
speaking.” It is notable also that Vinson provides social-class information
about only a bare majority—five—of the judges. Given his assertion that my
use of “lower” applies to all nine justices, one might think his discussion
would have been more complete—as well as more fair—if he had reported
the corresponding social class-origin information for Webb, Williams, Taylor,
and—not least—McTiernan, whose father was a policeman.
One other point should be made about chapter 7. I was at least as inter-
ested in its methodological as in its substantive implications. There had been
a great deal more talk than action in the United States about analysis of opin-
ions and the related social interaction, and apparently the only relevant prior
work was that of Ulmer on the Michigan Supreme Court (1963). The rela-
tive abundance of opinion as compared to voting data, for the Australian High
Court, made possible an analysis of functional in comparison to formal lead-
ership, in relation to the social characteristics of the judges; and this study
of opinion behavior was prerequisite to the subsequent test of the hypothesis
that—contrary to the intuitive expectations of many American commenta-
tors—opinion and voting behavior do in fact function as alternative sides of
the same decisional coin (Schubert 1969a). And in this latter respect, chapter
7 constitutes an extension, both to a larger group of judges and to a foreign
setting, of the equivalent concern which from its inception had informed also
the Jackson project.
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4
A Factorial
Model of the
Roosevelt Court
Over a decade has elapsed since Thurstone and Degan (1951) published
what remains the only attempt to use factor psychology (Guilford 1961)
and factor analytic methods in a study of the United States Supreme Court.
This pilot research in the application of factor analysis to official voting
data has been summarized in a textbook (Fruchter 1954) as an example of
obverse (Q-technique) factor analysis, but its usefulness to psychologists,
political scientists, sociologists, or lawyers has been limited by the inabil-
ity of the original authors to interpret the factorial resolution that they
deemed appropriate to the data (Thurstone and Degan 1951: 4). The pur-
pose of this article is to demonstrate that these same data are amenable to
an intuitively plausible interpretation by the employment of a specific psy-
chometric model of the Supreme Court. The proposed model utilizes, but
is not limited to, factor psychology for the interpretation of the relation-
ship between stimulus and response points in what Coombs (1964: chap.
1) calls a joint multidimensional psychological space.
This chapter was originally published, in slightly different form, as “A Solution to the In-
determinate Factorial Resolution of Thurstone and Degan’s Study of the Supreme Court” in
Behavioral Science 7 (October 1962): 448–458.
This article was prepared with the very substantial aid and assistance of the Center for Ad-
vanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. In particular, I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness
to John Gilbert, staff statistician, and to my colleague of the fellowship year 1960–1961, Profes-
sor Clyde Coombs of the Department of Psychology of the University of Michigan.
A very brief description of the Thurstone and Degan study will be fol-
lowed by a description of the proposed alternative model, and a proposed
solution to the problem of indeterminancy in accounting for the variance in
the Supreme Court’s decision-making in the set of decisions that comprise
the raw data.
I. THE THURSTONE-DEGAN STUDY
Because of the brevity with which the authors described their universe
of raw data, it is impossible to be certain precisely what they observed in
the United States Reports, since there are serious empirical problems of
classification of judicial opinions and votes (cf. Schubert 1959: 164–166)
concerning which there is as yet no consensus among lawyers and political
scientists who are specialists in the study of judicial behavior and/or the
Supreme Court. However, they did observe, generally speaking, decisions
in which from two to four justices disagreed with the majority during the
period from October 1943 through June 1945; and their sample included
a set of 115 subsets of votes of the justices, classified dichotomously as
either in agreement (+) or in disagreement (–) with the majority who con-
trolled the disposition of cases in specific decisions. Phi coefficients were
then computed from fourfold tables for each pair of justices; and the re-
sulting 9 × 9, symmetric correlation matrix was factored by the complete
centroid method. The orthogonal factor matrix was then rotated obliquely
to simple structure (Table 2, from Thurstone and Degan 1951: 5), thus
yielding the configuration of points and the factorial resolution depicted in
Figure 2 (from Thurstone and Degan 1951: 6–7).
The authors’ conclusion with regard to Figure 2 was that “The entire
configuration of nine vectors might be thought of as representing actually
five distinct attitudes or points of view which … would then be represented
by [five groups of] the judges as follows, namely, (1) Reed and Stone, (2)
Murphy and Rutledge, (3) Black and Douglas, (4) Frankfurter and Roberts,
and (5) Jackson and, to a lesser degree, Frankfurter” (Thurstone and De-
gan 1951: 3). Consultations by the authors with colleagues in the political
science and law faculties proved to be inconclusive, since these experts
were unable to agree upon any common interpretation of the “groupings
of attitudes” that were associated with the oblique rotated factors. As an
alternative, it was suggested (p. 4) that by a reexamination of the raw
data “with grouping according to the votes of the judges it should be
possible to clarify more objectively just what the factors are that are com-
mon to the cases,” although the authors thought that such further work
should be done by subject matter specialists rather than by psychologists.
Such further work is the basis for the present paper, on the premise that
the Thurstone and Degan study constitutes an imaginative and highly sug-
gestive demonstration of the potential utility of factor psychology for the
investigation of political attitudes and the study of political behavior.
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Figure 2. The Judicial Point Configuration after Oblique Rotation of the
Reference Axes to Simple Structure
The authors of the original study suggest that they would expect the
factors to represent attitudes toward such general issues as civil rights and
economic liberalism, but they do not explain how and why a correlation matrix
representing dyadic agreement with the Court’s majorities changes to sets of
individual correlations with substantively defined variables. It will be recalled
that the raw data observed consisted of votes that were classified so that +
was defined to mean “voted in agreement with the majority whose decision
controlled the disposition of a case” and – was defined to mean disagreement
with the majority; neither + nor – was defined in terms of the subject mat-
ter of the cases decided, and a computer is given no information about the
substantive variables involved in the decisions of the cases to which assent-
ing and dissenting votes relate. If, as Thurstone and Degan speculated, a high
correlation of an individual justice with a particular factor is to be interpreted
to mean (for example) an attitude of considerable sympathy for freedom of
speech as a constitutional right, then the votes to which such a correlation co-
efficient relates have been reclassified, at least implicitly, so that + now means
“relatively considerable sympathy for free speech” and – means a lesser de-
gree of such sympathy.
Such a reclassification of the meaning attributed to judicial votes im-
plies a discussion of the relationship of judicial cases (as a source of raw
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data) to the ideal-points of the justices. Indeed, the basic stimulus-response
model which Thurstone and Degan assumed implies that both kinds of
points are located somewhere in the same psychological space, since each
stimulus-response dyad symbolizes different aspects—perception and re-
sponse—of the behavior of the same organism in the empirical world.
II. A PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL OF SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING
An obvious strategy, therefore, for one who would seek to bridge the gap
between judicial attitudes and judicial votes would be to construct a psycho-
logical model of Supreme Court decision-making by using a multidimensional
generalization of the stimulus-response model to define the psychological
space and the underlying measurement relationships (Schubert 1961a). The
hypothesis to be tested is that the attitudes of each individual justice toward
the major variables which define the substantive value content of sets of cases
before the Court for decision cause him to react through his voting to the stim-
uli presented by the cases.
A Composition Model for the Voting Behavior of the Justices
In his general theory of data, Coombs (1964) classifies the mapping and
the analysis of the recorded observations of raw psychological data accord-
ing to three criteria: whether (1) the observations are of one or two pairs of
points; (2) a pair consists of an individual’s ideal-point and a stimulus-point,
or of two stimulus-points; and (3) the measurement relationship of the pair (or
pairs) of points is one of ordinality or proximity. The joint application of these
three criteria results, of course, in eight categories, and both factor analysis
and cumulative scaling are mapped into the same octant of Coombs’ classi-
fication chart; both involve ordinal measurement of the relationship between
a pair of points drawn from distinct sets (i.e., a pair consists of an individ-
ual’s ideal-point and a stimulus-point). In other words, at the abstract level of
Coombs’ theory of data, both metric and nonmetric factor analysis and cumu-
lative scaling are conceptualized as alternative approaches to the same basic
measurement problem, which Coombs has defined as:
Phij > 0 < = > i > j. (1)
In other words, “if, and only if, at the moment h, the point corresponding to
the individual [i], dominates the point corresponding to the stimulus [j], the
individual responds positively to the stimulus,” where Phij is defined as the dis-
tance between the pair of points in the joint space of the relevant dimensions,
and where < = > signifies “implies and is implied by.” (Coombs 1964: chaps.
1–4: Quadrant IIa.)
Coombs and his associates also have worked on methods and models
for multidimensional extension of the one-dimensional Guttman model of cu-
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mulative scaling, and Coombs and Kao (1960) recently have shown that
metric factor analysis and multidimensional cumulative scaling (or, as Coombs
prefers to call it, nonmetric factor analysis) may—given suitable data—pro-
vide alternative methods of data processing for the recovery of i- and j-points
in the same genotypic space. In his theory of data, Coombs (1964: chap. 12)
explicitly considers nonmetric factor analysis to be a multidimensional gen-
eralization of Guttman scalogram analysis. Thus, the theoretical equivalence
between scaling and factorial measurement of stimulus-response dyadic dis-
tances in r-dimensional space has been suggested, and established at least
to the extent that it does not seem unreasonable to posit such equivalence
as a hypothesis in constructing a model of the Court. Although the raw data
for Supreme Court decision-making do not provide sufficient information to
permit deterministic analysis of voting choices by means of multidimensional
scaling techniques, it is useful to borrow a concept developed in the work
in multidimensional unfolding, since we shall assume the theoretical equiva-
lence of factor analysis, for which the data are adequate. The relevant concept
is that of the individual compensatory composition model (Torgerson 1958:
345–359; Coombs 1964: chap. 12) according to which (1) it is the individual
(rather than the stimulus) who determines the weighting function, which is
considered to be constant over all stimuli for the responses of that individ-
ual; and (2) it is not essential that the individual exceed the stimulus on all
relevant dimensions, since it may be possible for him to compensate for his
deficiency on one dimension with an excess on other dimensions—depending
upon the precise location of both the i-point and the j-point, and the number
of dimensions, which obviously must be more than one.
Judicial Votes as Attitudinal Responses
Both cases and justices are conceptualized as sets of vectors in the same
psychological space. A case which has been accepted by the Court for decision
on its merits raises questions about one or more issues of value (which may be
denominated as questions of law, public policy, etc.), in relationship to a par-
ticular set of facts which tends to specify more precisely the meaning of these
questions of value.
In the simplest circumstance where only one variable is operative in a
case, the particular issue perceived by an individual justice defines for him
the relevant variable for decision-making in the case, and his response will
be determined by the projection of his i-point on the scale axis which rep-
resents this variable. Cases which raise questions of differing degrees of
valuation about the same variable (e.g., sympathy for constitutional claims
of the right to counsel in state criminal trials) are located at various points
in the space but in an approximate linear relationship to each other; thus,
each such point may be conceived of as lying upon or near an axis repre-
senting the variable (or variable cluster), which intersects the space. A case
which is perceived by the justices to raise a question concerning only one
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variable is located precisely upon the line of the axis for that variable, at a
particular positive or negative distance from the origin corresponding to the
degree of valuation of the question. Through the centroid of a set of scale
axes, representing a set of civil liberties subvariables, would pass an axis
representing a broadly defined heterogeneous variable (such as “all civil lib-
erties” cases for a given term); and this axis would follow the trace of the
mean of the projections of all the relevant j-points for cases.
The i-points also project on the scale axes, and the loci of these respon-
dent-points is determined by the correlations that each has with these scale
axes (that is, by the orthogonal projections on each axis from each point).
Where a justice “is” in the space, therefore, is a function of his attitudes to-
ward the major decisional variables, as these attitudes have been sampled by
his voting responses to questions of valuation raised by particular cases dur-
ing the specified period of analysis.
If the attitude of the justice is such that he agrees with (accepts, responds
positively or affirmatively to) the degree and intensity of valuation which he
perceives a case to demand, he votes in support of the variable; otherwise, he
rejects or votes against it. How a case will be decided by the Court depends,
therefore, upon where the i-points of a majority of the justices participating
in a decision are located in relationship to their individual perceptions of the
locus of the j-point representing the case.
The Relationship between Scaling and Factorial Measurements
The orthogonal factor matrix of Table 4 provides the necessary informa-
tion, as determined by Thurstone and Degan, to plot the configuration of
i-points in three dimensions. The orthogonal reference axes need not be ro-
tated, since the analysis and interpretation below, which are based upon the
composition model and theory of voting behavior of the justices described
Table 4. Centroid and Rotated Oblique Factor Loadings for Supreme
Court Justices, 1943 and 1944 Terms
Centroid Matrix Oblique Matrix
Justices I II* III* A B C
Mu (Murphy) .67 .24 .17 .02 – .49 – .39
Ru (Rutledge) .64 .10 .10 .14 – .33 – .31
Bl (Black) .80 – .23 – .24 .63 – .03 – .05
D (Douglas) .70 – .29 – .31 .67 .08 .05
S (Stone) – .53 – .38 .23 – .04 .49 – .04
Re (Reed) – .21 – .45 .06 .23 .48 .02
F (Frankfurter) – .57 .19 – .08 – .35 .04 .27
J (Jackson) – .28 .23 – .58 – .02 – .01 .64
Ro (Roberts) – .64 .23 .10 – .49 – .01 .12
* Reflected (with reversed polarity).
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in the preceding sections, do not involve the imputation of substantive
meaning to the factorial axes. The orthogonal factor axes are statistical
constructs which provide a frame of reference for the space in which is
located the configuration of i-points; although it may be possible to infer
appropriate labels for the factors, this is not an essential nor even necessar-
ily a useful step in interpretation under the model of the Court’s behavior
that is proposed here. What is essential is to pass scale axes through this
factor space in such a way that the ordinal rankings of i-points on the re-
spective scales correlate positively high, and at an acceptable probability
level with the ordinal ranking upon these same scale axes of the projections
from the i-points; and these latter points already have been determined in
a fixed and invariant configuration by the factor measurement. Of course,
the substantive content of the scale axes must correspond to the major pol-
icy issues decided by the Court during the period of time under analysis;
in other words, the set of cumulative scales must include a classification
of the same raw data that were used for the factor analysis, although the
Guttman procedures will map these data both differently and independently
from the factor analysis.
III. AN EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF THE MODEL
It would, of course, have been possible to collect the data for the
scale analysis directly from the official case reports; but in order to pro-
vide an even more rigorous test of the theory, it has been considered
preferable to utilize data that have been collected independently, and
for quite different purposes, by a third researcher. Pritchett’s study of
the Roosevelt Court (1948), which was published over a decade ago and
prior to the Thurstone and Degan study, appears to be the only available
source of data that might be adapted for present purposes. Pritchett
does not report his observations of the raw data, but he does report
matrices of paired agreement in dissenting votes, by terms of the Court,
and other information on the basis of which it is possible to reconstruct
a set of fourfold tables which will reproduce a satisfactory approximation
of the correlation matrix reported by Thurstone and Degan. (The repro-
duced correlation for the Douglas-Black dyad, for instance, is .53, while
the correlation for this dyad reported by Thurstone and Degan is .59;
for the Black-Roberts dyad, the reproduced correlation is – .67, while
the correlation reported by Thurstone and Degan for this dyad is – .66;
and for the Murphy-Rutledge dyad, the reproduced correlation is .43 as
compared to .46 in the original study.) The purpose of making this check
is to establish a basis for confidence in the assumption that, although
there is no mention in Pritchett’s book of either factor analysis or cumu-
lative scaling, he did indeed observe the same raw data as was observed
by Thurstone and Degan; and therefore it is reasonable to assume that,
since Pritchett also reports measurements in the form of scales, there is
some justification for inferring that the ordinal rankings of the justices
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on Pritchett’s scales are at least rough approximations to the set of ordi-
nal rankings that would be derived from cumulative scaling of the same
data.
The Error Variance
Pritchett’s scales consist of simple percentage rankings of the justices,
according to the proportion of the cases, in a sample relating to a particu-
lar value, in which each justice voted in favor of what was defined as the
positive direction of the continuum for the value. One source of error, if
one is to adapt Pritchett’s scales to define the ordinal ranking of the jus-
tices on the scale axes, results from the fact that it is only assumed that
Pritchett’s rankings are about the same as those derivable from cumula-
tive scaling of the same cases. This assumption seems justified because
of the success that has been achieved in cumulative scaling for recent
terms (Schubert 1962b; Spaeth 1963b; Ulmer 1961b) of many of the same
variables that Pritchett defines, although it is not known for certain that
Pritchett’s scales are based upon universes of data that are scalable in the
Guttman sense during the time period that they cover.
A second source of possible error can be attributed to the circumstance
that Pritchett’s scales are based upon a temporal interval of six years, with
the Thurstone-Degan sample for the 1943 and 1944 terms falling in the middle
of Pritchett’s period, which spans the 1941 through 1946 terms. It seems al-
together likely that rankings based upon the 1943 and 1944 terms would not
be completely typical of the longer period, although the extent to which they
may have deviated and the nature of such deviance are unknown. It is also
possible that the variables that Pritchett scaled for the longer period are not
precisely the same as one might prefer to work with for cumulative scaling of
the shorter period alone.
In addition to these errors that are likely to arise in the adaptation
of Pritchett’s scales, the present writer has determined experimentally, by
the study of a set of hypothetical data for which both i- and j-points were
plotted as observations of imaginary raw data, that the total error variance
due to the correlational and factor analysis is about 10 percent. The latter
finding confirms the wisdom of Thurstone and Degan’s decision to work
with three factors, since it seems doubtful that much confidence can be
reposed in factors extracted beyond the third, in applying centroid factor
analysis to data of this type, considering the characteristically small mag-
nitude of the correlations in the third and subsequent residual matrices.
Ordinarily one could assume that error variance arising from the use of
cumulative scales with acceptable reproducibility levels would be less than
the factor error variance, but in this particular instance it is necessary to
be aware of the likelihood that the error variance in the rankings on the
scales is at least as great as the error variance in the location of the con-
figuration of i-points by the factor routine.
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The Ordinal Scales
Although Pritchett (1948) reports scales of other subvariables that might
have been selected for present purposes, the most generalized variables with
which he attempted to work were two broad aspects of liberalism as a socio-
political value: civil liberty and economic liberalism. According to the theory
advanced by the present writer, the paravariable of liberalism should ap-
pear in the factor space as a centroid axis between the scale axes of civil
liberty and economic liberalism, so a general scale of liberalism has been con-
structed from Pritchett’s data for the civil liberty and economic liberalism
variables. Moreover, the theory also stipulates that both the civil liberty and
economic liberalism variables will appear in the factor space as the centroids
of sets of scale axes representing subvariables. In order to demonstrate this
relationship, “support of labor’s claims and interests” has been selected as a
characteristic subvariable of economic liberalism, and “support of workmen’s
compensation claims” has been selected as a characteristic sub-subvariable of
the prolabor subvariable. The five scales presented in Table 5 represent, there-
fore, four different levels of generalization, and two categories of substantive
differentiation, of liberalism as a sociopolitical value.
Pritchett’s tables report, for each justice, the percentage of votes in sup-
port of the variable. These percentages have been converted to scores ranging
from + 1 to – 1 by use of the formula,
s = 2P − 100100 ,
(2)
where s is the score shown in Table 5, and P is the percentage reported by
Table 5. Scales of the Liberalism Variable and Subvariables for the
Stone Court (1941–1946 Terms)
Scale Variables
L
(Liberalism)
CL
(Civil liberty)
EL
(Economic
liberalism)
EL-L
(Prolabor)
EL-L-WC
(Workmen’s
compensation)
Justices 1 2 3 4 5
Mu .72 .88 .64 .88 1.00
Rn .54 .66 .50 .76 1.00
Bl .62 .32 .76 .86 1.00
D .54 .26 .64 .72 1.00
S – .27 – .14 – .32 – .36 – .60
Re – .10 – .44 .04 .32 .08
F – .28 – .32 – .22 – .12 – .16
J – .26 – .40 – .24 .04 .10
Ro – .66 – .42 – .76 – .90 – .88
Page references in
Pritchett (1948)
254,
257 254 257
208,
257 208
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Table 6. Reference Axis Coordinates, Coefficients, and Cosines for
Scale Axes
Scale Axes
L CL EL EL-L EL-L-WCCoordinates/
coefficients 1 2 3 4 5
I/α 1.00 .90 1.00 1.00 1.00
II*/β – .10 .40 – .10 .10 .20
III*/γ .40 1.00 .10 .00 .10
Cosines
Figure 2a – 06° 24° – 06° 06° 11°
Figure 2b 22° 48° 06° 00° 06°
Figure 2c 104° 68° 135° 00° 26.5°
* Reflected (with reversed polarity).
Pritchett. Scale 1 is based upon a set of average percentages calculated from
the totals columns of Pritchett’s summary tables.
The Scale Axes
Table 6 gives the reference axis coordinates and the corresponding
cosines, which have been used to plot the scale variables as scale axes in
the factor space defined by the centroid reference axes reported by Thur-
stone and Degan (Table 4). Since the direction of orthogonal axes extracted
by the complete centroid method is arbitrary, reference axes II* and III*
have been reflected, as noted in the footnote to Table 6, in order to reverse
the signs of factor loadings reported by Thurstone and Degan, so that the
point configuration and scale axes can be shown in positions that are char-
acteristic. These characteristic positions for the justices and the liberalism
scale axes have been determined by research on subsequent terms of the
Court by the present writer. The scale axes have been positioned in the
factor space so as to maximize the positive correlation between judicial
rankings on Pritchett’s scales and on the scale axes. In order to deter-
mine the latter set of rankings, it is necessary to ascertain the orthogonal
projections from the i-points on each scale axis, in the various possible
positions that it might assume. The distance from the origin to the point
which is closest to a given i-point, on any scale axis, is computed by use
of a standard formula from analytical geometry,
d = αx + ßy + γz
(α2+ ß2+ γ2)1/2 (3)
where d is the distance from the origin to the point on the scale axis where
it is orthogonal to the projection from the i-point; x, y, and z are coordi-
nates on the centroid factor axes for the i-point; and α, β, and γ are the
coefficients which determine the position of the scale axis in the three-di-
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mensional factor space. Alpha, beta, and gamma are derived by trial and
error, working with the factor matrix. A reasonably close first approxima-
tion for the values of these weights is suggested by an examination of
two-dimensional plots (viz., as in Figure 3) of the configuration of i-points
in the factor space. It should be noted that the same coefficients are also
the reference axis coordinates for the positive terminus of the scale axes
in Figure 3. It is not assumed that the positions in which the scale axes
have been placed constitute a uniquely “best” fit to the configuration of i-
points; but it is assumed that the positions defined in Table 6, as computed
by the use of Equation (3) and shown in Figure 3, are an appropriate and
approximately correct solution. One way to conceptualize this question is
to think of a cone which intercepts a small circular area on the surface
of a unit sphere; all axes lying within the cone are so positioned that the
coefficients, which determine the position of each axis, will array along the
axis the projections from i-points so as to produce the same set of rankings
of the justices as will be produced by any other axis within the cone.
Figure 3. Scale Axes and the Judicial Point Configuration in the Orthogo-
nal Factor Space
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Table 7. Judicial Correlations with Scale Axes
Scale Axes
L CL EL EL-L EL-L-WC
Justices 1 2 3 4 5
Mu .66 .62 .66 .69 .72
Ru .62 .51 .63 .65 .65
Bl .67 .32 .79 .77 .71
D .56 .15 .69 .67 .60
S – .37 – .28 – .46 – .57 – .57
Re – .13 – .30 – .16 – .25 – .29
F – .57 – .37 – .59 – .55 – .53
J – .49 – .53 – .36 – .26 – .28
Ro – .58 – .27 – .65 – .61 – .57
Figure 3 shows the set of two-dimensional plots of the five scale axes
in relationship to the point configuration determined for the centroid fac-
tor space. The orthogonal projections on the scale axes from the points,
in the three-dimensional space, are given in Table 7 as distances from the
origin on the scale axes. In Figure 3a, the L axis is almost parallel to refer-
ence axis I; and in these two dimensions, the first centroid factor is a good
approximation of the liberalism axis. The L and EL axes coincide in the
first two dimensions, and the subvariables of EL (EL-L and EL-L-WC) lie
between EL and CL. In Figure 3b, the CL axis lies almost equally spaced
between reference axes I and III*, while EL is again almost parallel to I,
and L now appears as the centroid between CL and EL. In these first and
third dimensions, EL-L coincides with I, while EL-L-WC coincides with EL.
Since our three dimensions define a space corresponding to a cube, Fig-
ure 3c shows the “end-on” view, and confirms the impressions that one
gets from the top view of Figure 3a and the side view of Figure 3b. In
accordance with our theory, the L axis should be positioned as the three-
dimensional centroid of the CL and the EL axes, and this is clearly seen to
be the case. The EL-L and EL-L-WC axes should be almost parallel to each
other and in such a relation to EL that, if other subvariables of economic
liberalism were identified and plotted as scale axes, the EL axis would ap-
pear as the centroid of the set of such axes; the relationship among the
three EL axes shown certainly is consistent with such an interpretation.
Moreoever, the EL-L-WC axis is the closest of the three economic liberal-
ism axes to the CL axis, which is tantamount to saying that the issue raised
by claims to compensation by injured workers is closer to the general set
of civil liberties issues than are the rights of labor or issues of economic
liberalism generally. This finding is not only intuitively plausible, but it has
also been supported by other research which suggests that judicial atti-
tudes toward workmen’s compensation claims are an excellent index to
more generalized attitudes toward liberalism (Schubert 1959: 129–142).
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The most striking finding suggested by Table 7 is that this set of Supreme
Court justices was clearly partitioned into liberal and conservative subsets:
Murphy, Rutledge, Black, and Douglas are positively correlated, and the re-
maining justices are negatively correlated, with all five of the scale axes.
Murphy and Rutledge evince the greatest sympathy for claims of civil liberty,
while Black and Douglas are the strongest supporters of economic liberalism.
Black is the justice most favorable to the claims of labor and economic lib-
eralism generally, while Murphy is most favorable to civil liberties. Among
the conservative justices, Reed is the most favorable on the EL scales, while
Roberts is the most conservative justice in his attitudes toward issues of eco-
nomic liberalism. All of these findings correspond very well to Pritchett’s
findings (Table 5). If Pritchett’s scales are used as norms, most justices are
appropriately spaced on the scale axes although the mean absolute variance
is least for the L axis, slightly greater and equal for the CL and EL axes, and
considerably larger for the two axes which represent subvariables of EL. The
correspondence between paired rankings, however, is much closer.
A Correlational Test of the Theory
Table 8 shows the rank correlations for the five pairs of scales and scale
axes. Of the total of seven inconsistencies, two are in the ranks on the L
axis, because of the Murphy-Black and Jackson-Stone reversals. These are
trivial, however, because Murphy and Black are almost tied on the L axis,
and Jackson and Stone are almost tied on the L scale. Murphy and Black are
again reversed, as are Rutledge and Douglas, on the labor axis, although
these are also trivial inconsistencies, since Murphy and Black are practi-
Table 8. Correlation of Judicial Ranks on Scales and Scale Axes
L CL EL EL-L
EL-L
WC
Variables 1 2 3 4 5
Rankings based on table 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4
Justices
Mu 1 2* 1 1 2.5 3 1 2* 2.5 1
Ru 3.5 3 2 2 4 4 3 4* 2.5 3
Bl 2 1 3 3 1 1 2 1 2.5 2
D 3.5 4 4 4 2.5 3 4 3 2.5 4
S 7 6 5 6 8 7 8 8 8 8
Re 5 5 9 7* 5 5 5 5 6 6
F 8 8 6 8 6 8* 7 7 7 7
J 6 7* 7 9 7 6 6 6 5 5
Ro 9 9 8 5* 9 9 9 9 9 9
Rank correlation
coefficient (tau)
.873 .722 .873 .889 .913
Significance level,
1-tailed (p)
<.00043 .00290 <.00043 .00012 .00043
* Inconsistent rankings.
A FACTORIAL MODEL OF THE ROOSEVELT COURT . 85
cally tied on the labor scale, and Rutledge and Douglas are almost tied
on both the scale and the axis. Both Reed and Roberts are inconsistently
ranked on the CL axis, because of their relatively low negative loadings;
and Frankfurter’s rank on the EL axis is inconsistent because of his high
negative loading. Otherwise, the rankings on the axes are all consistent
with the rankings on the corresponding scales.
The correlations are remarkably high, ranging from .72 to .91; and the
probabilities associated with these coefficients are all less than three chances
in a thousand. In other words, if one were to plot Pritchett’s scales against
i-point configurations in three dimensions, the coordinates for which were
drawn from tables of random numbers, he would have to repeat the experi-
ment hundreds of times before he could expect to encounter as high a positive
correlation for any one pair of rankings; and of course, the odds against repli-
cating by chance as good a fit for all five pairs of rankings are considerably
higher.
It seemed preferable to avoid tied ranks; consequently Table 8 shows
no ties in the axis ranks, and there are only the few that Pritchett reported
in the scale ranks. However, it is obvious that the error variance in either
set of measurements is sufficiently large so that one might reasonably con-
sider all close scores in Tables 5 and 7 to be tied in rank. Defining “close” as
a difference of less than .05, ten additional tied doubles and five tied triples
are produced in the scale and axis rankings. The resulting rank correla-
tions, however, are just as high as those reported above, ranging from .82
to .93, with the highest significance level being .002; so the error variance
in both sets of rankings appears to be unsystematic. As a further check,
Spearman rank correlation coefficients were also computed, for the pair
rankings shown in Table 8; rho was higher than tau for CL (.817), and it
was also higher for the other four sets of rankings, ranging from .94 to .97,
with a significance level of .0041 for the CL coefficient and of less than .001
for the others.
It seems quite clear that the scales and their corresponding axes are
very highly correlated, and it makes little difference which method of rank
correlation is preferred for the measurement of the relationship. Moreover,
the level of significance seems to be well within the limits of confidence usu-
ally accepted for attitudinal measurement. It seems reasonable to conclude
that the justices voted as they did in the set of cases under examination be-
cause of their respective individual attitudes toward the liberal values that
the cases evoked for decision. The centroid factor routine locates the i-points
of justices as it does in the factor space primarily because of the differen-
tials in the attitudes of the justices toward different aspects of liberalism. Of
course, it is altogether likely, and related research in more recent terms of the
Court (Schubert 1962b) confirms, that other values than those of liberalism
are raised in cases for decision by the Court. But the liberalism values so pre-
dominated, in a quantitative as well as a qualitative sense, that they can well
account for all but a small portion of the variance in the voting behavior of the
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justices during the two terms examined in this paper.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper has been to suggest a theory of the voting be-
havior of Supreme Court justices, and to describe a method which can be used
to provide a test of the theory. It is believed that the application of the theory
and method to sets of factor data provided by Thurstone and Degan and at-
titudinal data provided by Pritchett has made possible a plausible solution to
the problem of factorial interpretation that was left unresolved by the earlier
study of Thurstone and Degan. It is also possible that the proposed combi-
nation of factor analysis and cumulative scaling, within a multidimensional
composition model suggested by Coombs’ theory of data, may prove to be of
general interest to psychologists who are concerned with the empirical prob-
lem of measuring attitudinal differences among a small number of respondents
who are presented with a large number of stimuli, under circumstances such
that the group decision-making process is highly stylized and quite routine,
and it is reasonable to suspect that the stimuli raise questions about a limited
number of basic values toward which the respondents’ attitudes are functions
of consistently high levels of cognition.
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5
A Psychological
Analysis of the
Warren Court
Much recent research in the decision-making of the United States Su-
preme Court has been characterized by a pronounced emphasis upon the
invocation of sociopsychological theory (Spaeth 1961; Ulmer 1961a, 1961b)
and statistical methods of data processing (Fisher 1960; Kort 1960b; Nagel
1960; Tanenhaus 1960) in lieu of exclusive reliance upon the legal-historical
theory and methods typical of most research in this field of study. Symbolic
of this development is the increasing tendency of political scientists to con-
sider constitutional law as an aspect of political behavior as well as a branch
of law, and correspondingly, to study the subject matter as judicial behavior.
Naturally, this recent work has evinced a preoccupation with unidimensional
analysis, since it is less complicated to work with one variable than with many,
and the experience so gained no doubt is a prerequisite to multivariate
study. Nevertheless, students who remain committed to the more traditional
workways in constitutional law are quite right in insisting, as they do, that
most Supreme Court cases raise what at least appear prima facie to be many
issues for decision, and that their more subjective and impressionistic mode
This chapter was originally published, in slightly different form, as “The 1960 Term of
the Supreme Court: a Psychological Analysis” in American Political Science Review 56 (March
1962): 90–107.
This article was prepared with the very substantial aid and assistance of the Center for Ad-
vanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. In particular, I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness
to John Gilbert, staff statistician, and to my colleague of the fellowship year 1960–1961, Profes-
sor Clyde Coombs of the Department of Psychology of the University of Michigan.
of analysis retains the great virtue of not oversimplifying the rich complex-
ity of many Supreme Court cases to the extent that inescapably seems to
be required by the newer theories and methods. Clearly, further advances
in the behavioral study of Supreme Court decision-making depend upon the
development of multidimensional models of Court action, which will make
possible the observation and measurement of interrelationships among the
significant major variables that in combination provide the basis for an
adequate explanation of the manifest differences in the voting and opinion
behavior of the justices.
The purpose of this article is to describe one such multidimensional
model of the Court, and to explain its theory and application to the empir-
ical data of the most recent session of the United States Supreme Court,
which terminated only a month prior to the time when this was written.
Substantively, the purpose is to demonstrate that the psychological ap-
proach to be proposed leads to more significant, more comprehensible, and
more valid insights into the political behavior of the Supreme Court than
seem to be provided by the case-by-case approach—an approach that at-
tempts to realize the same ends by the quite different means of a series of
précis upon what are inevitably (since there must be some space limitations
in professional journals) a fraction of the hundred-odd cases that the Court
decides nonunanimously on the merits each term. The specific hypothesis
to be tested is that most of the variance in the voting behavior of the jus-
tices can be accounted for by the differences in their individual attitudes
toward a small number of fundamental issues of public policy. These public
policy issues constitute the variables of this study.
I. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
Since both a general statement of the theory (Schubert 1961a, 1962d)
and a technical description of the method (Schubert 1962a) have been
published elsewhere, only the essentials needed for comprehension of the
substantive findings will be presented here. In accordance with modern psy-
chometric theory (Coombs 1964: chaps. 1, 11, 12; Coombs and Kao 1960;
Guilford 1961), which generalizes the basic stimulus-response point rela-
tionship, Supreme Court cases are treated as raw psychological data which
embody the choices of the individual justices among a variety of stimuli.
Each case before the Court for decision is conceptualized as being repre-
sented by a stimulus (j) point, which is located somewhere in a psychological
space of the relevant dimensions, depending upon the number and inten-
sity of issues that it raises. The combination of the attitudes of each justice
toward these same issues also may be represented by an ideal (i) point, lo-
cated in the same psychological space. In each decision of the Court, what
is observed is the relationship between the i-point of each justice and the
j-point for the case. The relationship that is measured is one of dominance;
that is, whether the position of the i-point in the dimensions that define
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the space equals or exceeds, or is less than, the position of the j-point
in these dimensions. Technically, an individual-compensatory composition
model (Torgersen 1958: 352–359; Coombs 1964: chap. 12) is assumed: for
an i-point to dominate a j-point, it is not essential that the individual equal
or exceed the stimulus on all of the relevant dimensions, since an individ-
ual may (in appropriate instances) be able to compensate for his deficiency
on one (or more) dimensions by an excess on other dimensions. To take a
specific example, let us assume a simple two-dimensional space, where the
relevant dimensions are judicial attitudes toward “civilian control over the
military” and “stare decisis.” A justice like Clark, whose attitude toward
the civilian control variable was relatively negative or unsympathetic, might
nevertheless be induced to vote in support of this value in a particular deci-
sion, because his relatively positive attitude toward stare decisis might lead
him to follow a recent precedent, even though he had disagreed with the
decision establishing it. Thus, his deficiency (in relationship to the degree
of support for civil liberties demanded by the later case) might be compen-
sated for by his strongly pro-stare decisis views. Conversely, a justice like
Frankfurter, whose attitude toward civilian control was more positive than
Clark’s, might nevertheless vote against this value because of his slight re-
gard for the value of stare decisis.1
Next let us consider the conjoint relationship between the i-points of all
nine justices, assuming full participation in the decision, and a particular j-
point. Obviously, how the case will be decided will depend upon whether a
majority or a minority of the i-points dominate the j-point. If a majority of
i-points dominate, then the value or values raised by the case will be upheld
or supported by the decision “of the Court”; and if, to the contrary, the j-
point dominates a majority of the i-points, then the value or values raised by
the case will be rejected—“the Court” will refuse to support them. To take a
concrete example, let us assume the general value “civil liberty,” and the spe-
cific question whether “the Fourteenth Amendment requires” the Supreme
Court to reverse a state court conviction of a criminal defendant, based in
part upon evidence procured as the result of an unreasonable search or
seizure. According to the theory proposed, it would be assumed that the i-
points of no more than three justices dominated the j-point representing this
issue at the time of the decision in Wolf v. Colorado, and that no more than
four did so throughout the following decade. As a consequence of Stewart’s
appointment and of Black’s explicitly avowed shift in attitude toward this is-
sue, a majority of i-points did dominate when the issue arose once again for
disposition in Mapp v. Ohio, a decision announced on the closing decision day
of the 1960 Term; and consequently, Wolf v. Colorado was overruled. Actually,
the voting division in Mapp v. Ohio was 6–3, with Clark both supplying the ex-
tra favorable vote and writing the opinion of the Court; Clark’s position should
1. See Kinsella v. Singleton, Grisham v. Hagan, McElroy v. Guagliardo, and Wilson v.
Bohlender, all decided January 18, 1960. Cf. Schubert 1963c.
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have occasioned no surprise, however, because it was in precise accord with
the intention that he had announced seven years earlier when concurring in
Irvine v. California. Clark considered himself bound by the Wolf precedent un-
less and until a majority could be formed that would agree to overrule that
decision—an event that was forestalled for several more years, apparently, by
Black’s idiosyncratic blind spot for the Fourth Amendment.
We can now consider an operational definition of the Court’s decision-
making. In one dimension, the voting division of the Court is precisely
determined by the intersection of the j-point with a line along which are ar-
rayed the i-points of the justices. (This definition, it should be noted, is the
one which applies for cumulative [or Guttman] scaling of Supreme Court
cases.) In two dimensions, a decision is determined by the line orthogo-
nal to the j-point vector; all justices whose i-points fall on the orthogonal
line, or beyond it (in the positive direction of the variable) will vote in
support of the value, and the remaining justices whose i-points lie on the
negative side of the line will vote to reject it; while unanimous decisions
occur, of course, when all i-points lie on, or on the positive side of, the
orthogonal line, or else when all i-points lie on the negative side of this
line. In three dimensions, the decision is determined by the plane which
intersects the space orthogonally to the j-point vector; and more generally,
in r-dimensions by a hyperplane of r – 1 dimensionality which intersects
the r-dimensional space in a similar manner.
Thus, we conceive of both i-points representing the composite at-
titudes of individual justices, and j-points, representing the composite
issues raised by individual cases, as sets of vectors terminating in points,
each with a unique position in the same psychological space. Hereinafter
we shall assume that this space is three-dimensional, since we shall work
in three-space in the empirical application which follows. Cases in a set
which raises questions of differing degrees of valuation about the same
variable (e.g., sympathy for the constitutional claims of the right to coun-
sel in state criminal trials) are located at various points in the space, but
in an approximately linear relationship to each other; thus, each such
point may be conceived of as lying upon or near a scale axis, repre-
senting the subvariable, which transects the space. Through the centroid
of a set of scale axes, representing a set of civil liberties subvariables,
would pass an axis representing a broadly defined heterogeneous major
variable (such as “all civil liberties” issues for a given term); and this
scale axis would follow the trace of the mean of the projections from
all of the relevant j-points. But the i-points also project upon any scale
axis; and therefore, a one-dimensional solution for the Court’s decision-
making function may be achieved by measuring the relationship between
the projections from j-points and from i-points upon a scale axis repre-
senting any variable that is of interest. This, in effect, is precisely what
is happening, in theory, when an analyst constructs a cumulative scale of
a set of decisions that are postulated as pertaining to a single dominant
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variable, and positions the scale as an axis in the space. It is apparent
that if the model is adapted for analysis invoking this particular definition
of the decision-making function, as we shall do in the discussion which
follows, the Court’s decision-making is still being measured in unidimen-
sional terms. But the model itself is multidimensional and, as we shall
demonstrate, makes possible measurement of the interrelationship among
several variables within a common frame of reference; and moreover, there
is every reason to suppose that further research, and subsequent work
with the model, will lead to the development of mathematical refinements
corresponding to the multidimensional conceptions of the decision-making
function given in the operational definition above.
In order to utilize the model that has been described, what we require
are procedures to locate both i-points and j-points in three-dimensional
space, and to measure the dominance relationship for any dyad, with each
dyad consisting of a j-point and an i-point. Factor analysis affords a readily
available technique for locating the set of i-points for a given set of deci-
sions, such as a term of the Court, in a fixed spatial configuration. But the
raw data come in a form that preclude the use of factor analysis, at least in
the same manner, in order to locate the j-points. The reason for this is that,
in a typical recent term, the Court divides in about a hundred decisions on
the merits. Consequently it is possible to make a relatively large number
of observations—about one hundred—of the location of a relatively small
number of i-points—never more than nine. But more than nine observations
of the location of any specific j-point are never possible, because there are
never more than nine votes recorded in a single case. One hundred obser-
vations are ample to locate the i-points, by factor analytic techniques, with
considerable precision; but nine observations are far too few to permit the
same thing to be done for j-points. As we shall exemplify presently, factor
analysis is essentially a statistical method for breaking down a correlation
matrix into its principal component elements; and it can never be more
reliable than the matrix upon which it works. No single Supreme Court
decision contains enough votes to allow the computation of reliable correla-
tion coefficients. If we had a hundred justices participating in the decision
of each of, say, a dozen cases in the typical term, factor analysis could serve
very well to locate a configuration of j-points, but it would then be incapable
of locating the i-points. If there were a hundred justices participating in the
decision of a hundred or more cases in each term, factor analysis could be
used to locate both types of points with what ought to be good precision.
This implies that the model here described may very well find application
for study of the attitudes of United States senators or for state legislators,
as well as for other smaller decision-making groups like the Supreme Court.
Although it is not possible to locate j-points in the space as precisely as
i-points, at least by factor analysis, it is possible to locate sets of j-points in
the same space with the i-points. This is done by cumulative scaling of sets of
cases. Each cumulative scale measures the one-dimensional alignment of the
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attitudes of the justices toward a single variable. If most of the Court’s deci-
sions can be associated with a set of cumulative scales, and if the set of scales
can be passed through the space as axes in such a way that the projections
from the i-points on the scale axes are consistent with the alignments of the
justices on the cumulative scales, then it will be assumed that the scale axes
are indeed the counterparts of their analogue cumulative scales; and that the
variance in the voting behavior of the justices is adequately accounted for by
the manifest differences in the attitudes of the justices toward the cumulative
scale variables. The procedure for fitting scales in the factor space will be ex-
plained in greater detail in connection with specific empirical data, in a later
section of this article.
II. THE UNIVERSE OF RAW DATA
The sample of decisions to be analyzed consists of all cases in which
the Supreme Court divided on the merits during the period of the 1960
Term, which extended from October 10, 1960, through June 19, 1961.
Both formal and per curiam decisions accordingly are included, but unan-
imous and jurisdictional decisions were excluded. As Table 9 indicates,
almost three-fourths of the Court’s formal decisions were reached over the
disagreement of one or more justices, while this was true of less than one-
fourth of the per curiam decisions. These results were in line with previous
experience. It has not been unusual either, in recent years, for the justices
to disagree in a majority of their decisions on the merits, as they did dur-
ing the 1960 Term. The average annual number of split decisions over the
past fifteen terms was 97, and the average number of unanimous decisions
on the merits was 79; in this respect, the 1960 Term was quite typical.
Table 9. Summary of Decisions on the Merits,
1960 Term
Decision Formal Per curiam Totals
Split 87 12 99
Unanimous 34 41 75
Totals 121 53 174
For purposes of this study, each case, to which the Court had assigned
a unique docket number and for which the Court had made a disposition on
the merits, was a unit for voting analysis. As a unit of content, the docketed
case offers the advantages of being specifically and uniquely identifiable,
and of providing what with very rare exceptions is an unambiguous basis for
voting attribution which can readily be replicated by other analysts. (Those
familiar with earlier studies of judicial voting behavior will recognize that
some scholars have worked with less explicit units of measurement, such as
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the “opinion of the Court” or the “decision” of the Court.) There are also
disadvantages to the use of the case as a unit, but none relevant to the
empirical data with which we presently are concerned.
For each case, one set of nine votes was counted. In each of eleven cases,
one justice did not participate in the decision on the merits; and in one other,
two justices did not. There were also two Federal Employers’ Liability Act ev-
identiary cases and one Jones Act case in which Frankfurter, according to his
custom (Schubert 1962c), persisted in jurisdictional dissent at the time when
his colleagues voted on the merits; these three jurisdictional dissents were
classified as nonparticipations, for purposes of the present analysis. Eight
votes could not be specified, in one case in which the Court divided equally,
without opinion. After these nonparticipations and unspecifiable votes were
deducted, a total of 867 votes remained; they constituted the basis for the fac-
tor analysis and the cumulative scaling.
III. THE FACTOR ANALYSIS
Computation of the Correlation Matrix
The initial task in any factor analysis is the construction of a correlation
matrix. In the present study, the correlation matrix was based upon a set of
fourfold tables which, in turn, were constructed directly from the 867 votes
just described. These votes were tabulated to show the totals of agreement
and disagreement with the majority, in the decision of each case, for every
pair of justices. For any such pair, each case holds five possibilities: (1) both
may agree in the majority; (2) both may agree in dissent; (3) the first member
of the pair may vote with the majority, while the second dissents; (4) the sec-
ond member of the pair may vote with the majority, while the first dissents; or
(5) either or both members may fail to participate, in which event there is no
score for the pair for that case. In the tabulation of votes for the factor analy-
sis, no attention is paid to the substantive variables to which the decisions
relate; the sole criterion for the attribution of votes in each case is agreement
or disagreement with the majority.
It is most convenient to arrange the summary tabulation of agreement-
disagreement, for each judicial dyad, in the form of a fourfold table such
as Table 10. The table shows that Black and Douglas dissented together 29
times; this dis/dis (– / –) cell is the one that contains the kind of information
utilized in some earlier studies (Pritchett 1948; Schubert 1959) of “dissent-
ing blocs” of the Court. Similarly, Black and Douglas agreed in 70 of these 98
sets of votes; this is the sum of the major or positive diagonal (i.e., the + / +
and the – / – cells), and this is the kind of information that was the basis for
the “interagreement” bloc analysis of the studies just cited. The weakness
of these earlier approaches was that, by concentrating upon the agreement
between pairs of justices, the analysts ignored what is at least an equally
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Table 10. Fourfold Table of Agreement-Dis-
agreement, Douglas-Black, 1960 Term
Black
+ – Totals
Douglas + 41 5 46
– 23 29 52
Totals 64 34 98
NOTE. The total of joint votes counted for this dyad is 98
rather than 99, although both Black and Douglas participated
in all split decisions on the merits during this term, because of
the lack of any objective basis for identifying the partition of
the votes in the one case, already noted, in which the Court di-
vided equally.
important aspect of judicial voting behavior, that is, the ways in which jus-
tices disagree. Table 10, for instance, shows that not only did Douglas and
Black disagree in over a fourth of these decisions, they tended to disagree
in a particular way. In over 80 percent of these instances of disagreement, it
was Douglas who dissented while Black adhered to the majority. This finding
certainly suggests that Douglas was more extreme in his dissenting behav-
ior than Black (or, as we shall observe presently in Table 11, than any other
member of the Court during this term). Moreover, the correlation coeffi-
cients, which are computed from the fourfold tables, are very sensitive to
how votes are partitioned between the two cells of a diagonal, as well as to
differences between the diagonals.
In order to measure precisely the relationship among the four cells of a
fourfold table, phi correlation coefficients are computed.2 In the correlation
2. The phi coefficient is an approximation of the Pearsonian r correlation coefficient, and
is appropriate to use when, as here, the two distributions to be correlated reflect a genuine di-
chotomy. The phi coefficient is relatively simple to compute: it is the ratio of the difference of
the cross-products of the diagonals of a fourfold table, to the square root of the product of the
marginals. For the data of Table 10,
Evidently, the sign of the coefficient depends upon which diagonal cross-product is the larger;
or, in other words, upon whether or not a pair of justices agree more often than they disagree,
and also upon whether they agree both in assent and in dissent, i.e. whether their disagreement
is divided equally or disproportionately between the cells of the diagonals. The maximum range
of the phi coefficient is from + 1 to – 1; but these limits rarely are attained empirically, since the
maximum size of phi is a function of the distribution of the marginals, and can be ± 1 only when
all four marginal frequencies are equal. See Cureton 1959: 89–91.
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maxtrix shown in Table 11, phi ranges from + .745 (for Harlan and Frank-
furter) to – .602 (for Douglas and Harlan). Harlan, therefore, was the most
extreme justice in the range of his agreement and disagreement; and he voted
most frequently the same as Frankfurter, and least often in agreement with
Douglas.
Since there are nine justices on the Court, there are fourfold tables and
correlation coefficients for each of thirty-six dyads.3 For purposes of this study,
all data were placed on punch cards, and both the computation of phi co-
efficients and the factor analysis were programmed for computer analysis.4
Since both matrices are symmetrical, and in order to conserve space, Table 11
presents the fourfold tables above the major diagonal, and the correlation co-
efficients below.
Before turning to the results of the factor analysis of the correlation
matrix, some interesting findings may be observed from a mere inspection
of Table 11. The most obvious is the sharp demarcation of the justices into
what appear to be two opposing blocs. Douglas, Black, Warren, and Brennan
all correlate positively with each other, and negatively with the five remain-
ing justices. With the exception of Stewart’s marginally negative correlation
with Clark, these remaining five justices—Frankfurter, Harlan, Whittaker,
Clark, and Stewart—all correlate positively with each other, and negatively
with the first group. Stewart clearly was the most independent member
of the Court in his voting behavior: his highest correlation with any other
justice, in either direction, was less than .35; and his voting was almost per-
fectly independent, statistically, from what are otherwise the most marginal
members of each group, since his correlation was approximately – .03 with
both Brennan and Clark. As the fourfold tables indicate, Black and Warren
often dissented together, as did Frankfurter and Harlan also; but neither
Black nor Warren ever joined either Frankfurter or Harlan in dissent. It
is obvious that these two pairs of justices, and the respective groups with
which each tended to associate, were in pretty sharp and basic disagree-
ment over something; and unless we are prepared to accept the somewhat
fatuous notion that they couldn’t get together over the meaning or applica-
tion of the principle of stare decisis, as some students of the Court seem
to believe (Kort 1960a), then it may not be implausible to entertain the hy-
3. When factor analysis is performed by hand use of a calculator instead of utilizing a com-
puter program, it is necessary to arrange the correlation coefficients in the form of a square
symmetrical matrix, with the major diagonal filled with the estimates of the highest communality
for each justice. For the techniques of factor analysis the interested reader is referred to any of
the several standard works on this subject, e.g. Fruchter 1954; Cattell 1952; Thurstone 1947.
4. I am indebted to John P. Gilbert for developing a program for the computation of the phi
coefficients, and also one for the computation of the factorial distances discussed in the final sec-
tion of this paper. The computer program for the IBM 650 utilized was Centroid Factor Analysis,
Ident. No. SU-4524, written by Jonathan E. Robbins (April 1957), developed and tested by the
Watson Scientific Computing Laboratory, Columbia University, and modified by Mr. Gilbert, Cen-
ter for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford (multilithed).
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Table 11. Fourfold Tables and Phi Correlation Matrix, 1960 Term
D Bl Wa Br S C Wh F H
_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
+ – + – + – + – + – + – + – + –
D +41 5 42 4 44 2 31 14 23 22 20 26 16 23 20 25
–23 29 31 21 33 19 43 6 51 1 45 7 47 3 50 1
Bl .471 +61 3 58 6 41 19 40 23 32 32 31 26 37 26
–12 22 19 15 33 1 34 0 33 1 32 0 33 0
Wa .363 .655 +69 4 51 18 50 22 41 32 39 26 45 26
–8 17 23 2 24 1 24 1 24 0 25 0
Br .392 .403 .664 +57 16 55 21 45 32 44 25 49 26
–17 4 19 2 20 1 19 1 21 0
S –.230 –.337 –.195 –.029 +56 18 52 22 51 15 56 17
–15 4 11 9 10 9 11 8
C –.551 –.410 –.273 –.175 –.031 +56 18 55 14 59 14
–9 14 8 11 11 12
Wh –.455 –.474 –.367 –.319 –.133 .331 +51 12 53 11
–12 14 17 15
F –.578 –.481 –.390 –.287 .228 .343 .348 +58 5
– 4 20
H –.602 –.441 –.362 –.322 .171 .317 .315 .745
NOTE: The justices are coded as follows: D (Douglas), Bl (Black), Wa (Warren), Br
(Brennan), S (Stewart), C (Clark), Wh (Whittaker), F (Frankfurter), H (Harlan).
pothesis that these groups may have been in disagreement about the social,
economic, and political values that the Court upholds in its decisions.
The Factor Loadings
The initial product of a factor analysis is a set of derived correlations
(or “loadings,” as they customarily are called) which purport to measure
the extent to which each element, of whatever has been associated in the
correlation matrix, is related to the components or dimensions into which
the basic correlation matrix has been broken down. In the present study,
the elements are the justices, and the factor loadings purport to express
the correlation of each justice with the basic underlying dimensions of the
phi matrix. Although it is technically possible to extract as many factors as
there are elements intercorrelated in the phi matrix—nine, in the instant
case—only six factors actually were computed, and of these, only three will
be used for purposes of testing the principal hypothesis. The reason for so
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limiting the number of factors is twofold: (1) the residual matrix, repre-
senting the amount of variance unaccounted for by the first three factors,
was very small, and less, indeed, than the estimated error variance; and
(2) most readers of the American Political Science Review are accustomed
to thinking in terms of three-dimensional space, and three factors can be
given a Euclidean graphical representation with accords with the spatial
intuitions, and therefore the comprehension, of most readers.
The usual procedure in factor analysis is to rotate the orthogonal fac-
tor axes, which are the direct product of a complete centroid routine, to
oblique positions that are presumed to correspond to some criterion re-
lated to empirical reality, and thus to make possible a more meaningful
psychological interpretation than would usually be possible if the orthog-
onal axes were retained.5 The orthogonal axes have not been rotated in
the present study, but for the reason that, contrary to the usual procedure,
no reliance is placed upon the association of substantive meaning with the
factors. Substantive meaning is associated, instead, with the scale axes
which are passed through the space defined by the orthogonal factor axes;
and thus the scale axes—which are oblique—perform the same function,
for purposes of interpretation, that is usually accomplished by rotation of
the orthogonal axes. The orthogonal axes are used, therefore, only as a
set of reference axes to define the three-dimensional space in which the
i-points of the justices and the j-points of the cases are located. And the
factor loadings, shown in Table 12, function as Cartesian coordinates which
locate the i-points of the justices in the factor space.
Factor loadings can vary, in principle, from + 1 to – 1; in practice, their
variance is bounded by the extremity of the correlation coefficients upon
which they are based. It will be observed that, on the average, the highest
loadings (both positive and negative) are on the first factor, and that the
mean magnitude of the third factor loadings is smallest. This is inherent in
the centroid routine, which assumes that the first factor, to which the largest
portion of the variance is attributed, is the most important factor, and so on.
The loadings on the first factor range from a high of approximately + .77,
for Black, to a low of – .74, for Frankfurter. Evidently, the justices are parti-
tioned on the first factor into the same two groups that were manifest in the
phi matrix; but evidently also the groupings on the second and third factors
are quite different. Mere inspection of the factor matrix of Table 12 suggests
that the multidimensional relationships among the justices are going to be
5. Perhaps it should be noted, for the benefit of readers not familiar with the method,
that orthogonal axes are statistically independent, while oblique axes are correlated with
each other; therefore, making a factor interpretation based directly upon a system of or-
thogonal axes implies an assumption that there is no relationship among the factors, which
must be conceived to be independent of each other. Applied to the present data, this would
involve the assumption that there was no relationship, at least in the minds of the justices,
among the major issues of public policy toward which they responded in their voting.
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Table 12. Factor Loadings for Judicial Ideal-
Points, 1960 Term
Factors
Justices I II III
D .754 .283 .170
Bl .769 – .259 – .130
Wa .699 – .456 .089
Br .578 – .298 .291
S – .289 .126 .363
Wh – .571 .065 – .108
H – .714 – .373 .226
F – .736 – .338 .270
C – .519 – .245 – .309
somewhat different, and certainly more complex, than the simple bifurcation
of a single dimension which will account for much, but not enough, of the
variance in the voting behavior of the justices. For a fuller understanding
than a single dimension—even when it is overwhelmingly the most impor-
tant one—can afford, we must turn to an examination of relationships made
possible by work with the three-dimensional factor space.
IV. THE CUMULATIVE SCALES
Cumulative scaling is a research operation completely independent of the
factor analysis, and so may be undertaken before, at the same time, or after
the factor analysis is completed. In cumulative (or Guttman) scaling, the same
universe of raw data is used as for the factor analysis. But instead of tabulat-
ing votes by dyads and in terms of agreement with the majority, for scaling
purposes votes are tabulated by cases, and are classified as being either in
support of, or in opposition to, certain defined scale variables. The variables
employed here were identified on the basis of experimental work in previous
terms of the Warren Court. The basic procedures for cumulative scaling have
been discussed elsewhere (Schubert 1959: 270–290), although the format of
Figures 4–6, below, differs somewhat in the presentation of results.
Consistent votes in support of the scale variable are denoted by the
symbol x, and inconsistent positive votes by x. A blank space indicates a
consistent negative vote, and the symbol – is used to signify an inconsistent
negative vote. An asterisk signifies nonparticipation. Scale scores are simple
functions of scale positions, and a justice’s scale position is defined as being
fixed by his last consistent positive vote. Where one or more nonparticipa-
tions separate a justice’s consistent positive and negative votes, his scale
position is assumed to be at the midpoint of the nonparticipation or non-
participations, since it cannot be determined how he might have voted. A
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justice’s scale score is computed by the formula:
s = 2pn − 1, (2)
where s is his score, p his scale position, and n equals the number of cases
in the scale. Scale scores, like correlation coefficients and factor loadings, can
range in value from + 1 to – 1, with the significant difference in practice that
1960 Term, C Scale
Justices
Cases D Bl Wa Br S Wh F H C Totals
5/762 x 1–8
6/308 x 1–8
6/420 x 1–8
6/582 x 1–8
4778: 200 x x 2–7
5/265 x x * 2–6
4/507 – x x 2–7
4/611 – x x 2–7
5/458 x – x 2–7
4/388 x x x 3–6
3370: 685 x x x 3–6
4839: 122 x x x 3–6
5/381 x – x x 3–6
4/372 x x x x 4–5
4/426 x x x x 4–5
5/43 x x x x 4–5
5/301: 70 x x x x 4–5
5/301: 179 x x x x 4–5
5/399 x x x x 4–5
5/431 x x x x 4–5
6/36 x x x x 4–5
6/82 x x x x 4–5
6/117 x x x x 4–5
4581: 1 x x x x 4–5
4623: 12 x x x x 4–5
4719: 486 x x x x 4–5
6/617 x – – x x 3–6
6/599 x – – x x x 4–5
4/587 x x x – x 4–5
4/479: 14 x x x x x 5–4
4/479: 83 x x x x x 5–4
5/85 x x x x x 5–4
5/551 x x x x x 5–4
6/1 x x x x x 5–4
4694:233 x x x x x 5–4
4842: 161 x x x x x x 6–3
5/715 x x x x x x 6–3
4798: 236 x x x x x x 6–3
4/631 x x x x x x 6–3
5/312 x x x x x x 6–3
6/213 x x x x x x 6–3
6/418 x x x x * x 5–3
4703: 238 x x x x – x 5–4
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Cases D Bl Wa Br S Wh F H C Totals
4754: 4 x x x x x x x 7–2
4577: 669 x x x x – x x 6–3
4/350 x x x x – – x x 6–3
5/534 x x x x – x x x 7–2
4/454 x x x x x – x x 7–2
4687: 181 x x x x x – x x 7–2
5/610 x x x x x x x x 8–1
5/167 x x x x x x – x x 8–1
221–236
Totals
Pros 49 43 43 38 20 10 7 6 5 221
Cons 2 8 8 13 30 41 44 44 46 236
Scale
positions 51 47 45 39 25 13 6 6 1
Scale
scores 1.00 .84 .76 .53 –.02 –.49 –.76 –.76 –.96
R=1− 22403=.945 S=1−
23
79=.709
NOTE: In Figures 4–6, cases are cited in either of two ways. Those decided
prior to June 1961 are cited to the official United States Reports: the digit pre-
ceding the slash bar is the third digit of the volume number, and should be read
as though preceded, in each case, by the digits 36; the number following the
slash bar is the page cite; and if more than one case begins on the same page, a
docket number follows the page cite, separated from it by a colon. Official cita-
tions are not available, at the time this is written, for cases decided during the
final three weeks of the term; such cases are cited to Volume 29 of United States
Law Week, Supreme Court Section, with a four-digit page number followed by
the docket number.
Two coefficients appear at the bottom of each scale; they purport to measure
the degree of consistency in the set of votes being scaled. R is Guttman’s coeffi-
cient of reproducibility; .900 or better is conventionally accepted as evidence to
support the hypothesis that a single dominant variable has motivated the voting
behavior of the justices in the set of cases comprising the sample. S is Men-
zel’s coefficient of scalability; it provides a more rigid standard than R, because
S (unlike R) does not capitalize upon the spurious contribution to consistency
that arises from the inclusion in the scale of either cases or justices with ex-
treme marginal distributions. Menzel has suggested that the appropriate level
of acceptance for S is “somewhere between .60 and .65”; the scales presented
in Figures 4–6 are well above the suggested minimal levels of acceptability for
both R and S. See Menzel (1953).
Figure 4. Judicial Attitudes toward Civil Liberties, 1960 Term
scale scores frequently attain these extreme values, reflecting the extrem-
ity of attitude of several of the justices in each of the scales shown in
Figures 4–6.
The C Scale
Figure 4 is a cumulative scale of the fifty-one civil liberties cases that
the Court decided by divided votes on the merits during the 1960 Term. In
content, the C variable was defined broadly to include all cases in which the
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primary issue involved a conflict between personal rights and claims to liberty,
and governmental authority. The number of cases included in the scale—over
half of the total—was somewhat larger than in other recent terms; but the
ranking of justices on the scale was very similar to that of the 1959 Term, and
precisely the same as in 1958, which was Stewart’s first term on the Court.
The scale accords with common knowledge that Douglas, Black, Warren,
and Brennan are more sympathetic to civil liberties claims than the other
members of the present Court. But there are definite gradations among the
attitudes of these four “libertarian” justices toward the civil liberties claims of
this term, and the scale distance separating Douglas and Brennan is just as
great as the scale distance separating Whittaker and Clark. The mean rate of
support for civil liberties claims of the four justices with high positive scale
scores (the liberals on this issue) is 85 percent; the mean rate of opposition for
the four justices with high negative scale scores (the conservatives on this is-
sue) is 86 percent. This differentiation of the Warren Court into a set of liberal
justices and a much more conservative group agrees with Pritchett’s findings
(1954: 227) for the Vinson Court, except that Frankfurter now appears as a
conservative rather than as an exponent of “libertarian restraint.”
It is certainly noteworthy that Douglas, over a wide range of specific is-
sues, supported civil liberties claims in all except two out of fifty-one cases.
His two inconsistent (and C –) votes both came in cases that raised technical
questions of procedure relating to the statutory rights of federal criminal de-
fendants, in cases where another variable (J – : Supreme Court deference to
lower courts) also was present. Douglas was the only justice to dissent alone
against C – decisions of the Court; and his four solitary C + dissents identify
him as the justice most sympathetic to civil liberties claims. At the opposite
extreme was Clark, who found only five civil liberties claims, out of the total
of fifty-one, sufficiently persuasive to gain his vote. Moreover, four of Clark’s
five C + votes were inconsistencies, suggesting that in these cases he may
have been motivated by his attitudes toward other variables than C; there is,
of course, little empirical basis for assuming that all justices perceive all is-
sues raised by cases in the same way, or that any justice’s voting behavior
will be perfectly consistent. The Guttman model assumes that if in a particular
scale most respondents are highly consistent most of the time, it is reasonable
to infer that they are predominately motivated by their differential attach-
ments to a common value. And it is in precise accord with the assumptions
of the “individual-compensatory composition model,” mentioned earlier, that
a justice may, in some decisions, compensate for his lack of sympathy for,
say, civil liberties by his strong attachment to other appropriate values that
he may perceive to be present in the decisions. This theory seems to pro-
vide a plausible explanation for Clark’s inconsistencies. His most inconsistent
votes, for instance, came in two cases, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author-
ity and Mapp. v. Ohio, where he joined C + majorities against the dissents
of Harlan, Frankfurter, and Whittaker. The first case involved racial discrim-
ination in a restaurant in a publicly owned building; and the second was the
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decision, already mentioned, which overruled Wolf v. Colorado. In both cases,
Clark’s strong attachment to stare decisis appeared to overcome his basically
C – attitude sufficiently to cause him to support the majority, although such a
consideration obviously did not forestall the more activist conservatives from
voting as dictated by their convictions about libertarian claims.
The key decision-maker in C cases during the 1960 Term, however, was
Stewart, whose propensity to function as the swing man in an otherwise well-
balanced Court was sufficiently obvious to attract journalistic comment (Time
1961). Although Stewart tied with Clark for inconsistency with four such
votes, he nevertheless voted consistently over 90 percent of the time, and his
scale score of – .02 indicates the close balance of his voting on civil liberties
issues. Stewart was in the majority far more often than any of his colleagues,
dissenting in only seven of the fifty cases in which he participated; and in nine-
teen 5–4 decisions, Stewart’s vote was determinative. Slightly less than half
(43 percent) of the cases on the scale were decided C +, but the failure of the
cases to break evenly cannot be attributed to Stewart. The division between
C plus and minus decisions would have corresponded precisely to Stewart’s
scale position, except for the inconsistent negative votes of Black, Warren, and
Brennan, in the bottom three C – cases near the middle of the scale. Bren-
nan’s inconsistency’s is of no particular interest; it occurred in a routine case
of statutory interpretation involving the imposition of multiple sentences upon
a federal criminal defendant. But the Black and Warren inconsistencies ap-
peared in two of the “Sunday Closing Law Cases,” Gallagher v. Crown Kosher
Super Market and Braunfeld v. Brown, both decided on May 29, 1961. Many
dispassionate observers will agree that the Black and Warren votes in these
cases to uphold the constitutionality of the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania
“blue laws,” which upheld the principle of majority transgression of both the
religious and the economic claims of the defendants, were clearly illiberal;
and the fact that such votes appear as inconsistencies in the C scale should
enhance confidence in the proposition that the C scale provides an adequate
general measure of the civil libertarian sympathies of the justices.
The E Scale
One finding, which has resulted from applying the research approach
of this paper to a much longer period—fifteen terms—has been that po-
litical scientists have been living with a somewhat distorted image of the
Court during the past two decades. The pronounced emphasis upon the
Court’s civil liberties decisions,6 reflecting, perhaps, the no-doubt laud-
6. This emphasis is reflected, for example, in Pritchett 1954: viii, and in McCloskey
1962: 71–89. In his series of annual survey articles on constitutional law, published in the
American Political Science Review during the decade 1952–1961, David Fellman allocates
three-fourths of the approximate 370 pages, in which he discussed civil liberties, economic,
and taxation issues, to what are here denominated C scale cases, and the remaining one-
fourth to E and F scale cases.
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able bias with which students of the Court approached their subject, has
tended to obscure the significance of the Court’s decisions relating to eco-
nomic liberalism. The usual impression that one receives from reading the
literature is that the traumatic events of 1937 resolved the problems of
economic liberalism for our generation; and that since that time, the eco-
nomic liberalism of the New Deal has motivated at least a clear majority
of successively later Courts in supplanting the economically conservative
precedents established by a majority of the “Nine Old Men” and their pre-
decessors of the Taft Court. The real issues of public policy on the Court,
it has seemed, have related to civil rights and liberties. But a careful and
systematic examination of all of the Court’s decisions on the merits con-
tradicts the impressions that the Court is preoccupied with questions of
constitutional interpretation, and that statutory interpretation—which the
economic cases characteristically involve—is a policy-making function of
lesser importance to the Court.
Taking the decade of the 1950s as the most relevant recent sample,
there were more cases on the E scale than on the C scale in half of the
terms. Specifically, there were more E than C cases in both the 1958 and
1959 Terms, so the clear preponderance of C cases in the 1960 Term is
atypical. Counting, of course, is no substitute for thinking; and a quanti-
tative measure of the relative importance of the Court’s decision-making
on the issues of civil liberty and economic liberalism does not foreclose
a qualitative judgment on this question. But the mere assumption that
constitutional questions are qualitatively more important than statutory
questions is no proof; and absent acceptable criteria in terms of which
it can be demonstrated that the Court’s civil liberties questions gener-
ally—not just the School Segregation Cases—have had a greater impact
upon American society during the past two decades than have the Court’s
decisions involving economic issues, it does not seem too unreasonable to
accept at least tentatively findings based upon quantitative criteria.
In content, the E scale is just as broadly and heterogeneously defined as
the C scale. The basic value that permeates the issues of economic liberalism
is that of favoring claims of underpriviledged economic interests as against
those of affluence and monopoly power. Thus, E + is prolabor in union-man-
agement conflicts, pro-small business as against big business, pro-competition
and antioligopoly, pro-governmental economic regulation “in the public in-
terest” of special, “private” economic interests, and, most characteristically,
economic liberalism means to favor the claims of injured railroad workers and
seamen against their corporate employers and insurers.
As Figure 5 shows, the four justices who are civil libertarians are also the
ones who score highest on the E scale. But the remaining five members of the
Court vote quite differently upon the two kinds of issues. Clark, who was least
sympathetic to civil liberties, appears in the role of an economic liberal, scor-
ing only slightly lower than Warren and Brennan, and definitely emerging as
the fulcrum of the Court on E issues. Nor is this a matter of recent conversion;
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1960 Term, E Scale
Justices
Cases D Bl Wa Br C H S F Wh Totals
6/169 x 1–8
5/320 x x 2–7
4/441 x x * 2–6
4614: 284 x x 2–7
4618: 306 x x 2–7
4618: 307 x x 2–7
4713: 392 x x 2–7
4743: 97 x x x x 4–5
5/705 x x x x * 4–4
4/325 x x x x x * 5–3
4/520 x x x x x x 6–3
5/1: 45 x x x x x x 6–3
5/1: 46 x x x x x x 6–3
5/336 x x x x x x 6–3
6/316 x x x x * * 4–3
6/276 – x x x x x 5–4
5/731 x x x x x x 6–3
4/642 – x x x x x * 5–3
5/160 x x x x x – x * 6–2
5/667: 64 x x x x – x x * 6–2
5/667: 85 x x x x – x x * 6–2
5/695 x x x x – x x * 6–2
5/705 x x x x – x x * 6–2
5/651 x x x x x x x * 7–1
6/28 x x x – x x – x 6–3
113–100
Totals
Pros 23 24 18 17 11 9 6 2 3 113
Cons 2 1 7 8 13 15 18 14 22 100
Scale
positions 25 24 18 18 16 10.5 7.5 4 0
Scale
scores 1.00 .92 .44 .44 .28 –.16 –.40 –.68 –.100
R=1− 13196=.934 S=1−
13
49=.735
Figure 5. Judicial Attitudes toward Economic Liberalism, 1960 Term
Clark also ranked fifth (and again, after Douglas, Black, Warren, and Bren-
nan) on the E scales for both the 1958 and 1959 Terms. Neither fact should be
surprising; Clark’s judicial voting record is quite consistent with the political
position of the Texas “Fair Dealer” who served as Truman’s Attorney General
at the time of his appointment to the Court.
Stewart scores much lower on the E scale than on C; and Whittaker,
who was the most moderate of the four C – conservatives, is identified as
the anchor man of the Court in terms of his economic conservativism. Of
particular interest is the fact that Frankfurter, who was tied with Harlan at
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the next to the bottom rank on C, also is in the second lowest rank on E.
If we consider, as may seem intuitively justifiable, that the C and E scales
taken together provide a good test of liberalism as a generalized range of
attitudes, then it seems quite clear that Frankfurter was the most illiberal
justice in the 1960 Term: he voted only nine out of sixty-seven times in sup-
port of the liberal position. The necessary inference that one would draw, on
the basis of cumulative scaling theory, from Frankfurter’s low scale scores
of – .76 on C and of – .68 on E is that he voted conservatively because of
his conservative attitudes. Any inference must be evaluated, however, in the
light of Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s own explanations, frequently proffered,
which contradict the assumption that, for him at least, these two scales
each involve a single dominant variable. According to Frankfurter, who of-
ten has admitted his passionate personal sympathy for the down-trodden
and oppressed among the Court’s litigants, many of his illiberal votes in
these cases must be attributed to his deference to federalism or to judicial
restraint, or to the wise judges who sit on lower courts of the present or
the Supreme Court of the past.
The F Scale
The third most important variable, in recent terms, has been the F
scale, which deals with monetary conflicts of interest between private in-
dividuals and government. Thus, F + means to uphold the position of the
government (national, state, or local) in tax and eminent domain cases, and
in other matters where fiscal claims are at issue. In a sense, therefore, F
is a closer analogue to C than is E, since C also is concerned with conflicts
of interest between private individuals and governmental authority. But an
examination of the voting and opinion behavior of the justices makes it ap-
parent that for most of them, the issues of the F scale are more closely
related to issues of economic liberalism than of civil liberties. This is hardly
surprising, since F is differentiable from E primarily in terms of the parties
whose interests are in conflict. Yet this difference in the identity of the par-
ties may make a considerable difference to particular justices, depending
upon how far they regard the government as a fiscal trustee acting in the
“public interest” of the commonwealth, or as the largest single combina-
tion of monopolistic economic power.
The F variable was discovered in the process of empirically examining
the voting patterns in several preceding terms. Several justices, and in par-
ticular Douglas, voted differently in some cases to which the government
was a party from their behavior in most other cases involving economic
issues. As Figure 6 shows, Douglas and Black, who ranked first and second
on both of the liberalism scales, are at opposite ends of the F scale. In
all fourteen cases which comprise the scale for this term, Black voted to
uphold the position of the government, while Douglas voted in the opposite
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1960 Term, F Scale
Justices
Cases Bl Wa C Br F H S Wh D Totals
4/443 x 1–8
5/624 x x x 3–6
4811: 288 x x x x x 5–4
4/361 x x x x x x 6–3
5/467 x x x x x x * 6–2
4/310 x x x x x x x 7–2
4469: 533 x x x x x x * x 7–1
4/289 x x x x x x x x 8–1
4/446 x x x x x x x x 8–1
5/753 x x x x x x x x 8–1
3381: 629 x x x x x x x x 8–1
3381: 843 x x x x x x x x 8–1
4/410 x x – – x x x x 6–3
6/99 x x x x x – x x x 8–1
89–35
Totals
Pros 14 13 11 11 12 10 8 9 1 89
Cons 0 1 3 3 2 4 4 5 13 35
Scale
positions 14 13 12 12 12 11 9.5 8 1
Scale
scores 1.00 .86 .71 .71 .71 .57 .36 .14 –.89
R=1− 353=.943 S=1−
4
23=.826
Figure 6. Judicial Attitudes toward Governmental Fiscal
Claims, 1960 Term
way in all except one case—which would have been decided unanimously,
and thus would not have appeared upon the scale, if it had not been for
Harlan’s inconsistent vote. On the other hand, Frankfurter, who ranked
near the bottom of the Court on the C and E scales, is tied with Brennan
and Clark for the fourth rank on the F scale. Clearly, the ranking of the
justices on F is different from their rankings on either C or E. Moreover,
the government won twelve of these fourteen cases, and Douglas was the
only member of the Court who did not vote to support the position of the
government in at least a majority of the cases.
In terms of content, six of these cases raised questions of national taxa-
tion; four were state or local tax cases; and the remaining four were concerned
with fiscal claims against the national government: one in eminent domain,
one in tort, and two others. It is convenient to postpone, until the next section
of this paper where it can be discussed in the context of Figure 7, the question
why Douglas voted more often in the company of Whittaker and Stewart, than
with Black and Warren, on the issues comprising the F scale.
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This scale does not meet one of the recommended minimal standards for
a Guttman scale, in that fewer than ten of the cases include two or more dis-
senting votes (Torgerson 1958: 324). But this requirement of Guttman scaling
was established in order to avoid the spurious inflation of the coefficient R;
and, as previously noted, the coefficient S is computed in a way that precludes
that possibility. Since the value of S is quite high (.83, or about .20 above the
acceptability level), and the ranking of the justices is similar to those of the
immediately preceding terms, it seems justifiable to consider F to be scalable
for this term, and to accept the scale.
The Minor Scale Variables
In addition to the three major variables so far discussed, three other mi-
nor variables have been tentatively identified on the basis of similar research
in other recent terms of the Court. These include A (judicial activism in review-
ing the decisions of the Congress, the president, and administrative agencies);
N (federalism, and conflict between the national and state governments); and
J (the supervisory authority of the Supreme Court over the decision-making
of lower courts). Too few cases have been associated with any of these vari-
ables in recent years, to permit scaling them. In the 1960 Term there were
four cases on A, two on N, two on J, besides the one 4–4 decision in which the
votes were not identified. Therefore, ninety-one of the ninety-nine split deci-
sions of the 1960 Term are included on the scales of the three major variables;
and together, the C, E, and F scales account for the variance in the voting be-
havior of the justices in 91 percent of the decisions of the Term.
V. SCALE AXES IN THE FACTOR SPACE
The next step is to position the scale axes, which are considered to be
the psychological analogues of the cumulative scales, in the space defined
by the factorial reference axes. It will be recalled that the configuration of
i-points for the justices is uniquely determined by the set of factor loadings
given in Table 12. The problem now is to determine whether it is possible
to pass a set of axes through the factor space in such a manner that the
rankings of the projections, from the i-points onto the axes, are equivalent,
in a statistically acceptable sense, to the rankings of the justices on the
scale axes. What is required mathematically in order to accomplish this
are sets of weights which will determine the position of the axes in the
space, and the points on each axis where the projections from the i-points
fall. Given such data, it will then be possible to compare the rankings of
the justices, on the cumulative scales, with the rankings of the projections
from their i-points on the counterpart scale axes.
It is helpful to prepare a set of two-dimensional plots of the i-points
against the reference axes, similar to Figure 7 but without the scale axes.
Initial estimates of weights can be made from an examination of such two-di-
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mensional plots. More precise determination of a set of acceptable weights
requires mathematical analysis of the factor matrix of Table 12, and the use
of a calculating machine. The distance from the origin of the factor space to
the point which is closest to a given i-point, on any scale axis, is computed
by the formula,7
d = α x + ß y + γ z
( α2 + ß2 + γ2 )1/2’
(3)
where d is the distance from the origin to the point on the scale axis where
it is orthogonal to the projection from the i-point; x, y, and z are coordinates
of the factorial reference axes for the i-point; and α, ß, and γ are the coeffi-
cients which determine the position of the scale axis in the three-dimensional
factor space. The same set of coefficients also provides the reference axis co-
ordinates for the positive terminus of the scale axis.
The positions in which the scale axes have been placed in Figure 7 do not
necessarily constitute a uniquely “best” fit to the configuration of i-points; but
it is assumed that as defined in Table 13 and shown in Figure 7 they furnish
an appropriate and approximately correct solution. One way to visualize this
solution is to think of a cone intercepting a relatively quite small circular area
on the surface of a unit sphere; any axis lying within the cone will array the
projections from i-points so as to produce the same set of rankings of the jus-
tices as will be produced by any other axis within the cone.
The three plots of Figure 7 may be thought of as three views of a
cube: Figure 7a is a top view, Figure 7b is a side view and Figure 7c is
an end view. With relationship to reference axis I, the C scale axis enters
from the lower right octant of the cube, passes through the origin, and
emerges at the end through the upper left octant. The E scale axis passes
downward and to the right of I. Reference axis I, it should be noted, is
approximately the centroid, or arithmetic mean, of the C and E scale axes.
The C axis clearly passes closest to Douglas, who also appears to have
the most extreme projection on the positive segment of the axis. (Such a
projection would correspond to Douglas’ position with the highest score
on the C cumulative scale.) Black, Warren, and Brennan project upon the
positive segment of the C axis too, but we cannot be certain from an ex-
amination of Figure 7 precisely what the sequence of their rankings will
be. Stewart clearly will project upon the C axis somewhere near the origin,
which means that his “loading” on the axis will be close to zero. And the
remaining four justices all will project upon the negative segment of the C
axis, corresponding to their negative scores on the C cumulative scale.
Douglas, Black, Warren, and Brennan all will project positively upon
the E axis, although it looks as though Douglas will rank lower on the axis
7. The use of this formula was kindly suggested by John P. Gilbert [and at that time, in
1960, I needed the advice].
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Figure 7. Scale Axes and the Judicial Point Configuration in the Orthogo-
nal Factor Space
than he does on the cumulative scale. Clark, who ranked fifth on the E cu-
mulative scale, also will project to the fifth position on the E axis; and the
remaining justices will project negatively, corresponding to their negative
scale scores for this variable.
Douglas is somewhat separated from the other three so-called libertar-
ians, and the reason for this becomes apparent when we consider the F
scale axis, which cuts across the center of the space to emerge through
the front face, with only slight deviation toward the end (at I + ) and down-
ward. Particularly in Figure 7a, which includes the two most important
dimensions, it can be seen that the relationship of the F axis to the C and
E axes is such that the justices who project upon the negative segment of
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Table 13. Reference Axis Coordinates, Coeffi-
cients, and Cosines for Scale Axes
C E F
Scale axes 1 2 3
Coordinates/
coefficients:
I/α 1.00 1.00 .08
II/ß .15 – .86 – 1.00
III/γ .43 – .47 – .25
Cosines
Figure 4a + 08½° – 40½° – 85½°
Figure 4b + 23½° – 25° – 72°
Figure 4c + 71° – 151½° – 166°
F are Stewart and Whittaker, who have the most negative projections on E,
and Douglas, who has the most positive loading on C, in these two dimen-
sions. This suggests that F presents issues that pull together the justices
who project at opposite extremes on the two liberalism scales. Douglas,
in other words, might vote in opposition to governmental fiscal claims be-
cause of a strong and generalized antagonism to governmental regulation
and control; this could help to explain the extremity of his support for civil
liberties claims, which are also claims of private persons in opposition to
governmental regulation and control. Whittaker and Stewart, on the other
hand, might vote F – because of their strong economic conservativism, and
their corresponding sympathy for “free enterprise” and antipathy for pub-
lic fiscal controls. The converse argument would explain why the remaining
justices all would project positively on the F axis. Economic liberalism, as
understood by Black, Warren, and Brennan, frequently involves support of
governmental regulation and control “in the public interest”; and both lib-
erals and conservatives agree that taxation is necessary to support positive
programs of governmental regulation of the economy. Douglas’ action ap-
pears to have been reciprocated by Frankfurter, Harlan, and Clark, whose
support of the government against claims of personal right seems to carry
over to the support of the government against claims of private fiscal right.
In any event, the position of the F axis in Figure 7 is such that, from
a statistical and geometric point of view, F appears to be essentially or-
thogonal to—that is independent of—the C axis, and moderately correlated
positively with the E scale. The suggested psychological explanation is at
least not inconsistent with the mathematical relationships that are evident
in the data.
VI. A TEST OF THE BASIC HYPOTHESIS
The principal hypothesis underlying this study is that differences in the
attitudes of the justices toward the basic issues raised by the cases that the
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Court decides account for the differences in their voting. In short, Supreme
Court justices vote as they do because of their attitudes toward the public pol-
icy issues that come before them. We are now in a position to make a statistical
test of this hypothesis.
The i-points of the justices are separated in the factor space because
of variance in the extent of majority participation of individual justices;
but the factor analysis routine knows absolutely nothing about the subject
matter of the values to which the decisions relate. The relative degrees of
support by the justices of the key substantive issues can be determined
by cumulative scaling; but cumulative scaling is a unidimensional measure-
ment device, and each such scale is based upon a different universe of
content, and is quite independent methodologically (as distinguished from
psychologically) from every other scale. Moreover, the cumulative scale
data are inadequate to permit the recovery of the configuration of the i-
points in multidimensional space (Coombs 1964: chap. 12; Coombs and Kao
1960: 230). We shall assume, therefore, that if the cumulative scales can
be reconstituted as a set of scale axes whose position is consistent with
the configuration of i-points in the factor space, then the attitudinal dif-
ferences of the justices on the cumulative scales account for the variance
in the voting behavior of the justices, which is represented by the spatial
separation of their ideal-points in the multidimensional factor space. If the
correspondence between the set of cumulative scales and their scale axis
analogues can be established in accordance with accepted procedures of
statistical proof, then we shall have proved, in a mathematical sense, that
the justices of the Supreme Court vary in their voting behavior according
to the differences in their attitudes toward the scale variables.
Table 14 presents a comparison of the cumulative scale scores, and the
distances along the counterpart scale axes at which the i-points project (as
determined by formula 3), together with the corresponding sets of rank-
ings, for all justices on each of the three major variables. Although both
scale scores and axis loadings range in value, in principle, from + 1 to –
1, so that some meaning can be attached to direct comparisons of pairs of
corresponding scores and loadings, it will be recalled that, for mathemati-
cal reasons relating to the marginal distributions of the fourfold tables, the
intervals on the two types of continua are not genuinely commensurable.
Moreover, it has been determined experimentally that the error variance
in the factor analysis routine is usually around 10 percent; while the er-
ror variance in the cumulative scales is only slightly less; and there are
other sources of error variance implicit in the general method. Therefore,
it seems reasonable to employ the nonparametric rank correlation test for
the purpose of making the comparison. In spite of the seeming precision
of coefficients carried to the third decimal place, it would be fatuous to
pretend that the measurement employed in this study can hope to be more
than a rough approximation of empirical reality.
As Table 14 indicates, there are no inconsistencies in the two sets of
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Table 14. Correlation of Judicial Ranks on Scales and Scale Axes
C E F
Axis Ranks Scale Axis Ranks Scale Axis Ranks Scale
.791 1 D 1 1.00 .308 4* D 1 1.00 .341 2* Bl 1 1.00
.614 2 Bl 2 .84 .752 1 Bl 2 .92 .474 1* Wa 2 .86
.609 3 Wa 3 .76 .749 2 Wa 3½ .44 .272 3 C 4 .71
.599 4 Br 4 .53 .498 3 Br 3½ .44 .263 4 Br 4 .71
–.104 5 S 5 –.02 –.116 5 C 5 .28 .205 6* F 4 .71
–.553 6 Wh 6 –.49 –.357 6 H 6 –.16 .251 5* H 6 .57
–.610 7 F 7½ –.76 –.406 7 S 7 –.40 –.232 8* S 7 .36
–.612 8 H 7½ –.76 –.409 8 F 8 – .68 –.081 7* Wh 8 .14
–.627 9 C 9 –.96 –.411 9 Wh 9 –1.00 –.256 9 D 9 –.89
Rank correlation
coefficient (tau) .986 .901 .870
Significance level
1-tailed (p) <.000025 .00012 .00043
*Inconsistent rankings.
rankings for C. The correlation coefficient is less than + 1.00 because of
the tie in the scale scores of Frankfurter and Harlan, which increased very
slightly the probability of perfect agreement with another set of rankings.
The correspondence between the two sets of rankings for E also is perfect,
except for Douglas, whose loading on the scale axis is much too low to cor-
respond well with his maximal scale score. We can readily observe, from
Figure 7, that with the point configuration given by the factor analysis, it
would be impossible to position the E axis in such a way as to accommodate
both Douglas’ position, and those of the remaining justices. It has, there-
fore, seemed preferable to position the E axis in the way that best reflects
the attitudinal alignment of the other eight justices, and to consider Dou-
glas’ i-point to be located inconsistently with his manifest attitude toward E.
There are several possible explanations for Douglas’ apparent inconsistency.
The problem might be one of error variance, since the factor routine knows
nothing of Guttman scale inconsistencies, and Douglas’ two E – inconsisten-
cies would tend to pull him below Black, at least, in projection on E, in the
attribution of variance by the centroid factor routine; to this we could add
the imponderable effect of the error variance inherent in the factor analysis
itself. But an alternative psychological explanation might be that the i-point
configuration is correct, and that it is inconsistent for a justice, who is as
hostile to governmental fiscal control as Douglas, at the same time to be the
Court’s strongest supporter of claims of economic liberalism.
The two sets of rankings for F are generally in close accord, since a
tau of .87 is considered to be very high. There are three reversed pairs in
the axis rankings: Black and Warren, Frankfurter and Harlan, and Stew-
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art and Whittaker. Reference to Figure 6 shows that the reversal, for each
of these pairs, was occasioned by the difference of a single vote; and the
value of tau was lowered by the triple tie in the scale ranks. It seems
quite likely that the F scale, which is marginally acceptable in any event,
is based upon too few (and too extreme) cases to constitute an adequate
sampling of the attitudes of the justices toward this value; and that a scale
based upon twice as many cases might result in a much closer correspon-
dence between the cumulative scale and the point configuration. In other
words, it seems most likely that in the case of F, the inconsistency between
the two sets of rankings should be attributed to the inadequacies of the
scale, rather than to errors in the point configuration. This question could
be resolved only by an examination of the justices’ voting behavior in a
term in which they chose to accept for decision a considerably larger num-
ber of cases dealing with the issue of governmental fiscal powers than they
have dealt with in recent years; or, as might well be done, by pooling the
data for several terms of the Court.
Nevertheless, the correlation between all three sets of rankings is very
high, with or without the above explanations. From a statistical point of
view, it should be noted that the probabilities shown in Table 14 relate
to the probability of producing, by chance alone, the indicated congru-
ence between any one scale and the point configuration. The prospect of
chance replication of as good a fit for all three scales simultaneously, with
the same fixed point configuration, is of course very much more remote;
indeed, the joint probability, which is the product of the three discrete
probabilities, is a truly astronomical number: <.011129, or approximately
one chance in a trillion.8 It seems warranted, under these circumstances,
to accept the hypothesis that the variance in the voting behavior of the
justices during the 1960 Term can be adequately accounted for by the dif-
ferences in their attitudes toward the fundamental issues of civil liberty,
economic liberalism, and governmental fiscal authority.
VII. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE SEPARATING THE
JUSTICES
Taking the judicial ideal-points in the factor space as reasonably ade-
quate symbolizations of the respective attitude syndromes of the individual
justices, we can use them to examine one final question. Discussion about
the justices frequently revolves around such questions as which ones tend
to share the “same point of view,” and which ones are “furthest apart” in
their thinking. The factor space provides a convenient basis for objective
measurement of the psychological distance which separates each justice
from each of the others.
Since the measurement of these psychological distances is purely math-
8. [For a contrary opinion, see Gow 1971.]
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ematical, we shall carry it out in five-dimensional space. This will afford a
slightly more accurate basis for measurement than the three-dimensional
space depicted in Figure 7, since the fourth and fifth factors will permit us
to consider, presumably, the effect of the minor variables (such as A, N, and
J) which, although not scalable in the Guttman sense, nevertheless must be
considered to be a part of the attitude syndrome of each justice. The psy-
chological distance will be measured on the same scale as that employed for
the three-dimensional factor space: along orthogonal reference axes, each of
which extends from – 1 to + 1. The standard formula for computing the dis-
tance between any two points in orthogonal five-space is:
d(i1–i2) = [(v1 – v2)2 + (w1 – w2)2
+ (x1 – x2)2 + (y1 – y2)2 + (z1 – z2)2]1/2, (4)
where d is the distance, i1 and i2 are the ideal-points of a pair of justices, and
v, w, x, y, and z are the coordinates (or “loadings”) of the justices on factors
I–V. Much more simply, one can use the computing formula
d = 1 – ø, (5)
where phi (ø) is the correlation between the two points.
The result of computations according to formula (4) are shown in Table
15. Harlan and Frankfurter are by far the closest two justices, in terms of
their attitudes toward the policy issues that the Court decided in the 1960
Term; they are separated by a distance of only .14 in the five-dimensional fac-
tor space. Contrary to what even many close observers of the work of the
Court seem to believe, however, it is Warren and Brennan—not Douglas and
Black—who are next most similar in attitude, at a distance of .42. In fact, there
are five other pairs (Wh-C, .52; Bl-Wa, .53; Wh-S, .57; Wh-F, .67; and Wh-H,
.70) with “ideational identity” closer than that of Douglas and Black,9 who are
separated by a distance of .75. On the other hand, the greatest difference in
attitude is that between Douglas and Black, on the one hand, and Frankfurter
and Harlan, on the other; the average distance separating these two pairs of
justices is 1.60. Moreover, Douglas, Black, Warren, and Brennan all agree that
Frankfurter and Harlan are the justices whose point of view is most different
from their own; and, conversely, Harlan, Frankfurter, Whittaker, Clark, and
Stewart all agree that Douglas and Black are the justices most distant psycho-
logically from themselves.
If we seek an “average” justice whose point of view best typifies that of
the Court as a whole, he is clearly Stewart at an average distance of .98.
The variation of Stewart’s separation from his colleagues also is confined to
the smallest range. Such a finding is perfectly consistent, of course, with the
9. In an article devoted to the attitudinal similarities and differences of these two justices,
Spaeth has concluded that his data, also, “show significant ideational difference between Black
and Douglas” (1961: 176).
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Table 15. Attitudinal Distances among Judicial
Ideal-Points, 1960 Term
D Bl Wa Br S C Wh F H
D .75 .93 .83 1.21 1.53 1.44 1.63 1.63
Bl .75 .53 .80 1.30 1.47 1.44 1.58 1.54
Wa .93 .53 .42 1.18 1.38 1.39 1.52 1.50
Br .83 .80 .42 1.02 1.27 1.29 1.42 1.44
S 1.21 1.30 1.18 1.02 .93 .57 .78 .82
C 1.53 1.47 1.38 1.27 .93 .52 .80 .85
Wh 1.44 1.44 1.39 1.29 .57 .52 .67 .70
F 1.63 1.58 1.52 1.42 .78 .80 .67 .14
H 1.63 1.54 1.50 1.44 .82 .85 .70 .14
findings of scale analysis, and with the configuration shown in the three-di-
mensional space of Figure 7. In similar accord with expectations is the finding
that the most atypical justice was Douglas who, separated by an average dis-
tance of 1.24 from his colleagues, entertained the most generally extreme
views of any of the justices.
Although Stewart and Clark are adjacent to each other in the two-di-
mensional matrix of Table 15, since the pattern shown is the most generally
consistent one, these two justices are not very close to each other in five-space
(as a glance at three-dimensional Figure 7 suggests). Stewart and Clark both
are closer to Whittaker, Frankfurter, and Harlan than they are to each other.
Finally, it is noteworthy that Whittaker—not Frankfurter—is the most typical
of the group who, at least in relationship to the C and E variables, are the con-
servative justices; Whittaker’s average distance from the other four justices at
the “right wing” of Table 15 was only .62. And it is Warren—not Black—who
is the most typical of the four liberal justices, with an average distance of .63
separating him from the other three.
VIII. SUMMARY
The objective of this paper has been to demonstrate the utility, for
a more accurate insight into the basic factors that underlie disagreement
among Supreme Court justices, of a more rigorous psychological approach
than has been characteristic of most discussion of their attitudes. The at-
tention of scholars always has focused upon the values articulated in the
opinions of the justices, and particularly in majority opinions; but much less
attention has been given to the possibility that an examination of the voting
behavior of the justices might provide a better and more reliable approach
to the understanding of their attitudes than the study of opinions. Re-
search during the last two decades has turned increasingly to the analysis of
judicial voting records, in addition to opinion language; and reliance under-
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standably has been placed, during what might well be termed the pioneering
stages of the development of a science of judicial behavior, upon unidimen-
sional models. These necessarily are limited in their capacity to represent
adequately the complex interplay of attitudes in the mind of any human be-
ing. The time has now come when it may be appropriate for students of
judicial behavior to consider the advantages to be gained by utilization of
multidimensional models of the behavior of Supreme Court justices.
One such model, exemplified here, is suggested by recent (and ongoing)
research in psychometrics. It proceeds on the premise that a justice reacts in
his voting behavior to the stimuli presented by cases before the Court in ac-
cordance with his attitudes toward the issues raised for decision. This article
has presented what is believed to be persuasive evidence that this is precisely
what the justices were doing when they voted in the decisions of the 1960
Term.
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6
Jackson’s Judicial
Philosophy
Robert H. Jackson died more than a decade ago, and his departure from
the Supreme Court marked the end of an era in American judicial politics,
since he left behind as a minority those remaining of the colleagues who had
joined with him to compose the so-called Roosevelt Court (Pritchett 1948).
He was still very much alive when I interviewed him shortly after the Steel
Seizure decision in 1952 and subsequently when the initial stages of the
present research were designed and carried out. His unanticipated and fatal
heart attack had two incidental consequences that are relevant here: it fixed
an unavoidable natural closure for the data—his activities—that I was study-
ing, and at the same time imposed an insurmountable foreclosure upon one
of my research ambitions, for the best way to validate generalizations about
a man’s attitudinal predispositions and belief systems is to check them as
predictions against his future behavior. Social scientists understandably re-
pose less confidence in findings about hypotheses that can be validated only
statistically, and then only by retrospective testing. Perhaps it was an error,
therefore, not to have switched from Jackson to some other justice as a sub-
ject; but even one who chose a younger justice (such as Arthur Goldberg)
This chapter was originally published, in slightly different form, as “Jackson’s Judicial Phi-
losophy: An Exploration in Value Analysis” in American Political Science Review 59 (December
1965): 940–963.
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might have guessed wrongly about his tenure, and Jackson’s career did offer
several unusual advantages—for reasons that will be explained shortly—which
it seemed important to exploit. This is a sector of political research in which
relatively little has been done, and it is possible that the theory and methods
employed here may be useful to others in the study of political values. The sub-
stantive findings are confined to a single individual; but nothing in the theory
and methodology bears any unique relationship to Jackson—or to judges, for
that matter. They can be used to analyze the attitudes of other types of polit-
ical decision-makers who make observable choices with which are associated
verbal rationales that are or can be systematically recorded in a reproducible
form.
The data for this study include all the three-hundred-odd opinions that
Robert Jackson wrote as a Supreme Court justice and all his votes in the more
than a thousand formal nonunanimous decisions in which he participated. His
opinions have been classified by type and analyzed for their value content,
using correlational, cluster, and factorial methods; and his votes have been
studied by cumulative scaling. These materials, so analyzed, make it possible
to test several hypotheses, primarily by intercorrelating his values, and by cor-
relating his values with his votes and the types of opinions in which they were
articulated.
There is no dearth of what evidently is impressionistic literature on the
subject of judicial attitudes. The law reviews, and to a lesser extent the
political science journals, frequently carry discussions of the imputed atti-
tudes of individual judges—and, especially, of justices of the United States
Supreme Court. Moreover, these discussions customarily are based upon an
analysis of judicial opinions; and Jackson has not been neglected by the legal
commentators or the judicial biographers.1 Some of them—notably Jaffe and
Nielson—have purported to discuss the essence of Jackson’s philosophy as a
judge, but the essences they find are not in agreement. The typical conclusion
has been that it is futile to attempt to discover any systematic structuring of
attitudes for Jackson. Weidner, for instance, warns:
The most striking feature of Justice Jackson’s judicial philosophy is that it can only
with great difficulty be made to conform to any of the neat and currently popular classi-
fications of Supreme Court justices…. The way out is to abandon attempts to squeeze the
justices into these deceptively precise categories…. The classification of Supreme Court
justices as advocates of either judicial activism or judicial restraint, and the use of sta-
tistical devices to facilitate the process, can be a helpful approach to some problems of
constitutional law. But it is inadequate to the task of determining the judicial philosophy of
a particular justice. Jackson, for one, cannot be so readily pigeonholed. (1955: 593–594)
In similar although less dogmatic vein, Barnett remarks that “in striving to
associate Jackson’s views with some doctrine or set of doctrines which will
neatly explain them all, one is beset with difficulties” (1948: 241). And even
1. For example, Barnett 1948; Fairman 1955; Frankfurter 1955; Gerhart 1953, 1958; Jaffe
1955; Nielson 1945; Steamer 1954; Symposium 1955; Weidner 1955.
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Pritchett—whom Weidner evidently had in mind as the only previous com-
mentator who attempted to make some use of quantification in guiding his
appraisal of Jackson—concludes that his own “figures, however, average out
a certain unpredictability in Jackson’s votes” (1948: 261). In a subsequent
attempt at a summing up, Pritchett adds that “the rather erratic nature of
his opinions ma[kes] it difficult to catalogue him…. The unpredictability of
Jackson’s performance leads one to question whether he has developed any
systematic theories about civil liberties or the judicial function” (1954: 18,
228–229).
In this state of our knowledge, Jackson appears to be a particularly ap-
propriate subject for a study by behavioral methods. Perhaps at least in this
instance any substantive findings that emerge will not be open to the usual
rhetorical charge that all the elaborate paraphernalia serve only to confirm
what already is known by prudent men of common sense.
I. THE DATA AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS
Jackson participated in the decisions of the Supreme Court for a total of
twelve terms: 1941–1944 and 1946–1953.2 During this period, he wrote 138 in-
stitutional opinions (for the Court), 51 concurring opinions, and 113 dissenting
opinions. He also wrote 4 opinions, consisting either of jurisdictional dissents
or of memorandum opinions in his ex officio capacity of supervising justice for
the Second Circuit, that are included for some purposes in the analysis below.
In addition, he wrote 16 opinions that are here scored as nulls, since his dis-
cussion is limited to statements of facts without value preferences indicated.
Eight other opinions were jointly written by Jackson and various other justices.
These 24 opinions have been excluded completely from analysis in the present
study.3 My principal data for present purposes consist, therefore, of the deci-
sions in the cases to which 306 opinions authored by Jackson relate;4 and my
primary focus is upon his opinions and votes in these decisions.
The Variables
The data were analyzed in terms of four sets of variables, which I shall
call “content variables,” “opinion variables,” “voting variables,” and “chrono-
logical variables.”
2. Jackson was on leave of absence from the Court throughout the 1945 Term, acting in the
role of United States Chief Counsel in the Nuremberg war crimes trials. See Harris 1954. Only
six months before his death, in his introduction to Harris’ book, Jackson wrote that “the hard
months at Nuremberg were well spent in the most important, enduring and constructive work of
my life.”
3. For a list of Jackson’s opinions, which contains some omissions and duplications but which
corresponds closely to the independently compiled list used in the present study, see the Stan-
ford Law Review 8 (1955): 60–71.
4. Jackson wrote both the majority opinion and a separate concurring opinion in Wheeling
Steel Corp. v. Glander.
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The identification of the content variables5 was based on an analysis
of all of Jackson’s opinions. A panel of three judges—two graduate students
and myself—read and scored independently each opinion for the presence of
any of a set of thirty-three substantive categories. I had first constructed a
code that defined these content categories on the basis of a preliminary ex-
amination of about 20 percent of the total of Jackson’s opinions. This code
was to some extent modified in the process of analyzing the complete array
of cases—which required, of course, reevaluation of some opinions. Any in-
stances of disagreement in scoring were discussed among the panel of judges
until a consensual judgment was reached. Subsequent research in political
attitudes and ideologies6 indicates that the attitudinal dimensions relevant
to Supreme Court behavior are considerably broader and more heteroge-
neous—and consequently fewer in number—than I had assumed at the time
the present project was begun.
Conceptually, each of these variables represented a continuous attitudinal
dimension for Jackson, but the method of classifying the data had the effect of
treating each variable as though it were dichotomous. Each variable was di-
rectionally defined, and Jackson might make a statement either in affirmation
or in negation of the variable; henceforth I shall use the term “value” to refer
to either of the two directional meanings (positive or negative) that are asso-
ciated with each variable.7 The coding rules required that such statements be
in normative form, and not merely factual assertions. (For example, if Jackson
said that a defendant in a state criminal case had confessed during a period of
extended interrogation while he was being held incommunicado by the police,
the content analyst left such a remark unscored, as a factual assertion; but if
Jackson said that it was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for a state
to convict a defendant on the basis of a coerced confession—and irrespective
of whether he thought that this had happened on the facts in that particular
case—such a statement was scored as agreement with the positive value of the
second variable: “freedom from state restraint of civil liberty.” It was also pos-
sible, and not uncommon, for Jackson to agree with both the affirmative and
the negative value of the same variable in a single opinion; in such cases, the
variable was scored as ambivalent for that opinion.) Since most variables were
not discussed (at least, normatively) in most opinions, scoring as “absent” was
most common. It is the joint occurrence of content values (scored as either af-
firmative or negative) that is of interest in the analysis below.
Some of the initial set of thirty-three content categories turned out to
be univalued, and therefore of little help in making correlational analyses;
5. For other recent discussions and examples of content analysis, see North et al. 1963; Kort
1963; and Schubert 1963c.
6. For example, H. McClosky 1958; Lane 1962; Schubert 1965c.
7. “Variable” denotes the content category; the name (or symbol, or short title) of the vari-
able in apposition with a valence symbol (+ or –) or phrase (“positive value” or “negative value”)
denotes the affective meaning of a particular stimulus or response set.
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others appeared to have neither a logical nor a psychological bearing upon
Jackson’s voting behavior. An example of one of the original categories
which was both univalued (in effect, with marginals of sixty-seven pro and
four con) and non-functional (in relationship to voting) was judicial candor,
a subject upon which Jackson often exhorted his colleagues in normative
terms and criticized them in factual propositions of which the following are
typical:
Justice “X” [frequently Murphy or Black] is not (but should be) candid; the majority
in this case are not candid; etc.
The Supreme Court should not overrule precedents sub silentio, but should come
right out and say what it is doing.
The Supreme Court should not proceed by indirection.
The Supreme Court should not indulge in legal fictions; the Court ought not to spon-
sor myths concerning judicial behavior.
Supreme Court justices should articulate their major premises; the Court should
practice what it preaches.
The Court has [deliberately] sublimated the conflict underlying the instant case.
The lower court in this case was more candid than is the Supreme Court [by pointing
out that ghostwriting flourishes in official circles in Washington].
Accordingly, the original list of thirty-three categories was later reduced to
thirteen, in part by eliminating from further consideration the merely verbal
(as I came to deem them) ones such as candor. Other categories were com-
bined; for example, among the six initial categories ultimately combined to
form the variable “Supreme Court policy-making,” is stare decisis, which for
Jackson was markedly bivalent. The positive value characteristically would
take this form of utterance:
A justice should follow a precedent with which he disagrees until a majority of the
Court will forthrightly agree to overrule it.
The Supreme Court does not appear to (but should) follow its precedents.
The Court should give “full faith and credit” to its own prior decisions.
The Court should follow stare decisis, even when it leads to a wrong result, when
Congress has acquiesced in the decision.
The Court should follow stare decisis, except when the proposed new policy clearly
is preferable to the old one.
The Court should not make new constitutional law unless the old law is unsound and
“works badly in our present day and society.”
Jackson affirmed his belief in stare decisis in seventy-four opinions. On the
other hand, in twenty-two other opinions he expressed quite opposing views:
Throughout its history, the Court has been required from time to time to reconsider
a precedent decision (and should do so now.)
The Court should not follow precedents that clearly are blunders.
The Court should not follow precedents that are not acceptable to a majority of the
sitting Court.
The Court should not follow stare decisis when to do so would lead to a wrong deci-
sion.
It is better to create confusion by overruling a precedent than for the Court to adhere
to a rule that it cannot and will not respect in application.
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The reduced set of content variables consists of the following:
1. National restraint of political (civil) liberty.
2. State restraint of political (civil) liberty.
3. National restraint of economic liberty.
4. State restraint of economic liberty.
5. Monopolistic control of enterprise.
6. Federal (national-state) relationships.
7. Executive or congressional policy-making, or both.
8. Lower court policy-making.
9. Lawyers.
10. Litigants.
11. The public interest.
12. Colleagues (other Supreme Court justices).
13. Supreme Court policy-making.
The opinion variables fell into four categories: institutional, concurring,
dissenting, and jurisdictional or memorandum.
There are only two voting variables: C (political liberalism/conser-
vatism, = civil liberty) and E (economic liberalism/conservatism). Most of
the data for these variables are available in the recent report of another
research project, which analyzes the votes of all justices of the Supreme
Court in all decisions on the merits for the period of the 1946–1962 Terms,
on the basis of the political and economic policy variables (Schubert 1965c:
esp. chap. 5). The coding of Jackson’s votes for the cases in which he
wrote opinions, beginning with the 1946 Term, was taken directly from this
larger pool of voting data. In order to include similar voting data for his
first four terms, the relevant decisions of this earlier period were evalu-
ated in relation to the political and economic variables. Each decision was
scored as an outcome for the set of participating justices in that case, and
Jackson’s vote was then scored (just as that of each other justice) in rela-
tionship thereto. This voting analysis of the 1941–1944 Terms was carried
out half-a-dozen years after the content analysis of opinions was completed,
which no doubt tended to minimize further the possibility of analyst bias
and to confirm the independence of the two sets of observations.
Like the content variables, the two voting variables were scored
dichotomously, but with the differences that no ambivalent category was
recognized for either, and the two voting variables could not jointly occur
in the same decision. Although Jackson might (and often did) discuss many
values in an opinion, or the same value more than once (and perhaps in-
consistently), he could vote only once, and in only one way, in any single
decision. Consequently, his vote in each decision was coded in one of the
following five categories: (a) politically liberal (C + ); (b) politically conser-
vative (C – ); (c) economically liberal (E + ); (d) economically conservative
(E – ); or (e) other.
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The major chronological variable was derived by partitioning all of Jack-
son’s opinions (and their associated votes) into three equal periods of time:
the 1941–1944, 1946–1949, and 1950–1953 Terms. In order to test certain
of my hypotheses it was also necessary to compare the first period with the
latter two combined; or, the last period with the first two combined; and in
one instance to use a slightly different breakdown, in order to compare the
1941–1944 and 1946–1948 with the 1949–1953 Terms.
The primary method of analysis consists of a cross-tabulation of the joint
occurrences of variables within and between the four sets. Generally speak-
ing, fourfold tables, phi coefficients, and either chi squares or Fisher’s exact
probability test were computed for each cross-tabulation of a pair of variables.
The Reduced Content Matrix
In order to define the political and economic content variables consis-
tently with the two corresponding voting variables, the set of content
variables was further reduced by combining the first and second variables
“freedom from national restraint of civil liberty” and “freedom from state
restraint of civil liberty” into paravariable #14 (political liberalism/conser-
vatism); and by combining the third, fourth, and fifth variables, “freedom
from national restraint of economic liberty” and “freedom from state re-
straint of economic liberty” and “monopolistic control of enterprise” all
with reversed polarity,8 into paravariable #15 (economic liberalism/con-
servatism). At one time I planned to study the phi correlation matrix for
this revised set of ten variables (#6–15), using cluster and factor analysis
in order to isolate the more fundamental latent dimensions of Jackson’s
attitudes as a judge. For technical reasons, however, it was necessary
to eliminate three more variables from the correlation matrix before un-
dertaking these further analyses. The frequency for the ninth variable
(lawyers) was so low (18), and the marginal distributions for variables #11
(public interest) and #12 (colleagues) were so extreme (56–1 and 7–154)
that useful correlations between these three and the remaining variables
could not be obtained. Therefore, the cluster and factor analyses were
based upon a seven-variable matrix. Henceforth, short titles for particular
values, or symbols as indicated, will be used instead of numbers to des-
ignate these variables: N (#6), A (#7), J (#8), X (#10), P (#13), C (#14),
and E (#15).
The correlation matrix for the content variables was cluster analyzed
by the elementary linkage, hierarchical syndrome, and rank-order typal
methods (McQuitty 1957, 1960, 1963). It was factor analyzed by the prin-
cipal axes method, followed by varimax rotation (Harman 1960: 154–191,
8. Sign reversals were necessary for the economic variables, in order to maintain conti-
nuity with other recently published research in judicial attitudes toward economic policy.
See Schubert 1965c; Spaeth 1963a: 290–311, 1963b: 79–108.
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301–308). The phi coefficients and associated chi squares, and the factor
analysis and rotation, were calculated on computers.
II. THE HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED
The hypotheses to be tested will be stated, together with the supporting
considerations for each.
1. The values articulated by Jackson in his opinions correlate in clusters
that correspond to meaningful attitudinal concepts.
Particularly during the period since Jackson’s death, a body of cumula-
tive knowledge about the social psychology of judicial attitudes has begun
to be developed. I assume that my cluster findings ought to articulate
with these data; but the clusters of content values will not necessarily
coincide with the impressions that a reader sophisticated in the general
subject-matter field—namely, the traditionally trained constitutional law
scholar—might gain from having read all or a substantial portion of Jack-
son’s opinions. Findings based on the cluster analysis should be more valid,
more reliable, and more precise than those based upon purely qualitative
opinion analysis, for few subjective opinion analysts attempt to base their
findings upon a reading of all of a judge’s opinions; and fewer still could
claim to make consistent observations, and retain adequate recall to keep
them in mind and to make the millions of associations and comparisons in-
volved, when the universe of data comprises over three hundred opinions,
many of which are dozens of pages in length. For such a task, computers
have inherent advantages, whatever their other limitations. From a statis-
tical point of view, the cluster analysis findings might be thought of as the
mean, from which subjective opinion analyses could be expected to devi-
ate.
The clusters ought also to be “meaningful” in the sense that we should not
expect to find patent inconsistency in the relationships denoted. The training
of a lawyer and the vocation of a writer of judicial opinions are to articulate
arguments characterized by at least prima facie rationality.
The test by which we shall measure this hypothesis is whether the
cluster analysis findings: (a) define attitudes which are consistent with
other behavioral research findings about judicial attitudes; and (b) are in-
ternally consistent.
2. The latent attitudinal dimensions revealed by factor analysis of Jack-
son’s opinions will correspond to the latent attitudinal dimensions attributed
to the Court as a whole, during the same period, on the basis of scaling and
factor analysis of voting data.
Since cluster analysis deals only with the manifest or surface relation-
ships of the correlation matrix, the attitudinal dimensions yielded by factor
analysis can be expected to uncover more complex and subtle interrelation-
ships. The requirement that Jackson’s attitudinal factors correspond to
those that previous research has identified as common to the decision-
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making group of which Jackson was a member is premised upon two
assumptions: (a) that opinion writing and voting are alternative behavioral
modes of response, both of which are determined by a judge’s attitudes to-
ward the stimuli presented by cases for decision; and (b) that the variables
that Jackson recognized as most important in his judicial decisions—not
necessarily his valuation of those variables—did not significantly differ
from the consensus of his colleagues concerning which were the most rel-
evant and important content variables. Black and Jackson, for instance,
might agree that the political liberalism/conservatism variable (viz., a civil
liberties issue) represented the most important question for decision in a
case relating to a Communist’s claim of the violation of his constitutional
right to freedom of speech; but their respective valuations might be very
different: Black might argue in his opinion and vote in favor of political
liberalism, while Jackson might affirm the negative value of political con-
servatism.
The confirmation of this hypothesis will depend upon a comparison of the
findings from the factor analysis of the content-variable correlation matrix,
with findings from scaling and factor analysis of voting data for the whole
Court.
3. Jackson’s votes, in relation to the political liberalism value, will corre-
late positively and significantly with his affirmations of the same value in his
opinions; a similar proposition is asserted to obtain between his votes for and
against economic liberalism and the economic liberalism content-value.
The assumption here is the same as the first advanced in support of Hy-
pothesis 2, above: that opinion writing and voting are alternative behavioral
modes of response, both of which are determined by a judge’s attitudes to-
ward the stimuli presented by cases for decision. If this is true, then Jackson
should affirm the political liberalism value in opinions which he wrote to justify
pro-civil liberty votes, and he ought consistently to affirm the political liberal-
ism value more than any other content value in such cases; moreover, there
should be few (if any) cases in which his opinion negates the civil liberty
value although he votes in favor of it. Of course, this assumption is in accor-
dance with intuitive expectations premised upon the presumed relatively high
degree of rationality in judicial behavior; but so far as I have been able to dis-
cover, no one thus far has attempted to design an experiment which might
make possible either proof or disproof of this basic assumption about judicial
decision-making.
The test of this hypothesis will be statistical: the stipulated correlation
must be positive and significant, at a level of confidence of not less than .05
(one-tailed).
4. There are no significant differences between Jackson’s value assertions
in concurring and in dissenting opinions; but there are significant differences
between his value assertions in institutional opinions and in either concurring
or dissenting opinions, or both.
It is usually assumed that there are differences between the values a
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judge asserts when he speaks for the Court and what he says in dissent. As
Cardozo put it:
Comparatively speaking at least, the dissenter is irresponsible. The spokesman
of the court is cautious, timid, fearful of the vivid word, the heightened phrase. He
dreams of an unworthy brood of scions, the spawn of careless dicta, disowned by the
ratio decidendi, to which all legitimate offspring must be able to trace their lineage.
The result is to cramp and paralyze. One fears to say anything when the peril of
misunderstanding puts a warning finger to the lips. Not so, however, the dissenter….
For the moment he is the gladiator making a last stand against the lions. The poor
man must be forgiven a freedom of expression, tinged at rare moments with a touch
of bitterness, which magnanimity as well as caution would reject for one triumphant.
(1925: 715)
Little or no consideration appears to have been given, however, to the con-
tent-value relationship between concurring and other opinions. One might
reasonably speculate that a concurring justice should feel no greater sense of
responsibility than a dissenting justice. Therefore, one ought to expect to find
significant differences between institutional and separate (concurring or dis-
senting) opinions, but not between concurring and dissenting opinions.
A supporting argument might be drawn from small group theory. Since
four justices constitute the minimum number necessary to support an institu-
tional opinion,9 while it is the maximum for either a concurring or a dissenting
opinion, Jackson clearly had to compromise his views with a much larger
group when he wrote for the Court than otherwise. The extent to which a
judicial opinion represents the personal views and language of the author
presumably varies inversely with the size of the group which accepts the
opinion; and so institutional opinions should tend to be more depersonalized
than concurring or dissenting opinions. On both psychological and sociologi-
cal grounds, therefore, we should expect that if any significant differences in
the value content of opinions emerge, they will be in accord with the stated
hypothesis, which can be verified statistically in the same manner as Hypoth-
esis 3, except that the test for Hypothesis 4 is two-tailed.
5. There were significant changes, reflecting certain critical events that
occurred on and off the Court, in both Jackson’s opinion and voting behavior.
Let us examine this hypothesis by testing a set of more specific but inde-
pendent sub-hypotheses:
5.1 The longer Jackson remained on the Court, the more conservative he
became.
It frequently has been assumed that judges (like other people) become
more conservative as they grow older, and remain longer on the bench.
Certainly this assumption was the explicit premise of President Roosevelt’s
charges against the Court in the “Court-packing” episode of 1937; and evi-
dently, Jackson himself agreed with it (R. Jackson 1941: 184–188). In order
9. In the relatively rare occasion (for the Court) when only six or seven justices participate
in a decision.
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to test this hypothesis, we can compare the marginal totals for the voting
and content variables of civil liberty and economic policy, for the three four-
year periods. In order to accept this hypothesis, it is required that changes
occur in the stipulated direction, that these changes be progressive from
period to period, and that they should be statistically significant at the .05
level of confidence (one-tailed).
5.2 There was a significant increase in Jackson’s dissenting behavior after
his failure to succeed Stone as chief justice.
Jackson’s presidential ambitions had been cut short by Roosevelt’s third-
term decision; and his apparently good chance of succeeding Chief Justice
Hughes was foreclosed by the outbreak of World War II (Anonymous 1938;
Childs 1940; Corey 1937; McCune 1947; Gerhart 1958: 229–231). Evidently,
despite Roosevelt’s death in 1945, he then had expected to return from his tri-
umph at Nuremberg and assume the center chair on the Supreme Court bench
in place of Stone, who died on April 22, 1946, as the war crimes tribunal’s
work drew to a close. Soon afterward Jackson was told that Hugo Black was
lobbying with Truman against his promotion; the upshot was Jackson’s long
cable from Germany to the judiciary committees of both houses of Congress
(New York Times 1946; United States News 1946), exposing to public view (in
confirmation of long-standing Washington gossip) his version of the “feud” be-
tween Black and himself which had split the Court.10 Since Truman already
had submitted Fred Vinson’s name to the Senate for confirmation, the almost
certain effect of Jackson’s pronunciamento would be to serve as an epitaph to
his political ambitions.
If it is true that Jackson returned to the Court in 1946, bitterly disap-
pointed at the frustration of his ambition to achieve an honor that he (and
many others) thought he had earned and deserved—and more specifically, a
frustration due to the political chicanery (as he saw it) of his colleague Black,
the leader of a “bloc of libertarian judicial activists” (R. Jackson 1955: 57)
with whom Jackson differed in a struggle for leadership on the Court—then
we might reasonably expect Jackson to articulate his disappointment and
disagreement by writing more dissenting opinions than he had felt to be nec-
essary or appropriate during his first four terms on the Court. Such behavior
would provide an appropriate denouement for the act of political suicide he
had committed at Nuremberg; and Jackson was by no means insensitive to the
implications of an increase in a judge’s propensity to dissent, for he wrote in
his valedictory, the undelivered and posthumously published Godkin Lectures
that:
… there is nothing good, for either the Court or the dissenter, in dissenting per
se. Each dissenting opinion is a confession of failure to convince the writer’s col-
leagues, and the true test of a judge is his influence in leading, not in opposing, his
court. (1955: 19)
10. Gerhart 1958: 258–265; Schlesinger 1947: 73–79, 201–212. Gerhart’s pro-Jackson ac-
count should be compared with John Frank 1949: 124–131, which offers a countervailing bias.
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A statistical test of this hypothesis would consist of a comparison of the
totals for Jackson’s majority and dissenting opinions, for the periods before
and after his absence from the Court during the 1945 Term. Since an increase
in the proportion of Jackson’s dissents is predicted, the test will be one-tailed,
and as before the confidence level of .05 is posited as the criterion for accep-
tance or rejection.
5.3 After his return from his experiences as chief prosecutor at Nurem-
berg, Jackson became more conservative toward civil liberty, in both his
opinion and voting behavior.
A subjective reading of Jackson’s opinions which discuss civil liberty is-
sues leaves one with the impression that his intimate familiarity with the rise
of the Nazi movement under the Weimar Republic—a subject which he fre-
quently found occasion to discuss in his extra-judicial writings subsequent
to 1946—had convinced him that it was suicidal for a democracy to permit
conspiratorial, revolutionary groups to organize, to advocate openly their sedi-
tious doctrines, and to contest with rival groups for the control of the streets.
Many persons, including many judges, would agree with such a position, with-
out having had the very exceptional sensitization to the threat of fascism that
Jackson must have experienced in his role as chief prosecutor. But the hy-
pothesis here is that Jackson’s attitude toward “ordered liberty” became more
conservative as a consequence of his having had the unique experience that
Nuremberg afforded; and that this change in his attitude had a significant ef-
fect upon his subsequent behavior as a judge.
A statistical test of this hypothesis is provided by comparing the marginals
for the political liberalism/conservatism content and voting variables, for the
periods before and after his absence from the Court during the 1945 Term.
The test should be one-tailed, since the direction of change is predicted; and
the .05 level of confidence is the criterion for decision.
5.4 After the end of World War II, Jackson became more conservative to-
ward economic policy, in both his opinion and his voting behavior.
This hypothesis rests upon the assumption that Jackson’s fundamental
economic orientation was that of a conservative (cf. Berelson et al. 1954:
1, 94, 100; McClosky 1958): he was a self-made man and the leading
lawyer in a small city, located in an area where traditional and business
values were decidedly dominant; and his lifelong friend and early client
was the head of a local utility corporation. Jackson liked and lived the
life of the upper middle-class gentleman; and most of his friends enjoyed
similar socioeconomic status. The fact that he himself was a Democrat,
while the community in which he lived and most of his friends (during the
first four decades of his life) were staunchly Republican, presents no real
contradiction; to the contrary, the traditional basis for Jackson’s choice of
party is in strict accord with the findings of many investigations of po-
litical socialization (H. Hyman 1959: 74; Maccoby et al. 1954–1955). His
great-grandfather, Elijah Jackson, was described as a “stiff Democrat” and
was identified with a group who “were generally intense partisans of Gen-
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eral Andrew Jackson”; his grandfather, Robert R. Jackson, “was a Democrat
throughout his life, [who] boasted to young Robert of having voted for
Franklin Pierce and for every Democratic candidate for President from that
time down to Woodrow Wilson”; and his father, William Eldred Jackson,
“remained an outspoken Democrat,” in “a community that was intensely
and sometimes bitterly Republican (Gerhart 1958: 26–28).
Jackson’s conversion to the economic liberalism of the New Deal was a
necessary function of his career in national politics, but there is no need to
assume that his enthusiastic support of the New Deal’s economic programs
was not perfectly “sincere.” Similarly, his attack upon the economic conser-
vatism of the Hughes Court (R. Jackson 1941) is in the style, and has all of
the ear-marks, of the partisan advocacy of a brief filed by the president’s
counsel before the bar of public opinion, Jackson’s disclaimer of “dispas-
sionate…. consider[ation]” (1941: v) to the contrary notwithstanding. Both
the necessity of preserving the image of a “typical New Dealer”—as he was
called by journalists in the late 1930s—so long as hope of the chief jus-
ticeship (or even of the presidency) remained, and the pressures to uphold
the successful prosecution of World War II, provide reinforcing explana-
tions for the assumption that Jackson would write and vote as an economic
liberal during his first four terms on the Court. None of these considera-
tions survived after Jackson returned to the Court in 1946, and we might
well expect that his acceptance of the end of his political career would
be accompanied by an apparent shift to the right that would bring his
decision-making behavior in regard to economic issues in closer accord
with his personal ideology.
This hypothesis, it should be noted, is not the same as Hypothesis 5.1,
to which it might be thought to bear some superficial resemblance. To test
it we require that there be a sharp differentiation between the periods be-
fore and after the 1945 Term, and—to the contrary of what we stipulated
for 5.1—that there be no significant difference between the second and
third periods (i.e., 1946–1949 and 1950–1953). Moreover, 5.4 applies only
to the economic conservatism value, while 5.1 requires conjoint change for
political conservatism as well. Our test for 5.4 will be: (a) that a change
takes place in the direction of Jackson’s support for both the content and
the voting economic variables, from liberalism to conservatism; and (b)
that the difference between the sets of marginals be statistically significant
at the .05 level of confidence (one-tailed).
5.5 Jackson’s decision-making behavior became more liberal after Murphy
and Rutledge left the Court.
Both Murphy and Rutledge, who frequently voted with Black and Doug-
las in support of liberal values (Schubert 1965c: 103–105, 129–131), died
during the summer vacation between the end of the 1948 Term and the
opening of the 1949 Term. I have demonstrated elsewhere the influence that
a bloc of four justices can have in forcing the consideration of an issue by
the rest of the Court, under the Court’s rule that jurisdictional decisions can
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be made by a minority of four justices (1962c). I have also shown that the ef-
fect of the reduction in size of the libertarian bloc to two justices—actually,
to only one justice during the 1949 Term, in view of Douglas’ absence during
most of this term due to a horseback-riding injury—was a drastic change in
the character of the stimuli to which the justices were expected to respond,
with an almost total elimination of the more extreme libertarian claims that
Murphy and Rutledge frequently favored having the Court consider and de-
cide in behalf of the claimants (1965c: 226). From a psychological point of
view, then, Jackson’s responses ought to appear to be relatively more lib-
eral during a period when he was asked to uphold less extreme libertarian
claims—claims that he could more readily accept; or, as Guttman might put
it, when he was being asked “easier questions.”
We require, under this hypothesis, that Jackson give proportionately
greater support to the liberal values in both his voting and opinion writing
during the later period. The test will be to compare the marginals for the con-
tent and voting variables for both the political and economic variables, for the
terms before and after the summer of 1949. The direction of change is pre-
dicted, so a one-tailed chi square test at a confidence level of .05 provides an
appropriate criterion.
III. A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE FINDINGS
The voting and content variables can be initially described, in a general
way, by the observation of their marginal frequencies.11 For the political vari-
able, Jackson voted 45–40 and for the economic variable 46–71. The slight
positive leaning in his civil liberties votes is of course not statistically signif-
icant, but his voting preference for economic conservatism is significant at
the .03 level.12 The joint total for both voting variables, 202, indicates that
two-thirds of our 306 cases involved what were for the Court decisions re-
lating to these two major attitudinal variables. Analysis of the much larger
sample (1643) of all nonunanimous decisions on the merits during the sev-
enteen terms 1946–1962 shows that a third of these decisions (572) involved
the political variable and another third (551) the economic variable (Schubert
1965c: 148). Comparison of these two samples suggests that although the pre-
sent sample is quite typical of the period in which Jackson was a member of
the Court, in the relative importance of liberalism and conservatism to other
attitudinal dimensions, Jackson showed a marked affinity for writing opinions
in cases raising the economic issue: the difference between the total of 85 po-
litical votes and 117 economic votes is significant at the .001 level.
11. In the discussion that follows, the first of each pair of frequencies will be that for the
positive value and the second will be for the negative; for the content variables, the frequency
for ambivalent scores appears in parentheses between the marginals.
12. This and the subsequent findings in the text at this point are based on the chi-square
one-sample test (two-tailed).
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His verbal behavior is in sharp contrast to his voting behavior, however.
He favored the liberal political value significantly 35–(30)–16, while apportion-
ing his support for the economic content variable with seeming impartiality
42–(24)–38. One might well conclude that Jackson gave verbal support to civil
liberty while giving his voting support to economic conservatism.
For Jackson it made a difference, however, whether the civil liberties
claimant opposed the national or a state government. The overall margin-
als for the political content variable disguise the fact that his support for
civil liberty claims against the national government, 30–(13)–7, was ac-
companied by a negative deference toward state civil liberty claimants,
6–(20)–11. If the 2:1 ratio of national to state cases had been reversed,
Jackson’s verbal support for political liberalism might have appeared to
be just as impartial as his support for the economic content variable. In
regard to economic content, however, the differences in his support of na-
tional, 19–(6)–10, and of state, 21–(14)–5, regulation of business seem less
important—although the latter is statistically significant and the former
is not—than the opposite direction of his remarks concerning the antimo-
nopoly component of the economic variable: Jackson favored the negative
value (promonopoly) 14–(7)–30, and some of the most incisive language
in his opinions upholds the virtues of free enterprise and denounces the
vices of organized labor. So the fact that the most proximate prelude to
his Nuremberg manifesto was his thinly veiled public attack upon Black in
a labor relations case is doubtless no accident (Jewell Ridge Coal Co. v.
Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of America; Gerhart 1958: 247–253).
And the seeming balance of Jackson’s verbal support regarding the eco-
nomic content variable results from the admixture of his generally liberal
remarks about both national and state government regulation of business,
and his generally conservative views toward labor-management relation-
ships.
On issues of federalism, Jackson tended to favor states’ rights (decen-
tralization: N – ), but not significantly so, 23–(9)–30. In regard to the three
variables which involve the Court’s participation in policy-making, however, he
gave quite one-sided and significant verbal support to the negative values, fa-
voring restraint in Supreme Court policy-making (P – ) 33–(80)–117; deference
to lower-court policy-making (J – ) 19–(38)–80; and deference to policy-making
by the Executive and Congress (A – ) 18–(16)–35. He also manifested signifi-
cantly negative deference toward litigants (X –) 39–(15)–65.
The remaining three variables could not be included in the correlational
analysis, for the technical reasons mentioned earlier. Although most of his
remarks about lawyers and their role were favorable 13–(2)–5, he discussed
this subject so infrequently that the difference between his favorable and
unfavorable statements is of only marginal statistical significance. His sym-
pathy for the public interest 56–(1)–1 and his antipathy for his colleagues
7–(6)–154, to the contrary, are both highly significant statistically. Indeed,
the extremity of the division of the marginals for the public interest variable
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suggests that the phrase “the public interest” had no substantive attitudinal
content for Jackson, and that, instead, he employed it as a benediction or
malediction for any other subject about which he wanted to speak with favor
or disfavor (Schubert 1960b). This view finds support in an examination of
the fourfold tables for the public interest and other variables, which reveals
that his most frequent affirmations of the public interest occurred in opin-
ions in which he urged judicial restraint or was deferential to lower court
judges, or nondeferential to litigants or to his colleagues. His zeal for the
public interest was most articulate in relationship to his discussion of ideas
that he favored and of the behavior of other people with whom he disagreed:
ideas that he approved were identified with the public interest, and persons
whom he criticized were stigmatized as behaving contrary to the public in-
terest.
Jackson’s favorite subjects for discussion in all of his opinions were ju-
dicial restraint and his colleagues. This is hardly surprising; we might well
expect Supreme Court justices to be introspective about their role, and sen-
sitive to their interpersonal relationships, especially in the context of essays
whose function is to establish the rectitude of one’s own ideas and the errone-
ous thinking of one’s associates. However, it is customary, for this very reason,
for Supreme Court justices (like congressmen) to bend over backwards to ob-
serve the formal marks of courtesy; the usual form of address of a justice who
is about to impale a colleague is to refer to him as “brother,” and to express
extreme respect for his views. Jackson rarely bothered to observe such ameni-
ties. As we noted earlier, he was a very candid man; and indeed, “candor”
and “rationality” were the words he mentioned most frequently when showing
negative deference to his colleagues. He combined remarks critical of his col-
leagues with advocacy of policy restraint in over a fourth of his opinions; this
was the highest association for any pair of variables. He also frequently asso-
ciated anticolleague remarks with affirmations of the public interest and with
deference to lower courts.
The Correlation Matrix
Table 16 shows the fourfold tables and the correlation matrix for the
content variables. One weakness that is probably inherent in the use of the
method of content analysis, at least with this type of data, is evident in the
fourfold tables: the size of the observed frequencies often is small (the num-
bers in the cells are low), notwithstanding the fact that the observations were
based upon a set of over three hundred opinions. This reflects, of course,
the circumstance that judicial opinions are written selectively, and the issues
raised by discrete cases are so delimited by the screening processes of lower
appellate court review and Supreme Court jurisdictional decision-making that
no justice finds it necessary or appropriate to discuss all of his attitudes in all
of his opinions. In effect, each opinion of a justice defines a subset which in-
cludes a sample drawn from the universal set of all his attitudes.
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As already noted, the marginal distributions for the variables show that
Jackson favored the negative (or deference) value for all except the polit-
ical and economic variables. Hence it might seem convenient to identify
these other five variables by short titles which would emphasize their neg-
ative values. It happens, however, that almost all of their intercorrelations
are negative or zero—of course, the correlation between (A –, J –) is iden-
tical to that between (A +, J +)—and the correlation between (C + , E +)
also is negative. It seems more important, therefore, to maximize (as Table
17 does) the positive correlations in the matrix in order to facilitate the
cluster analysis. That is best accomplished by reversing the polarity of E
and N only. And questions of format aside, all the statistical relationships
remain unaffected by such a transformation.
The relationships shown by the correlation coefficients are quite com-
patible with intuitive expectations. Using the short titles given in Table
17, JUDCEN (Judicial Centralization) for instance, is associated with POLIB
(Political Liberalism) (support for civil liberties) and PROLIT (Pro Litigants)
(sympathy for litigants)—in the latter instance, for the perfectly sensible
reason that in most opinions in which he discussed both subjects, Jackson
combined deference to the lower court with remarks hostile to the litigant
who was seeking to upset its decision. The zero correlation between JUDCEN
and JUDREV (Judicial Review) demonstrates that Jackson’s attitude toward
judicial review of the decision-making of lower courts was perfectly inde-
pendent of his attitude toward judicial review of the decision-making of
Congress and the administration. Similarly, his attitude toward federalism
was independent of his attitude toward lower courts, which shows that he
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discriminated sharply between what were for him the disparate policy is-
sues of centralization in the government generally, and within the judicial
hierarchy; otherwise, we should expect to find a high positive correlation
between J + and N + .
Table 17 shows that the other two content values most closely related to
judicial policy-making (A + and P +) are independent of each other and (like J
+) not very closely associated with the remaining four variables, among which
intercorrelation tends to be highest. We might well infer from this that Jack-
son’s attitude toward activism and restraint in policy-making by the Supreme
Court, although often articulated with intensity and fervor, had very little to
do with his attitudes toward the other content variables. This inference sug-
gests that the Supreme Court policy-making variable functioned for him like
the public interest and colleagues variables: all of these were useful as verbal
symbols that he could manipulate in support of other values to which he at-
tached greater substantive significance, and which were probably much more
important in shaping his decision-making.
JUDREV has its highest correlations with FEDECEN (Federal Decentraliza-
tion) and POLIB. Both of these are intuitively sensible relationships. Jackson
never argued in favor of judicial review of presidential or congressional ac-
tion (or spoke favorably of a litigant) in an opinion in which he also defended
centralization of governmental power; and in the civil liberties cases, he
urged judicial review most often when upholding the rights of claimants. His
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attitude toward the constitutional autonomy of the other two branches was
substantially independent of his views on economic policy, however, and the
very low or zero correlations with the remaining variables suggest that for
Jackson the only legitimate justifications for judicial supremacy were in de-
fense of states’ rights and civil liberties, POLIB itself correlates at .35 or better
with all except one of the other variables; while the economic variable corre-
lates as highly as this only with one other variable (PROLIT) besides POLIB.
The Cluster Analysis
Various methods of cluster analysis confirm what seems obvious from an
examination of the face of the correlation matrix (Borgatta 1958–1959). The
simplest of these methods, which focuses upon the primary and secondary
levels of interrelationships, is McQuitty’s Elementary Linkage Analysis (ELA)
(1957). ELA shows for each variable which other is most highly correlated with
it, as signified by a solid directional arrow in Figure 8; second highest relation-
ships are depicted by broken directional arrows: and reciprocal relationships
are portrayed by pairs of apposite half-arrows.
Figure 8 shows that the closest association is between POLIB and ECONS
(Economic Conservation); and that PROLIT is most closely related to ECONS, JUD-
CEN with POLIB; while JUDREV and JUDACT (Judicial Activism) both are functions
of FEDECEN, which in turn is most closely related to POLIB.
Observation of the secondary linkages brings out more clearly the
principal cluster relationships. There are three important and interlocking
clusters: (X +, E –, C +), (E –, C +, N –), and (C + , N –, A +). PROLIT and
Figure 8. Primary and Secondary Elementary Linkage among Content
Values
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JUDREV are linked through the (E –, C +) and (C +, N – ) pairs, respectively;
and the (E –, C +, N –) triple is the central element in the structure. All
the other values have either primary or secondary links with POLIB, which
serves as the cornerstone. The two least well-integrated values are J + and
P +; judicial review of lower courts is advocated most frequently in con-
junction with support for civil liberty and litigant deference, while JUDACT
is oriented toward POLIB and FEDECEN.
What the above analysis fails adequately to emphasize is the low level
of association between economic conservatism and federal decentraliza-
tion, which is, however, made quite evident by the alternative methods
of Hierarchical Syndrome Analysis (HSA) and Rank Order Typal Analysis
(ROTA) (McQuitty 1960, 1963). HSA defines (X +, E –, C +, N –) as the only
important quadruple.
ROTA, which is the method most sensitive to intransitivity of relationships,
suggest first the (E –, C +) double; next the (X +, E –, C +) triple; and then
the (X +, E –, C +, N –) quadruple. The only intransitivity for the triple is a
function of the trivial difference between POLIB’S correlation of .45 with J +,
as compared to its .44 correlation with X +; the only other intransitivity is the
previously mentioned low .19 between E – and N –. ROTA confirms that the
three policy-making values (J +, A +, and P +) are poorly associated, either
with the cluster of four or with each other.
Cluster analysis directs attention to the integrative role of political lib-
eralism in the structure of Jackson’s attitudes. The most general finding
would be that there is one primary cluster, composed of litigant deference,
economic conservatism, political liberalism, and federal decentralization.
There are also two overlapping subclusters: JUDREV with POLIB and FEDECEN;
and JUDCEN with POLIB and PROLIT. ECONS has important associations only
with POLIB and PROLIT. The intercorrelations among E –, C +, and X + are
the only ones statistically significant at the .05 level of confidence.
The Factor Analysis
I have assumed that factor analysis might reveal certain latent
relationships among the content variables, but that the latent structure
ought, of course, to be consistent with the manifest structure developed by
cluster analysis. Six factors were extracted, and 85 percent of the variance
was accounted for by the first four axes. Varimax rotation loaded most of
the variance on the first two rotated axes, and upon a sixth factor which
emphasized the same three variables as did the second. In Table 18 the
four principal axes are designated by roman numerals, and the two rotated
factors by roman numerals with prime (′) marks; reversed factors are des-
ignated by asterisks.
Table 18 shows the first principal axis to be clearly one of political lib-
eralism, and the third to be predominately one of economic conservatism
joined with deference to lower courts. The second and fourth axes focus
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Table 18. Principal Axes and Varimax Factors
Factors I* II III* IV* I′* II′
Values
JUDCEN .28 – .56 .63 .47 .00 .00
PROLIT .69 – .24 .00 – .11 .26 .09
ECONS .68 – .27 – .66 – .18 .97 – .10
POLIB .94 – .17 – .03 .14 .82 .24
FEDECEN .71 .49 .15 – .04 .17 .27
JUDREV .47 .58 .48 – .23 .01 .97
JUDACT .10 .47 – .38 .77 .03 – .01
more upon the policy-making values: the second pairs judicial review with judi-
cial decentralization, and federal decentralization with judicial activism; while
the fourth is mostly concerned with judicial activism and judicial centraliza-
tion. None of these relationships appears to be illogical or inconsistent. Jack-
son’s attitude toward civil liberty appears strongly related to his states’ rights
sentiments, his attitude toward civil liberties claimants, and his economic
conservatism; the three policy-making values are much less important to his
political liberalism. Certainly, as the third axis suggests, it is sensible that
at the time when Jackson was on the Court, he should associate economic
conservatism with deference to lower-court decision-making. Similarly, it is
plausible for the third axis to associate judicial review of executive-legislative
policy-making with both judicial activism and the decentralization of judicial
policy-making (since the lower federal and state courts then were probably
more conservative than the Supreme Court); but of course judicial centraliza-
tion is also a sensible adjunct to activism in Supreme Court policy-making.
Only two relationships worth mentioning are shown by the fifth and sixth
axes (which are not reproduced here), PROLIT correlates – .67, and POLIB .33,
with V*, indicating that Jackson by no means sympathized with all claimants
even when he wrote and voted in support of their civil liberty claims—and
names such as Rosenberg, Beauharnais, and Guy W. Ballard (“alias Saint Ger-
main, Jesus, George Washington, and Godfre Ray King”) come readily to mind
as examples. On VI, FEDECEN is .49 and JUDREV – .40, suggesting that Jack-
son frequently advocated judicial restraint toward state executive-legislative
policy-making.
The varimax factors denote the same two clusters of triples that we
observed through cluster analysis: the first (X +, E –, C +) on I′, and the
second (C +, N –, A +) on II′. Factor I′ shows that Jackson’s extremely high
degree of economic conservatism was associated with a favorable attitude
toward civil liberty, a moderate amount of sympathy for litigants, and a
lesser degree of states’ rights sentiment. Stated otherwise, his liberal atti-
tude toward personal rights was in contradiction to his conservative attitude
toward property rights. The inconsistency may lie, however, in contempo-
rary notions of liberalism rather than in Jackson’s thinking. To favor civil
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liberty means to oppose governmental control of personal rights, while to
favor economic liberalism means to support governmental control of prop-
erty rights. Jackson, therefore, was consistent in his support of both the
personal and the property rights of the individual, in opposition to govern-
mental control. He was, in short, more a classic nineteenth-century than a
modern twentieth-century liberal (Schubert 1965c: 201).
It may seem surprising, at least at first blush, to discover that the au-
thor of a book entitled The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy (R. Jackson
1941), in which he vigorously attacked his immediate predecessors on the
Court for their economic conservatism and defense of an out-moded ideol-
ogy, should become a judge whose most pronounced attitude was one of
empathy with John Stuart Mill rather than with John Maynard Keynes. But
Jackson the judge did not hesitate to dissociate himself from what he once
characterized as “earlier partisan advocacy”; as he remarked in the Steel
Seizure Case, apropos a policy statement he had issued as attorney gen-
eral, “a judge cannot accept self-serving press statements of the attorney
for one of the interested parties [i.e., the previous, not the then occupant
of the office of president of the United States] as authority in answering
a constitutional question, even if the advocate was himself” (concurring in
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer). Of course, the correctness of
this appraisal rests upon the assumption that Jackson did change, in his
official behavior, from an economic liberal to an economic conservative, a
proposition that we shall test below.
The close correspondence between the cluster and factorial findings is
further demonstrated by Figure 9, which depicts the three most important
planes in which we can observe the relationships among the content values
and between their major clusters.
In the liberalism plane, the first cluster is a prominent substructure in the
configuration; and although this cluster includes what clearly appear to be a
majority of the values that were most important to him, these are not the val-
ues that Jackson seems to emphasize in his valedictory, the Godkin Lectures
(1955). There Jackson advocates, instead, primarily political liberalism and the
three values aligned with it in the first quadrant of the liberalism plane: fed-
eral decentralization, judicial review, and judicial centralization.
Judicial activism is the most extremely positioned value in the policy-mak-
ing plane, in which the second cluster appears prominently. If JUDCEN were
replaced by the negative value for that variable, it (JUDCEN) would appear in
the fourth quadrant of the plane, immediately below JUDREV, confirming our
earlier observation that in deferring to states rights, Jackson argued that judi-
cial review of state policy-making should be left to the lower courts. But both
major clusters are centered around and not far from the origin of the space,
which confirms graphically our previous observation that Jackson’s advocacy
of judicial activism—or restraint—was virtually independent of the crux of his
system of values.
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Figure 9. Three Perspectives of the Value Configuration
In the plane defined by the two rotated factors, both major clusters ap-
pear in the first quadrant, with the first cluster loaded primarily on the first
rotated axis, and the second cluster loaded primarily on the second axis. Here,
judicial review is independent of economic conservatism, and political liberal-
ism is the most important correlate for both of them. From this perspective,
neither judicial centralization nor judicial activism has any bearing upon the
values in the two clusters.
It was anticipated that factor analysis would reveal latent relationships
more subtle than those made manifest by cluster analysis. Clearly, the fac-
torial analysis confirms very strongly the cluster findings, while at the same
time adding detail, depth, and clarity to the perception of the interrelation-
ships among the values. One additional finding, that cluster analysis did not
denote, is most apparent in Figure 9. FEDECEN and PROLIT appear closely as-
sociated with each other, as well as with POLIB, in both liberalism planes;
and this is also true of the policy-making plane, but with the difference that
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in the latter perspective, they constitute (with ECONS) the values that are
least associated with the function of judicial policy-making.
IV. THE TESTS OF THE HYPOTHESES
We turn now to an examination of the substantive findings in relation to
the set of hypotheses stated earlier.
(1) The cluster analysis findings denoted two overlapping clusters: (X +,
E –, C +) and (C +, N –, A +). Other research in Supreme Court voting behav-
ior has identified attitudes toward C and E as the two most basic attitudinal
dimensions for the justices as a group (Schubert 1965c: chap. 5). Voting data
for the Court as a whole, collected by terms, do not provide sufficient depth
to make possible cumulative scaling of all the content variables discussed in
the present study, based as it is upon the pooling of opinion data for a dozen
terms. However, other evidence suggests that N, A, and J are scalable vari-
ables (Schubert 1965c: 146–157). The only cluster element that shows up
more importantly in Jackson’s opinion writing behavior than in the voting of
the justices as a group is the litigant variable.
There is nothing irrational or illogical about the cluster associations.
Traditional scholarship discusses and finds much ambiguity in Jackson’s
views on issues of economic policy, civil liberty, and centralization; but
traditional scholarship has little to say about Jackson’s views toward judi-
cial review of lower courts, since the usual concern is with “substantive”
rather than jurisdictional decision-making; and it has nothing whatever to
say about Jackson’s attitudes toward litigants, since there is no relevant
legal category to encompass this (“bias” means something quite different,
in legal parlance, the fiction being that judges’ decisions are not affected
by their attitudes toward the parties litigant. Our clusters, therefore, seem
meaningful; they are internally consistent; and they reveal relationships
that transcend the accepted lore about Jackson’s “philosophy as a judge.”
No basis appears for rejecting Hypothesis 1.
(2) Hypothesis 2 states that the latent attitudinal dimensions re-
vealed by factor analysis will correspond to the scaling and factorial
attitudinal dimensions that independent research has identified as com-
mon for the Court during the period in which Jackson served. The
scaling and factor research in the attitudes of the whole Court covers
the period of the 1946–1962 Terms, which includes the last eight terms
of Jackson’s tenure. These data show that Jackson’s average rank was
between fourth and fifth on C and between eighth and ninth on E
(Schubert 1965c: 104–107, 130–133). In relation to the seventeen other
justices who were on the Court during the period 1946–1963, Jackson
ranked tenth on political liberalism, and seventeenth on economic liber-
alism (Schubert 1965c: 125, 145). Evidently he was a political moderate
but an economic conservative in his attitudes, as one would infer from
his voting behavior in relation to his colleagues. Moreover, in that behavior
and during that period, Jackson was a moderate on a Court that became more
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conservative, as a group, toward civil liberty; and he was a conservative on a
Court that became more liberal, as a group, toward economic policy.
The political and the economic variables were the two most important at-
titudinal scales for the justices as a group, throughout the 1946–1963 period.
Many justices are liberals, and some are conservatives, on both scales; but it
is precisely because other justices are (like Jackson) more liberal toward po-
litical than economic issues—or, like Tom Clark, politically conservative but
economically moderate—that two scales are necessary in order adequately to
measure the similarities and differences among the justices with regard to the
major components of modern liberalism.
Once comparisons are made between his voting in the political and eco-
nomic cases in which he wrote opinions, and his rank position on the general
C and E voting scales, it becomes relevant to inquire whether the votes with
opinions constitute a representative sample of the universes of political and
economic voting data. Although, as we noted earlier, the sample is represen-
tative to the extent that it includes the same ratio of C and E votes, to total
votes, as does the universe of voting data, this finding does not inform us
concerning the correspondence between the direction of those votes, in the
sample and in the universe.13 For the political variables, the ratios of liberal
to total votes are .67 for the sample and .34 for the universe, during the pe-
riod before the 1945 Term; and .50 (sample) and .34 (universe) thereafter. The
ratios for the entire period of twelve terms are .53 and .34. For the economic
variable, the corresponding ratios are .57 and .43 (before the 1945 Term), .26
and .13 (afterward), and .39 and .26 (overall). Taking into consideration the
different frequency sums to which these ratios relate, and using a two-tailed
test, the difference is significant (at < .05) between all pairs of ratios except
for economic voting during the earlier subperiod—and even that difference
is significant, if we compare Jackson’s voting in cases with opinion with his
voting in cases in which he wrote no opinion. Evidently, Jackson voted con-
sistently more liberally on both political and economic issues, in the cases in
which he wrote opinions, than when he voted without opinion. This (one might
infer) may have been for the very good reason that he chose to write separate
opinions, or was assigned the opinion of the Court, in those cases in which he
was prepared to take what was for him a relatively liberal position (e.g., con-
curring in Edwards v. California, and writing for the majority in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette). But we must likewise conclude that in
his overall decisional behavior, Jackson was even more conservative than he
appears to be on the basis of the present analysis of the cases in which he
wrote opinions. Jackson also tended to be more liberal in his opinion writing
13. The data for voting in decisions with opinion are reported in Table 20; for the marginal
distributions for all Jackson’s votes in decisions on the merits of the political and economic scale
variables, see fn. 15 and 16. A comparison of these two sources shows that for those (non-sam-
ple) cases in which he wrote no opinion, the voting marginals (before and after the 1945 Term)
are: for C, 11–36 and 37–104; and for E, 40–66 and 8–127.
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than in his voting toward either C or E, although these differences are only
marginally significant at about .10 (two-tailed). The data are suggestive, there-
fore, of a consistent scalar relationship for both variables: that Jackson was
most liberal in his opinions, that he was relatively moderate in his voting in
cases in which he wrote opinions, and that he was most conservative in his
voting in the cases in which he wrote no opinions.
Since Jackson’s verbal support for civil liberty was more extreme than his
voting support, while his verbal support for economic conservatism was less
extreme than his voting support, we should interpret Factor I of Table 18 as
indicating for Jackson a more favorable attitude of political liberalism, and a
less extreme attitude of economic conservatism, than are suggested by scal-
ing and factor analysis based on observations of his voting behavior. There is
certainly nothing inconsistent, however, between the two sets of data; to the
contrary they reinforce each other strongly, and the more so once we recog-
nize the apparently consistent differentials between his verbal and his voting
behaviors.
Both factors I and I′ show Jackson’s political and economic attitudes
to be functions of a single factor of liberalism. Factor analysis of voting
data for the Court shows precisely the same thing, with the difference that
observations for a set of nine justices make it possible to relate cumula-
tive scales, representing the C and E variables, to the reference axes in
factorial space. Typically, the C and E scales are highly correlated with the
first centroid axis, which appears as the mean between the scales (Schu-
bert 1965c: 209–217). As noted above, Jackson in relation to his colleagues
was a moderate on civil liberties but the most extreme conservative on the
Court on economic issues (although Whittaker, who joined the Court after
Jackson’s death, was even more extreme in economic conservatism). This
attitudinal combination of political moderation and economic conservatism
has been identified with the ideological type Pragmatic Conservatism; and
among the eighteen justices who served during the seventeen-term period
1946–1963, Jackson ranked thirteenth on liberalism but second on the prag-
matism dimension—on which he was exceeded only by Goldberg (for whom
only the data of a single term were available) (Schubert 1965c: 262, 266,
271). Pragmatism was there defined as a function of the component ide-
ologies of individualism and libertarianism; and on the individualism factor,
Jackson typically ranked very high—in five of the eight terms, 1946–1953,
he ranked first (Schubert 1965c: 204, 224).
Jackson can best be characterized, on the basis of his voting in relation-
ship to his colleagues, as ideologically a pragmatic, individualistic conserva-
tive; and attitudinally as a political moderate and economic conservative.
Nothing revealed by the present study is inconsistent with calling him a con-
servative judge with a high regard for individualism and pragmatism. These
are all qualities which have been stressed as typical of him, by previous com-
mentators upon his philosophy. Barnett concludes that “His general position
has been individualistic, pragmatic, hard to predict, middle-of-the-road, and,
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on balance, conservative.”14 Weidner characterizes his approach to civil lib-
erties as “pragmatic.” Jackson himself, incidentally, cited William James in a
pro-civil liberty opinion (United States v. Ballard)—and James is hardly an au-
thority frequently invoked by Supreme Court justices.
It is true that the latent voting-factor ideologies are different from the
second, third, and fourth opinion-content factors, which relate to manifest
attitudes. On the other hand, we have found significant differences between
his verbal behavior and his voting behavior in general; and this destroys
any empirical basis for the assumption (underlying Hypothesis 2) that the
attitudes revealed by Jackson’s opinions necessarily would correspond to
the attitudes inferred from his general voting behavior. The manifest opin-
ion factors are a function of the means he employed to proffer a formal
rationalization for a small portion of his total votes, and frequently, in di-
rect relationship with small groups (and often, with none) of his colleagues;
the latent voting factors are a function of his conjoint relationship with all
his colleagues. Neither the strategies nor the tactics nor the processes that
govern opinion writing and voting are the same. The opinion factors tell us
what was most common in the relationships among Jackson’s manifest at-
titudes in what he chose to write “for the record”; while the voting factors
inform us what was most common among the latent ideologies of all the
justices—Jackson plus eight colleagues. What we ought reasonably to have
expected, in comparing two such sets of factors, was not congruence, but
the absence of inconsistency.
The first factor—liberalism—is the same for both sets. The subsequent
opinion factors represent attitudes that were important for Jackson in the
cases in which he wrote opinions, and which were fundamental components
of his personal system of values; but these were not values accepted as the
most important criteria for decision by enough of his colleagues, so as to
appear as important components of the first three (at least) factors common
to the justices as a group in their voting over the period of the past two
decades.
We conclude that there is certainly no basis for the complete rejection
of Hypothesis 2. It cannot be confirmed in its entirety in the form stated,
but the reason lies in the ineptitude of our formulation of the hypothesis
rather than in any basic inconsistency in the two sets of factor data. Hy-
pothesis 2 must therefore be partially rejected, but our test of it has not
been unfruitful. The present intensive study of the opinions of a single jus-
tice and the related extensive studies of the voting behavior of the Court
as a group differ in many respects methodologically; yet, to the extent that
they may appropriately be compared, they are in very substantial agree-
ment.
14. Barnett 1948: 241. Cf. the works, all there cited, of the following authors: Fairman 1955:
487; Gerhart 1953: 969, 971; Jaffe 1955: 992–993; Nielson 1945: 384, 401–403; and Weidner
1955: 593.
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(3) Hypothesis 3 assumes a significantly high positive correlation between
Jackson’s opinions and votes, in support of the political and the economic
content variables. Table 19 shows that the correlation between values and
votes (1) for political liberalism is positive and moderately high, and (2) for
economic liberalism also is positive and slightly higher. Conversely, the cross
correlation between political values and economic votes is zero, and between
economic values and political votes it is negative and moderately high.
These correlations were calculated from only that part of the complete
data in which the voting and the content variables were observed to occur to-
gether in the same decisions. Table 20 reports the sets of marginals for all
votes and content values for both C and E, for each of the three major time
periods.
On the basis of the demonstrated relationships between content values
and votes, for both variables, I conclude that Hypothesis 3 is confirmed.
(4) Hypothesis 4 supposes no significant differences between Jackson’s
content values as articulated in concurring and in dissenting opinions, but ex-
pects them as between institutional and separate opinions. For purposes of the
analysis below, “majority opinions” include both institutional and concurring
opinions; “separate opinions” include both concurring and dissenting opin-
ions; and institutional opinions continue to mean opinions for the Court. The
data to be discussed are reported in Table 21.
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Table 20. Marginal Frequencies of Values and Votes for the
Political and Economic Variables, by Major Periods
1941–1944 1946–1949 1950–1953
C E C E C E
+ – + – + – + – + – + –
Values 5 2 19 10 13 6 11 14 17 8 12 14
Votes 10 5 28 21 13 15 8 25 22 20 10 25
We shall also examine an alternative Hypothesis 4′, which states the or-
thodox view: that there will be significant differences between majority and
dissenting opinions (and, by implication, not otherwise).
In general, the first part of Hypothesis 4—that concurring and dissenting
opinions will show no significant differences in content values—cannot be dis-
proved statistically by our data. None of the differences is significant at the
.05 level of confidence. For content variable N, the significance level is only
slightly greater than .10 (two-tailed), and for P, it is less than .10 but greater
than .05; these differences might be considered marginally significant. Jack-
son distinctly tended to argue for decentralization when he dissented. The
difference for P is even more pronounced, however, when majority and dis-
senting opinions are compared; so the latter interpretation seems the more
important one. For none of the variables, then, are differences between con-
curring and dissenting opinions statistically significant; and one of the two
marginal contrasts is less important than another relationship to be consid-
ered below.
It is much easier, of course, to fail to find significant differences than to
find them; so the test for the second part of the hypothesis is much the more
important of the two tests. None of the differences between institutional opin-
ions and concurrences is significant. There are significant differences between
institutional opinions and dissents for E (and its component subvariables) and
for X, and there are marginally significant differences for P; but most of these
differences are even greater when majority opinions are compared with dis-
sents, so as before I shall assume that the latter interpretation should be
preferred.
Institutional opinions were also compared with separate opinions, but
nothing new was revealed by this examination. The frequencies for concur-
rences are so much lower than for dissents that practically all of the differ-
ences that appear must be attributed to the effect of the latter variable; and
the differences observed are of the same order as those discussed immedi-
ately above. I find no significant differences that properly can be construed as
appertaining to a comparison of institutional opinions with concurring or dis-
senting opinions, let alone both. Consequently, Hypothesis 4 must be rejected.
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Table 21. Associations between Content and Opinion Variables
Content N A J X P C E E(3)
(National)
E(4)
(State)
E(5)
(Monopoly)
Opinion + – + – + – + – + – + – + – + – + – + –
Institutional 12 13 5 14 8 44 13 34 17 48 9 7 25 8 10 0 13 0 10 9
Concurring 6 3 2 7 4 12 2 8 7 14 10 5 4 2 3 2 1 0 0 0
Dissenting 5 14 10 13 7 23 23 21 8 54 15 4 13 28 6 8 7 5 4 21
Significant differences emerge, however, between majority and dissenting
opinions, for economic liberalism and each of its three component variables
(freedom from national restraint of economic liberty, freedom from state re-
straint of economic liberty, and pro business monopoly), at confidence levels
ranging from less than .05 to less than .001, two-tailed.
Two other variables also show significant differences. Jackson was anti-lit-
igant in his majority opinions, and ambivalent in dissent; and also significant
is his tendency to argue for policy activism in majority more than in dissenting
opinions. Thus, almost half of the variables show important differences in Jack-
son’s opinion behavior when he voted with the majority as compared to when
he dissented. I conclude that alternative Hypothesis 4′ is partially confirmed
by these data; to the extent that significant differences appear in Jackson’s
opinion behavior, they support the traditional view that a dissenting judge ar-
ticulates his attitudes more outspokenly than one who votes with the majority.
My own hypothesis, which was inferred from sociopsychological theory, is not
supported by the evidence of this study.
(5) Hypothesis 5 consists of a set of more specific hypotheses about
changes in Jackson’s opinion and voting behaviors, in response to what are as-
sumed to have been critical events in his career.
5.1. This hypothesis states that Jackson became increasingly more con-
servative the longer he remained on the Court; and we have stipulated that,
in order to confirm it, the data must provide evidence of progressive change
through each of three major time periods. The data to test this hypothesis are
contained in Table 20. Our present interest is in a comparison of the marginal
distributions, between periods, for each of the four variables (political content
values, political votes, economic content values, and economic votes).
For political content values, no significant differences are evident be-
tween periods; while for political votes and economic content values change
occurs, and in the predicted direction, but only between the first and second
periods, and even then it is not significant. For economic votes also, change
occurs in the predicted direction between the first and second periods, and
it is significant at less than .005; but no significant difference is discernible
between the second and third periods. Therefore, the data for none of these
four variables confirm the hypothesis; if Jackson became more conservative
we must seek some other explanation than aging in office to account for it.
5.2 Was there a significant increase in Jackson’s dissenting behavior
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after his failure to obtain the chief justiceship? Before the 1946 Term, the
ratio of Jackson’s majority to dissenting opinions was 69:24; thereafter it
was 120:89. The difference between the ratios for the two periods is sig-
nificant at <.005 (using X2 and a one-tailed test). The percentage of his
dissents was 26 in the earlier period and 43 in the later one. Jackson’s
rate of dissent increased by two-thirds after the 1945 Term, but was quite
stable thereafter: 44 percent for the period of the 1946–1949 Terms, and
42 percent thereafter. Of course, the causal relationship implied by this hy-
pothesis rests upon inference only; it will be no more persuasive than the
reasons adduced to support it. The data confirm the descriptive portion of
the hypothesis, however, and we cannot reject the hypothesis on the basis
of these findings.
5.3. Did Jackson become more conservative in his attitude toward civil lib-
erties, after his experience as chief prosecutor at Nuremberg? Evidently not:
when the data for the 1946–1949 and 1950–1953 periods (Table 20) are com-
bined, the direction of change is right for both content values and votes, but
X2 is only 0.03 and 1.38, respectively, and neither of these is significant even
for a one-tailed test. This hypothesis is not confirmed by these data.15
5.4. Did Jackson become more conservative in his attitude toward eco-
nomic issues after the end of World War II? Again, Table 20 provides the
relevant data. The change is in the right direction, for both the content value
and voting and it is significant at <.05 in both instances—for voting, indeed, p
<.0005.16 The relative frequency of his expressions of economic conservatism
increased by about two-thirds after the 1945 Term: by 62 percent (from 34
percent to 55 percent) for the content value and by 72 percent (from 43 per-
cent to 74 percent) for voting. The percentages of economic conservatism for
the second and third periods are 56 and 54 percent for the content values, and
76 and 71 percent for voting. This shows that both his opinion and his voting
behavior were highly stable, in regard to this variable, after his return to the
Court in 1946. Since the direction of both his verbal and his voting support
was E + during the first period and was E – thereafter, it seems warranted
to infer that Jackson was an economic liberal during his first four terms
on the Court, and an economic conservative thereafter. As in the case of
Hypothesis 5.2, the causal portion of the present hypothesis rests upon in-
ference from biographical data but the objective fact of a significant shift
in Jackson’s official behavior in relation to economic policy, which coincided
15. For all Jackson’s votes on the merits (including decisions in which he wrote no opin-
ions), the marginals for the political variable are 21–41 for the period before the 1945 Term, and
72–139 thereafter. X2 for these two ratios is 0.013, which indicates that the goodness of fit is
significant at >.95. Certainly these data confirm the refutation of this hypothesis.
16. For all Jackson’s votes (including decisions in which he wrote no opinions), the mar-
ginals for the economic variable are 68–87 for the period before the 1945 Term, and 26–177
thereafter. X2 for these two ratios is 32.5, which indicates that the increase in the conservatism
of his voting on economic issues is significant at <.0005, irrespective of whether or not he wrote
opinions to rationalize his votes.
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with the World War II period and its aftermath, seems indisputable. The hy-
pothesis cannot be rejected on the basis of these data and findings.
5.5. Our final hypothesis is obviously in contradiction with the pre-
ceding hypotheses 5.1, 5.3, and 5.4, each of which assumed that Jackson
became more conservative in his attitudes toward either civil liberty or eco-
nomic issues, or both, during the period following his return to the Court
from a year’s leave of absence. Hypothesis 5.5 states that Jackson became
more liberal, in regard to both civil liberty and economic issues, after the
deaths of Murphy and Rutledge. The test for this hypothesis requires the
partitioning of the data into two sets: the 1941–1944, 1946–1948 Terms;
and the 1949–1953 Terms.
Only the political content value changes in the predicted direction; and
this change is so minimal that the goodness of fit of the two marginal dis-
tributions is significant at >.97 (with X2 <.003)! Not only are the changes
for the other three variables in the wrong direction; economic voting is sig-
nificantly more conservative although, as we have seen, this change began
earlier, as demonstrated by the even higher X2 for change toward economic
conservatism after the 1944 Term. But the fact that this hypothesis must so
clearly be rejected is not without interest. Jackson’s rank in voting in sup-
port of civil liberty shifted abruptly from sixth to fourth after Murphy and
Rutledge left the Court (Schubert 1965c: 105, 113–115). It would be possi-
ble for an analyst working only with the C scale data to interpret this shift
in rank as evidence that he changed in his attitude, toward increasing sym-
pathy for civil liberty, during his last five terms on the Court. The present
data demonstrate the danger of attempting to make anything other than
relational inferences, when one is working with ordinal data, for which the
underlying metric is unknown and indeed, in terms of such data, incapable
of being determined.
Table 22. Political and Economic Variables, before and after
the End of the 1948 Term
C E
Values Votes Values Votes
Period + – + – + – + –
1941–1944, 1946–1948 14 7 20 16 27 19 32 37
1949–1953 21 9 25 24 15 19 14 34
The appropriate inference from Jackson’s rise in scale rank after 1948 would
be that, in relation to a different (and generally, more conservative) set of
colleagues, Jackson appeared to be more favorable to civil liberty than a ma-
jority of his colleagues. But Table 22 indicates that his own attitude toward
civil liberty did not become more favorable; to the contrary, the changes in
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his opinion and voting behavior toward civil liberty were quite insignificant,
and his voting trend was toward greater conservatism.
(6) Table 23 summarizes the decisions that were reached for each of the
hypotheses in the tests discussed above.
Table 23. Summary of Tests of Hypotheses
Hypothesis Subject Decision
1 Clusters +
2 Factors 0
3 Equivalence of liberalism content-values and votes +
4 Institutional opinions and separate opinions –
4′ Majority and dissenting opinions 0
5.1 Increasing conservatism –
5.2 Increasing dissent after 1945 Term +
5.3 Increasing C—after 1945 Term –
5.4 Increasing E—after 1945 Term +
5.5 Increasing liberalism after 1948 Term –
An examination of Table 23 suggests an additional hypothesis not for-
mulated in advance of the general analysis of the data. The confirmation of
Hypotheses 5.2 and 5.4 suggests the question of the relationship between
Jackson’s economic conservatism and his dissenting behavior. We now know
that both his tendency to dissent and his conservatism toward economic pol-
icy increased significantly after his return to the Court in 1946; and Tables 19
and 20 both show that his increased economic conservatism during the later
period was manifested in both his opinions and his votes. Jackson, in other
words, behaved primarily as an economic liberal during the earlier period, and
primarily as an economic conservative during the later period; and his switch
to conservatism was accompanied by an increasing tendency to dissent. There-
fore, it seemed reasonable to infer Hypothesis 6: that there was a significantly
high and positive correlation between the economic content-variable and the
opinion-variable differences, in that Jackson supported the liberal position in
the majority and the conservative position in dissent. To test this hypothesis,
let us specify that the stipulated correlation must be observed with both the
content and the voting variables during both periods. Thus, the hypothesis
would test the relationship between the opinion variable and both the content
and voting variables, for Jackson’s period of economic liberalism and also for
his period of economic conservatism. Confirmation would also establish that
the relationship was independent of the direction of his support of the eco-
nomic variable.
It is clear from viewing Table 24 that Hypothesis 6 cannot be rejected.
The correlations for both the content value and voting are quite stable,
notwithstanding Jackson’s metamorphosis from a liberal to a conservative
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Table 24. Economic Liberalism and Conservatism in Majority
and Dissenting Opinions, before and after the 1945 Term
Period 1941–1944 1946–1953
E Variable Values Votes Values Votes
– + – + – + – +
Opinions
Majority 3 15 12 28 7 14 23 15
Dissenting 7 4 9 0 21 9 27 3
ø = .480 .548 .363 .332
X2 4.75 11.98 5.31 6.05
p < .025 .0005 .025 .01
position.17 Of particular interest are the minor diagonals of the fourfold ta-
bles, which show that Jackson argued in support of economic liberalism in
dissenting opinions just as often—indeed, a bit more often—than he supported
economic conservatism in majority opinions. In his voting, however, he fre-
quently upheld the conservative position in the majority, while dissenting only
thrice in support of economic liberalism during his entire period of service on
the Court.18 The importance of this finding will be apparent presently.
One thing is obvious: the causal parts of Hypotheses 5.2 and 5.4, which
were accepted tentatively, must be reconsidered. If Jackson’s increasing dis-
senting behavior and economic conservatism are so highly and consistently
correlated, we cannot remain satisfied with independent explanations for
each: that his dissenting should be attributed to his disappointment over his
failure to become chief justice, while his economic conservatism is attributed
to the end of the need for judicial support for the war effort, as well as to the
collapse of his political ambitions. In the light of Table 24, it seems preferable
to rely upon the broader explanation for both his increasing dissidence and his
switch to economic conservatism. “Switch” is probably a very poorly chosen
word to describe Jackson’s behavior, however, if our interest goes beyond the
manifest facts to the latent factors.
As we noted above, Jackson was no more prepared to dissent in behalf
of economic liberalism in his “liberal” period than during his “conservative”
period. Given his own sophisticated sensitivity to the political implications
of dissenting behavior, consider that he was unwilling ever to dissent, even
once, in support of the position that we can assume would have furthered
his political ambitions, during the time when such a display of conspicu-
17. The corresponding correlations between political liberalism/conservatism (in either
content values or voting) and majority/dissenting opinions, are negative, low, and insignif-
icant. Of course for the entire period of twelve terms, the correlations for the economic
variables necessarily are positive and significant: .475 between content values and opinions,
and .458 between voting and opinions.
18. All three economically liberal dissents came in the 1952 Term.
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ous economic liberalism might have done him the most good, politically
speaking. I attribute his failure so to behave, with such rationality, to a con-
sistency with his own most strongly rooted attitude; and the evidence of
the present study strongly indicates that this was economic conservatism.
Therefore, Jackson’s change in his opinions to greater support for economic
conservatism, and his reinforcing dissenting behavior, reflected not a con-
version to a new view of political economy, but rather a reversion—at least,
at the behavioral level—to the beliefs of his forefathers, his youth, and his
manhood prior to his entry into political office.
V. CONCLUSION
A significant positive correlation exists between Jackson’s verbal and
voting support for political liberalism, although his overall voting record man-
ifested less sympathy for civil libertarianism than did his opinions; in relation
to his colleagues, Jackson consistently was a moderate in his voting on civil
liberty issues. He showed a slight but not significant tendency toward greater
political conservatism after the end of World War II, which apparently was
quite independent of the swings of his colleagues toward greater (1946–1948
Terms) and toward lesser (1949–1953 Terms) political liberalism.
The issue to which Jackson was most deeply attached was economic pol-
icy, and a very high and significant correlation shows up between his opinion
and voting behavior in this regard. Renowned as an economic liberal at the
time of his appointment to the Court, he maintained this image, in both his
opinions and his voting, only during his first four terms. After the war, his be-
havior changed sharply and significantly to strong and consistent support of
economic conservatism; and throughout his last eight terms on the Court, he
vied with Frankfurter for the bottom position in the cumulative scales of vot-
ing in support of economic liberalism. His rate of dissent in behalf of economic
conservatism doubled during this later period.
His espousal of economic liberalism and relatively low rate of dissent dur-
ing the war years were generalized characteristics of his official behavior, in
addition to being specifically related to each other. The same was true of his
economic conservatism and much higher rate of dissent after the war. My con-
clusion is that Jackson’s economic liberalism was a necessary function of his
political career; and that the collapse of his political ambitions for the chief
justiceship and even the presidency best explains his reversion to economic
conservatism and his increasing dissidence. With life tenure as an associate
justice, he had nothing more to lose; and so he wrote and voted in support of
the value that was most fundamentally related to his way of life and his career
before he went into politics.
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7
Opinion Agreement
Sociologists and social psychologists have devoted considerable attention
in recent years to the study of small groups (Cartwright and Zander 1960;
Collins and Guetzkow 1964; Berelson and Steiner 1964: chap. 8; Olmstead
1959), but relatively little has been done to focus upon appellate courts as
a situs for empirical research (Murphy 1966). The data for this paper have
been taken from a larger study of High Court decision-making in which I have
been engaged for several years.1 In the present report I shall discuss primar-
ily from a sociometric point of view the question of the relative popularity of
judicial opinions among the justices of the High Court, particularly in relation
to the participation in decision-making and the background characteristics of
the justices. Other papers published elsewhere are concerned with the social
attitudes of the justices, as inferred from cumulative scaling of their voting in
split decisions of the court (Schubert 1969d), and with the political ideology of
the justices in relation to their social attributes, their participation in decision-
making, and their voting behavior (Schubert 1968).
The sample for analysis consists of all decisions of the High Court re-
ported in volumes 84–107 of the Commonwealth Law Reports for the decade
extending from Chief Justice John Latham’s de facto retirement, on May 11,
1951, to the appointment of Justice Francis Owen, on September 22, 1961.
The only personnel changes occurred during the winter of 1958, when Dou-
glas Menzies (appointed June 12, 1958) replaced William Webb (resigned May
16, 1958), and Victor Windeyer (appointed September 8, 1958) replaced Dudley
This chapter was originally published, in slightly different form, as “Opinion Agreement
among High Court Justices in Australia” in Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology 4
(1968): 2–17, 158–159.
1. For their support of the larger research project, I am indebted to the Institute of Ad-
vanced Projects of the East-West Center, and the Social Science Research Institute, both of the
University of Hawaii; and to the Asian Studies Center of the Office of International Programs of
Michigan State University.
Williams (resigned July 31, 1958). We have therefore two stable subgroups
of seven justices each,2 with one of these groups acting during an earlier
and longer period of seven years, and the other group acting during a later
and shorter period of three years. Five justices (Dixon, Taylor, Edward Mc-
Tiernan, Wilfred Fullagar, and Frank Kitto) were members of both groups
and participated in the decisions of the Court throughout all (or substan-
tially all) of the entire ten-year period. There is a total, therefore, of nine
judges in the sample, and what from a sociological point of view are two
different “courts” (Snyder 1958), because of the change in the composition
of the decision-making group.
Table 25. The Sample of High Court Decisional Data
Period 1
(1951–1958)
Period 2
(1958–1961) Totals
Decisions 510 200 710
Opinions* 2141 836 2977
Participations 2321 927 3248
*Opinions in CLR, vols. 84–99, are Period 1; those in vols.
101– 107 are Period 2; and those in vol. 100 are divided be-
tween the two periods.
The frequencies of decisions, participations, and opinions observed in the
sample are reported in Table 25, with a breakdown for the two periods. Ref-
erence to Table 25 shows that both the ratio of opinions to decisions (4.2)
and the mean panel size (4.6) are the same in both periods. The former is a
measure of the average number of opinions associated with a decision, and
is an institutional characteristic of the court during the period studied; the
mean panel size has a more intuitively obvious sociological meaning, because
it describes the average size of decision-making groups for the court. The
High Court acts through a continuously shifting series of ad hoc committees
or panels of two to six members; and it infrequently—11 to 12 percent of
the time—utilizes en banc (or, as Australian lawyers call it, “full Court”) de-
cisions of the entire group of seven justices. Panels of five make a majority
of the decisions and panels of three are next in popularity, for the reason (it
has been suggested) of avoiding the possibility of an equal division of votes.
The ratio of opinions to votes (i.e., participations), which measures change
in the relative frequency of individual articulation of opinion, is the same for
both periods, .92 and .90. This demonstrates the pronounced extent to which
Australian High Court justices do deliver individual opinions. These findings
2. Except that during the initial year of the earlier period, the ailing chief justice took no part
in the Court’s decision-making, so there was only a six-man group then. The senior “other” justice
(cf. Sawer 1957: 488) and the de facto chief during 1951–1952, Owen Dixon, was promoted to chief
justice de jure on April 18, 1952, Sir John having formally retired one day earlier; and Alan Taylor
was appointed on September 3, 1958, to the position vacated by Sir Owen.
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stand in sharp contrast to those for the United States Supreme Court, whose
average ratio of participation3 is much higher, and ratio of opinions to partic-
ipation4 is much lower, reflecting the differences in customs and institutional
roles that have obtained, for these two courts, at least during the period of
their coexistence. During the same ten-year period as that for our High Court
sample, the Supreme Court decided on the merits of 1,749 cases, of which
946 (54 percent) were split decisions. Only 187 (26 percent) of the High Court
decisions were nonunanimous; so the Supreme Court decided over twice as
many cases in absolute terms and it divided in voting twice as often as did
the High Court.5 Voting data provide the more adequate source for the study
of the decision-making of the Supreme Court because they provide a larger
sample of observations (than do Supreme Court opinions) which discriminate
among individual differences in behavior, but for the High Court, opinion data
afford a better sample of such observations than do votes.6 The much higher
degree of apparent decisional “unanimity” in the High Court is perhaps an-
other way of saying the much greater tendency to reveal, through individual
opinion nuances, sublimated latent voting differences which, given the Amer-
ican institutional ethos, might well have emerged instead as manifest split
decisions.
The cultural expectation for the Supreme Court is that, whatever the
level of voting disagreement that may obtain, the justices are supposed to
minimize the public disclosure of their differences by grouping themselves
around the smallest possible number of opinions that can rationalize the out-
come:7 a high social value is placed upon maintaining the illusion of harmony
and consensus among the justices.8 Critics tend to brand as “political” deci-
sions for which the voting division is close, but they are equally disparaging
of a multiplicity of opinions, arguing that judges who “knew the law” would
be of a single mind on questions of constitutional interpretation. The sit-
uation is diametrically reversed for the High Court, for which the cultural
expectation is that justices will assume individual (rather than collective)
3. This is the mean panel size divided by the maximum size of the court, and is .95 for the
Supreme Court and .66 for the High Court.
4. Apparently, less than .20. For references to sources, see my paper (1969d).
5. Consequently, the corresponding sample of split decisions available for the study of the
Supreme Court is five times larger than the present High Court sample.
6. Disregarding for the moment the impact of cultural norms governing disclosure of dif-
ferences in viewpoint, we can observe that disagreement in opinions is more widespread than
that concerning outcomes because dissenters almost without exception disagree with the opin-
ions of justices who vote in the majority, but majority justices are by no means agreed upon their
reasons for reaching the same result. For the same reason, opinion differences can be observed
also in decisions for which the vote as to outcome is unanimous; and for the High Court such
“unanimous” decisions are much more numerous than split decisions.
7. Cf. Walter F. Murphy’s discussion of the implications of game theory for Supreme Court
behavior (1964a): esp. pp. 12–36; and see Bickel 1957.
8. The American practice goes back to the days of John Marshall who used the opinion of
the Court, which he usually gave personally and in almost all other cases assigned, as a de-
vice for extending his own dominance over his colleagues, and therefore over the policy norms
enunciated by the Supreme Court.
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responsibility for their votes in the court’s decisions, and that one way to en-
force this norm is to insist upon individual rationalizations (or critiques) of
the collective result. The American Supreme Court best fulfills its institutional
role when the nine justices all speak with a single voice to deliver the mes-
sage behind which they all have united;9 the High Court remains faithful to its
own institutional role10 when each of the seven justices participating in a full
Court decision has his own say, in his own way, even though all say about the
same thing. The American approach leads, of course, to a somewhat spurious
appearance of monolithism which undoubtedly facilitates the Court’s role of
political leadership, both in relation to its competitors in national policy-mak-
ing (the Congress and the administration) and in relation to its control over
lower courts. The Australian approach tends to accentuate the public image
of High Court justices as a group of competent professional lawyers, although
it entails also certain disadvantages of a perhaps minor order, such as inef-
ficiency in the use of the available time, a high level of redundancy in the
content of opinions (and this notwithstanding the efforts of court reporters to
edit out the repetitious restatements of “the facts” of each case), and what
is often substantial difficulty in appraising what “the court” has decided—at
least in terms of policy norms for the future.
The number of opinions written by each justice is shown in Table 26. It
might be thought that the indicated scale is biased by Taylor’s nonparticipa-
tion in the first year’s decisions, and by the relatively low participation—which
does occur—for Taylor during his first year on the court and for Menzies and
Windeyer during theirs,11 but an examination of the data from this point of
view does not reveal discrepancies of sufficient importance to justify report-
ing the details. The decrease in the average number of opinions per justice
per volume, from 18.6 in Period 1 to 15.9 in Period 2, is not significant
statistically. The order of frequency with which the justices expressed indi-
vidual opinions is of course highly and positively correlated with the scale
of participation ratios,12 which we shall consider below; and in making
9. Note Chief Justice Earl Warren’s apparently strenuous efforts to suppress possible dis-
sent (from, among others, Felix Frankfurter) and to present an absolutely united front in the
disposition of the School Segregation Cases of the early and middle 1950s. See my Constitu-
tional Politics (1960a) pp. 487–511.
10. For a description of the High Court’s historical development, its organization and proce-
dure and decisional style, and ideological differences among some of the justices as exemplified by
their opinions in certain decisions thought by lawyers to be leading cases, see Anonymous 1967.
11. A correction was made by deleting vols. 84–87 and 99–100 from the computations. The
court averages are about the same, for each period and for the two periods combined, as they are
for the complete data given in Table 26. Taylor does exchange ranks with Fullagar for Period 1, and
Taylor’s combined total for the twenty volumes (88–107) is second (among the five justices with con-
tinuing tenure, of course) only to that of Dixon, reflecting his exceptionally low (and atypical) rate
of participation in the decisions reported in the first four volumes for the sample.
12. The rho coefficients are 1.00 for Period 1, .92 for Period 2, and .88 for the compos-
ite scales of all nine justices.
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Table 26. Frequency of Opinions by Individual Justices
Scale
Order Justice
Period 1
(16.5 vols.)*
Period 2
(7.5 vols.)
Both
Periods
1 Dixon 435 163 598
2 Menzies — 135 —
3 Windeyer — 129 —
4 Kitto 330 110 440
5 Webb 316 — —
6 Fullagar 306 108 414
7 Taylor 281 100 381
8 Williams 241 — —
9 McTiernan 232 91 323
Totals 2141 836
Average per justice per volume: 18.6 15.9
*Decisions of both the earlier and the later court are reported in volume
100. Hence the opinions of the five justices with continuing tenure have been ap-
portioned, and about half have been tabulated for the earlier and the other half
for the later period.
comparisons with measures of background characteristics and opinion agree-
ment, the participation scales will be used.
I. OPINION AGREEMENT
In order to measure opinion agreement, it is necessary to observe the
opinion of each justice, in relation to the opinions of all other participating
justices, in each of the 710 decisions of the sample. A set of rules was drawn
up to guide the graduate assistant who did the coding of opinion relation-
ships. These rules are reproduced in the Appendix [to this chapter] in order
to explain more clearly the concept of agreement that was followed. In gen-
eral, the coding rules specified that any pair of judges who stated explicitly
that they agreed with each other, or who joined in a common opinion, would
be scored as in agreement. Judges who wrote separate opinions, and ei-
ther stated their disagreement or failed to be explicit about agreement, were
scored as in disagreement. Relationships are not necessarily symmetrical: it
is quite possible (and usual) for Justice B to note his agreement with Jus-
tice A, who in turn says nothing about his own attitude toward B’s opinion;
and under such circumstances A was coded in disagreement with B although
B was coded in agreement with A. The index of agreement for a justice,
with each other justice, consists of the ratio of the sum of his instances of
agreement to the joint sum of both his instances of agreement and of dis-
agreement, for a stipulated period of time. Thus, during Period 1 Fullagar
wrote 282 opinions in decisions in which Dixon also participated. Because
Dixon agreed with 196, and disagreed with 86, of Fullagar’s opinions, the
index of Dixon’s agreement with Fullagar is 196/282 = .70. The matrices of
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Table 27. Opinion Agreement
Period 1 (1951–1958) Period 2 (1958–1961) (1951–1961)
D Wi T K F We Mc D K F Wn Mc T Me D K F T Mc
D 68 67 72 72 66 66 D 57 53 58 58 51 42 D 68 68 64 64
Wi 71 61 54 54 67 54 K 51 34 47 32 44 42 K 65 56 60 46
T 64 62 62 58 56 52 F 44 39 40 37 41 33 F 64 57 55 45
K 69 54 64 62 55 50 Wn 48 42 33 32 39 29 T 60 56 52 48
F 70 53 58 62 50 48 Mc 43 27 36 37 40 34 Mc 53 43 47 47
We 60 61 52 50 51 50 T 44 35 26 42 35 29
Mc 56 49 49 46 51 47 Me 38 34 32 34 36 34
NOTES: All values are two-place decimals; decimal points have been omitted. The
justices are coded as follows: D (Dixon), F (Fullagar), K (Kitto), Mc (McTiernan), Me (Men-
zies), T (Taylor), We (Webb), Wi (Williams), Wn (Windeyer).
indices of agreement, for both periods, are reported in Table 27, which should
be read down columns rather than across rows.
The matrices are of course asymmetrical. They show that during both
periods, five of the six associates found themselves consistently in closest
agreement with the chief justice, while Williams (Dixon’s own first choice) was
the consensual second choice during the first period; and after Williams left
the group, Kitto emerged as the next best choice during the second period.
Conversely, all of his six colleagues were in least agreement with McTiernan
during the first period, although he subsequently was displaced by Menzies,
who received during the second period even more negative deference than
was bestowed upon McTiernan. These first and second order relations, of
both positive and negative deference, are illustrated by the elementary link-
age analysis (McQuitty 1957) diagrams depicted in Figure 10. It is possible
to combine the two sets of linkage relationships, and thereby develop a crude
scale of relative agreement, which in effect reduces the variance of each ma-
trix to a single dimension. This is done by assigning weights of + 2 and + 1,
respectively, to the first and second order levels of agreement, and weights
of – 1 and – 2 to the fifth and sixth levels of agreement. Table 28 reports
the resulting scales, which confirm our previous observations from the face
of the matrices, and order all of the justices in a consistent manner along the
same dimension, in each period. This table shows that Dixon, Kitto, Fullagar,
and McTiernan are in the same rank order in both periods, but Taylor drops
three ranks in the second period. The latter difference is not simply contex-
tual, either. It is true that Menzies found himself in agreement with Taylor
both absolutely and relatively much less frequently than had Williams; but
Fullagar and Kitto and McTiernan also all ranked Taylor lower in the later pe-
riod than in the earlier one. The columnar sums show that not only was Dixon
the consensual choice during both periods (and McTiernan the dissensual one
during the first period, and Menzies during the second); these relationships
within the group were symmetrical, since Dixon has the highest average
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Figure 10. Elementary Linkage in Opinion Deference
level of agreement with all others in both periods, while McTiernan has the
lowest average level during the first period and Menzies during the second.
In order to make comparisons with the attribute and participation scales
which rank all nine of the justices, it is necessary to construct a composite
scale of opinion agreement also. There is no question about the sequence
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Table 28. Sociometric Agreement Scales
Period 1 (1951–1958) Period 2 (1958–1961)
Combined
(1951–1961) Composite
+ – Sum + – Sum + – Sum Scale Rank
D 11 0 11 D 11.5 0 11.5 D 8 0 8 D 1
Wi 5 0 5 K 5.5 –1.5 4 K 4 –1 3 Wi 2
T 2 0 2 F 1 0 1 F 2 –3 –1 K 3
K 2 –1 1 Wn 2 –4 –2 T 1 –3 –2 F 4
F 1 –4 –3 Mc 1 –4 –3 Mc 0 –8 –8 Wn 5
We 0 –4 –4 T 0 –3.5 –3.5 T 6
Mc 0 –12 –12 Me 0 –8 –8 We 7
Mc 8
Me 9
Dixon, Kitto, Fullagar, McTiernan, nor about the placement of Williams and
of Menzies in relation to them. But there is a problem about Taylor; and in
view of the fact that both Webb (on the Period 1 scale) and Windeyer (in Pe-
riod 2) fall between Fullagar and McTiernan, we must choose some basis for
discriminating between Webb and Windeyer, unless they are to be considered
as tied in rank on the composite scale. The five-justice scale based upon the
agreement matrix for the entire period (1951–1961) places Taylor also in the
sequence between Fullagar and McTiernan, so we now have three justices
(Webb, Windeyer, and Taylor) in that interval of the scale. But the Period 1
scale clearly ranks Taylor (and Fullagar) before Webb, just as Period 2 ranks
Windeyer before Taylor (and Fullagar before them both). Hence, the sequence
Fullagar, Windeyer, Taylor, Webb, McTiernan is determined.
The matrix averages, .58 during the first period and .40 for the second,
confirm what seems evident from an inspection of the face of the two matrices:
that the general level of interagreement among the justices was substantially
lower for the second period than during the earlier one. On the basis of these
data alone, it is of course impossible to say whether this seemingly sharp drop
in opinion consensus was due to the personnel changes, to changes in the na-
ture of the issues being decided, or to changes in the political environment
in which the High Court worked. The research design did not anticipate this
question, and I have no rigorous basis for suggesting an answer; but my feel-
ing about the matter is that there seemed to be no marked changes in the
content of the issues, and I am unaware of any milieu changes, during the
second period, that would seem likely to have had such an effect upon the
court—although I hasten to add that my impressions of the Australian politi-
cal scene are subject to correction by those more specialized in the subject.
The remaining reason—the substitution of Windeyer and Menzies for Webb
and Williams—seems to me to be more plausible as an explanation. There is
certainly considerable evidence that changes in one or two seats have had
a traumatic effect upon the decision-making of the United States Supreme
Court; consider Clark and Minton vice Murphy and Rutledge; or Warren
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and Brennan vice Vinson and Minton. But I am not aware of any studies of
opinion agreement in the Supreme Court, which would make possible explicit
comparisons with these findings for the High Court.
II. ATTRIBUTES
There are many possible explanations to account for the fact that the
opinions of certain justices are consistently deemed more popular, and
those of others less popular, by all of the members of the decision-mak-
ing group. On the American Supreme Court of the 1920s, for example,
William Howard Taft was much more noted for his social than for his task
leadership, while the dour McReynolds was notoriously nasty even in his
face-to-face behavior toward justices junior to himself whom he disliked
(e.g., Brandeis and Clark).13 One might hypothesize that the two new jus-
tices who joined the Court in 1958, Menzies and Windeyer, “fit in” better
with the remainder of the group than had the men whom they replaced,
Webb and Williams. But “fit in” in what sense? Because their personalities
were more pleasing, and deeming the newcomers to be more “sociable”
colleagues the others found it easier to agree with them?14 Providing that
data adequate to support discriminations among all of the justices on such
a personality variable as sociability could be acquired—and I certainly do
not have such information—and scaled, then one might hypothesize that
the sociability scale would correlate highly and positively with the opinion
agreement scale. Of course, the observation of the predicted correlation
would not prove that sociability causes opinion agreement, but the obser-
vation of a low or negative correlation certainly would tend to weaken
confidence in this particular explanation. Similarly, one might hypothesize
that the better explanation lies in differences in the professional legal
skill of the justices, and that those with the highest skill enjoy the most
(and those with less skill the least) agreement by the other justices with
their opinions. Not only is this the conventional explanation that Australian
lawyers would proffer—at least, for the benefit of nonlawyers—but a cer-
tain prima facie plausibility is immediately suggested by the circumstance
that the individual whose opinions were indisputably most popular is none
other than Sir Owen Dixon, a man considered by many Australian legal ob-
servers to be not only the acknowledged master of analytical positivism but
also the “greatest Judge in the English-speaking world.”15 In order to test
13. See David J. Danelski’s discussion (1961) of “social leadership.”
14. Or was it because the two newest justices were (during the brief three years that
we observe in the present sample) being wooed by their elders, who sought the neophytes
as allies who might tip the scales one way or another in the various differences, both social
and ideological, that had tended to harden over the years among the majority of five jus-
tices with continuing tenure? See Murphy (1964b), especially “Task Leadership and Social
Leadership” at pp. 395–397 and “Social Control through the Glad Hand” at pp. 403–405.
15. The Sydney Morning Herald (April 2, 1964), p. 2; and Sawer: “Dixon is the greatest
exponent of the analytic and conceptual type of English common-law thinking in Australian
legal history, and probably the greatest living judge in that tradition in any English-speak-
ing country” (1957: 497).
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this hypothesis, however, it would be necessary to scale the other eight jus-
tices as well, and although it seems highly probable that such data could
be obtained16 I do not have them. Other possible hypotheses might predict
high positive correlations with scales of seniority on the High Court, or
with judicial experience—and Sir Owen would rank first on either of these
scales also.17 Both of these variables are themselves highly correlated with
each other and with age, however, and the latter is the one with which I
have chosen to work. Rejection of the hypothesis for age would at the same
time have the effect of leaving little room for confidence in the likelihood
that either of the other two related explanations (seniority and judicial ex-
perience) are important.
In addition to age, the background characteristics concerning which I
attempted to obtain systematic information for all justices in the sample
included: the location, size, and socioeconomic aspects of the community
in which each judge was raised; his relatives and family connections;
the occupation of his father, father-in-law, and other close male relatives;
his ancestry; religion; education; legal, governmental, and other occupa-
tional experience; partisan affiliation and political activity, social clubs, and
similar group affiliations; military experience; honors and awards; and pub-
lications and academic ties. I also sought to acquire systematic information
concerning the changing states in the health of the justices, because I
hypothesized that both the participation and opinion-writing ratios are di-
rectly affected by the biological parameter of relative physical capacity to
undertake and to enjoy work. Of course I consulted the published sources
available in the United States for the obviously accessible data; what was
disappointing was that after having been fortunate in securing the services
of a qualified graduate student in Australia, who was able to work in local
libraries and interview knowledgeable Australians, the additional yield in
terms of usable data was very small. I did not expect to get very far with
the inquiry about health, but it was somewhat surprising to learn that it
was not possible to complete the inventories, for all nine justices, even with
regard to such matters as religious and political party affiliation; such in-
formation is readily available about state and lower federal as well as about
Supreme Court justices in the United States. (Bowen 1965: chap. 1, and
esp. p. 8 no. 1; Nagel 1961b, 1962a; Goldman 1966).
The limited data available do suggest that the justices of the High Court
comprise an exceptionally homogeneous group. All, for example, held univer-
16. One obvious procedure would be to conduct an interview survey of High Court bar-
risters. In the United States such peer ratings of the professional competence of lawyers
are published on a continuing basis by the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory; and cf. the
precocious (at least, for American political science) article by Mott 1936: 295–315.
17. Dixon was beginning his career as an undergraduate student at the University of
Melbourne when the first session of the High Court convened in 1903; and his personal
career in the law, and association with the High Court, spanned almost the entire period of
its existence, up to the time of the present study.
162 . AN EMPIRICAL VIEW OF JUDICIAL VALUES
sity law degrees; all had been barristers—indeed this particular group had
perfect closure on this parameter, because the youngest member (Douglas
Menzies) had served as junior barrister to the eldest (Owen Dixon); all be-
longed to exclusive, upper-class social clubs—reflecting, no doubt, their typi-
cally lower-middle-class origins. The two appointees of Labour governments
(McTiernan and Webb) also were the only Roman Catholics; Dixon was iden-
tified as an agnostic (cf. O. Dixon 1965); and the others were Protestant or
were presumably so. There were differences in regard to domicile, with four
coming from New South Wales and four from Victoria,18 and this variable did
seem worth examining because of the possibility that differences in what I
hypothesized to be the two subcultures might produce, through early social-
ization and continuing adult reinforcement, differences in the within-group
social relations and in the belief systems of the justices. The hypothesis that
the subgroup structure of the group would correspond to their domiciliary dif-
ferences could be investigated by correlating domicile with participation, and
we shall examine this relationship presently. The other hypothesis, that dif-
ferences between the cultures of the two states might be reflected in stable
and consistent attitudinal and idealogical differences among the justices, is
the subject of other reports (Schubert 1969d, 1968a). My hypothesis about the
influence of age upon judicial behavior is not the more usual psychological one
that judges (like other humans) experience both biological and social changes
as a consequence of the transition from middle age to the status that Ameri-
cans, with all good will but some perverse side effects, have come to denote
as “senior citizenship”; and that as a consequence of the inescapable accel-
eration of rigidity in personality and soma alike that accompanies advanced
aging, there is a corresponding rigidity in attitudes which results in greater
conservatism in one’s idealogy. Obviously this is not an implausible hypothe-
sis to entertain if one is studying a group whose average age is about that at
which most persons expect (and, increasingly, are required) to retire from ac-
tive employment. I have, however, an alternative hypothesis which I believe
to be even more relevant and important: that age is an index to the prevail-
ing pattern of dominant cultural norms during a person’s youth, and hence to
his socialization and his direct experience of major disturbances affecting his
society. A reinforcing consideration is that there are biological correlates of
maturation that suggest the likelihood that age-mates are more apt to share
social interests than are persons of different generations.
Because age is the only one of the variables which I could use that would
permit the establishment of a ratio scale, I had to forgo indulgence in this
statistical luxury because the highest level of measurement that could be ob-
tained for most of the variables is ordinal. Indeed, I scaled age nominally,
because there were two sharply distinguished subgroups of justices, an older
18. Webb, from Queensland, was only the third justice ever to be appointed to the High
Court other than from the two leading states; it was necessary, of course, to exclude him from
correlations involving the domicile variable.
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Table 29. Attribute Scales
Scale Ranks
Justice
Social, Economic,
Political
Conservatism Age Domicile
Windeyer 1 7.5 6.5
Menzies 2 7.5 2.5
Fullager 3.5 3 2.5
Williams 3.5 3 6.5
Kitto 5 7.5 2.5
Dixon 6.5 3 2.5
Taylor 6.5 7.5 6.5
Webb 8 3 —
McTiernan 9 3 6.5
NOTE: For age, 3 = older and 7.5 = younger.
For domicile, 2.5 = Victoria and 6.5 = New South Wales.
group all born in the nineteenth century and a younger group. The best I
could do with the remaining data was to construct an index scale of social,
economic, and political background characteristics, based upon the incom-
plete information available relating to political party affiliation (Labour, –
1; anti-Labour, + 1), religious affiliation (Roman Catholic, – 1; Anglican or
Presbyterian, + 1), experience in partisan political office or campaigning
(Labour, – 1; anti-Labour, + 1), partisan character of the government ap-
pointing the justice to the High Court (Labour, – 1; Bruce-Page, 0 [Dixon];
Sir Robert Menzies’ governments, + 1), and the familial socioeconomic
status of the justice (working class, – 1; middle or upper class, + 1). In-
dex score sums ranged from + 5 (Windeyer) to – 4 (McTiernan); Dixon
was + 1; and Webb, the only other justice with a negative (Labour or
non-Conservative) score, was – 2. The directionality assigned to this SEP
(socioeconomic-political) scale was “Conservative.” I have discussed the de-
tails of the “Age” and “SEP” scales elsewhere (1969d); these two scales and
the one for domicile are reproduced in Table 29.
III. PARTICIPATION
I have also discussed participation from both a normative and an em-
pirical point of view and in detail but with particular reference to split
decisions, in the report cited above, so my remarks here are limited to
what is essential for a consideration of participation as it relates to opinion
agreement. It is obvious that one constraint upon the volume of a judge’s
opinions is the relative frequency of his opportunities to write opinions, that
is to say, the extent of his participation in both split and unanimous de-
cisions of the court. With regard to the High Court, little is known about
the considerations that underlie a chief justice’s choices in the staffing of
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Table 30. Participation Scales
Justice
Period 1
(1951–1958)
Period 2
(1958–1961)
Combined
(1951–1961)
Composite
Ranks
Dixon .36 .31 .35 1
Menzies — .06 — 2
Windeyer — .05 — 3
Kitto .13 –.01 .09 4
Webb .02 — — 5
Fullagar .01 –.01 .00 6
Taylor –.05 –.22 –.10 7
Williams –.23 — — 8
McTiernan –.24 –.19 – .23 9
decision-making panels. In Table 30 are shown three participation scales,
one for each period and a third for the two periods combined for the
five justices with continuing tenure, for the total sample including both
split and unanimous decisions.19 For the five justices who acted during
both periods, the product-moment correlation between the two scales is
.92, which certainly suggests that there were no important changes in
relative participation in the court’s decision-making, during the period
covered by this analysis. The apparent changes between the two periods
are the lower participation of both Kitto and Taylor,20 and the higher par-
ticipation of Windeyer than that of the man whom he replaced, Williams.
By using the ratios for the combined periods to establish the scale order
for the five justices for whom this is possible, the rank positions of the
remaining four can be interpolated from their relative positions on the
scales for Period 1 and Period 2, respectively. Table 30 reports this com-
posite ordinal scale of participation, in the total decisions of the court,
for all nine justices.
IV. CORRELATIONS AMONG ATTRIBUTES, PARTICIPATION,
AND OPINION AGREEMENT
Table 31 shows the correlations among the attribute, participation, and
opinion agreement scales, for each period and for the two periods com-
bined.21 The correlations among the three variables in the submatrix of
attribute scales is of course the same whether comparison is made with
split or with total decisions; and I have discussed this submatrix else-
19. I have reported (1969d) the scales for split and for unanimous decisions, sepa-
rately. The product-moment correlations between this set of scales is .94 (for Period 1)
and .75 (for Period 2).
20. The decrease in Taylor’s participation is considerably less extreme than the drop
in his opinion popularity, noted above.
21. All coefficients in Table 31 are rho rank correlations, except for the three correlations
between age and domicile, which are phi coefficients.
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Table 31. Intercorrelations among Scales
Periods: 2\1 Age Dom. SEP Part. Opn.
Age .00 –.08 –.16 –.16
Dom. .17 .30 .88 .10
SEP –.51 .22 .11 .49
Part. .07 .58 .45 .39
Opn. .43 .43 –.13 .32
Combined Periods
Dom. SEP Part. Opn.
Age .00 – .48 – .34 .26
Dom. .11 .57 .22
SEP .40 .13
Part. .17
NOTE: Scale abbreviations are Dom. (Domicile); SEP (Socio-
economic-political); Part. (Participation); Opn. (Opinion).
where (1969d). Attention here will focus instead upon relations involving the
participation and the opinion agreement scales. During the first period, there
is a very high correlation of .88 between domicile and participation, which
shows the extent to which not only Chief Justice Dixon, but also his fellow Vic-
torians, Kitto and Fullagar, tended to dominate the structure of the court’s
decision-making panels. In the second period, the two new and younger jus-
tices joined these activists; and Windeyer’s domicile in New South Wales
accounts for the .30 drop in the corresponding coefficient. Overall, the partici-
pation scale shows only moderate correlations, negative with age and positive
with domicile and with SEP, which is to say that (notwithstanding the preemi-
nent exception provided by the chief justice himself) young conservatives from
Victoria tended to dominate the court’s decision-making.
The opinion popularity scale has moderate positive correlations with par-
ticipation during both periods, and with conservatism during Period 1; but
there is an abrupt shift to higher correlations with age and domicile during
Period 2. Dixon, whose opinions were most popular, lowers the correlation
between SEP and the opinion scale in both periods because of his relatively
liberal rank on the conservatism scale; but the principal reason for the sharp
drop in this correlation for the second period is that Menzies, second only
to Windeyer in conservatism, wrote the least acceptable opinions. A major
cause for the rise in correlation between age and opinion agreement was
that Taylor, a younger judge, wrote less popular opinions during the second
period; while Webb, an older judge whose opinions were not popular, retired
after the first period. The correlation between domicile and opinion agree-
ment rose because Williams, a New South Wales judge whose opinions were
popular, retired; and Fullagar, a Victorian whose opinions were unpopular,
rose in rank on the scale because of William’s retirement and Taylor’s drop
in popularity—indeed, the coefficient for the second period would be twice
166 . AN EMPIRICAL VIEW OF JUDICIAL VALUES
as high as it is (i.e., in the plus eighties) were it not for Menzies’ inconsistent
position, with three of his fellow Victorians in the first three ranks, then the
three from New South Wales, and finally Menzies bringing up the rear.
When we examine the correlations for the composite opinion agreement
scale, however, we find that all of them—including the relationship with par-
ticipation—are low, ranging from + .13 to + .26. Of course, not too great
confidence could in any circumstances be placed in rank correlations such as
these, based on a very small sample, and so evidently fluctuating depending
upon changes in, or changes in the behavior of, one or two justices. Neverthe-
less, the evidence, such as it is, indicates that none of the hypotheses tested,
as possible explanations for the observed consistencies in opinion agreement
among these justices, can be supported by these data. We cannot, that is, ac-
count for the differences in opinion agreement on the basis of age (whatever
our assumption about its direction and substantive significance), or on the ba-
sis of differences in the major subcultures from which these men were drawn,
or in their conservatism (at least, as I was enabled to measure it), or even
(through participation differentials) in their relative degrees of exposure to
group esteem.
There would seem to be two ways along which future research into
the problems to which this paper has been addressed might usefully be
developed. One approach would be to improve upon the defects in design,
the adequacy of access to relevant information, and other faults of this
exploratory inquiry, and to replicate the research in a sounder manner. A
second approach would be to look into some of the alternative hypotheses,
such as sociability or legal skill, which proved to be beyond the scope of
what I could attempt in this particular project. No matter which of these
two approaches were to be pursued, I think it would be highly desirable
that the investigation be carried out by an Australian who could hurdle
easily many of the roadblocks which are major obstacles for an alien ob-
server, and thereby better focus and concentrate his time and energies
upon the substantive problems of decision-making theory toward the solu-
tion of which I hope this paper will make some contribution.
V. APPENDIX
Coding Rules for Interagreement in Opinions
1. We establish, for each volume, a matrix with columns defined by judges in the
role of initiators, and rows defined by the same judges in the role of targets of agree-
ment or disagreement.
2. The observations which, in each case, we seek to make consist of the extent to
which each participating judge agrees with each judge who writes an opinion in the
case. We wish to tally each instance of agreement and each instance of disagreement,
for each dyadic pair. To record the data, divide each cell of the matrix (except those of
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the major diagonal) into two parts. Enter the tallies of agreement in the upper half of the
cell, and of disagreement in the lower half.
(a) If Judge A explicitly states that he accepts or joins in Judge B’s opinion, then
A agrees with B.
(b) If Judge A explicitly states that he rejects or disagrees with Judge B’s opin-
ion, then A disagrees with B.
(c) Two or more judges who explicitly reject each other’s opinion should be tal-
lied as mutually disagreeing with each other.
(d) If each of two or more judges writes an individual opinion in a case, and
there is no explicit language on the part of any of them regarding the accep-
tance or rejection of other opinions, we shall infer that such judges disagree
and tally them accordingly.
(e) The relationship of agreement is not necessarily symmetrical (i.e., recipro-
cated); similarly, disagreement may be asymmetrical (unidirectional).
(f) Two or more judges who coauthor the same opinion always agree with each
other, unless one of them also writes an individual opinion expressing views
which the other(s) explicitly reject.
(g) Even though two judges (say, A and B) write separate opinions, if A says ex-
plicitly that he accepts B’s opinion (and wishes merely to add a few words of
his own), while B makes no reference to A, tally A as in agreement with B,
and B as in disagreement with A.
(h) A participating judge who writes (or coauthors, in the event of joint opinions)
no opinion of his own can agree (or disagree) with a judge who writes an
opinion; but none of the other participating judges can either agree or dis-
agree with a judge who neither writes nor coauthors an opinion.
(i) If Judge A, who writes no opinion, expresses agreement with Judge B’s opin-
ion, and if B is tallied as being in disagreement with opinions by C and D,
then A also should be tallied as disagreeing with C and D.
(j) For cells in the major diagonal, always tally a judge as in agreement with
himself if, and only if, he writes or joins in (coauthors) an opinion in the case.
(Tally nothing in such a cell, if a judge simply notes that he accepts another
judge’s opinion in the case.)
3. For example, let us assume a case in which A, B, C, D, and E participate. A, B, and C
coauthor an opinion, although C writes an individual opinion expressing additional views of
his own. D writes a separate opinion. E writes no opinion, but notes that he agrees with D.
None of the opinions included an explicit statement of acceptance or rejection of the other
opinions. This case should be coded as shown below. (I have indicated by letter the rule
which governs each coding decision.)
Initiators
Targets A B C D E
A 1 j 1/ f 1/ f /1 d /1 i
B 1/ f 1 j 1/ f /1 d /1 i
C 1/ f 1/ f 1 j 1/d /1 i
D /1 d /1 f /1 d 1 j 1/ a
E e.h e.h e.h e.h j
[Not relevant to the case: rules (b), (c), and (g)]
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4. Transcribe from your work sheet matrix to a summary matrix for each volume,
in which the entries for the nondiagonal cells will be fractions in the following form:
sum of agreement tallies
sum of agreement tallies plus sum of disagreement tallies
and the diagonal cells will consist of integers (equal to the number of opinions written
or coauthored by each judge). Our example (above) would be transcribed as follows:
Initiators
Targets A B C D E
A 1 11
1
1
0
1
0
1
B 11 1
1
1
0
1
0
1
C 11
1
1 1
0
1
0
1
D 01
0
1
0
1 1
1
1
E 00
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
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Comment on “Opinion
Agreement among High Court
Justices”
by TONY VINSON
G. SCHUBERT HAS INDICATED the difficulties besetting an “alien observer’s” at-
tempts to gather reliable background information on High Court Justices in
Australia. While wishing to acknowledge these difficulties, it is nevertheless
necessary to challenge two points in Schubert’s analysis of opinion agreement
among the justices. The first of these concerns a question (domicile) which
was central to the author’s analysis; the second involves his imprecise use of
terminology at a time when this appears necessary for the advancement of so-
ciology in Australia.
On page [163] reference is made to the justices’ “typically lower-middle
class origins”. This appears to refer to all nine justices covered in the study
and is incorrect by any of the usually accepted criteria of “class” or status.
Dixon is the son of a solicitor and was educated at Hawthorn College in Mel-
bourne. Fullagar was educated at Haileybury College in Melbourne and at
Ormond College in the University of Melbourne. Kitto’s father was the holder
of an O.B.E., and Menzies is the son of a clergyman.
Windeyer is the son of a Sydney solicitor and was educated at Sydney
Grammar School. To quote from a speech which he made at the Fourteenth
Legal Convention of the Law Council of Australia:
My people were in this country, engaged in the profession or administration of the
law, before the Colony of South Australia began; before the Colony of Western Australia
began; long before the Port Phillip district became Victoria; long before Moreton Bay dis-
trict became Queensland, and when Van Diemen’s Land had only been for a few years
separated from New South Wales.1
The Windeyer family was founded in Australia in 1828 by Charles
Windeyer who became a magistrate and was appointed first Mayor of Sydney
upon its incorporation as a city. His son, Richard, a Sydney barrister, was a
This article was originally published, in slightly different form, in Australian and New
Zealand Journal of Sociology 4: 158–159, and is here reprinted with the author’s kind permission.
1. 41 Australian Law Journal 344.
prominent member of the Legislative Council of N.S.W. [New South Wales].
Richard’s son, William, was the first graduate of the University of Sydney (B.A.
1856, M.A. 1859). He was for many years a member of the N.S.W. Parlia-
ment and was both Solicitor-General and Attorney-General of N.S.W. He was
appointed to the Supreme Court of N.S.W. in 1879 and remained a member
of that bench until 1896. During that period he was knighted. Sir William
Windeyer was the grandfather of the present High Court Judge.
Owen, who was educated at Sydney C.E.G.S., is the son of a N.S.W.
Supreme Court Judge, Sir Langer Owen, who was a Judge from 1922 to 1933.
Sir Langer was himself the son of another N.S.W. Supreme Court Judge, Sir
William Owen, who was on the bench from 1887 to 1908.
On page 163 of the article, reference is also made to variations in domicile
and to differences in the two subcultures of New South Wales and Victoria
which might produce “through early socialization and continuing adult rein-
forcement, differences in the within-group social relations and in the belief
systems of the justices”. Schubert refers to four Judges coming from New
South Wales and four from Victoria. He comes back to the same point further
in the paper, and on page 166 refers to Kitto as a Victorian. The whole of his
mathematics about domicile are based on his belief that Kitto should be re-
garded as a Victorian. He was born in Victoria, but he attended high school
in Sydney, worked in the New South Wales Crown Solicitor’s Office and was a
member of the New South Wales bar until his appointment to the High Court.
He still lives in New South Wales and would in the legal profession be re-
garded as a “New South Wales” Judge.
There can be no doubt that Dixon and Fullagar were Victorians, having
been born there, educated there and practised there at the bar. Menzies was
born in Ballarat but attended high schools in Hobart and Devonport, Tasmania.
He attended Melbourne University and practised at the Melbourne bar before
his appointment. He would be regarded in the legal profession as a “Victorian”
Judge.
Windeyer and Owen are from New South Wales. McTiernan and Taylor
were born in New South Wales and have spent their legal life in New South
Wales.
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PART III
Quantifying
Political Ideology
THE THREE ESSAYS grouped in Part 1 look at the relationship between behav-
ioral jurisprudence and jurisprudence in law; the three in this part examine
the relationship between behavioral jurisprudence and the theory of ideol-
ogy in the rest of political science. There is inevitably a considerable
amount of communality in the point of view expressed in all six articles,
however, because they all are products of a relatively small period of time
(with publication dates ranging from the spring of 1966 through the autumn
of 1968). Furthermore, the first two of the articles in this part (chapters 8
and 9) are especially closely related, because the second of the pair was
designed to be and functions in fact as an empirical test of a portion of
the theory stated in the first and they were published in successive months.
The third of these articles (chapter 10) is concerned with an empirical
test—though in a much more abstruse and less precise way—of another part
of the theory stated in the first article. In its most general form, the theory
is concerned with the structure and content of belief systems—with how,
that is to say, people organize conceptually their likes and dislikes, their
sympathies and antipathies, their biases. In this general form it is there-
fore a branch of psychology; there is no reason to presume that beliefs
about (say) sex or childrearing or religion differ, from a neurophysiolog-
ical point of view, from beliefs about politics or law (Gluckman 1965; D.
Morris 1967); and in any event beliefs about aspects of public policy nec-
essarily deal with questions of sex and childrearing and religion, as well
as with politics and law. It is also an aspect of political science, however,
because political scientists long have been concerned with the “philoso-
phies” of important political figures, ranging from presidents of the United
States to local bosses. The study of the political and social and economic
values articulated in the opinions of Supreme Court justices lies close to
the core of the traditional interest of constitutional lawyers, whose practice
of disguising these policy components by wrapping them in the rhetoric of
constitutional conceptualism fooled no one except peasants (the laity); all
members of the intelligentsia (lawyers and their acolytes) spoke the same
conventional gobbledygook—else what’s a law school for?—and therefore
understood quite well that conventional references to “due process” and
“equal protection” or “commerce among the states” were oblique ways of
talking about who could be sent to jail and who not, who could vote and
who not, and who must pay his taxes and who need not do so. In its classic
form the constitutional law game did not approve that any save a few cham-
pions—the Oliver Wendell Holmeses and the Thomas Reed Powells—should
speak openly, in front of the (ugh) general public, of constitutional ideolo-
gies as though they were appurtenant to the justices themselves rather than
being functions of the constitutional document. So far as we can tell from
what they wrote and taught, there never was a moment when such lead-
ing public law scholars as Woodrow Wilson, Frank Goodnow, and Charles
Austin Beard, or (to take somewhat more recent figures) Haines, Ford,
Cushman, Corwin, Ewing, Mott, and Swisher, to say nothing of such con-
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temporary public law scholars as Mason, Fellman, McCloskey, Mendelson,
and Tresolini, ever doubted that, as a then former associate justice of the
Supreme Court proclaimed, the Constitution is what the judges say it is.1
At least as defined by the political scientists who have almost completely
dominated research and writing and graduate instruction in the subject from
the beginnings of the profession, the constitutional law game has been a po-
litical game, the rules of which specify a very large small group, the members
of which are replaced at aperiodic and mostly unpredictable intervals through
an indirect process of representational choice. From the perspective of the
now almost two centuries of experience with the Court, it seems clear that
its membership is continuously but slowly changing: on the average, there is
a complete turnover in all nine positions (including that of the chief justice)
every sixteen years, which is slightly more often than once every generation.
Values, ideas, and beliefs change (and would change, for strictly biological
reasons, even if there were not—as there are—other more focused, but not
more direct, influences) throughout a person’s lifetime, from early infancy
until (for most people) virtually the moment of death. But the most intense,
pervasive, and enduring stage of enculturation is undoubtedly that of youth,
including both the socialization that occurs through the family and that which
takes place through more formal educational processes. Consequently the
principal imprinting of culture is highly correlated with time as well as place;
and consequently, the continuous process of replacing the personnel of the
Court (or of any court, for that matter) is tantamount to a continuing trans-
formation in the values represented on the Court. At the same time the age at
which justices are appointed assures that the cultural configuration that they
tend, in the aggregate, to represent, corresponds best not to the values typ-
ical of the society in which they act, but rather that of the nation as it was
about a generation and a half earlier. Of course, this statement is an exag-
geration, to the extent that Supreme Court justices (either before or after
their appointment to the Court) have modified to some extent their views
in response to the pressures of the changing environment in which they
have continued to live (see Cook 1973). But the fact remains that, at this
time of writing (in the winter of 1973), the average age of Americans is
thirty-three years, while the average age of incumbent justices is sixty-
three—which makes them ideologues of American society during World
War II far more than of the time during which they sit in judgment, at
least from the point of view of the beliefs into which they were social-
ized (subject to whatever ideological learning they may have undergone
in the interim). The Supreme Court is a system whereby an indeterminate
1. There is increasing evidence that a similarly realistic attitude is now coming into ac-
ceptance among some legal opinion leaders in other countries whose legal systems derive
primarily from the common law: of course, Canada (Weiler 1968); but also South Africa
(Dugard 1971); the Mother Country itself (Drewry and Morgan 1969; and Jaffe 1970); and
even in Australia (Reid 1972; and Stone 1972).
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but substantial portion of the symbols of the national culture are brought into
closer correspondence with the modal behaviors of the society; while the gen-
eration (-and-a-half) gap in judicial age tends to assure that the meaning of
the Constitution will never come into too close a correspondence with that
patterning which is most prevalent within the society. So at least among Amer-
ican political scientists the constitutional law game has involved an appraisal
of the goodness-of-fit between the image of culture projected by the ideology
supported by the Court, in its particular decisions, and the feelings of the com-
mentator about what the needs of contemporary society are, in regard to the
policy issues that are the subject of the decisions. And hence, in studying judi-
cial ideology, judicial behavioralists have differed from constitutional lawyers
more in research theory and method than in choice of subject.
The differences in research theory and method, however, have been
substantial. The theoretical objective of behavioral jurisprudence has been
to articulate findings about the belief systems of judges, with the findings
of other political scientists about the political valuations of other decision-
makers (ranging from such elites as the Congress and office of the president
to the mass of citizens). Interest has tended to focus, therefore, upon such
questions as the extent to which the views expressed by Supreme Court jus-
tices (at any particular time) are typical of other federal judges, and of state
or municipal judges; the extent to which the beliefs of judges, in regard to
policy issues, are affected by their conceptions of judicial role and by their
previous professional socialization and experience, as intervening variables;
and the extent to which judicial belief systems are attributable to early
enculturation. Another focus of interest has been the effect of social inter-
action upon decision-making. Although alternative paradigms are possible,
I prefer to treat social interaction as a set of independent variables that in-
teract with ideology, in a causal model of decision-making. The reason for
this is that considerations of strategy, social distance, social deference (or
dominance), social exchange, and other aspects of coalition-building (Riker
1962; Atkins 1970) are involved in the process of small group decision-
making, whatever may be the ideological or personality similarities and
differences among the individual members of the group. It is my view, there-
fore, that both personality and these social interaction variables must be
included in any model of Court decision-making that purports to be more
than partial, but that they are best kept analytically distinct from the
ideological variables and also from each other. Similarly any comprehen-
sive model of decision-making must make allowance for the effects of the
judicial bureaucracy with which the individual justices continuously in-
teract: this bureaucracy includes the law clerks who are assigned to each
justice (and who clearly influence his decisions by providing him with
both information concerning cases and critique of his proposed decisional
choices and rationalizations); the custodians of supporting administra-
tive and controls services (such as the office of the clerk, the librarian,
the reporter, and his own secretary); and—particularly for the chief jus-
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tice—ancillary bureaucracies concerned with the training, monitoring, and
manipulation of lower federal court judges (i.e., the Federal Judicial Center,
the Administrative Office of United States Courts, and the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States). I have increasingly come to believe, moreover,
that it is of at least equal importance to include in any reasonably adequate
comprehensive model certain biological variables, of which health, intelli-
gence, and aging are certainly appropriate examples. So it should be clear
that a focus upon the belief systems of individual justices is an avowedly
incomplete and partial approach to the analysis of decision-making—but
it is a necessary part of (and probably, prelude to) more comprehensive
analysis, just as would be also parallel and cognate studies of social in-
teraction among the justices, or analyses of their ecological relationships
with supporting bureaucracies, and analysis of their individual biological
and personality systems.
The principal methods that have been used to study judicial ideology have
been questionnaire and interview surveys, cumulative scaling, cluster analy-
sis, factor analysis, and smallest space analysis. The most extensive use of
an attitudinal inventory, according to reports of published research at the
time of this writing, remains Stuart Nagel’s doctoral dissertation, which was
completed over a dozen years ago (1961a). Nagel undertook to make a ques-
tionnaire survey of all judges of state supreme courts in the United States;
his pooled response data describe no court in particular, but they do tend to
characterize in a most general way the ideological differences among Amer-
ican state judges—as of the time when his work was done. The Nagel study
was based on the prior research of Eysenck, who had developed the attitu-
dinal inventory from which Nagel drew for the subset of questions that he
used. Eysenck (1954) had used it to study the ideological differences among
political party supporters—a mass rather than an elite population—in Eng-
land during the late forties. Neither Eysenck nor Nagel undertook to analyze
their response data by cumulative scaling; instead Eysenck moved directly
into factor analysis, while Nagel contented himself with reporting percentages
of marginal frequencies of responses (1963a). Eysenck had also proposed a
theory of the relationship among responses to questionnaire items, scales, and
factorial dimensions, and of the corresponding relationships among opinions,
attitudes, and ideologies (1954: 111–113). Chapter 8 discusses the Eysenck
theory of ideology, in particular relation to the theory (and method) of cumu-
lative scaling; while chapter 10 is based upon a reanalysis of the data from
three empirical studies (the two mentioned above, by Eysenck and by Nagel;
and Dator, 1967).
Chapter 8 originally was written for presentation, in a necessarily some-
what abridged form, as a paper at a panel meeting of the Southern Political
Science Association. The panel met in Atlanta in November of 1965, about
half-a-dozen years after the inception of the publication of research in judicial
behavior in a sustained and continuous way, and at a time when the critical
opposition to judicial behavioral research in the United States was peaking.
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In a book published in that same year (and, indeed, only a couple of months
before the panel meeting), I had ventured an initial attempt at characterizing
the critique, and also at rebutting it (1965d: chap. 7)—although I relied pri-
marily, for the latter purpose, upon a then recently published article by Martin
Shapiro (1964b). By then I had been engaged in similar controversy—con-
cerned fundamentally with the propriety of using the scientific approach to
study human affairs—for over a decade (cf. Schubert 1954a), and it had
greeted my own initial article on judicial behavior (1958e). It was apparent,
by the mid-sixties, that criticism was emanating from three quite different
points of view: some critics were public lawmen who simply defended the
status quo ante (Berns 1963); others were avowedly political and empirical
in their professed orientation, but hostile toward quantification and experi-
mental rigor (Peltason 1964a); still others were themselves sophisticates in
scientific method who deplored the lack of sophistication that, in their view,
characterized the initial efforts of judicial behavioralists (Fisher 1958).2 Cor-
responding to these points of view I identified three basic approaches to
research in the judicial process field: traditional, conventional, and behavio-
ral. In my initial discussion of this typology, I distinguished among them on
the grounds of their manifest empirical characteristics, and in the chronologi-
cal sequence in which they had evolved historically. But a linear model did not
seem to fit what I perceived to be significant in the interrelationships between
these three points of view. By 1965 my conviction was that the three stand-
points were just about equally critical of each other; and if this were true,
the mathematical model of their relationship would have to be curvilinear. So
one objective of my Atlanta paper was to develop and explain this hypothesis
about the structure of positions that defined research postures in the field of
judicial process.
A second objective of the paper was to discuss the then recent criticisms
of the use of scaling theory and method that had been voiced not by tradi-
tional public lawmen but by several research scholars for whom I entertained
(then as now) considerable respect, including Samuel Krislov (1966), Martin
Shapiro,3 and Joseph Tanenhaus (1966). I decided that I should attempt a
more systematic and comprehensive statement of the theory of judicial scaling
than anyone had offered theretofore, the previous emphasis having been much
more upon technique than upon theory. Consequently, the paper acquired a
dual emphasis, with about equal concern for scaling as an approach to the
analysis of judicial decisions and as an approach to understanding academic
approaches to the study of the judicial process. So the focus was jointly upon
judicial and academic attitudes and ideologies.
A third aspect of the paper was not my own idea, but rather reflected
the initiative of Joseph Bernd, who organized the panel. As he planned it,
2. There were also pseudo-sophisticates, who posed as proscientific critics of judicial be-
havioralism: e.g., Becker 1963b.
3. Martin Shapiro’s views were expressed, as I recall, in the form of comments upon the
draft of my Atlanta paper.
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a paper was to be presented also by Wallace Mendelson, who had emerged by
that time as the leading spokesman for the public law (“stand patter”) critique
of judicial behavioralism (Mendelson 1963). So I wrote the paper under the
misapprehension that Mendelson would be present to speak for himself (and
to defend himself) in regard to my own remarks; and this explains what oth-
erwise might be considered to be certain somewhat gratuitously ad hominem
references to Mendelson, in the opening section of the paper. As it turned out,
to both my surprise and regret, Professor Mendelson was unable to partici-
pate; but that news reached me only after I had arrived in Atlanta, and so I
presented the paper as I had written it.
It happened that there was an unusually close relationship, in several
respects, between chapters 8 and 9. I left to return to East Lansing on the
day after I had presented my paper in Atlanta and when both its content
and the response that it had provoked (from discussants and the audience
alike) remained uppermost in my mind. By chance I was seated, for the
flight to Detroit, next to a person who was conspicuously anxious about air
travel—considerably more so even than I. There was a ten-minute wait for
clearance to take off, during which time our craft parked with engines idling
at the end of a runway; and my fellow passenger was getting me so nervous
that I decided to put my mind to something more constructive, so I pulled a
tablet out of my brief case and began to consider the question whether, and
if so how, it might be possible to make an empirical test of the theory, about
the structure of research postures, that I had proposed at the panel on the
preceding day. As chapter 8 shows (at p. 187), I had stated the theory as
an explicit hypothesis about the ordering of proximity relationships between
political science and various cognate fields (of the life and social sciences,
and of the humanities). The resulting sequence was a circular ordering, with
three equidistant points specifying the loci of the midpoints of segments of
the traditional, conventional, and behavioral perspectives. But the empirical
content of these segments consisted, according to my theory, of the various
political scientists who during the preceding decade had been contributing
to research in the judicial process field. Consequently, it should be possi-
ble to locate these persons, in at least an ordinal relationship to each other,
along that continuum: if my own position (for instance) were in the center
of the behavioral segment, then I perceived Peltason (for example) to be in
the center of the conventional segment, and Mendelson in the center of the
traditional segment. Similarly, I thought I could locate other scholars, with
whose work I was familiar, as proceeded to do that for the thirty or so of the
leading contributors to research in the field. That completed the specification
and positions on one or another of the segments. So Ioperationalization of the
hypothesis; to test it, one could conceivably consult mass opinion (by survey-
ing samples of other political scientists, or of students) or a panel of experts
(whose ratings of the subjects could be compared with my own statement in
the hypothesis). But I turned instead to what I thought would be an even better
test of validity: to ask the subjects themselves where each of them thought
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he himself should be located, and to ask them also to serve as a panel of
experts for rating each other. By the time the flight landed in Detroit an
hour later, I had completely worked out the design for the empirical test,
including both the detailed statement of the hypothesis and the procedures
for testing it. As the Appendix to the article reprinted as chapter 9 shows
(p. 247), the questionnaire to collect the empirical data was mailed out two-
and-a-half weeks later; and the exigencies of publication happened to work
out so that both the Atlanta paper and the empirical validation of one of its
major hypotheses were published a year or so later, in different political sci-
ence journals but in successive months.
Chapter 10 also focuses upon ideological relationships, but with an
explicitly cross-cultural design; and it arose out of a very different set of
circumstances. An event of considerable importance to the development of
the field of judicial process and behavior was the convening in 1963 of
a two-week seminar on judicial behavior, at Ann Arbor, Michigan, under
the auspices of the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research and
at the behest of Warren Miller. Among the fifty-odd faculty members and
graduate students who participated in the seminar were several persons
who did not then, and do not now, consider themselves to be primarily
specialists in judicial behavior; and among such persons was James Dator,
whose own field of primary interest was at that time comparative poli-
tics. Subsequently he was employed for several years as a faculty member
at Rikkyo (St. Paul’s) University in Tokyo, and while there he decided to
apply a research idea that stemmed from his having attended the 1963
summer seminar in judicial behavior, by carrying out a survey of Japan-
ese high court judges, in replication of Stuart Nagel’s questionnaire study
of state supreme court judges (discussed earlier). Dator and I began a
correspondence concerning his research shortly before the initial report
of his research was published in 1967; and we have remained in touch
since then, initially in regard to the more extended analysis of his high
court data that I had asked him to undertake. His first report had been a
straightforward descriptive account of his project; I urged him to obtain
a copy of Nagel’s data cards, and then factor analyze both his own and
Nagel’s data, so that it might be possible to discuss comparatively the fac-
torial findings—which, according to the theory of judicial ideology that I
had presented in the Atlanta paper, would in substance be a comparison of
the ideology of Japanese and American judges. He did carry out the factor
analyses, and he undertook to present his findings in a common format,
and in relationship to his reappraisal of Eysenck’s prior studies, which had
employed an extended version of the same questionnaire that was used by
both Nagel and Dator, of political party members in several European coun-
tries (Eysenck 1953, 1954; Eysenck and Coulter 1972); but Dator chose to
direct his own reanalysis to the question of whether the modified Eysenck
questionnaire provided an appropriate instrument for investigating the at-
titudes of Japanese judges. Explicitly, Dator preferred not to undertake a
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comparative analysis of the substantive findings, about ideological differences,
that one might infer to be supported by the respective studies. As Dator’s work
progressed, it became clear that in order to get at the comparative substantive
analysis that I thought important, I would have to do it myself.
Dator’s second (and factorial) report (1969) was to be published as a
chapter in a book on comparative judicial research, of which I was coeditor;
and the completed manuscript of that book (including, of course, Dator’s
chapter) already had been submitted to the publisher when I was asked to
present a paper at an international conference of mathematical theories of
voting behavior.4 I made this the occasion for writing the paper that ap-
pears here as chapter 10; I had undertaken the smallest space computer
analyses, upon which the analysis rests, during the preceding year, but
had put the results aside in the hope that Dator might be willing to carry
through with the analysis that I thought ought to be made. Consequently
my own paper is strictly a secondary analysis of data collected by several
other persons, and I am correspondingly indebted to Eysenck, Nagel, and
Dator. The work is also, therefore, an exceptionally clear example of cu-
mulative building in the construction of social science theory: Eysenck had
constructed his initial questionnaire on the basis of the pooled items of vir-
tually all of the reported work on political attitudes up through the end of
World War II (Eysenck 1947); Nagel adapted what he considered to be the
most discriminating items, from Eysenck’s questionnaire, for his own work
on American judges (Nagel 1963a); and Dator had taken over Nagel’s in-
strument—which of course he had to translate into Japanese, and modify
in certain other respects—for his study of Japanese judges. And I started
in where Dator left off; but I clearly could not even have conceived of my
research design, let alone have carried it out, without the extensive prior
labors of the three other scholars, each working in a different country and
continent.
Due to another exigency of the publication process—in this instance, the
fact that articles normally can be published more rapidly than books—the ar-
ticle that is reprinted here as chapter 10 appeared several months before
Dator’s second report, upon which it was primarily based. At the time this is
written no subsequent studies have as yet been published to carry forward
the analysis of ideology presented in chapter 10. But I have been continuing
to work along these lines much of the time during the past five years. One
such project involved a full year of survey field research, interviewing samples
of approximately fifty judges each in Switzerland and in South Africa. One
facet of that project was to collect data that would make possible a compara-
tive study of the ideology of supreme court judges in these two countries,
which were selected because of the marked extent to which subcultural dif-
ferentiation is reflected in the representational structure of their judiciaries.
4. Organized by Professor Oskar Morgenstern, at the Institute for Advanced Studies,
Vienna, Austria, June 26–27, 1968.
QUANTIFYING POLITICAL IDEOLOGY . 181
Hence the data will support comparative analysis of ideologies within each
country, as well as between them. The interviews included both probing open-
ended questions, the replies to which were taped, and an extensive schedule
which subsumed scales of political, economic, psychological, and social con-
tent. Some of the items for the schedule were taken from those used by Dator
and Nagel; others were taken directly from Eysenck (because Nagel had not
selected them); and still others were taken from a variety of sources, includ-
ing works by Adorno et al. (1950), Rokeach (1960), and McClosky (1958), and
from the handbook on political attitudes published by the Survey Research
Center (Robinson, Rusk, and Head 1969). An initial report that discussed pri-
marily the design of this research was presented as a paper at a panel of the
Ninth World Congress of the International Political Science Association (Schu-
bert 1973d, and cf. Gow 1974), but the bulk of the coding, computer work,
and analysis, still remained to be done then. Another project was not cross-
cultural, and indeed was limited in its focus to the United States Supreme
Court; but it did involve comparative methodological analysis of judicial
ideologies (Schubert 1974a). One facet of this project, the data for which
covered the periods of the Vinson and Warren Courts, involved an investi-
gation of the differences in substantive findings required by interpretations
based upon, respectively, principal component factor analysis, oblique factor
analysis, and smallest space analysis (with the dimensionality of the smallest
spaces varying from one to four). Another facet of this project that consti-
tutes an extension of the chapters reprinted herein is the construction of a
set of physical models of the ideological configurations for three-dimensional
smallest space—and certainly from the point of view of reader apprehension,
these physical models represent a step forward from the topographical map-
pings reported in chapter 10.5
5. It has been suggested to me that the smallest space topography portrayed in chapter 10
is markedly reminiscent of the paintings of Jean Dubuffet, such as his Amplification of the Tap
(1965).
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Ideologies
and Attitudes
I. THE CRITICAL FUNCTIONMany of those academicians who are most vehement in their disputa-
tion of the relevance of attitudinal analysis to political science argue from
premises that are patently ideological in character (Becker 1964: 3, and
chap. 1; Mendelson 1963). Typically such persons are unlettered in the
alien academic disciplines of contemporary anthropology, psychology, and
sociology, to say nothing of mathematics, statistics, or computer technology.
But they know what they like, and also what they dislike; and the vigor with
which a growing list of de Maistres of public law (to borrow John Roche’s apt
phrase) have ridden off to joust in defense of the ancien régime demonstrates
their conviction that it is far better to fluster in a just cause than to yield to
Mephistopheles. The problem has been that this Faustian drama, though fre-
quently advertised, rarely gets into production, primarily because each of the
leading would-be protagonists insists upon appearing on stage horsed on a
nag, clad in tin armour, and fitted with the accounterments of the White Knight
(in Through the Looking-Glass). It is difficult to join in combat with champi-
ons who keep falling off on their heads into ditches, because they refuse to do
their homework. Instead, the Dons Quixote of public law indulge in rhetorical
argument, in the heightened phrase, in violet (as well as violent) prose which
This chapter was originally published, in slightly different form, as “Ideologies and Atti-
tudes, Academic and Judicial” in The Journal of Politics 29 (February 1967): 3–40. Copyright
1967 The Journal of Politics.
An earlier draft of this article was presented as a paper, “Academic Ideologies, Judicial
Attitudes, and Social Change,” at the 37th Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science
Association on November 4, 1965. The author thanks Martin Shapiro, Joseph L. Bernd, David
Hughes, and Stephen Whittaker for their comments on the paper.
is intended to appeal to the passions rather than to the intellect of the audi-
ence.
It might be of mild interest to answer in the same vein what has been
to date the public-law literary critique of research in judicial behavior. Wal-
lace Mendelson perforce persists in his own common-sense intuitions, stated
in an idiom that is high in emotive content and moralistic exhortation and
scholastic allusion but low in observable empirical referents, substituting
for behavioral concepts words that have little recognizable semantic correla-
tion with those used by judicial behavioralists to describe their work (1964);
while Theodore Becker reiterates repetitious ruminations of straw men.1 A
rose is a rose is a rose, perhaps; and it may be that at some level of abstrac-
tion a scale is a scale is a scale. But among behavioral scientists do-re-mi
is not Osgood’s semantic differential; and neither is Guttman’s simplex. It is
not possible to join issue at a technical level with persons who insist upon
their right to bypass knowledge of the basic research that has been done in
such fields as (for example) the social psychology of attitudes.
Consider Mendelson’s assertion that “neo-behavioralism has been over-
influenced by the judicial activists” and that “behavioralism is a by-product
of libertarian activism.” This peroration reaches its apogee when Mendel-
son proclaims that “The knight errantry of judicial activism has bred in the
neobehavioralists (among others) an iconoclasm toward law and the judi-
cial process that goes beyond the bounds of reason. What should be charged
to a few judges is chalked up against the legal system” (1963: 603). On the
merits, the fancy that judicial conservatives like Frankfurter are value-free2
while the “libertarian activists” (to employ, as Mendelson does, Pritchett’s con-
cept) indulge in judicial behavior is simply preposterous. To argue that all
judges are, or ought to be, value-free in their official behavior makes some
1. Cf. Theodore L. Becker, “[Behavioralists assume] that various personal factors located
in the judge’s mind can completely explain his decisions. Put another way, these scholars as-
sume that the judge’s own personal predispositions regarding the subject matter before him
are the single causative factor effecting [sic] judicial decision-making patterns. These pre-
dispositions, it is believed, are immune from any other influences, for example, judicial role
(the requirement of objectivity and impartiality) … [and] modern researchers have chosen
to avoid this factor as even being worthy of consideration and research….” (Becker 1966a:
13–14. Emphasis added to “completely”; other italicizations are Becker’s.) Neither here nor
in anything that he has published to date has Becker cited any behavioral literature to exem-
plify his charges.
2. “[As] I have just suggested: among his colleagues, such a judge must be the least prej-
udiced by liberal or anti-liberal bias; in this sense, then, the freest to consider each case on its
own merits—our closest approximation of the non-partisan magistrate. The judge in question is
Felix Frankfurter.” (Mendelson 1963: 598). But cf. the evaluation by another scholar who, though
familiar with Mendelson’s views, has been a student of what he calls “Frankfurterweise” for a
much longer time: “It has been said of Holmes that he survived into his own generation. It may
yet be written of Frankfurter that he was appointed as his was passing into history. He came to
the Court beautifully equipped to carry on the Holmes-Brandeis opposition to judicial activism
in the economic field. In twenty-three years on the bench, he had occasion to write just one such
opinion. He came totally ill-equipped, emotionally as well as from his sense of values, to meet
the challenge of a new era. Although he came from Vienna rather than from Paris, in a way his
history is so French. For France, it will be recalled, on the eve of World War II was so beautifully
prepared for World War I.” (Grant 1965: 1042).
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sense—not to everyone, to be sure, but to a great many people; and to hypoth-
esize that judges are affected, to a greater or lesser extent, by their beliefs
and attitudes, has seemed a proposition worth testing to a great many other
persons, going back at least as far as Plato. But the notion that good (non-
activist) judges are value-free, while bad (libertarian activist) judges alone
indulge their personal biases, seems to be idiosyncratic to Professor Mendel-
son. Of course, Mendelson’s fancy is closely related to the metaphysic of an
analytical jurisprudence which posits an antiseptic judiciary of legal techni-
cians whose exclusive function, interest, and expertise is procedural. But the
fervor with which Mendelson sketches the scenario for his morality play—good
old Felix, and bad old Hugo—brands his advocacy as a polemic which, however
suitable for argumentation in a lawyer’s brief, cannot be taken seriously as
academic scholarship, even under the looser canons deemed appropriate for
nonbehavioral research in political science.
The range of the differences among us in the extent to which we seek
to be either “political” or “scientific” in our own work makes it difficult for
persons at the antipodes of these two continua to engage in effective com-
munication with each other, let alone to find a level of discourse at which
they profitably can debate each other’s work. It may, therefore, be of greater
benefit to the profession if we eschew logomachy—a game that both behav-
ioralists and their critics can play without generating much light—in favor
of an attempt to answer the question why political scientists do divide so
sharply in their perceptions of others’, as well as of their own, work. The ma-
jor underlying cause, we might hypothesize, lies in these persons’ divergent
ideological orientations toward their professional work. A first step toward
better common understanding may well consist of a clearer delineation of
the relevant academic ideologies; and in an attempt to take that first step,
I have suggested that among political scientists today, the three most im-
portant orientations toward study of law and courts are the traditional, the
conventional, and the behavioral.3
II. ACADEMIC IDEOLOGIES
The traditional approach among political scientists is that of the public
lawyer, who is content to define his subject matter as constitutional law
(see chap. 2). Even at the organizing meeting (convened at the American
Political Science Association annual meeting in September 1965) of the po-
litical science section of the Law and Society Association—which may very
well have been perceived by many persons as an avant-garde group, in
view of its ties with the American Sociological Association—the preponder-
ant majority of those present identified their field interest as either “public
3. This was first proposed as a hypothesis in my Judicial Policy-Making (1965d: 158–185).
Part II of this chapter (“Academic Ideologies,” infra) expounds and illustrates the hypothesis
in somewhat greater detail. For an empirical test of the hypothesis, see chap. 9.
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law” or “constitutional law.” There can be little doubt that most political scien-
tists who have a primary interest in courts embrace the traditional ideology.
The conventional ideology is aptly so called because it corresponds to the
modal, or political process, approach among political scientists today—when
their subject matter is anything other than courts and law. The characteristic
point of view is that courts are political institutions and judges are political
decision-makers, and therefore that political scientists ought to study them in
the same way that they would seek to understand any other political phenom-
ena. The classic statement of this orientation is found in remarks made by Jack
Peltason (1953, 1955).
Judicial behavioralism is an attempt to construct a systematic theory about
human behavior, analyzing data about judges and adjudicatory processes of
decision-making by using theories and methods from all of the behavioral sci-
ences, according to their relevance to the particular inquiry at hand.
The relationship among these three academic ideologies is suggested
by Figure 11. The figure portrays a circular relationship, with three points
partitioning the curve into three segments. In this paradigm, the points
correspond to the ideological positions, and the segments correspond to
movements that have been so labeled (although not, of course, in this con-
text) by other writers. With the objective of further clarifying the idea which
the figure is intended to symbolize, let us consider a few more examples,
starting with the traditional position and proceeding in a clockwise direc-
tion. In addition to the works by Mendelson already cited, Abraham (1968)
provides an excellent illustration of the traditional orientation. The judicial
process approach, which links the traditional and the conventional points
of view, is well exemplified by two recent books: Shapiro (1964a) and Ja-
cob (1965). The conventional ideology is articulated by Pritchett and Westin
(1963), and in Krislov (1965). Danelski (1964) and Murphy (1964a) are ex-
amples of what Shapiro (1964b) calls “political jurisprudence,” spanning
the conventional and the behavioral positions. Recent articles by Walter
Murphy (1966) and by Joseph Tanenhaus (1966) are characteristically be-
havioral studies. Probably there would be relatively few disagreements
concerning the validity of this classification of the recent literature in the
field, at least thus far. Some persons may find much more disturbing the
suggestion that the circle appropriately can be closed via the “jurimetrics”4
4. The portmanteau is Lee Loevinger’s; I personally dislike the term because it tends
to overemphasize measurement and methodology. Loevinger seeks, of course, to draw a
sharp contrast with “jurisprudence”; but it seems to me that political scientists have no
such obligation. “Judicial behavior” is probably too narrow in scope; perhaps social-scien-
tifically oriented law professors, political scientists, and sociologists all might agree upon
the potential usefulness of the concept of “adjudicatory behavior,” which implies a relation-
ship to political behavior and the behavioral sciences generally, and invokes the image of
human beings rather than of numerical manipulations. Figure 11 recognizes this distinction
by attributing differing (though overlapping) content-meanings to the “jurimetrics” and “be-
havioral” approaches.
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Figure 11. Academic Ideologies toward Adjudication
segment which links the behavioral with the traditional position. The work
in jurimetrics often has been relatively spectacular, since it has tended to
focus upon the prediction of decisional outcomes (as in much of the recent
writing of Stuart Nagel, Fred Kort, and Reed Lawlor).
The points denoting the ideologies can be viewed, alternatively, as the
midpoints of segments which correspond to the humanities, the social sci-
ences, and the behavioral sciences, respectively. The resulting sequence of
academic disciplines (ranging from law through history, economics, political
science, sociology, psychology, biology, anthropology, philosophy, and thus
back to law) is of course schematic, but it may have some heuristic value in
suggesting the ordinal relationship of the modal tendencies for the frequency
distributions of ideological standpoints in these fields. Thus the humanities
tend to be concerned with what we might call the letter of the law; the
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social sciences, with legal institutions and political groups; and the behavio-
ral sciences, with the personality of legal decision-makers. Accordingly, the
characteristic focus of attention of the three major ideological standpoints
has been that traditionalists study law, conventionalists study courts, and
behavioralists study judges.
The implication of the circle, however, is that it defines an infinite con-
tinuum of points of view, which represent differing combinations of the
bench-mark orientations defined by the three ideologies. It would be more
realistic still to define the figure as two-dimensional, in which event we
could identify positions within the perimeter, and thus speak of varying
combinations of adjacent ideological positions (and cf. Figure 16, infra).
Nevertheless, for an initial step in the direction of better comprehending
the professional perspectives which differentiate—and at the same time
integrate—political scientists, it may be more useful to confine this discus-
sion to the circle, leaving spheres and more complicated multidimensional
spaces to some future occasion when the quality of our data and the ur-
gency of our need may justify greater complexity. As it is, the suggestion
of a curvilinear continuum is upsetting enough to those colleagues whose
conceptions of the field can more readily be accommodated to a straight
line. The circle suggests, also, why a person who identifies with any of the
three benchmark positions tends to reject both of the other two: from his
perspective, they are equally far away from where he perceives himself
(ideologically) to be; this explains also why such a person often lumps the
other two positions together—even though one who identifies with either of
the other two finds his and the other position to be quite different. Thus, for
example, we find Jack Peltason recently remarking that “It is difficult to un-
derstand the intensity of the attack upon [behavioralist] research by those
who champion [traditional] scholarship, for there is not much difference be-
tween the basic assumptions and goals underlying the two approaches….
They have the same nonpolitical orientation toward judicial decision-making
…” (1964a). According to our figure, this is precisely the way a conventional
theorist ought to feel; and as Peltason had remarked over a decade earlier,
we political scientists should “turn our attention to the judiciary as a facet
in the group struggle and relate the activities of judges to that of other
groups,” leaving history to the historians, law to the lawyers, and psychol-
ogy to the psychologists (1953: 56). Similarly, Martin Shapiro is critical of
both law-professor exponents of “neutral principles of constitutional adju-
dication” and of the “behavioral wing of political jurisprudence” (1964a:
chap. 1). Public law types, on the other hand, tend to view conventional
and behavioral research as equally risqué; while behavioralists consider the
case study approach (other than as a possible source of data and hypothe-
ses) to be just as innocent of scientific potential as is the legal case method
of analysis.
It is hardly surprising that behavioral research into the attitudes of
judges has met with considerable skepticism, much discounting, and more
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than a little just plain disbelief. Given the value predispositions of most of
the relevant professional audience, it could not have been otherwise.
III. ACADEMIC ATTITUDES
Academic ideologies tend to determine academic attitudes toward the
study of judicial attitudes. Attitudinal differences imply differing choices
among such core components of academic attitudes as modes of discourse,
logic, statistical literacy, rationality, empiricism, methodology, and scientism.
We shall now examine some of the differences in academic attitudes toward
attitudinal research, in regard to each of these facets.
1. Concepts
From the traditionalist point of view, a judge’s decisions are determined
in part by an authoritative structure of norms (the law), in the manipulation of
which he is skilled, and in part by what is called the judge’s “philosophy.” By
judicial philosophy, public law scholars mean the judge’s views on questions of
public policy, which usually are related to a broadly defined linear continuum
of liberalism and conservatism.
From the conventional point of view, judicial decision-making is the prod-
uct of interaction among social groups; and the judge functions as a transmis-
sion belt for the articulation of group (social) interests. But group interests are
equated to particular positions in regard to proposed dispositions of questions
of public policy.
Hence concepts analogous to the behavioral concept of “attitude” are
central to both the traditional approach and the conventional approach.
This might suggest the facile conclusion that the problem of conflicting aca-
demic ideologies is primarily a matter of words,5 and that “philosophy,”
“group interests,” and judicial “attitudes” are synonymous. There may be
more truth in this observation than has been recognized, but there remain
important differences in weighting. Behavioralists assign a predominant
weight to judicial personality as a source of substantive decisional norms;
traditionalists assign a subordinate weight, looking to the law as the more
important and more usual source of norms; while conventionalists assign
5. Samuel Krislov, for example, recently has debunked efforts to use systems theory as
the basis for analysis of judicial institutions and behavior as principally involving the substitu-
tion of “new nomenclature for familiar facts,” saying (e.g.) that “little of moment results from
referring to the Department of Justice as a ‘subsystem’” (1966: 1577). Krislov also denigrates
as “post hoc” reasoning a recent attempt to take advantage of five years of accumulated em-
pirical work in scaling judicial attitudes and in analyzing judicial attributes, by the statement
of a hypothesis about the degree of correlation among classes of cultural, attribute, and atti-
tudinal variables (1966: 1581). The criticism seems inconsistent with his plea, earlier in the
same article, for progress in theory building, by movement “from theory to empirical data
and back to theory” (p. 1573). Presumably, Krislov’s “from theory” means a priori reasoning,
and his “back to theory” means post hoc reasoning. Ergo propter hoc?
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a minimal—usually zero—weight to the judge’s personal values (as distin-
guished from his social role). It is not surprising, therefore, that most of the
critique of so-called attitudinal-statistical analysis has come from conven-
tionally oriented rather than from traditionally oriented scholars. Moreover,
the conventional critique of scale analysis of judicial attitudes has been
couched in what purports to be a dispassionate, and even a technical,
correction of behavioralist blunders, by real experts in the theory and meth-
ods of social psychology. It seems appropriate, therefore, to examine the
core arguments of the critique of attitudinal analysis, since this offers some
promise of constituting a subject upon which a more scientific debate might
be possible.
2. Logic
One of the charges most frequently levied against studies of judicial atti-
tudes, particularly when the method of cumulative scaling has been employed,
is that the findings are based upon a circular process of reasoning. Thus,
Mendelson asks: “Could it be that scale analysis is tautological or circular, that
the meaning it yields is the meaning one puts into it?” (1963: 597). Shapiro
makes the point more explicit: “… there is a kind of basic circularity in sta-
tistical approaches to the problem of judicial attitudes. Consistency in voting
behavior is used to infer the attitude, and then the attitude is used to explain
the consistency.” (1964a: 14) And Becker makes it verbose:
… Professor [Q] misuses the data of judicial votes and opinions in relationship to
psychological explanatory concepts (including and in addition to attitude)…. In Hullian
fashion, he sets up the stimulus-response bond scheme with the case (the facts within
the judicial opinion itself) as the stimulus (S) and the vote (the decision of the court) as
the response (R). The former is the independent variable and the latter, of course, the
dependent variable. The intervening variable is the judge himself, or his attitude or at-
titude universe. The conceptual difficulty in this scheme is that these facts, as gleaned
from the opinion verbiage, are not a stimulus at all. Are the facts as they are stated
in the judicial opinion the same facts presented to the court for decision? No, they are
not. The case opinion itself was not that which confronted the perceiving organisms
(the judges) at the argument. That set of facts (presented in the opinion) was not the
same which, after perception, filtered through the attitude net (behavioral predisposi-
tion set) and triggered the response. The case opinion itself represents a distillation
of the stimulus, which was the actual factual situation presented to the court. Hasn’t
Professor [Q] utilized the response itself as a stimulus? So it seems. (1964: 14)
Have behavioralists attempted to square the circle (or vice versa)? On this
question, at least, all three critics seem to be in substantial agreement; and
since there appears to be some superficial plausibility in what they say, a reply
seems justifiable. Let us start with Becker, and work backwards.
All of the talk about Hull, behaviorist psychology, stimulus-response
bonds, and judges being intervening variables is Becker’s gloss, not any-
thing that Q ever has said. To the contrary, both Q and other behavioralists
have emphasized opinion behavior and voting behavior as alternative forms
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of decisional response; and the question that they have thought to be of in-
terest is not whether opinion rationales are “stimuli” but rather the extent to
which they are correlated with votes (see, e.g., Schubert 1960a: 516, 1963c:
62, and esp. 1965b). Out of the entire situation (including the record, briefs,
oral argument, conversation with colleagues, newspaper and television com-
mentary, law review articles, the competence of his clerk, the current state
of mental and physical health of himself and his family, perhaps the war
news from Vietnam, et cetera, ad infinitum, plus the remembered and the
sublimated historical antecedents of all of these events) a judge defines the
issue to which he will react in his decision. Much of his training as a lawyer,
and of his socialization as a judge, combine with the customs and institu-
tional procedures for judicial decision-making to provide maximal (within
the range of possible variation for human beings) assurance that his cogni-
tion of the situation will be highly structured, especially when he defines the
question for decision. Unless there were high communality in perception of
the issues deemed relevant, consensus on the Supreme Court (for example)
would be considerably lower than the present level—which many observers
already consider to be deplorable.
In order for rational decision-making to take place, it is not necessary
that all justices be in precise agreement concerning the “facts of the case,”
as these might be inferred from the record. It is essential that they be in
substantial agreement concerning what issue they are going to decide; and
most of the time they are in such agreement. To the extent that agree-
ment is lacking, clues usually are provided by separate opinions and by
jurisdictional dissents. When their disagreement is sufficiently important
(notwithstanding the milieu of consensus-pointing norms in which they
work) to lead them to be willing to signify it in the articulate form of opinion
language or a minority vote, Supreme Court justices typically disagree about
how the issue should be decided—not about what issue the case presents.
Since those justices who join in it have agreed to accept the common opin-
ion of the Court, in addition to voting the same way in the disposition of the
case, it is reasonable to accept what they say there as evidence concern-
ing the issue(s) to which their decision relates.6 Of course, not all justices
6. The principal justifications for inferring stimuli content from judicial opinions admittedly are:
(1) convenience and accessibility; and (2) parsimony in research costs. But there is no reason why
a researcher could not substitute content analysis of case records (including lower court action,
briefs, and what transcripts of oral argument he could get at) if he is concerned that opinions of
judges are so unrelated to the questions being decided that they mislead him even in regard to the
major issue(s) to which the decision relates. Alternatively, one who fears that the analyst’s bias will
lead him to substitute his own for the judges’ perceptions of the issue(s) in a case might agree to
use the categorizations of some putatively neutral classifier (such as the West Key Number System).
Moreover, interview and questionnaire data can be correlated with imputed decisional values in or-
der to test the validity of the content of judicial scales. But these are all empirical matters; whether
judicial opinions are or are not appropriate as sources of data, for the classification of decisions ac-
cording to issues, raises no theoretical question.
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are agreed upon consensual definitions of the issues in all cases; and to the
extent that they are not in agreement, this is one (among several) of the
sources of error variance. However, if this were a major difficulty, it ought
to result in fewer and poorer, not more and better, acceptable cumulative
scales. The procedure tests the hypothesis that all justices are responding to
the same issue, in each set of votes (decision) of the scale. The only possible
effect that can be produced by empirical deviations from the hypothesis is
to lower the consistency apparent in the scale. We ought to expect that a set
of judges, each responding individually to a different item in a miscellany of
issues, will vote in random, not in consistent, patterns.
3. Statistical Literacy
(Un)critical references to “attitudinal-statistical” work tend to create
the quite false impression that cumulative scaling is a statistical technique.
A scalogram is an ordering of empirical data into a pattern, according to
predetermined rules; it is neither a statistic nor the result of statistical
analysis. Any claim to the contrary hardly rises above the vulgar linguistic
practices whereby “statistics” are used as a substitute for “data,” or the
latter are used to refer to a single item. Once a scale—the ordering of
empirical data in a particular pattern—has been constructed, the question
then arises whether (and if so to what extent) the contrived pattern differs
from a chance ordering of the same data, or from the least consistent pat-
tern possible for these particular data, given such empirical parameters as
the number of participants in each decision and the number of decisions
participated in by each respondent. The researcher can use his own judg-
ment in this matter, just as one might examine a painting, by staring at
the scale and thereby arriving at a subjective judgment concerning how
consistently the justices voted in the cases that comprise the scale. Or the
researcher might undertake to contrive some ad hoc index to help guide his
judgment; this procedure would at least tend to assure greater consistency
in the researcher’s own judgments concerning a set of different scales than
if he were to rely exclusively upon his intuitions and impressions. The dif-
ficulty with both of these procedures is that no two researchers are likely
to come up with either the same subjective judgments or the same ad hoc
indices; and even if they should happen to arrive at identical judgments,
there is no precise way in which they can communicate this information to
each other.
A third alternative open to the researcher might be to use a con-
ventional statistic to test the consistency manifest in the scalar pattern.
However, as has recently been pointed out in a book which reports several
dozen empirical scales, “One of the weaknesses of cumulative scaling, from
a statistical point of view, is the lack of any really uniform criterion for test-
ing significance” (Schubert 1965c: 78). And even when the available indices
indicate that a scale meets conventional levels of consistency, the scale may
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not satisfy other nonstatistical criteria of scalability (Torgerson 1958: 324;
Green 1954: 356; Schubert 1959: 271–280; Lingoes 1963). Only the naive
will assume that the use of statistical tests can substitute for the ultimate
judgment of the analyst as a responsible scholar. The statistical tests simply
make it more likely that several responsible scholars, of equal competence
and experience, will reach similar judgments concerning the same scale or
set of scales.
So if there is circularity in the use of cumulative scales of judicial votes
as a basis for making inferences concerning judicial attitudes, this has nothing
to do with statistics. Nor does Shapiro’s labeling judicial attitudes as a “prob-
lem” (cf. Beard 1948: 216) in itself pose any problem, unless it gives rise to
other difficulties. This brings us to Shapiro’s claim that “Consistency in voting
behavior is used to infer the attitude, and then the attitude is used to ex-
plain the consistency.” According to Guttman’s theory, when the questions are
arranged in a sequence of increasing difficulty, and a group of respondents an-
swers the questions consistently, then it can be inferred that the responses are
evidence of the differences, among the respondents, toward whatever attitudi-
nal dimension the questions have in common. Some error is to be anticipated
in empirical investigations, due to faulty observations and classifications of
the data and failure of the theoretical model to fit the data; moreover there
are computational errors inherent in the measurement techniques themselves.
The statistical coefficients are supposed to direct the attention of the analyst
to the first two types of error; and he is supposed to keep in mind the possible
degree of influence, upon his observed statistical scores, of the third type of
error.
4. Rationality
There ought to be a rational relationship between the sample of cases
being scaled, and the attitudinal dimension that is hypothesized as being
related to them. If one were to draw a sample of Supreme Court decisions
consisting of all cases for which decisions were announced on even-num-
bered days of the month, then it would probably be unreasonable for an
analyst to claim that he could make an inference about the attitudes, of
Supreme Court justices, toward civil liberties—unless there is some nonob-
vious association between civil liberties decisions and the calendar.7 It
might be reasonable to hypothesize that, with such a sample, one might
investigate the attitudes of Supreme Court justices toward announcing de-
cisions on even-numbered days, providing that there is some plausible basis
(either in theory, or from previous empirical observations) for assuming
7. Since the above was written, Tanenhaus has published what appears to be a some-
what similar claim: that by following what are (from the point of view of judicial rationality)
non-rational procedures of item selection, he can nevertheless observe a marginally “accept-
able” coefficient of scalability (1966: 1593). For discussion of this claim, see pp. 196–199.
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a functional relationship between the calendar and judicial perceptions of
public policy. On the other hand, there is some reasonable basis, in the pre-
vious research findings of scholars in the humanities, the social sciences,
and the behavioral sciences (to say nothing of the explicit earlier work of
such students of the Supreme Court as Robert E. Cushman and C. Herman
Pritchett) for hypothesizing that Supreme Court justices may, in those cases
in which civil liberties issues are predominant, decide on the basis of the
attitudes of the justices toward civil liberties.
Many scholars also think it reasonable to hypothesize, for the same or
indeed for any other sample of cases, that the more relevant attitudinal
dimension to test is stare decisis. Both Becker (1963a: 265) and Shapiro
(1964a: 35–38) have raised this question; but thus far, neither has seen fit
to face up to the possible difficulties that might arise, particularly if one
were to attempt to do what they recommend: take a sample of cases selected
because the predominant issue posed (according to the participating majori-
ties of justices) is some aspect of civil liberties, and use those cases to test
the hypothesis that the justices decided them as they did because of their
respective degrees of belief in stare decisis. Off hand, one suspects that it
might be difficult, even using the traditional methods of legal case research
that these authors recommend, to order the cases according to the strength
of the relevant precedents for each case—since the cases in the sample have
not been selected on the basis of their supposed relationship to precedential
decisions (strong or weak, clear or ambiguous). Neither Becker nor Shapiro
has even hinted as to how he would operationalize the idea of stare deci-
sis, so that a meaningful test of this hypothesis might be possible, using a
sample of decisions drawn on the basis of other parametric characteristics,
and using cumulative scaling as a method of analysis (Becker 1965, 1966a;
Shapiro 1965). Off-the-cuff suggestions that stare decisis may be the real
reason why nine Supreme Court justices voted consistently 402 out of 419
times in a set of 56 civil liberties decisions are not going to convince any-
body who understands how a cumulative scale of such cases is constructed.
Perhaps it may be also significant that to date, neither Becker nor Mendel-
son nor Shaprio (nor any other of the traditionalist or conventionalist critics
of “attitudinal-statistical” research) has reported a scale of stare decisis—or
of anything else, for that matter. There are, on the other hand, several re-
ports of behavioral research in which the possible influence of stare decisis
has been investigated (Ulmer 1959; Schmidhauser 1962b; Schubert 1963c,
1965c; Kort 1963; and cf. Becker 1964: chaps. 3–5). In these investigations
samples were selected so as to maximize the probability that if stare decisis
were an important influence in judicial decision-making, this would show up
in the analyses.
5. Empiricism
There is nothing circular about stating a hypothesis, drawing a sample
of data, observing and classifying the data, and then making an analytical
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judgment concerning the extent to which the observed data support the
hypothesis. This is what one does in cumulative scaling, and this is what ordi-
narily is done in scientific research. Humanists and many social scientists get
an idea, collect some data that they think may bear upon the idea, select that
portion of the data that seems relevant (or, worse, substantiative) and throw
the rest away, and then offer some generalization about the portion of the data
that has been selected as relevant. This is what is really circular, or in Mendel-
son’s words, a “self-proving hypothesis.”
How much confidence one may be willing to repose in the results of a
scale analysis is another matter. Traditionalists typically generalize their legal
principles on the basis of the observation of individual cases, as discrete items;
indeed, they often insist that this is the only legitimate way to analyze cases.
But a behavioralist has minimal confidence in an inference generalized from
a single case; and with a set of respondents the size of the Supreme Court,
one cannot construct a cumulative scale with less than ten items, and usu-
ally at least twice that many are required to justify even minimal confidence
in a scale. On the basis of a single scale with high apparent consistency in
voting behavior, one might feel justified in making the further investment in
time, money, and other precious resources necessary to examine other sam-
ples, selected so as to articulate with the initial sample, and employing the
same research design. This is how, for example, Ulmer (1960) proceeded when
undertaking his exploratory investigation of civil liberties as a possible attitu-
dinal variable of importance in Supreme Court decision-making. Suppose one
then finds, upon examining cases whose content is not civil liberties, that other
samples of decisions can be related to different but equally consistent voting
patterns for the justices; that in combination a few such scale variables sub-
stantially exhaust the universe of the Supreme Court’s decision-making on the
merits; and that such variables scale term after term, for a changing group
of justices totaling almost a score, and over the course of almost two decades
(Schubert 1965c: chap. 5). Perhaps one may then be warranted in drawing
some tentative inferences about the possible importance to decision-making
of attitudinal differences among the Supreme Court justices, at least during
the period that he has studied. No behavioralist is clever enough to superim-
pose or inject enough of his own meaning, as an analyst, into that many (over
1,500) decisions, so that he can get the meaning back out again in the form of
consistent patterns of voting.
If the critics actually were to attempt to check upon what the behav-
ioralists have done, then they also are going to have to learn how to do
(inter alia) cumulative scaling; and most behavioralists doubtless would wel-
come such a development in the profession. At the same time it is readily
understandable that many traditionally or conventionally oriented political
scientists might not feel that it would be worth the effort; but the role of
a critic is more difficult, and the time for soothsaying is about over. Critics
of judicial scaling ought to be willing to get their hands dirty (with em-
pirical, perhaps even quantitative, labor), and come to grips with errors in
IDEOLOGIES AND ATTITUDES . 195
the use of scaling at an operational and not merely a metaphysical level.
One critic, who has done precisely that, is Joseph Tanenhaus, himself a be-
havioralist and, indeed, the person who, in a paper which he read at the
1956 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, intro-
duced the method of cumulative scaling of judicial decisions to the political
science profession. But like Dr. Frankenstein, Professor Tanenhaus has for
some time harbored doubts concerning his monster running amok;8 and re-
cently he has made public some of his reservations concerning the use and
abuse of cumulative scaling to study judicial attitudes.9
6. Methodology and Scientism
Tanenhaus mentions half-a-dozen or so reasons for his skepticism:
(1) He questions the overly rigid procedures, which I once suggested,
for ordering cases (1966: 1590). (And so have I.) In 1959 these procedures
were tentatively proposed in the first published work by a political scientist
attempting to use the method to study judicial decisions.10 The procedures
were then advertized as a possible substitute for analyst subjectivity during
what explicitly was stated (and presumed) to be an exploratory, experimental
(and temporary) period while political scientists were becoming more familiar
with the use of the new method. By 1960, less than a year after the suggested
procedures had appeared in print, I personally had given them up,11 because
greater familiarity with the sociopsychological literature convinced me that
several of these restrictions are unwarranted in theory, and further experi-
ence had demonstrated that they provide what is empirically too conservative
a criterion. Tanenhaus seems to think that these procedures encourage the
production of spurious scales of judicial voting; but the opposite is true of both
my intent in proposing them and my observation of their effect in practice.12
8. I happen to know this from personal correspondence extending back to 1959; and
see Tanenhaus 1961.
9. “There is serious doubt,” he says, “whether what now passes for the cumulative scal-
ing of judicial decisions is in any strict sense cumulative scaling at all” (1966: 1588). Louis
Guttman, the innovator of the method, thinks that the use of his techniques to analyze ju-
dicial decisions, in the manner that Tanenhaus criticizes, is cumulative scaling (personal
conversation, when Professor Guttman was my sometime colleague as Visiting Professor at
Michigan State University, during the fall term of 1962).
10. An earlier article (1958e) was based directly upon the book Quantitative Analysis of
Judicial Behavior (1959), which was then in process.
11. See the scales in Schubert 1962b, 1963a, 1963e, 1965c.
12. Tanenhaus was codirector of a summer seminar in judicial behavior convened under
the auspices of the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, at the Survey Research
Center of the University of Michigan in 1963, when this question of procedures for ordering
cases explicitly was discussed. At that time I argued against rigid adherence to the procedures
which I had proposed five years earlier; I urged that instead they be viewed as a guide for
beginners to learn how to construct a first approximation of a scale of judicial votes. The inter-
vening development of computer programs, which now provide such an initial approximation,
has the effect of making obsolete procedures for manual scale construction (including those
at issue here) except for the purpose of instruction as distinguished from research; see, e.g.,
BMD05S, “Guttman Scale # 1,” in W. Dixon (1964 ed.), pp. 390–398.
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(2) The basis of the suggested procedures for ordering items was the
assumption of a perfect scale as the theoretical model—not, as Tanenhaus
thinks, because of an assumption about the “intensity of issues.” (Except for
purposes of poetic rather than of scientific discourse, I think it is nonsensical
even to speak about the intensity of issues; people may feel intense about is-
sues, but intensity is a function of human perception.) It is not even clear to
me exactly what Tanenhaus means by “intensity” since he offers no definition;
for my attempt at an operational definition and for further discussion of inten-
sity, see Figure 13 and the accompanying discussion of it, in Part “V. Judicial
Attitudes,” of this article, infra.
(3) Tanenhaus refers to certain assumptions which he attributes to “Those
committed to cumulative scaling.” I shall presently dispute his assertion that
political scientists who have used cumulative scaling to study judicial deci-
sions have assumed that the observation of a CR of .90 (or of a CS of .65)
“proves” the existence of some postulated dimension; but I should like first
to take issue with the implications of Tanenhaus’ charge of commitment. He
does not name any particular individual as an example of such commitment;
but since my name appears in the adjacent footnotes more than that of any-
one else, I don’t wish to be presumed guilty by association. In everything that
I have ever written on the subject of cumulative scaling (in some dozen or so
places during the past eight or nine years), I have emphasized scale analy-
sis as one among several methods that might be worthy of experimentation;
I have stressed the desirability of eclecticism in research perspectives; and
I have both advocated and worked toward the construction of more open,
multidimensional models (as distinguished from exclusive reliance upon de-
terminate, unidimensional models such as that of linear cumulative scaling.)
Certainly I, for one, am not committed to cumulative scaling, or to factor
analysis, or game theory, or any other method or technique.
(4) Tanenhaus is concerned that judicial scales are not completely de-
terminate. But the difficulty here lies in the inadequacy of the data, not in
any defect inherent in the use of the method. With no missing data (i.e., with
full participation) and with a sample that includes n ( = the size of the court)
+ 1 decisions (each with a different voting division, and with no inconsis-
tent votes) one could always (for example) scale the United States Supreme
Court with only ten observations. Alas, this ideal rarely is encountered in
empirical samples of data. It is quite true that many scales have been re-
ported with multiple observations of voting divisions (i.e., with sets of cases
tied in rank order). Since it is possible to get only a single observation of
any case, such ties cannot be broken—by the use of cumulative scaling. But
we can obtain many observations of respondents; and usually ties in judi-
cial rank can be broken by expanding the analysis temporally to include a
more adequate sample (for illustrations, see Schubert 1965c: chap.5). The
question is not, as Tanenhaus’ discussion seems to indicate, whether in-
determinacy in empirical scales invalidates recourse to the method. The
question rather is: at what point does indeterminacy become so relatively
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large, and one’s corresponding confidence in the resulting findings so small,
that the use of the method of cumulative scaling, to analyze a particular
sample of data, must be considered inappropriate?
(5) Indeterminacy in empirical judicial scales stems mostly from either
or both of two causes: (a) nonparticipation; and (b) inconsistency in voting
patterns. Indeterminacy caused by nonparticipation is, in my experience, the
major difficulty which undermines (or ought to undermine) confidence in ju-
dicial scales. Tanenhaus discusses, however, only the second cause: “errors”
or inconsistent voting. His point seems to be that a statistical measure of
consistency in the voting pattern, which meets some conventional threshold
criterion level, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for guiding an ana-
lyst in his conclusion whether or not to accept or to reject the hypothesis that
he is testing, about judicial attitudes, through the construction of the scale. If
this were all, one would merely shrug at what appears to be a superfluous ob-
servation; but it is not all. Tanenhaus states that it is now widely recognized
that Guttman’s coefficient is spuriously high if the marginals of the items in
the sample tend to be biased toward the tails of the distribution. But all such
standard references as Torgerson (1958), Green (1954), Schubert (1959), and
Lingoes (1963), make this same point—and the article by Bert Green in the
widely used Lindzey Handbook was a dozen years old in 1966. Unless Tanen-
haus intends to imply that the persons whose work he criticizes were ignorant
concerning the limitations of the coefficients of reproducibility and of scala-
bility, at the time they were doing their judicial scaling, then the relevance of
this cookbook information, to his critique of the research that he discusses,
escapes me.
(6) From a discussion of the possibility that analysts may not recognize
bias and inadequacies in the samples that they draw—again, his concern about
the coefficients is directed at possible abuse by users, rather than at inherent
defects in cumulative scaling procedures—Tanenhaus turns to the suggestion
that an irrational scholar might make irrational inferences from a scale of judi-
cial voting. He makes his point in the form of what he himself calls an “esoteric
illustration”:
If one takes all the cases in Volume 355 of the United States Reports handed down
on days of the month divisible by three, and then classifies them so that a favorable vote is
assigned when a Justice supported petitioners (or appellants) with even docket numbers
or opposed those with odd docket numbers, and a negative vote for the reverse behavior,
one obtains an S of .62. (1966; 1593)
Such an outcome does not trouble me, and I really do not understand why
it seems to strike Tanenhaus as so alarming. The situation is analogous to
filling an urn with a thousand balls, two-thirds black and one-third white,
mixing them thoroughly, and then expressing amazement when a ball-gum
machine shovel, manipulated by a blindfolded operator, picks out sixty-two
black balls in the first hundred tries. I first pointed out almost five years
ago, and repeated several times in the interim before Tanenhaus published
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the remark quoted above (Schubert 1962b: 98, 100, 102; 1963e: 122; 1963a:
443n. 74; 1965c: 97–98), the explanation for the exceptionally high level of
overall voting consistency in divided decisions of the Supreme Court dur-
ing the 1957 term (which includes 355 U.S. Reports.). In the 1957 Term, as
has been true generally during the period since the end of World War II,
about two-thirds of the Court’s decisions related either to the political scale
or to the economic scale; and these two scales are positively correlated (at
a moderately high level) with each other. Since each scale independently
is internally consistent (with CRs of .96 and .99 and CSs of .84 and .90),
and, more importantly, since the MMR—the pattern of maximal inconsis-
tency, given the observed distributions of marginals for voting divisions in
these decisions—was .79 for the political scale and .81 for the economic
scale (that include the 1957 Term) there is a substantial underlying ba-
sis of consistency in the voting of Supreme Court justices irrespective of
the issues. Stated otherwise, the relevant question in interpreting sets of
Supreme Court votes, which have been arranged in patterns of scales, is not
“Does it surpass the minima for CR and/or for CS?” but rather is “How much
does the scalar pattern improve upon MMR?” If Tanenhaus had reported
that his vol. 355 experiment had resulted in a CR of over .90—and I assume
it must have been much less, else he would have reported it—constituting a
.15 to .20 improvement over the MMR for his data, one would be much more
impressed with the implications of his experiment.
(7) Tanenhaus speaks of the establishment of “the existence of a unidi-
mensional continuum” (1966: 1594) as though this is the Holy Grail for which
cumulative scalers are in quest. It is possible, judging from their published
statements on this subject, that several of the persons, who are named by
Tanenhaus on the same page where occurs the quoted remark, may concep-
tualize their efforts in terms of a search for unidimensionality. But I should
like to dissociate myself from any such notions. As I have attempted to explain
at some length, in a book which Tanenhaus cites (also on the same page),
my view is that “unidimensionality” is useful as a concept only if we remain
quite clear that it is a possible characteristic of our theoretical model—and
not repeat NOT of the empirical data themselves. It always has seemed to me
preposterous to speak, even figuratively, of any set of decisions of the United
States Supreme Court as though their empirical content could be “unidimen-
sional.”
IV. JUDICIAL IDEOLOGIES
In the study of judicial decision-making, policy attitudinal analysis is
a necessary but by no means a sufficient condition for the development of
comprehensive and systematic theory. Even a cursory knowledge of such
earlier work as Beveridge’s life of Marshall or of Cardozo’s lectures on “The
Nature of the Judicial Process” suggests the probably critical relevance of
sociometric analysis of intragroup relationships, and of biological parame-
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ters, to the task of constructing more general models. The study of judicial
attitudes toward public policy issues focuses upon the sector of cultural
parameters for judicial decision-making, since the belief systems of indi-
vidual justices necessarily reflect the socialization effects of a lifetime of
exposure both as a youth and as a professional, usually within the milieu
of the same (at least, taking the nation as the universe) system of values.
(Frankfurter, for example, became a chauvinistic exponent of the Anglo-
American legal systems, although he was born an alien and has said that
he never heard English spoken until he reached adolescence [Phillips 1960:
4].) It is not necessary to assume that knowledge about judicial attitudes
will explain everything about the decisions that (for example) the Supreme
Court makes; it is enough to be warranted in assuming that a focus upon
the attitudes of the justices toward policy issues will explain part of what we
do not yet fully understand. Attempts to illuminate this one sector (among
the several others) of our ignorance may also be of value in delineating the
boundaries between cultural, social, psychological, and biological subsys-
tems of the judicial decision-making process (Schubert 1968a).
As an initial step in the direction of laying the groundwork for dis-
cussing several theoretical criticisms that have been raised against substan-
tive findings about judicial policy attitudes, let us consider the outline of a
hierarchical theory of the relationships among judicial decisions, attitudes,
and ideologies. Figure 12 is based directly upon a more general hypothe-
sis concerning the structure of social attitudes, suggested by the English
factor psychologist Hans J. Eysenck.13 Figure 12 shows that ideologies are
the broadest constructs, and that each ideology is a function of several
macroattitudes. Each macroattitude is a function of several microattitudes;
and microattitudes are functions of decisional responses. As the figure sug-
gests, there are relatively few concepts at the ideological level, while there
will be, even for a single court, hundreds of decisional responses within a
relatively short span of time. From one point of view, we might say that
particular combinations of ideologies determine attitudinal dimensions, and
that decisional responses are determined by the correlations of individual
decision-makers with the attitudinal dimensions. This is a statement about
how we would infer, on the basis of this model, that decisions are deter-
mined by ideologies; and to the extent that in real life judicial decisions are
affected by nonideological determinants, then there should be error in at-
tempts to fit sets of empirical data to the model. Conversely, in attempting
to reconstruct ideologies from decisional behaviors, attitudes are logical in-
ferences from sets of decisional responses, and ideologies are inferences
from sets of attitudes.
Translated into operational terms, decisional responses consist of judi-
cial opinions and votes in individual cases; attitudes are cumulative scales
13. For further discussion of Eysenck’s theory, and of his relationship to American psy-
chologists, see Schubert 1965c: 191–193.
200 . QUANTIFYING POLITICAL IDEOLOGY
Figure 12. A Hierarchical Model of the Interrelationships among Ideolo-
gies, Attitudes, and Decisions
and subscales; and ideologies are factorial dimensions. From a substantive
point of view, the two ideologies designated in Figure 12 are EQU (Equal-
itarianism/Traditionalism) and IND (Individualism/Collectivism). The four
macroattitudes are C (political liberalism), E (economic liberalism), SE (so-
cial equality), and F (taxation). Of the microattitudes, PF (political freedom)
and FP (fair procedure) are subscales of C; W (prounion) and B/FC (antibusi-
ness; fiscal claims) are subscales of E. No subscales are indicated for either
SE or F. The relationship between scales and subscales has been discussed
elsewhere, with empirical examples.14
Table 32 reports the rankings, upon the two major scales, of all the jus-
tices who were members of the Supreme Court from October 1946 through
June 1963. These scales purport to summarize, therefore, the relative degrees
14. Schubert 1965c: chap. 6. For an example of the specification of decisional responses
in relation to a microattitude, see Spaeth’s article (1963a) on the prounion subscale.
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of political and of economic liberalism, respectively, of eighteen justices over
a period of seventeen terms. Evidently, these justices did not all participate to-
gether; for some of them (such as Douglas and Black) the number and range
of possible observations was maximal, while for others it was less: for Gold-
berg, only a single term. However, the cumulative scale provides a model
on the basis of which it is possible to link together, within a common frame
of reference, even respondents who have never participated together in the
decision-making of the Court. An attempt has been made to explain else-
where and at some length both the procedures whereby these scales were
constructed, and the explicit judgments on the basis of specific empirical data
upon which the validity of these scales rests; that discussion also emphasizes
the possibility of error that may have resulted from the inescapable (and not
insubstantial) lacunae in the response data.15 These errors, however, are of a
probable magnitude of the following range: it is entirely possible that Jackson
and his successor Harlan should not be denoted as tied on both scales; per-
haps if we had some kind of data on the basis of which we could make direct
comparisons between them, we might conclude that one should rank higher
than the other on either or both scales. Even data of the same type relied
upon, but for all three of Goldberg’s terms on the Court, might result in his ap-
pearing a couple of ranks higher on the political scale—in confirmation of an
earlier prediction.16 But it is highly improbable that the errors are of a magni-
tude such that Douglas is misclassified as a political liberal, because his “true”
rank is thirteenth instead of third; or that Frankfurter is misclassified on the
economic scale because (as many of his supporters doubtless will continue to
argue) his “true rank”—the one which reflects what he “really” believed as a
private citizen who happened to be cast in the confining role of a justice—was
first instead of sixteenth. In the absence of other evidence to the contrary, we
may be warranted in reposing sufficient confidence in the rankings of these
two scales, at least tentatively, to use them as the basis for apportioning the
justices into a rough classification of scale types.
Table 32 shows that since the end of World War II, the Supreme Court
has been divided primarily into three types of justices: (1) “liberals” who have
ranked high on both scales; (2) “economic conservatives,” who occupy the
middle ranks on the political scale and the bottom ranks on the economic
scale; and (3) “political conservatives,” who have middle ranks on the eco-
nomic scale but low ranks on the political scale. Only one justice, Harold
Burton, appears to have been consistently conservative, and to about the same
relative extent, on both scales; and Byron White is the only consistent moder-
ate, judging on the basis of this evidence.
15. Schubert 1965c: 97–146. Table 32 in this paper is based upon tables reported in ibid.,
pp. 125, 145.
16. See Schubert 1964a: 577, 582. For data on Goldberg’s second and third years, during
which his average rank, among incumbent justices, was third on six scales, see Schubert 1972f.
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V. JUDICIAL ATTITUDES
The data in Table 32 help to explain, at least in part, some of the aspects of
cumulative scaling of judicial voting behavior that appear to have been partic-
ularly troublesome for the conventionalist critics. We shall focus particularly
upon scalar consistency and attitudinal change, the intensity of attitudes, and
the meaning of moderation in scale ranks. For a typical criticism, let us take
Martin Shapiro’s syllogism (1964a: 37):
“Where attitudes are divined on the basis of membership in a group, the attitudes
of the very Justices who decide the Court are least amenable to divination. Scalograms
also typically show [MAJOR PREMISE:] Justices with the most uniform votes ranged on
opposite ends of the scale, with the decisive votes cast by those Justices in the middle.
Even if the votes of the middle Justices are consistent in terms of the scale, [MINOR
PREMISE:] their position in the middle indicates that they hold the attitude measured
by the scale less strongly than do the other Justices. [CONCLUSION:] Those Justices
who actually control the Court’s decision are, by the terms of the scale itself, the least
influenced by the attitudes that the scaler is using to explain the behavior of the Jus-
tices. (1964a; 37)
The American College Dictionary defines “divine,” when used as a tran-
sitive verb and in a sense other than prophecy, to mean “to have perception
by intuition or insight”; and it is submitted that the purpose of employing
the procedures of cumulative scaling is precisely to minimize the extent to
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which the analyst must rely upon his exclusively subjective appraisal of a set
of data. It seems much more in keeping with normal English word usage to
describe as “divination” the process by means of which Shapiro undertakes
to attribute motivation to the Court as an institution, on the basis of nothing
more objective than the most traditional doctrinal analysis, in the succeed-
ing chapters of his book in which he discusses the decisions of the Warren
Court in five fields of substantive public policy.
1. Consistency
It is not true, empirically, that justices with extreme scale scores show ex-
ceptional consistency in their responses; and on the basis of scale theory, one
should say that what is decisive is the location of the stimulus-point (repre-
senting the issue to be decided) in relation to the set of points representing
the justices, assuming that all lie on the same continuum. There is nothing
about a moderate scale rank that warrants the a priori conclusion that respon-
dents may not be intense in their moderation when they are asked to decide
relatively extreme questions. Hence, putting to one side the question which
justices “actually control the Court’s decision,” it certainly is not correct to
say that moderate justices necessarily are the ones “least influenced” by the
attitude measured by the scale. Let us consider why.
Turning first to the questions of attitudinal consistency and change, it is
important to distinguish among at least three different levels of analysis: (1)
the sociological level of analysis of consistency and change in the institutional
attitudes of the Court; (2) sociopsychological analysis of subgroups of the jus-
tices; and (3) psychological analysis of individual justices.
Coefficients of reproducibility and of scalability are designed to mea-
sure the consistency in the response patterns of the entire group of
respondents included in a particular scale; and judging on the basis of this
kind of evidence, the consistency of the attitudes of the Vinson and Warren
Courts, toward issues of political and economic liberalism, was fairly high,
with inconsistent responses averaging about five percent (Schubert 1965c:
80). On the other hand, the Court certainly did change “its” attitude to-
ward both issues, as a consequence of both (a) changes in the composition
of the group, and hence of the values programmed for its decision-making;
and (b) changes in the stimuli, reflecting such environmental changes as
the rise and fall of Senator McCarthy, the activities of the N.A.A.C.P. and
associated groups, the rise of the civil rights movement, and the congres-
sional movement of 1958–1959 to “curb the Court.” Both the Jenner Bill
and its legislative satellites, and Harry Truman’s appointments of Clark and
Minton as successors to Murphy and Rutledge, resulted in temporary “civil
liberties recessions” in terms of both the quantity and the quality of the
Court’s outputs regarding political liberalism (Schubert 1965c: 109–111,
114–116, 226).
All three of the major scale types denoted in Table 32 (liberals, political
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conservatives, and economic conservatives) were consistent, in the sense
that the same individuals fit the types term after term; and although there
were a few instances in which justices moved from moderate positions into
one or another of the major types, there were no instances of transfer from
one type to another. There were, of course, changes in the composition of
the types, as some individuals joined and others left the Court (Schubert
1965c: 244). Thus, there were four liberals during the 1946–1948 Terms,
only two for the next half-dozen years, three during 1955 and then four
again following Brennan’s appointment in 1956. Initially, there were two
political conservatives, who expanded to a dominant plurality of four dur-
ing the 1949–1952 Terms; but because no new appointments of justices
of this type were made after 1949, attrition reduced the group to two
by 1956, and since then there has been only Clark. During the first ten
terms there were two economic conservatives (Frankfurter, and first Jack-
son and later Harlan), who were joined by Whittaker temporarily, Stewart,
and then Goldberg; but only three remained in 1962. Meantime, the ide-
ological structure of the court, as well as its attitudinal structure, was
continuously changing as a result of these changes in the relative size of
the three major types: it made a very considerable difference whether the
Court consisted of two liberals, one conservative, four political conserva-
tives, and two economic conservatives, as in 1952, or whether it consisted
of four liberals, one political conservative, and three economic conserva-
tives, plus one relatively moderate justice who did not fit the types, as in
1962.
Generally speaking, the individual justices must appear to be consis-
tent in their voting behavior, and therefore presumably in their attitudes,
or else it is not possible for the Court to seem consistent. But there were
variations from one individual to another. Douglas, for example, voted con-
sistently—and incidentally, to uphold the value of political liberalism—in
149 out of a total of 150 C scale decisions during the 1955–1958 Terms;
while Clark, who participated in the same decisions, had ten inconsisten-
cies and voted liberally only 16 times (Schubert 1965c: 108–110). Similarly,
in the 203 E scale decisions of the 1954–1959 Terms, Douglas voted both
consistently and liberally in 201; while Frankfurter, participating in 180 of
the same decisions, had 13 inconsistencies and voted liberally only 36 times
(Schubert 1965c: 134–136). So individual inconsistency ranged from virtually
none to about 7 percent, although individual consistency varied within this
range from one period of time to another. None of the justices was exception-
ally inconsistent in his voting behavior, as measured by either of the scales,
throughout his tenure on the Court. Neither was there any significant relation-
ship between scale rank order and individual consistency; to the contrary, the
correlation between rank order and number of inconsistent votes is probably
very close to zero. Nor is there any evidence which indicates that any indi-
vidual changed his attitude, in relation to either of the major scales, with the
solitary exception of Chief Justice Warren, who did appear to change from a
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conservative to a liberal position, in regard to the political scale, during his
first two terms on the Court (Schubert 1965c: 118–276).
It was concluded, after a detailed review of the evidence relating to atti-
tudinal consistency and change on the Court, and from the points of view of
all three levels of analysis, that:
[A]ttitudes and ideologies appear to be most dynamic when viewed from
the perspective of the sociological level of analysis; and they appear to be
most consistent when seen from the psychological level of analysis. But …
[s]ubgroup study links psychological constructs, statistical measurements, and
individual behavior. This middle level of socio-psychological analysis is the key
to the understanding of the attitudes and ideologies of Supreme Court justices.
(Schubert 1965c: 276–277)
2. Intensity
The other principle question raised by Shapiro’s syllogism relates to
his minor premise: whether justices with medial ranks are less intense in
their attitude toward the scale variable than justices with either low or high
ranks. In the first place, ordinal positions on a scale, or on a set of scales,
are strictly relative indices. When Frankfurter, for example, changed from
the fifth rank on the 1947 and 1948 C scales, to third during 1949–1954,
and then to fourth in 1955, back to fifth in 1956–1957, and then to seventh
in 1958–1960, retiring from the Court ranking eighth (out of ten) for the
1961 Term, this does not indicate any change whatsoever in his attitude to-
ward political liberalism. Quite to the contrary, he “moved up to” third place
because Murphy and Rutledge vacated the first two ranks, and Douglas
and Black—who had been third and fourth—then became first and second.
Beginning in 1955, Frankfurter seemed to “move” further and further to-
ward the right end of the scale simply because, whatever may have been
the range of the interval gap between him and Black, corresponding to
the difference between the second and third ranks on the scale, this seg-
ment was successively occupied by relatively more liberal judges than he,
such as Warren, Brennan, Stewart, and White (Schubert 1965c: 104–111,
121, 283–284). There is no apparent reason to assume that Frankfurter was
more intense in his attitude toward civil liberties, during the height of Mc-
Carthyism (1949–1954) and during the civil liberties backlash symbolized
by the Jenner Bill (1958–1960) than when he happened to occupy the fifth
rank, as in 1947–1948 and 1956–1957. To the contrary, what evidence there
is points in the opposition direction (Schubert 1960a: 636–638).
The justice in the middle scale rank may be the central decision-maker,
but empirical studies of political behavior show that this tends to make him
the most—not the least—involved member of the group, in regard to what-
ever the policy issue may be. And this goes for involvement of his own
belief system, as well as in terms of his interactions with other members
of the group; for other members do not hesitate to appeal for his support
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on an ideological level—as well as on various other bases, depending upon
the character of the group. Certainly in the instance of the Supreme Court,
where the entire milieu is structured so as to reinforce ideological com-
petition (see John Frank 1958; Shapiro 1964a: chap. 1; Danelski 1964), a
justice in the middle of the scale inescapably is involved in the same attitu-
dinal matrix with his colleagues. Shapiro’s confusion stems from his failure
to distinguish between “intensity” as a relative concept and as an absolute
concept. When he speaks of a justice with a middle rank as being “least in-
fluenced by the attitude” it is clear that he is talking about intensity in some
absolute sense; but it just makes no sense to attribute any kind of absolute
meaning to what are defined as being strictly relative measurements and re-
lationships.
Shapiro seems to assume that if a respondent has a moderate rank,
he must therefore also have a “moderate” attitude, and be moderately
influenced by it—because moderate means moderate and no nonsense
about it. Conversely, Shapiro assumes that respondents with extreme
ranks (those at the tails of the scale) will also be ones who, in common
parlance, might be described as having an “extreme attitude” on the
subject; and who therefore are extremely influenced by their extreme
attitudes. But this confuses a member’s social relationship to the group
(scale ranks) with his psychological relationship to the substance of the
attitudinal content. A scale rank is (at least, in the scaling that has been
done thus far of Supreme Court justices) strictly a social index, a mea-
sure of how one person relates to others in responding to some selected
set of items. Whether, and to what extent, any of the respondents in a
group experience affect as a dimension of (i.e., feel intense about) their
responses depends upon the relationship between the respondents and
the questions.
Shapiro’s commonsensical notion of judges being “influenced” by atti-
tudes begs the question of perception of the relevance of a criterion, and
confuses the very different question of perception of the degree of value attri-
buted to an item in relation to a criterion deemed relevant. If a respondent
does not recognize a question as bearing upon a particular attitudinal scale
(i.e., if the item is not on the scale, for him), then he will not be “influenced”
at all by that attitude. If he does accept the dimension as relevant, then he will
be influenced to an extent that will depend upon the intensity of his response,
which is a measure of the relationship between his position and that of the
item, both on the same scale.
Figure 13 illustrates, in a schematic manner, the distance relationships
among respondents (justices) and stimuli (cases) on a continuum symboliz-
ing an attitudinal scale variable.17 In working with empirical data, we can
assume that it will be highly improbable that we shall ever encounter the
situation in which the attitudinal differences between each adjacent pair of
17. Cf. the figure, “Deviations Expressed in Percentages,” in Pritchett 1941: 894.
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Figure 13. A Psychometric Model of an Attitudinal Scale
respondents is the same distance interval. But a cumulative scale is not an
interval scale, irrespective of whether respondent differences are reported
as ranks or as scores; and therefore the equal spacing of Figure 13 corre-
sponds to the imperfect information that we are entitled to infer from such
a scale. If we assume that each respondent point on the scale identifies the
position that best describes the attitudinal position of a judge—where he
“is” on the scale—and that the left end of the scale identifies the positive
direction of the attitudinal variable, then a judge ought to be most uncertain
about his response to stimulus points that are very close to his own posi-
tion. That is to say, since our model is a dominance rather than a proximity
model (Coombs 1964: 7–12), a respondent’s position on the line is, speaking
loosely, his point of indecision; more precisely, his position defines the max-
imum of his acceptance of issues relating to the scale: he will reject (vote
against) all claims that correspond to stimulus points to his left (i.e., more
positive than he) on the scale; and he will accept (vote to support) all claims
whose points he dominates. The further away from his own position a stim-
ulus lies, the easier it is for him to be certain that he favors or disfavors it;
and consequently, the “intensity” of his attitude will be strictly a function of
the scalar distance between cases and justices. With ordinal measurements
only, the best we can do is to estimate distances—and therefore attitudinal
intensity—on the basis of rank differences. To invoke a crude hypothetical
example, a person who is opposed to capital punishment in any form is going
to be more intense in his attitude of disapproval of euthanasia than will be
somebody who favors the electric chair as a more humane instrument than
the scaffold; but we should note that Agent 007 may well be just as intense
in his approval of euthanasia as our liberal humanitarian is intense in his
disapproval.
3. Modality
Returning to Figure 13, we are now able to infer that medial justice R5
(Respondent # 5) will be just about as intense in his approval of D as he
will be intense in his disapproval of A, since each of the cases (A and D) is
three ranks removed from his position. Note also, however, that we should
attribute precisely the same degree of intensity to R1 in his approval of B,
or R2 in his approval of C, or R9 in his disapproval of C. In short, justices at
the “opposite ends of the scale” may be no more intense than the justice “in
the middle,” depending upon the issues they are asked to decide; and they
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may be more intense, or they may be less intense, depending, again, upon
the decisional situation. Thus, R6–9 will be more intense in their disapproval
of A than R5 will be, although R5 will favor D more strongly than will R6–8.
R1–4, however, will favor D even more strongly than will R5. On the other
hand, all (R1–9) may feel about the same intensity in unanimous decision,
either rejecting an extreme claim far off the scale to the left, or accepting
an exceptionally “easy” one (in Guttman’s phrasing) far off the scale to the
right; and under such circumstances, we might describe R5 as being “in-
tense in his moderation.” (Translated into legalese, we should say that the
latter case raises a question about the law regarding a matter which long
has been considered to be, and which remains, settled.)
The above discussion should make it clear that in relation to any em-
pirical scale with ordinal data, the model requires us to assume that the
relative intensity of the medial justice depends entirely upon the voting-di-
vision marginals, that is to say, upon the distribution of the stimuli points
on the scale. Let us consider Table 33, which summarizes some of the re-
lationships manifest in Figure 13 and thereby operationalizes the concept of
attitudinal intensity. If a scale consists of equal numbers of decisions with vot-
ing divisions of 1–8, 2–7, 7–2, and 8–1, then R5’s intensity will be precisely
the same as that for R3, R4, R6, and R7; and it will be the same as that of
R2 and R8 in the 1–8 and 8–1 decisions, and only slightly less than that of the
extreme respondents otherwise. R4–6 all will be less intense than the other
respondents in 3–6 and 6–3 decisions; and only in 4–5 and 5–4 decisions is it
correct to say that R5 will be less intense in his attitude than any of the other
justices. If a scale is perfectly balanced with equal proportions of decisions of
all types (ranging from 1–8 through 8–1), then it is correct to say that to a very
slight extent, R5 is less intense in his attitude, as measured by this scale, than
any of his colleagues. But a much more meaningful statement, considering the
magnitude of the sums of rank differences, would be that the moderate jus-
Table 33. Rank Differences as an Index of Respondent Intensity
Voting Divisions
Split Unanimous
Respondents 8–1 7–2 6–3 5–4 4–5 3–6 2–7 1–8 Sum 9–0 0–9 Sum
1 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 28 8 0 8
2 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 21 7 1 8
3 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 1 16 6 2 8
4 4 3 2 1 0 0 1 2 13 5 3 8
5 3 2 1 0 0 1 2 3 12 4 4 8
6 2 1 0 0 1 2 3 4 13 3 5 8
7 1 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 16 2 6 8
8 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 21 1 7 8
9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 28 0 8 8
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tices (ranging from R3–R7) all tend to be less intense in their attitude—if they
are presented with such an ideal array of questions—than the more extreme
justices at the margins of the scale (R1–2, and R8–9).
Another way of putting this is to say that the medial justice’s lesser de-
gree of intensity, to the extent that it arises, is a function not of his lesser
psychological attachment to the attitude measured by the scale, but rather
that this is a function of his social position in the group of respondents.
Indeed, from a strictly psychological point of view, we might well conclude
that the medial justice’s own attitudinal position is the most important one
to the decision-making of the Court on the issue under consideration, be-
cause his relatively moderate view will be closest to the modal position
for most decisions and opinions of the Court on that issue, as a conse-
quence of the Court’s system of plurality control over which cases it will
accept for decision on the merits (Schubert 1962c). So, to the extent that
we are interested in the institutional attitude of the Court, that too will
best be approximated by the attitude of the medial justice. Conversely, to
the extent that any single respondent’s position typifies the attitude of the
Court as a whole, as measured by the scale, it is again that of the me-
dial justice. Therefore, Shapiro’s syllogism just doesn’t hang together under
close scrutiny. His main point, that cumulative scaling fails to measure the
attitudes of the respondents with moderate ranks, is contradicted by the
theory, the practice, and the empirical studies—including some that have
made predictions for, and on the basis of, the ranking of medial justices
(Schubert 1964a: 576–586).
VI. THE FUNCTION OF CRITICISM
The foregoing analysis of the contemporary critique of judicial scaling
should not be construed to imply that behavioral research is not subject to crit-
icism. It is, and for mistakes at all levels and stages of research, from model
building to design to the details of empirical analysis of decisional content.
And this is a kind of criticism that is much needed. No doubt some behavioral-
ists have hesitated to publish technical criticism of each other’s work, because
of fears that to do so would give aid and comfort to traditionalist and conven-
tionalist “enemies,” who could be expected to seize upon any confessions of
error and to exploit them as admissions of guilt. But surely, such a posture
is appropriate—if at all—to the toddling stage; and it is out of place now that
the question whether the behavioral approach is a passing fancy appears to be
settled, and no longer necessary to debate. If behavioral research in adjudica-
tion is to improve its capacity to explain the past and to describe the present
and to predict the future, it needs criticism from all points of view. Conversely,
traditional research and conventional research might profit from behavioral
critique.
To be effective, critics must make a much larger effort than has been
apparent in the past, to carry on the discussion in the conceptual terms of
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the subject of their criticism—not necessarily those preferred by the critic.
This implies that would-be critics must attempt to familiarize themselves with
more than one language and level of discourse. Here is where a greater
awareness and understanding of the respective points of view characteristic
of the three academic ideologies becomes of crucial importance. Then, instead
of traditionalists communicating almost exclusively with other traditionalists,
conventionalists with conventionalists, and behavioralists with behavioralists,
transideological discourse may become possible, and even common. And why
not?
The field no longer is public law, but neither is it the judicial process, nor
judicial behavior. It is all three of these, and is likely to remain such a combina-
tion for some time to come. Neither the traditionalist, the conventionalist, nor
the behavioralist has a corner on the market of either wisdom or knowledge
about adjudicatory processes; to the contrary, each is specialized in differing
emphases upon what is important (or feasible) to study, and how to study it.
The time has come when we all should give greater attention to how we can
learn from each other, and less to the contemplation of our respective ideolog-
ical umbilici.
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Academic Ideology
This paper proposes a theory about the differences in perspective that po-
litical scientists bring to bear upon their teaching, research, and writing. It
also suggests a method which can be used to study such differences. The
particular empirical example discussed relates to only one of the subfields of
political science, but this report may encourage parallel investigations into the
structure of professional academic values in other component areas of the dis-
cipline. Such a result would not merely confirm or refute the applicability of
the theory as a generalization about political science; it also would enhance
our present meager and unsystematized understanding of the extent to which
our professional knowledge is affected by our quasi-professional (personal) bi-
ases. The development of such understanding evidently ought to be assigned a
high priority in any normative schedule of goals relating to the social ecology
of scientific inquiry.
The phenomenon of analyst value predisposition is by no means pecu-
liar to social science, and most certainly it is not idiosyncratic among political
scientists. Psychologist Silvan S. Tomkins recently has called attention to the
universality of the problem of academic ideology in all scientific work:
At the growing edge of the frontier of all sciences there necessarily is a maximum
of uncertainty, and what is lacking in evidence is filled by passion and faith, and hatred
and scorn for the disbelievers. Science will never be free of ideology, though yesterday’s
ideology is today’s fact or fiction.1
This chapter was originally published, in slightly different form, as “Academic Ideology and
the Study of Adjudication” in American Political Science Review 61 (March 1967): 106–129.
I wish to thank Charles B. Poland, a doctoral candidate in political science at Michigan State
University, for his assistance in preparing the data for computer analysis, and in related sta-
tistical tasks; and I wish especially to thank the twenty-six political scientists, all of whom are
identified in the paper, for their participation in the research described: this is a report of what
is in a most real sense our common labor, and I am deeply indebted therefore to these colleagues
in the field, whose cooperation made it possible.
1. “Affect and the Psychology of Knowledge,” Tomkins and Izard 1965: 73, and cf. pp. 75,
97.
This proposition’s particular pertinence for political scientists has been
pointed out by a law professor, in the context of his evaluation of the legal im-
plications of some recent behavioral research in adjudication theory. Although
Arthur S. Miller was writing for an audience of lawyers, the shoe fits us polit-
ical scientists just as well—and in view of the quotation’s personal allusion to
me, there can be no doubt of my own implication:
[I]t is a great fault of behavioral scientists (and lawyers), [to] believe that state-
ments may be made about such very human activities as the official settlement of
disputes in adjudication without the intrusion of the biases or prejudices of the ob-
server or commentator…. In Judicial Behavior, Professor Schubert … [says] nothing
at all about the mental attitudes and backgrounds of commentators upon the judicial
process. Are we to understand that the selection of facts, the organization of data,
the construction of theories, and the presentation of conclusions are all value-free?
As I have said previously, “the idea that personal values inevitably accompany—and
color—research in human affairs (including law) is widely accepted by leading social
scientists of the era. In like manner, a ‘disinterested legal science’ … is nonsense. It is
unattainable. What this requires, accordingly is avowedly ‘facing the valuations’ which
are present in all commentary” on the judiciary. Another part of the environment in
which courts operate is the scholarly community. Those who write about courts and
law should “face their valuations” in order to give us as scientific an explication as
possible. (1965a: 1098)
The present article might well be viewed as an attempt to remedy the de-
ficiency denoted by Miller. Such a rationale is so pat that perhaps I should let
it go at that, but the genesis of my inquiry into academic bias was in fact ear-
lier and in response to other stimuli.
I. THE HYPOTHESIS
From its beginnings following the Civil War until about a dozen years or
so ago, the study of public law in American universities was closely linked with
law school instruction and research; and the orientation which guided the
approach to the acquisition of knowledge about and understanding of the sub-
ject, by political science and by law professors alike, was legalistic (Schubert
1966a). Out of the Court-packing episode of 1937 came more than a reform
of the Supreme Court, however; the same set of events led also to some mod-
est reforms in theory and method, as well as in the content, of professional
discourse about the judiciary. The substantive change, which emphasized the
political involvement of courts and the political effects of judicial decisions,
came first and soon became the new orthodoxy among most political scien-
tists. The reform in theory and method began with Pritchett’s early work
(1941, 1948), but it was not until a decade ago that several other persons
began to follow the trail that he had blazed (Tanenhaus 1956; Kort 1957; Schu-
bert 1958e, 1963f: 1–3). After it had become clear that more than a passing
fancy was involved, the various departures from traditional public law peda-
gogy began to attract rebuttal, and for a while it doubtless seemed to most
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observers (including participant-observers) that the significant difference in
points of view lay between the defenders of the “leading case” approach in
public law (and their allies who use the great books approach to political phi-
losophy) and the rest of the political science profession.2 Such a simplistic
rationalization of the conflict seemed adequate to account for the critique that
emanated from spokesmen whose point of view readily could be identified
with parochial defense of the research modus operandi (or lack thereof) of the
humanities (Roche 1958), or with the inculcation of virtue and the promulga-
tion of justice (Berns 1963), or with the retention of Oldspeak as a tactic for
helping to embalm preferred aspects of the historical images of selected judi-
cial personalities (Mendelson 1963). But the rationale failed utterly to account
for the position assumed by persons whose professed orientation is passion-
ately political, and who purport to see no important difference between the
workways and standpoints toward data collection of groups of their colleagues
who perceive each other as defenders of the ancien régime (on the one hand)
and as harbingers of a Brave New World of Juridical Robots (on the other
hand) (Shapiro 1964a: chap. 1; Jacob and Vines 1963; Becker 1963b: 12).
In an initial attempt to canvass the principal objections that had
been raised against behavioral research in legal institutions and
processes, I suggested that it might be more useful to conceptualize the
academic chorus (or at least those who are performing the adjudication
oratorio) as a trio of groups (1965d), in lieu of the behavioralist-versus-
antibehavioral duet which prior discussion seems to have taken for
granted. But if there are three standpoints, how do they relate to each
other? The simplest hypothesis, which ought perhaps to be preferred on
grounds of parsimony, assumes as a model a linear ideological contin-
uum (ranging from behavioralists through judicial processors to public
lawyers). This hypothesis requires, however, not only that students of
the judicial process consider themselves to be equivalently distinguished
from the other two types, but also that the public lawyers and be-
havioralists each feel greater affinity for the judicial processors than
for each other. The available evidence, consisting of the expression of
professional opinion (in books, articles, papers, conversation, panel dis-
cussions, and correspondence), seemed to me to support the proposition
that most persons in each type consider themselves to be about equally
different from persons whom they would identify with either of the other
two types. This interpretation suggested the alternative hypothesis that
the relationship among the three types is better represented by an equi-
lateral triangle (or the circle on whose perimenter the three points of
such a triangle lie) than by a straight line.
2. A recent survey of the profession reports that when asked to evaluate the significance
of research contributions in seven fields of the discipline, political scientists ranked public law
(sixth) and political philosophy (seventh) as “least significant.” See Somit and Tanenhaus 1964:
56, 58.
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The typology, and the hypothesis of a circular ordering of types, pro-
vided me with a frame of reference which could be used to guide a more
intensive inquiry into some of the more recent criticisms of psychomet-
ric research in judicial decision-making, while at the same time supplying
an explanation for the affective overtones which typically accompanied the
perceptual and cognitive misunderstandings that underlay much of the cri-
tique (Schubert 1967b). But the proof of the pudding is in the eating; and
anyone who has enough confidence in his theoretical constructions to be
willing to publish them ought also to be eager to have them put to the em-
pirical test.3
Figure 14 summarizes the set of relationships, among the three ideolo-
gies, that was hypothesized.4 The figure shows the traditional ideology
to be centered in the humanities (History—Law—Philosophy) with a focus
upon law. The conventional ideology centers upon the social sciences (Eco-
nomics—Political Science—Sociology) and focuses its investigations upon
courts. The behavioral ideology is centered in the behavioral sciences (Psy-
chology—Biology—Anthropology) and upon the study of judges. The three
ideological positions divide the perimeter into three segments which desig-
nate the overlapping concerns of the major standpoints; thus, the traditional
approach merges into the conventional in the judicial process segment; the
conventional changes into the behavioral in the political jurisprudence seg-
ment; and the behavioral in turn leads back into the traditional approach in
the jurimetrics portion of the continuum. The relationship among all three
approaches is portrayed as a continuous one, in which an infinite variety
of discrete positions can be denoted, indicating particular proportions of
emphasis as between any two of the ideological standpoints. The figure is
completely determinate, it assumes (and indeed suggests) closure, and it
precludes the portrayal of ideological syndromes consisting of combinations
(in varying proportions) of all three standpoints; but it does afford a theoret-
ical explanation for the tendency, among judicial politics enthusiasts, to view
all decision-making analysis (whether on logical or psychological grounds)
as apolitical.5 The specification of a circular sequence of ordering for the
nine academic disciplines denoted in the figure is intended to be suggestive
only, and it is not assumed that such a manifestly oversimplified and overly
3. In this instance, the design for the empirical research reported herein was roughed
out the day after an oral presentation was made expounding the hypothesis (1965a: esp.
1–8, and Figure 1).
4. Figure 14 here is reproduced from Figure 11 of Chapter 8, and except for the minor
modification of changing Economics from third to first in the sequence of Social Sciences is
the same as Figure 1 in the paper. For further discussion of the a priori theory of acade-
mic ideologies in relation to Figure 14, with examples of writings which exemplify the three
standpoints, see Chapter 8.
5. As Harry Stumpf has remarked, “there are a good many scholars who … cry out for a
political approach to constitutional law while at the same time denouncing most or all behav-
ioral techniques” (n.d.: 6 n. 7).
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Figure 14. Academic Ideologies toward Adjudication.
rigid rank ordering corresponds, except as a very rough approximation, to
empirical reality; but at the same time, the ordering suggests the central
tendencies that tend to define the core content, in terms of academic fields,
of the major standpoints, and this definition of the modes in relation to the
disciplines may have heuristic value.
II. THE RESEARCH DESIGN
A. Theory
If anyone (including oneself) were to take seriously the hypothesis implicit
in Figure 14, then the obvious next step would be to attempt to test with em-
pirical data the propositions that:
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1. Political scientists with a primary interest in the study of adjudication
are divided among three distinct groups;
2. Each group consists of persons who identify with one of the three
corresponding ideological positions (traditional, conventional, or be-
havioral, as defined above); and
3. The three groups are equidistant in psychological space (i.e., their
position in two-dimensional space defines an equilateral triangle).
A possible way of obtaining empirical data relevant to the above propositions
would be to ask some of the political scientists who work in the field of the ju-
diciary where they think others are in relation to themselves, and where they
would locate themselves in Figure 14.
The answers to the first question might be converted into data in such
a form that it would be possible to intercorrelate the responses of the vari-
ous individuals in the sample; and if this were done, it occurred to me that
I might very well be able, in analyzing the correlation matrix, to take ad-
vantage of the theory and methods with which I recently had worked in
carrying out a study of judicial ideology (1965c). If one had any confidence
in the interpretation that had been based upon the application of these the-
ories and methods to data collected from official sources in libraries, then
one ought to be willing to put them to the test of a design that would
involve experimental research, survey-type “field” data, and a bevy of dy-
namic, “live” respondents who would be in a position to comment critically
upon the interpretation made of their replies. Most human sources of data
for such reasons as lack of status, ignorance, and inaccessibility to the rele-
vant communication channels, have no chance to correct the mistakes that
researchers have made using the data supplied by those sources; and most
researchers thereby lose the advantage of exposing their findings to mean-
ingful feedback from their subjects.
The answers to the second question would then make it possible
to make a three-way correlational check upon the degree of consistency
among several different measures of the cognitive structure attributed to
the sociopsychological field of the attitudes of these professionals toward
their academic work. First, there would be the researcher’s own conception
of where the others are, in relation to themselves and to himself. (He would
need to generate this information for purposes of drawing the sample of re-
spondents in any event.) Second, there would be the consensual conception
of the ideological position of each individual in the sample, in the opinion
of the others, as derived from the answers to the first question. Finally,
there would be the self-conception of each individual of his own position,
which the answers to the second question would provide. It would then be
possible to examine the relationship among the a priori hypothesis of the
researcher, the others’ consensual conception of egos, and the egos’ indi-
vidual conceptions about themselves.
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B. Procedures
1. The Raw Data. Thirty-two persons were chosen, on the basis of criteria
to be discussed below, for a mail survey. Each of these persons was sent the
letter and the questionnaire which are reproduced as appendices to this chap-
ter, together with a copy of Figure 14. The letters were individually typed,
although their content make it perfectly clear that they were part of a mail-
ing en masse; and the questionnaires were mimeographed. Together the letter
and the questionnaire purported to explain to the respondents the objectives
of the investigation and the information sought by the two questions; to assure
respondents that the raw data for the first question would be kept secret; and
to promise them an opportunity to comment critically upon a draft report of
the research before the latter was submitted for publication.
Question 1 of the questionnaire asked each respondent to rank all of
the other persons listed on the basis of his own perception of how closely
they agreed with him in their approach to the field in which, as it was
presumed, they had some common interests. The arbitrary assumption was
made that each person was in closest agreement with his own point of view.
It is recognized that for some types of inquiries and for some types of re-
spondents, the findings would be hopelessly biased by such an assumption.
In regard to this particular population of respondents, and the topic under
investigation, the assumption of nonschizophrenia seems justified. If cogni-
tive structure in the field of public law-judicial process-judicial behavior (or
in any other subfield of political science, for that matter) is so weak that
professors have no consistent point of view with which they identify, at least
during some reasonably limited span of time, then our whole enterprise as
teachers of political science is a kind of madness; and no amount of ratio-
nal investigation is going to be able to make any sense out of it. So the
respondent was asked to rank himself first; the person whom he thought
was in closest agreement with him as second; and so on until the individ-
ual (among those sampled) with whom his disagreement was maximal was
ranked as thirty-second. If the list contained persons with whom the respon-
dent felt that he was insufficiently well-informed to make a decision, the
directions specified that ranks of zero were to be assigned to such persons.
No particular model of space was specified, nor needed to be specified, as
a criterion for respondents in answering the first question. Each could hy-
pothesize a space of any dimensionality and structure that suited him; all
that was required of him was that he establish a decision function which
would permit him to discriminate degrees of proximity to his own position
in the space.
Question 2, to the contrary, specified a circle, upon whose perimeter
positions were to be denoted using a clock metric, as a guide to answers.
Figure 14 was suggested as one possible hypothesis about the ideological
relationships that might be subsumed by a circular model, and respondents
were directed to orient themselves in relation to the three major standpoints
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(at two, six, and ten o’clock, respectively) denoted by Figure 14. It was ex-
plicitly pointed out, however, that the positions—and therefore, of course,
the sequence—of academic disciplines, as shown in Figure 14, were in-
tended only to suggest one possible theory of the underlying gross associa-
tions of the three standpoints; and it was stated that respondents should not
choose their own positions because of either their agreement (or disagree-
ment) with the relative positions of the academic fields in the paradigm.
The raw data consisted, therefore, of the two types of responses made, and
marked on the questionnaires which were returned by the respondents. For
the first question, the raw data consisted of the sets of rankings of all or
part of the list of names specified by the question. For the second question,
the raw data consisted, in each case, of the respondent’s specification of a
number, ranging from zero to twelve, which would locate a position for him
on a circular continuum.
2. Coding. Coding was necessary for several purposes: to assure the
promised secrecy of the raw data; to correct technical mistakes in the re-
sponses; and to transpose the replies to machine-readable cards. The first
objective was accomplished by having only the author handle the question-
naire returns, to each of which was assigned a code number which identified
the respondent (but only to the author) in subsequent manipulations of the
data for the first question. An example of the kind of technical mistake that
had to be corrected would be the omission of a rank from those assigned, or
the failure to adjust for ties by omitting a corresponding number of interven-
ing ranks between the tied rank and the next to follow in sequence. (Inspection
of the returns suggested that a few of the respondents were not very expe-
rienced in the use of ordinal measurement; but all managed to indicate their
decisions with sufficient clarity to preclude the necessity for eliminating any
set of rankings on grounds of ambiguity.)
3. Measures. In order to calculate the correlation between each pair of
rankings, the coded data were input for computer anaylsis, using both rho and
tau rank correlation programs (J. Morris 1966; and cf. Kendall 1955; Siegel
1956: 202–223). These coefficients are not directly comparable numerically
because at any given level of association, the value of rho will be greater. Ei-
ther coefficient measures, for any two respondents, the degree of similarity or
of difference in their answers to the first question. The theoretical range for
both tau and rho is from plus one (indicating perfect agreement) to minus one
(indicating perfect disagreement); but the effect of requiring each respondent
to rank himself as first was to place an empirical limit upon the positive range.
Since this limit is well above +.99 for both coefficients, however, it was con-
cluded that such a trivial difference could have no practical effect upon either
the analysis or the resulting interpretation of the data. Either coefficient also
can be used to measure the degrees of association among the hypothesized,
the consensual, and the autogenous conceptions of the sequential ranking of
the respondents on a circular continuum.
4. Factor Analysis. Some inferences could be based directly upon visual
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inspection of the correlation matrices. But one major objective of the research
would be to isolate and to identify the principal dimensions which, while ac-
counting for a major proportion of the variance, would define a space in which
points representing the respondents could be located in a psychologically
meaningful configuration. This objective implied the use of a statistical pro-
cedure for multivariate analysis, such as factor analysis. I decided to use an
available computer program for principal axes analysis, and to call for both
quartimax and varimax rotation6 of (successively) the first two through the
first ten factors.
C. Data
1. The Sample. The criteria for choosing the sample were visibility, ac-
cessibility, and balance. Visibility meant that the persons selected must be
sufficiently well known generally and to each other that the probability of sig-
nificant nonresponse due to ignorance would be low. I assumed that persons
would know each other primarily, but not exclusively, through their writing;
and it would by no means be adequate that persons merely “know who others
are” by their names and general reputation. What would be required would be
familiarity with other persons’ ideas in some depth, and in particular concern-
ing their beliefs about how—in relation to theory, method, and kind of data—it
is best to study the subject (adjudication).
Accessibility required that the persons selected know the author per-
sonally, so that it could be assumed that they would at least read his letter
circulating the survey instrument, and the probability that they would reply
would be maximized. Balance required that there be approximately an equal
number of persons chosen to represent each of the three hypothesized points
of view; and further, that the persons selected be dispersed throughout all seg-
ments of the postulated circular continuum.
It might have been possible to restate at least the first of these criteria
in a form that would have permitted objective and quantified selection pro-
cedures, but I decided to proceed instead upon the basis of what was
presumed to be my adequate personal knowledge, resulting from recent bib-
liographical activities which had required me to survey (and resurvey) the
research literature in the field (Schubert 1963a, b; 1964a; 1968e; 1972c).
What was sought, after all, was not a random or probability sample, but in-
stead a highly biased (in terms of those statistical concepts) sample which
would consist of almost the entire universe of the elite leadership for one
subfield of an academic discipline. The design included a check upon the
author’s bias, however: the extent to which his judgment about the persons
6. The purpose of quartimax rotation is to simplify the variables (respondents), by making
the extreme loadings tend toward unity or zero on every factor; the purpose of varimax rotation
is to simplify the factors (the columns of the factor matrix) by making all loadings tend toward
unity or zero on each factor. Harman 1960: 294–308; Rummel 1970: 390–393.
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Figure 15. Hypothesized and Autogenous Ideological Positions.
selected corresponded with the group’s responses. If many persons with
poor visibility were included in the sample, the rate of nonresponse would
be high. If persons were not accessible, they would not bother to respond at
all. If the author’s judgment concerning the subgroup (i.e., ideological) iden-
tification of persons deviated from either the consensual understanding or
their own autogenous judgments, then the correlations between his ranking
of the sample and theirs (Figure 15) would be low or even negative.
The advice of colleagues was sought concerning an initial proposed sam-
ple of thirty, and as a result one younger person was deleted (for presumed
failure to meet the visibility criterion) and three others were added (of whom
two turned out to be nonrespondents, presumably because of poor accessibil-
ity). The revised and final sample of thirty-two persons is listed in Appendix
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B. Table 34 shows that it was assumed that the sample would include ap-
proximately equal numbers of persons of each major point of view; and the
outer circle of Figure 15 shows that it was further assumed that these persons
were spread throughout the continuum. The observed distribution of persons
among the three types, based upon the responses to the first question and the
correlation and factor analyses that we shall presently discuss, indicates that
the sample was somewhat biased in favor of the conventional point of view,
primarily because two of the persons whom I had assumed to be behavioral in
their orientation, and two others whom I had assumed to be traditional, were
consensually deemed to be conventional.
It was assumed that although there would be considerable qualitative
variation in visibility, any instances of exceptionally low visibility could
be handled by “purifying” the sample and deleting relatively “unknown”
persons, at least as items, in the generation of the correlation matrix. Ac-
cessibility seemed likely in all except three or four instances, although it
was recognized that a few persons might be blocked by their own emotional
reactions from responding to the intended query, as a consequence of pre-
vious professional interaction which had entailed affective side effects for
them; but it was assumed that almost all persons in such an elite group of
professionals would distinguish between their private and their public atti-
tudes toward the project, at least to the extent that their evaluation of its
merits would induce them to respond.
2. The Survey. The only person in the sample who refused to acknowl-
edge either the initial letter or subsequent correspondence was also the one
person whom the author never had met personally; he was one of those
added to the sample on the advice of colleagues. The mailing went out to
all persons in the sample on November 22, 1965; and positive responses
to Question 1 were received from twenty-five of the thirty-two during the
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ten-day period November 29–December 8. Three of the seven who had not
responded to the first question, by the latter date, had replied declining to
do so; subsequent endeavors to follow up with a second mailing evoked re-
sponses from two of the four persons who did not reply to the initial mailing.
There were, therefore, a total of twenty-seven replies to the first question.
All except three of the persons who answered the first question replied also
to the second question; and there were no persons who replied to the second
but not to the first. An attempt was made to follow up with the three persons
who had answered the first question but declined to answer the second, by
directing their attention to that part of the instructions which emphasized
that response to the question did not require one to accept the location of
academic disciplines that is suggested in Figure 14; and as a result, two of
them did answer the question. The twenty-six responses to Question 2 are
reported in Figure 15. The rate of response was 84 percent for Question 1,
and 81 percent for Question 2.
In addition to the five persons who refused to give any response to
the first question, the instructions anticipated that there would be partial
nonresponse in the form of omitted rankings, for those persons to whom
respondents assigned ranks of zero. Actually, there was much less partial
non-response than had been expected. Almost half of the total of forty-eight
omitted rankings (out of a possible total of 27 x 32 = 864) were due to
a single respondent, who ranked only the half-dozen persons with whom
he was in closest agreement and the other half-dozen persons with whom
he was in least agreement. By thus reporting only the tails of his distribu-
tion, he provided a useable reply; his deletion of a score of other persons
in the sample was a reflection, no doubt, of the less intense affect, or the
less adequate information, that he entertained with regard to them. Five
of the respondents were responsible for an additional twenty-five of the
omitted ranks; three respondents omitted one each; and the remaining sev-
enteen persons all were able to rank the entire sample. It is noteworthy
that 79 percent of the omitted rankings were attributable to four of the
seven persons whom we shall, shortly, discuss as affiliates of the traditional
viewpoint; the seven behavioralists, on the other hand, made no omissions.
One possible inference is that there is a consistent differential in the quality
of information input by these two groups of persons: behavioralists seem to
think that they are familiar with all of the literature produced in the field,
but at least several of the traditionalists appear to be unaware of at least
part of the behavioral and conventional research; the pattern of zero ranks,
for one traditionalist, is B:4, C:4, T:0; and for another, it is B:3, C:4, T:0.7
7. Walter Murphy suggests as an alternative inference “that behavior[al]ists are ac-
quainted with the work of traditionalists more than vice versa because so many of the
behavior[al]ists were trained in a traditional fashion by traditionalists; but few [if any] tradi-
tionalists have been trained by behavioralists” (personal communication to the author, May
4, 1966).
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(As one distinguished affiliate of the traditional standpoint remarked at a
panel meeting of the American Political Science Association just a decade
ago, the then editor of the American Political Science Review had asked
him to read a manuscript which was about courts and judges but was “full
of numbers”; so the eminent reader proceeded to advise the editor, as he
jovially remarked to the panel audience, to “send the paper off to some
mathematics journal.”)
3. Other Feedback. Two-thirds of the persons who answered the ques-
tions also volunteered comments, ranging from a sentence or two to long
letters, in which they discussed their responses and their opinions concern-
ing the utility and probable findings of the survey.8 Many were skeptical
concerning the possibility that anything meaningful would emerge from the
study, and often these persons explained in some detail the difficulty that
they had experienced in replying to the questions. Typically they pointed out
that they perceived themselves to be very complicated persons, with mul-
tivariate systems of academic values which could not possibly be projected
onto some crude one-or two-dimensional space without gross distortion of
their feelings. In replying to these comments, the author attempted to point
out that there was no specified dimensionality for response to Question 1;
and that the problem, with regard to Question 2, was to find the space with
the minimal dimensionality adequate to account for most of the common
variance among the respondents. To the extent that they were as idiosyn-
cratic (i.e., unarticulated with the prevailing academic cultural norms) as
many believed themselves to be, the question of the dimensionality of the
space was irrelevant, since their idiosyncracies could not, by definition, be
measured in any common frame of reference. In any event, their answers
should make it possible to test the validity of their objections: gross distor-
tion in the enfolding of many n-dimensional spaces into the hypothesized
circle ought to produce a randomized pattern of autogenous positions for
the respondents upon that circle, thus facilitating the rejection of the hy-
pothesis that Question 2 was designed to test. It was also explained that the
space selected for Figure 14 was two-dimensional because the effect of at-
tempting to portray or otherwise suggest a space of higher dimensionality
would almost certainly be to increase nonresponse to the second question
even more than the widespread feeling of vexation at its seeming oversimpli-
fication. The two-dimensional model corresponded, of course, to the relevant
dimensionality of the physical apparatus (i.e., a piece of Xerox paper) that
8. In addition, a draft of this report was circulated among some seventy persons, includ-
ing the twenty-five respondents who had indicated their wish to see a copy (by inserting a
check in the query at the close of the questionnaire form, Appendix B). Twelve of the respon-
dents replied in writing, some more than once and some in considerable detail. Three other
respondents conveyed their views to the author orally in direct conversation, as also did sev-
eral of the persons who had commented in writing on the draft. So the views of 60 percent
of the respondents were taken into consideration, in revising for publication the draft report.
Only one person suggested that it would be better to suppress the report of this research.
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was employed for purposes of presentation; and more importantly, many of
the persons in the sample might be assumed, on the basis of their previ-
ously published remarks, to entertain little empathy for the extension of a
psychological/statistical model to its Euclidean limits of dimensionality (viz.,
three), let alone going beyond that into conceptions of space that could
be perceived only through mathematical intuition. Even if the sample had
been limited to persons who would have understood a question keyed to an
explicit model of multidimensional space, the explanation of how to opera-
tionalize and to execute a decisional function for such a more complicated
space would have required a covering letter of considerably more than two
pages. Again the greater demands that such a question would have made
upon a set of (in)voluntary respondents almost certainly would have entailed
significant reduction in the level of response.
Several persons pointed out, in volunteered comments when they re-
turned the survey instrument, that they had found Question 1 to be difficult
but Question 2 even more so. This is readily understandable. What the first
question requires is some procedure for partitioning the universe of items
(persons in the sample) into sets which will be, in turn, successively fur-
ther subdivided into subsets and subsubsets; it is further necessary that
the subsets scale, both internally and in relation to each other, along a lin-
ear continuum. Few respondents, doubtless, were able to sit down and ask
themselves: “Now, who is closest?” and then, “Who comes next?” and so on,
through a list of over thirty names, with a resulting sequence that would rep-
resent a very reliable decision for them. Some persons attempted to do this,
however, as evidenced by a few answer sheets which were returned with
many crossings-out and changes in the initial ranking that was contrived.
Doubtless it was naive of me, but I guess I had assumed that responding to
Question 1 would not be too difficult, basing my assumption on my own (and
my colleagues’ apparent) ease in making decisions for departmental elec-
tions over the course of the past decade, using a preferential ballot to rank
a group of about thirty members. After the survey materials had been put
in the mail, however, and I faced the task of explicating my own response
to the first question, I better appreciated the extent to which I had become
accustomed to relying upon a host of clues and information in depth that
were available for the face-to-face group to a much greater extent than for
the synthetic one (cf. Collins and Guetzkow 1964: chap. 2). Moreover, the
task of ranking persons in order to attempt to assure or to preclude their
selection to serve the group in some representative capacity (e.g., as mem-
bers of a committee) is not the same as the task of evaluating all members
of the group in relation to a single selected and highly abstruse criterion. So
I fell back upon the “equally noticed difference” (or equal-appearing inter-
vals) method (Thurstone and Chave 1929) to guide my own responses. This
involved sorting all thirty-two names (including my own) into three groups
( + [like me], 0 [yes and no], – [different from me]) and then, by the same
procedure, dividing each group into three subcategories. This placed each
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person in a subcategory of three or four persons; the subcategories already
were scaled; and the few persons within each subcategory could then be
ranked on the basis of man-to-man discriminations.
The first question presumed no structure in particular for a respon-
dent’s own psychological space, but the second question clearly demanded
that he accept, as the basis for making a response, at least three assump-
tions of mine. Many of the respondents went out of their way to record
in their volunteered comments their disagreement with these assumptions,
which were that: (1) persons active in the field today can be classified into
one of three positions, or into a combination of any two, but not of all three,
of them; (2) the three positions are related to each other in a scalar order;
and (3) the scale is a circular (determinate, psychologically closed) con-
tinuum rather than a linear (indeterminate, psychologically open) one. It
should be clear by now that I did not necessarily “believe in” all three of
these assumptions; but I did consider it essential to make them in order to
construct the frame of reference within which to ask the question. Evidently
some common space would have to be hypothesized if the respondents’ self-
perceptions were to be denoted and measured in relation to a metric that
would permit commensuration. No doubt this question was easy for me, not
only because the assumptions were mine but also because I was aware of
the limited purposes that they were designed to subserve; it would be much
more difficult for other respondents to say, in effect, “this is where I am,”
particularly if they felt that they were being asked to specify their location
in some strange place that they had never visited and did not recognize. But
it is doubtful, also, that the differences between traditionalists and behav-
ioralists, and between both of them and certain other persons who rejected
either affiliation, was really all that novel a conception for very many of
these thirty-odd persons. The sample, it bears repeating, was of what one
would have to presume to be the most (not the least) aware members of
this field of the profession.
4. The Data Matrix. The raw data cannot, because of my explicit prior
commitment to the respondents, be divulged; but they certainly can be de-
scribed. They were coded in the form of two-digit numbers in the cells of a
27 x 32 rectangular matrix. Each respondent initially was assigned a two-
digit identifying number (from the sequence 01–32); this set of numbers
identified the columns of the matrix, and the respondents in their role as
items to be ranked by others. Those twenty-seven persons who answered
the first question also were assigned two-digit identifying numbers (from
the sequence 01–27); and this second set of numbers identified the rows
of the matrix, and the respondents in their role as rankers of the items
(other persons). The cell entries in any row include a continuous sequence
of numbers ranging from 01 to as many persons as the ranker ranked: all
cells in that row contain either a number from that sequence or the entry
00 (signifying that this item was omitted by this ranker). All (and only)
entries for self-ranking (the cell identified by a person’s columnar number
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as an item, and by his (other) row number as a ranker, are unity (01). The
only constraints upon the total of entries for any column, of course, are
that each includes only one entry of unity, and that other numbers be 00
or else range from 02–32—and either 00 or any particular number within
that range may appear several times or not at all.
Either the tau, or the rho, matrix is calculated by comparing the se-
quences of rankings for any two rows of the raw data matrix. In making
comparisons between rankers with rankings of different lengths, it is neces-
sary to delete from either sequence any items that are not included in both,
and to renumber either or both sequences of rankings accordingly. The rank
correlation coefficient (rho or tau) measures the differences, between two sets
of rankings, of items common to both. Consequently, the empirical correlations
are based upon discrete data pools of differing sizes, depending upon nonre-
sponse; but this entailed no serious problem for the subsequent analyses of
the correlation matrices, because of the generally very high proportion of com-
plete or almost complete response. To the slight extent that nonresponse did
affect a few of the correlations, this shows up in the testing of their statisti-
cal significance, as discussed below. The computer program that was used to
calculate the rank correlations evaluated their significance, and it also accom-
modated nonresponse (i.e., to the differing lengths of row sequences).
III. THE SOCIOMETRIC RANKINGS
A. The Correlation Matrices
Table 35 reports the correlation matrix, with rho coefficients below and
with tau coefficients above the major diagonal (the self-correlations of unity).
It is evident that the rho and tau matrices are equivalent, in the sense that al-
though the values of rho are larger (in both directions), the same patterns of
relationships are explicit in both matrices. Either matrix denotes three groups
of respondents. The first group includes eight persons, ranging from Kort
through Krislov, among whom the correlations are all positive, at a minimal
level of .33 for tau (with all intercorrelations significant at less than .005)
and of .39 for rho (which is significant at .014; otherwise all are below the
.002 significance level). A second group of seven persons, at the opposite end
of the major diagonal, ranges from Roche through Mendelson. All correla-
tions among persons in this second group are positive, at a tau minimum of
.13 and a rho minimum of .31, and all are significant at less than .07 except
for two correlations involving the three individuals who accounted for almost
three-fourths of the total nonresponse, so the reduced rankings available for
comparison readily explain the lack of statistical significance in the low posi-
tive correlations for these two pairs.
The fifty-six intercorrelations between the eight members of the first
group and the seven members of the second group all are negative at a minimal
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level of .15 (for tau, with p = .142; and .20 for rho, with p = .168) for Krislov/
Roche. Five other pairs (all involving one of the three persons with high non-
response in the second group) also have marginal significance values (.050 to
.075 for tau, and .050 to .090 for rho); the remaining fifty correlations all are
significant at less than .05, for both coefficients.
The average correlation among the eight persons in the first group is +
.53; among the seven persons in the second group it is +.45; and the aver-
age correlation, between persons in the first group and persons in the second,
is – .40. It seems reasonable to infer that these are two distinct and cohesive
groups. Each group consists of persons who are in very substantial agree-
ment with each other, and in very substantial disagreement with persons in
the other group.
A third group, adjacent to the Kort-Krislov group, extends from Vines
through Chase. All eight of these persons are positively intercorrelated (at
a minimal level of .21 on tau, and .32 on rho) and with very few exceptions
(three for tau, and two for rho, which have probability values between .04 and
.06), all are significant at less than .03. The intercorrelations of this group with
persons in the Kort-Krislov group all are positive, but somewhat lower than
that group’s correlations among its own members; and the intercorrelations
of this third group with the Roche-Mendelson group are mostly negative (of
the fifty-six correlations, forty-five of the tau, and forty-six of the rho, are neg-
ative) but again at a lower level than the negative intercorrelations between
the first two groups. These findings suggest that there is a third group which
falls in between the first two, but which is more closely aligned with the first
than with the second.
The three groups, which together account for twenty-three persons, leave
only four individuals who are not clearly aligned with any of the groups.
Schmidhauser is positively correlated with everyone in the two groups to his
left, and negatively correlated with members of the Roche-Mendelson group;
but many of his correlations are weaker, in both directions, than those of per-
sons in the Vines-Chase group: Schmidhauser has one tau correlation of – .41,
another of +.31, and nine in the plus twenties, but his other fifteen corre-
lations all are less than ± .20—which means that his common variance with
most persons is less than five percent (± .202 = .04). The correlations for
Rosenblum and for Vose are no higher, and they tend to agree—but not very
enthusiastically—with everybody else; of the fifty-one correlations for them
both, only nine are negative, and the highest of their negative correlations is –
.10. Unlike Schmidhauser, who seems to lean toward the two groups to his left,
the remaining individual, Scigliano, appears to lean toward the group to his
right. His highest correlations are + .24 and + .22, with Mendelson and Berns
respectively—who are at the right wing of the correlation matrix. Scigliano’s
correlations with the Kort-Krislov group all are within the ±.08 range, and six
are negative; with the Vines-Chase group, the range is ±.14, and half are nega-
tive; while with the Roche-Mendelson group, the range is ±.24, and a majority
are positive.
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In the light of the hypothesis associated with the sampling assumption
(Figure 15, outer perimeter), it seems reasonable to note the general corre-
spondence between the composition of these three groups, and the ideological
typology that was hypothesized. Although we shall make a more precise test
of the relationship in Part IV of this article, it will be convenient henceforth
to refer to the Kort-Krislov group as “behavioral,” the Vines-Chase group as
“conventional,” and the Roche-Mendelson group as “traditional.” On the basis
of only these correlation data, we should have to conclude that the remaining
four individuals are not clearly identified with any of the ideologies for which
the three groups stand.
B. Factor Analysis
Initially, a principal axis analysis was made of both matrices. The eigen-
values drop very rapidly after the second: for the rho matrix, the first axis is
12.27 and the second 4.21, the next five range between 1.83 and 1.04, and all
factors beyond the seventh have eigenvalues of less than 1.00. Similarly, for
the tau matrix, the first axis is 9.18, the second 3.41, the next five range be-
tween 1.64 and 1.00, and all factors beyond the seventh have eigenvalues of
less than 1.00. It is clear that interpretation ought to be confined to the first
two factors.
The research design called for successive output, for both matrices and
for both quartimax and varimax rotations, of the first two, then the first
three, and so on through the first ten factors. Two-dimensional plots were
made of the first four factors, for both rotations based upon both matri-
ces. These plots confirmed that the rotations limited to the first two factors
provide the most information with the greatest parsimony. The only notable
difference between the rho and the tau plots is that the vectors are longer
in the rho configuration (because the correlations are larger). It makes no
difference which is chosen; we shall select tau and focus attention upon the
two-dimensional rotations shown in Figure 16, the coordinates for which
are reported in Table 36.
The varimax rotation is the one which provides the reference axes for
the configuration in Figure 16. It is evident that three clusters are discrim-
inated by these two dimensions: a behavioral group consisting of Ulmer,
Kort, Danelski, Nagel, Tanenhaus, Spaeth, and Schubert; a conventional
group, consisting of Vines, Krislov, Becker, Grossman, Peltason, Shapiro,
Pritchett, Murphy, Chase, Rosenblum, and Vose; and a traditional group
composed of Roche, McCloskey, Mendelson, Tresolini, Abraham, Berns, and
Bartholomew.9 The first dimension scales these groups in the sequence B,
9. These groups agree with the clusters apparent in the correlation matrix, except that
this factorial configuration shows Krislov to be conventional rather than behavioral, and it
also shows two of the four isolates from the correlation clusters (Rosenblum and Vose) to be
conventionally oriented.
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Figure 16. Ideological Positions in Factor Space.
C, T; the second dimension, in the sequence of C, B, T. All three groups are
discriminated without intransitivity on both dimensions. The most cohesive
(i.e., tightly clustered) group is the behavioral, next is the conventional, and
the least cohesive is the traditional. In other words, the seven behavioral-
ists appear most similar in their point of view, and the seven traditionalists
share a distinctive but a much more diversified academic ideology.
Two individuals do not lie in any of the three clusters. Their independent
positions imply that their views tend to be idiosyncratic, in the sense that
whatever is represented by the two ideological dimensions which are com-
mon factors for twenty-five of the twenty-seven respondents, these two
individuals tend to conceptualize their respective approaches to the sub-
ject in other terms. In a statistical sense, this finding is expressed by their
communalities, the sums of the squares of their correlations with the two
factorial dimensions, which are much lower for the two isolates than for the
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Table 36. Factor Loadings
Varimax Quartimax Smallest Space
Variable I II* I II* I* II III
Abraham –78 –10 –70 38 –82 20 –36
Bartholomew –37 –27 –46 00 –47 35 –66
Becker 32 51 55 22 34 24 33
Berns –64 –27 –68 15 –81 –11 –53
Chase –19 69 25 67 –13 19 17
Danelski 71 43 83 –07 52 –16 10
Grossman 32 61 62 31 36 14 21
Kort 65 33 72 –11 56 –09 –05
Krislov 39 66 70 30 35 –11 19
McCloskey –77 15 –53 57 –74 04 –28
Mendelson –92 –05 –77 50 –84 10 –33
Murphy 04 67 42 52 01 –19 26
Nagel 62 42 75 –02 55 06 15
Peltason 26 69 61 41 25 –02 32
Pritchett 10 57 42 40 11 –37 –02
Roche –63 17 –41 51 –68 –14 –30
Rosenblum –22 58 17 60 –21 27 28
Schmidhauser 20 29 33 12 34 45 –18
Schubert 55 46 71 05 46 –23 06
Scigliano –10 04 –05 09 ** ** **
Shapiro 16 64 50 42 14 –11 36
Spaeth 50 33 61 –02 41 –41 –01
Tanenhaus 64 45 78 –01 52 –08 09
Tresolini –72 –06 –62 37 –75 26 –38
Ulmer 68 33 74 –13 55 –25 03
Vines 41 56 66 21 40 –02 31
Vose –32 51 04 60 –43 –01 27
NOTE: All numbers are two-place decimals.
*Means the factor has been reflected. All factors except
smallest space II have been rotated.
**This variable was not included in the smallest space analysis.
other respondents. Scigliano’s communality is .01, and Schmidhauser’s is
.13, while the average communality for the twenty-five affiliates of the three
groups is .50 (with Mendelson’s .85 maximal).
Both the varimax and the quartimax rotations represent orthogonal
repositioning of the principal axes, and it is easy to suggest in Figure 16
how the configuration appears in relation to the quartimax rotation. The
perimeter points labelled “QI” and “QII” identify the termini of the quarti-
max axes. Axis QI separates the configuration as follows: the seven persons
whose points are in the traditional cluster, plus Scigliano, all have nega-
tive correlations (i.e., are to the left of QII) on QI, while all others have
positive correlations. Thus, the quartimax rotation suggests the best one-di-
mensional array of the ideological differences, along the first quartimax axis,
with the traditional ideology distinguished from the conventional and behav-
ioral views entertained by the other persons in the sample; and the 8–to–19
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split implies at least a rough index of the relative importance of the tradi-
tional approach, in relation to the rest of the field, at the present time. The
point configuration remains invariant, of course; it is only the frame of ref-
erence (the set of orthogonal axes) that is rotated. Therefore, the apparent
gap between the traditional and the conventional groups does not change
under any rotation, although it is the quartimax rotation which directs atten-
tion to the fact that the conventional group is closer to the behavioral than
to the traditional one.
The proportion of the total variance that is accounted for, by the first and
second axes, is .466; for varimax, it is .263 (I) plus .203 (II), while for quar-
timax it is .340 (QI) and .126 (QII). These data confirm the suggestion above
that the first axis on the quartimax rotation (viz., the third data column of
Table 36), which accounts for 34 percent of the total variance, provides the
best one-dimensional solution of the correlation matrix. (For the rho matrix,
the first two factors account for 61 percent of the total variance, and of this 45
percent is attributable to the first quartimax factor.) The rho quartimax two-
factor rotation, incidently, is identical with the first two principal axes; and for
tau it is virtually so—none of the corresponding correlations of any of the re-
spondents on either of the first two axes differ, as between the principal axes
and the quartimax factors, by as much as |.015|. The extension of the analysis
to include the third and fourth factors did not prove particularly fruitful: the
total variance accounted for was increased only by .11 (.14 for rho), and the
effect of adding the additional factors was of course to add quite weak factors
for quartimax (neither the third nor the fourth factors added as much as 7 per-
cent additional variance, for either rho or tau).
C. Interpretation
The interpretation of any factorial data involves reliance upon some ex-
trinsic criterion which can be related to the variables in such a way as to
provide a basis for defining the substantive content of the factors. In other
words, what the factor analysis does is to denote the important patterns of re-
lationships among the variables; the task of interpretation then becomes, on
the basis of what are otherwise the known characteristics of the variables, to
identify the factors. In the case of our present data, there is one factor which is
by far the most important in explaining the observable relationship among the
variables. As Figure 16 shows, this is the first factor, which separates over 90
percent of the variables into three clusters. The observed clusters conform so
closely to the predicted clusters that we cannot, on the basis of this evidence,
reject the working hypothesis, which assumed that the persons in the sample
represent three distinctive standpoints.
If the first factor distinguishes between the behavioral and the traditional
approaches to the study of adjudication, with a third (conventional) group ar-
rayed between the other two because of its relatively much more moderate
correlations with the factor, what does such a dimension stand for? I submit
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that this factor is one of method, which relates to how one studies his subject.
Behavioralists advocate a scientific approach with the goal of developing sys-
tematic theory out of research that has been carefully designed in advance,
that operationalizes the relationships among variables, that employs an artic-
ulate methodology, and that relies upon quantification and (so far as possible)
statistical measurement. Traditionalists reject all of these goals, in favor of
a more subjective, speculative, and literary approach which, in their opinion,
avoids the many undesirable by-products that the behavioral approach nec-
essarily entails. This dimension, therefore, posits a continuum with modern
“political science” at one extreme, and “political philosophy” at the other. In
its most pristine terms, the conflict is that between physics and metaphysics.
In the context of the development of the rest of the discipline of political sci-
ence during the past half century, this is a factor of academic liberalism and
conservatism.10 In terms of the present study, the behavioral group is liberal,
and the traditional group conservative, in its academic ideology.
The second factor is one upon which all of the members of the conven-
tional group are strongly loaded. The behavioral group is moderately corre-
lated, in the same direction as the more extreme conventionalists, but the
traditionalists are only weakly correlated with the second factor. In the light
of the conventionalists’ insistence upon the importance of observing and de-
scribing political action—the facts of the judicial process in the context of the
larger political process—it seems reasonable to identify the second factor as
one of theory which is concerned with what is to be studied. The convention-
alists are empiricists who seek to build a theory of the judicial process out
of observations—preferably made in the field or laboratory—of the politics of
the judiciary. The negative pole of the second factor represents a rational ap-
proach to the study of law. Although our sample includes no persons who can
be described as adhering strongly to the ideology of legal rationalism, the be-
havioral group is less enthusiastically political in its orientation than are the
conventionalists, and the traditional group is least so.
We now are in a position to ascribe ideological content to the four
quadrants of the space described by Figure 16. Designating them in the
usual manner,11 the first quadrant, which evidently can appropriately be
described as the behavioral quadrant, is scientific empiricism, emphasizing
the scientific study of political action; and a majority of the conventional
group also fall in this quadrant. The second quadrant, the literary study of
political action, is much less densely populated than the first, but includes
10. The author is indebted to David Danelski for having pointed out that the first factor also
appears to discriminate among the respondents on the basis of age: all persons with negative
loadings on VI (i.e., to the left of the middle of Figure 16) are (when this is written, in May 1966)
over 40 years of age, and the average age of these eleven persons is 46.4 years; while half of the
remaining persons (i.e., those with positive loadings on VI, to the right of the middle of Figure
16) are under 40, and the average age of these sixteen persons is 39.4 years (personal commu-
nication to the author, April 24, 1966).
11. I + /II+ = 1st; I–/II+ = 2nd; I–/II– = 3rd; I + /II– = 4th.
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minorities from both the conventional and traditional groups, plus (weakly)
Scigliano. The third quadrant, the literary study of nonpolitical action—or,
as we can put it in relation to this particular field, the speculative study of le-
gal norms—is where most of the traditional group falls. The fourth quadrant
would, of course, be the scientific study of legal norms; but it is unpopulated
in our sample. To summarize: in terms of the typology of academic ideolo-
gies that I have attributed to the factorial space of Figure 16, the behavioral
group are scientific empiricists; the conventional group are political empiri-
cists; and the traditional group are nonscientific rationalists.
One final aspect of that space warrants consideration. Our hypothesis
(Figure 14) requires that we observe a configuration of points that lie, at least
roughly, in the pattern of a circle. It is manifest, in Figure 16, that this is not
the case; what we do observe is a semicircle, extending from Kort and Ul-
mer on the extreme right through Nagel, Schubert, Vines, Grossman, Shapiro,
Murphy, Rosenblum, Vose, Roche, and Tresolini, to Berns at a position diamet-
rically opposed to that of Kort and Ulmer. Figure 16 suggests the positioning
of another axis, whose termini on the perimeter of the space are identified
by the symbol: PS/L. This axis, whose position was determined by the method
of visual (or “graphical”) rotation, discriminates almost the entire configu-
ration—everyone except Bartholomew—from the empty space that otherwise
lies below the axis. Above this axis, the configuration of our sample arches in
a semicircle, with the points representing persons located at least roughly (it
would appear) in the sequence that had been hypothesized for them by Figure
15 (the outer perimeter).
We are now in a position to infer why our hypothesis of a circular config-
uration turned out to be only half right. The position depicted in Figure 14 at
six o’clock is for the academic discipline of law. We included no law professors
in the sample; and Figure 16 suggests that there is an important difference
between even those political scientists who have been designated as tradi-
tional in their approach and the law professors. Evidently, the spacing of the
academic disciplines is different than Figure 14—in the absence of empirical
data—presumed. Political scientists are more closely allied in their ideologi-
cal range than was assumed; and conversely, the legal approach pre-empts a
much larger segment of the total relevant ideological continuum than was ex-
pected. In order to have obtained a circular configuration, it would have been
necessary to have included in the sample some law professors—preferably,
a dozen or two, so as to maximize confidence in the discriminating power
of the factorial analysis—so as to be able to populate the fourth quadrant.
Then we might find representation for the rationalist academic ideology, ad-
vocacy for the scientific study of legal norms, and allies for those relatively
few political scientists who specialize in the speculative study of legal norms.
Unfortunately, however, we would have encountered immediate technical
problems, which would have precluded the extension of the present study to
a broader sample that included a goodly representation of law professors.
Neither the sampling criterion of visibility nor that of accessibility could have
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been satisfied, if a dozen law professors had been added to our sample. Prob-
ably something could be done to alleviate, or to correct for, the accessibility
problem; but the difficulty in regard to visibility appears to be almost insuper-
able. Political scientists and law professors simply do not read enough of each
other’s work for a mixed sample to be able to avoid producing overwhelming
quantities of either nonresponse or uninformed response. Given the differ-
ences that continue to obtain in the respective socialization experiences of
members of the two professions at both the graduate and post-professional-de-
gree levels, it is understandable that the motivation of most political scientists
to read the typical writings of law professors should be low, and vice versa.
Perhaps, however, an independent replicative study, but using a sample con-
sisting only of law professors, would produce the missing semicircle; and then
the two halves might be fitted together.
D. Smallest Space Analysis
In order to provide an additional perspective of the sociometric rela-
tionships implicit in the correlation matrix, I shall report also the results
of a Guttman-Lingoes “smallest space” (a nonmetric factor) analysis.12 This
approach might be deemed particularly suitable for our data, since it calcu-
lates a set of Euclidean coordinates for points so that the distances among
them correspond to the rank order differences among the coefficients in
the correlation matrix, which in turn are functions of the intersubjective
rankings (of the members of the group) of each other. The two-dimensional
solution was computed, but it is not reported here because it is almost iden-
tical with the first two factors of the three-dimensional solution, which is
much more interesting.
In Table 36, the output values for dimension coordinates have been con-
verted to the usual metric for factorial space (viz., ranging from +1.00 to
–1.00), and the first and third factors have been rotated orthogonally 27.5°
clockwise with the second factor remaining unrotated and orthogonal to them
both. Figure 17 shows the two-dimensional factor plots for SI/SIII and SII/
SIII. The first and third factor plane shows almost exactly the same config-
uration as does Figure 16, the only exception worth noting being Pritchett’s
appearance as an isolate. Just as do the first and second varimax axes, both
the first and third small space dimensions discriminate absolutely among the
three clusters; and the rotation of the latter two was made so as to bring the
dimensions into alignment with the axes.13 Hence the psychological content
12. Lingoes, Kay, and Spear 1965. I am indebted to David J. Peterson, then a graduate
student at Michigan State University, for assistance in the use of the program to analyze
the rho matrix (with Scigliano omitted because of his exceptionally low communality, as ev-
idenced by the principal axis factor analysis). See also Lingoes 1966a; and Guttman 1968.
13. A counterclockwise rotation of 60° produces the quartimax rotation of the principal
axes: that is, the traditional cluster then is negative on the first dimension, and everyone else is
positive.
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Figure 17. Ideological Positions in Small Space.
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of SI must be the same as VI, and SIII the same as VII. What the smallest
space analysis adds to the picture is the second dimension, SII, on which
most of the traditional group are positive, the conventional group are divided
about equally, and most of the behavioral group are negative, although there
is (as Figure 17b shows) considerable overlapping among groups, unlike the
differentiation provided by the other two dimensions. Examination of which
members of each group are most positive, and which are most negative, sug-
gests that this is a factor of positivism versus nomism—that is, of a primary
concern for the study of what are conceptualized to be facts, as distinguished
from a primary concern with values. Such a distinction is quite independent
of what may be deemed to be the appropriate substantive content of either
facts or values. Thus, we might expect to find some persons preoccupied with
political facts and others with legal facts; some with political values and oth-
ers with legal values. And cross-cutting all of these categories is the question
of methodology, since either type of fact or value can be studied scientifically,
and it can also be studied belletristically.
SI reveals the latter orientation; and the plane of SII/SIII (Figure 17b)
indicates both the predisposition and the relative intensity of persons in our
sample toward the dimensions of empiricism/rationalism and of positivism/
nomism. Starting in the first quadrant, the persons who emphasize the factual
study of judicial politics are Becker, Rosenblum, Chase, and Grossman. The
empiricists, who are more concerned with politics than whether it relates to
facts or values, are Shapiro, Peltason, Vines, and Vose. Political values is the
focus of Murphy, Krislov, Danelski, and Tanenhaus. Spaeth, Pritchett, Ulmer,
and Schubert are interested in values, irrespective of whether they relate to
political or legal variables. A shift to a concern for legal values characterizes
Roche and Kort, while Berns and McCloskey are rationalists whose primary
concern is with law. Bartholomew, Tresolini, Abraham, and Mendelson are
more concerned with legal facts; and the only positivist, interested in facts
whether they be legal or political—although leaning toward the former—is
Schmidhauser. The validity of this interpretation can, of course, readily be
checked against the content of the writing of these persons, which in most in-
stances is prolific.
IV. THREE VIEWPOINTS OF THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUCTURE
Figure 16 also can be used to provide a consensual ranking of “others”
by “egos.” We have noted that the configuration of points lies in a rough semi-
circle. The semicircle is “rough” because the vectors, which project (from
the origin of the space) the points representing the variables, are of differing
length; they vary in length precisely according to the communality differences
among the variables. Thus, it is apparent from Figure 16 that if Schmid-
hauser’s vector were extended to double its present length, he would then
clearly be a member of the conventional group. Similarly, if Scigliano’s vector
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were quadrupled in length, he would then be in the traditional group. But we
can extend all vectors to unit length, in which event all points will be arrayed
in sequence along the semicircular perimeter of the factorial space above the
PS/L axis. We can then use that sequence of points as a ranking of the vari-
ables, assigning the first rank to Ulmer, the second to Kort, and so on until we
reach Berns, who will be twenty-sixth, and Bartholomew, twenty-seventh. By
so doing, we shall have used the responses to Question 1 in order to provide
a consensual ranking of the respondents along a circular continuum which
we already have construed to be the empirical equivalent of the continuum
depicted in Figure 14. This ranking can then be compared with the rankings
which can be inferred from Figure 15, which shows the postulated bound-
ary between the “traditional” and “behavioral” segments to be at about 4:30
o’clock. We can measure both the inner and the outer circles of Figure 15, pro-
ceeding in a counterclockwise direction, just as we did in the case of Figure
16. Evidently, we should begin each ranking with the person who appears in
the “behavioral” position that is closest to the boundary between the behavio-
ral and the traditional segments. For the inner ring of self-perceptions, Krislov
is in the first rank, and Kort is in the second; while for the outer ring of the
sampling assumption (the hypothesis to be tested), Kort, Nagel, and Becker all
are tied for the initial (and, therefore, for the second) rank. The three rankings
are reported in Table 37.
The nonrespondents are (parenthetically) named along with the respon-
dent members of the sample, in the outer ring of Figure 15, since the nonre-
spondents of course were included in the sampling assumption. It is equally
evident that we cannot include the nonrespondents in the autogenous ranking,
since they did not supply us with their self-perceptions. It is possible, how-
ever, to make a nominal consensual classification of the nonrespondents, by a
procedure that will be explained in the next part of this article; so the nonre-
spondents are classified, in the first two rankings of Table 37, by ideological
type rather than by rank.
Inspection of the table suggests that the different rankings are at
least roughly similar. In considering the rows—the set of three ranks for
each of the twenty-seven respondents—the range of rank differences is
four or less for a majority, and the average range is less than five. There
are only two really big discrepancies, and both of these involve self-per-
ceptions—those of Krislov and Tanenhaus—which deviate markedly from
both the sampling hypothesis and the consensual perception. Reference
to Figures 15 and 16 shows that Krislov appears to consider himself
to be much more behavioral14—while Tanenhaus, conversely, considers
14. Subsequent to the writing of this sentence, Samuel Krislov has reported that
“my self-perception is not so out of line as might appear…. I did not then and, alas, still
do not, quite understand the clock metric and what I was trying to indicate was that I
was at the middle or the right wing of the behavioral group expecting such stalwarts
as yourself to be at ‘5:30’ or so” (personal communication to the author, April 7, 1966).
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Table 37. A Priori, Group, and Self-Perceptions of
Rankings on the Ideological Continuum
Variable Hypothesizeda Consensualb Autogenousc
Abraham 24 25 19.5
Bartholomew 26.5 27 25
Becker 2 10 8
Berns 26.5 26 22.5
Chase 19 17 11
Danelski 6.5 3 6
Fellman T Td NR
Grossman 19 19 11
Horn C Td NR
Jacob C Cd NR
Kort 2 2 2
Krislov 16 11 1
Lasswell B Bd NR
McCloskey 21.5 22 16.5
Mendelson 24 24 22.5
Murphy 10 16 14
Nagel 2 5 7
Peltason 13 13 16.5
Pritchett 13 15 11
Roche 21.5 21 22.5
Rosenblum 16 18 26
Schmidhauser 11 9 11
Schubert 6.5 7 4
Scigliano 19 20 NR
Shapiro 13 14 11
Spaeth 4 4 4
Tanenhaus 6.5 6 16.5
Tresolini 24 23 22.5
Ulmer 6.5 1 4
Vines 9 8 16.5
Vose 16 19 19.5
Westin T Td NR
aSee Figure 15 (the sampling assumption).
bSee Figure 16 (Q. 1 responses).
cSee Figure 15 (Q. 2 responses).
dSee Table 41.
NR = No response.
himself to be much less behavioral—than others seem to think. Exami-
nation of the inner ring of Figure 15 shows that except for Tanenhaus,
the behavioralists are about where they are hypothesized to “belong”;
but the conventionalists are bunched together in the narrow segment
spanning 11:00 and 12:00 o’clock, and all of the traditionalists except
Bartholomew are similarly escalated toward what was hypothesized to
be the conventional segment. Of course, this does not indicate that
the self-perceptions are inaccurate, but rather it refutes the a priori
assumption of equal spacing along the continuum. The bunching of
the conventionalists up close to the behavioralists, the gap between
the conventionalists and the bulk of the traditionalists, and the lat-
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ter’s self-placement near the boundary between the “traditional” and the
“conventional” segments, all of these are precisely in accord with the
configuration of points in Figure 16. Hence we should conclude that, in
general, it appears that the perceptions of selves by selves, and of selves
by others, are in very good agreement.
We can, of course, confirm these intuitive judgments by subjecting the
three rankings to the more rigorous statistical test of correlating the pairs
of rankings; and the results of this test are reported in Table 38. The rho
coefficient of .92, for the correlation between the hypothesized and the con-
sensual ranking, is exceptionally high; and we should have to conclude, on
the basis of this evidence, that the a priori assumptions about the ideolog-
ical content and structure among political scientists working in this field
tend to be strongly supported.15 The rho coefficient of .78, for the corre-
lation between the autogenous and consensual rankings, is high enough to
tend to confirm our subjective judgment that the respondents perceptions
of their own ideological positions are in close accord with the perceptions
about them that their coworkers in the same field entertain. Incidentally,
the feeling of many of the respondents, as articulated in their comments
to the author, that their attempts to comply with the author’s request, by
“forcing” themselves to commit themselves to a single point in two-dimen-
sional space when they felt their positions to be much more complicated
than that, should be somewhat assuaged, perhaps, by the results reported
above. It seems clear, now at least, that their replies make a lot more—and
more consistent—sense than they thought possible. Of course, persons more
familiar with psychometric theory would have anticipated the likelihood of
such an outcome. The problem is strictly analogous with the one we faced,
in interpreting the factorial output, in choosing whether to employ one, two,
15. We can make an equivalent extension to unit length of the vectors in Figure 17a and
then observe their rank order. The rho correlations for the smallest space ranking are .97
with the consensual ranking derived from Figure 16, and .88 with the hypothesized ranking of
Figure 15. (Pritchett, Scigliano, and Schmidhauser were deleted from the rankings for these
computations, because of their low communalities in either or both of the factor spaces from
which the rankings were derived.)
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three, or four or more factors as a frame of reference. We could have settled
for a four-factor, rather than a two-factor, solution of the correlation matrix.
This would certainly have afforded a richer, more complicated, and more
difficult-to-conceptualize space; and if the payoff, in terms of the quality as
well as the quantity of information thereby provided, had justified recourse
to a four-dimensional interpretation, then this is what we should have pre-
ferred. We found, however, that in fact the dimensions beyond the third were
so relatively weak that we passed the point of diminishing returns just as soon
as we added a fourth factor. We could also, of course, have settled for the first
factor alone, because the first varimax factor did offer a linear solution that ar-
rayed the three groups in sequence. Evidently, however, that would have been
oversimplification, because we then would have been foreclosed from study-
ing the second respect, in relation to what kind of data should be studied,
by which these three groups differ; and we also would have been unable, of
course, to say much about the validity of the assumptions about ideological
structure that are explicit in Figure 14. This is why, in correspondence with
respondents, I attempted to suggest that the question of the dimensionality of
the relevant space is an empirical rather than a theoretical question; and that
although it might be helpful to formulate a hypothesis about the number of di-
mensions—as was, in fact, done—that hypothesis should be subjected to the
test of the empirical data collected—as we have done.
The third correlation in Table 38, between the inner and the outer ring
of Figure 15, is also high enough to support the intuitive judgment that they
are in fairly close agreement. Finally, it should be noted that in Table 37 the
consensual ranking should be considered to be the norm from which both the
hypothesized and the autogenous rankings deviate in varying degrees.
V. CONCORDANCE AND IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY
A. Concordance
The raw data matrix can supply evidence bearing upon another and quite
different type of question relating to the responses to Question 1. Given a
set of rankings, we might wish to know how consistent are the judgments ex-
pressed by the persons making the rankings. Ordinarily, with psychological
data, persons are asked to rank some extrinsic objects, and our expectation is
that, if their perceptions and judgment are similar, then their rankings ought
to be in close agreement. Hence, W, the coefficient of concordance, which
ranges between .00 and 1.00, usually is interpreted so that a high score sig-
nifies high agreement among the subjects, and a low score poor agreement.
With sociometric data, however, the situation is very different. When each sub-
ject is evaluating the position of others in relation to himself, the criterion is a
shifting rather than a presumably fixed one. If we were to array a dozen per-
sons along the perimeter of a circle, or along a line, and to ask each to rank
the others in terms of his perception of their physical proximity to himself,
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we should anticipate a set of rankings in a very different pattern. If every-
body were spaced equally in a circle, and each exercised perfectly consistent
perception and judgment, then the sums of the ranks for each column of the
data matrix ought to be equal to each other; and the value of a coefficient of
concordance, calculated from such data, ought to be .00. Consequently, with
our data matrix, we should interpret a low value of W to mean high concor-
dance—that is, that there is very considerable consistency among the persons
in our sample, and in their conceptions of their ideological relationship to
each other and to the nonrespondents in the sample. A high value of W, to the
contrary, could only mean that a considerable number of the persons in the
sample all thought that they perceived the others, not only in the same way,
but also from the same base position—that is, both their conceptions of others,
and their self-perceptions, would have to be identical, or at least very similar.
In effect, we could anticipate a high W coefficient only if there were a sin-
gle ideological standpoint, which practically all of the respondents shared. We
know that, empirically, neither of these conditions obtains; and the coefficient
of concordance substantiates our judgment.
The available computer program for W (J. Morris 1966) does not ac-
commodate to, and could not readily be adjusted to, the missing data
occasioned by the double zero entries in the raw data matrix. In order to
get around this difficulty, the following procedure was adopted in order to
calculate a value for W. Ranks were substituted for the correlation coeffi-
cients in each row of the correlation matrix—it would not matter whether
the rho or the tau matrix were used for this purpose. This provided a com-
plete set of rankings, with no missing data, for a new 27 x 27 matrix. It
seems intuitively reasonable to assume that, if the ranks of the raw data
express a respondent’s judgment of how close another person is to him,
then the correlation coefficient for the two persons can be viewed as an
expression of their conjoint perception of this relationship. This assumes
that a person will feel closest to the person with whom he is most highly
(and positively, of course) correlated; and this is, indeed, precisely the as-
sumption that underlies the point configuration of the factor analysis. The
value of W calculated by the computer, for the data matrix described above,
was .13. It was possible, of course, also to calculate, by hand, the value of
W for the complete thirty-two-column raw data matrix; this was done, and
the coefficient obtained was .17. Although both of the observed values are
low, they doubtless reflect the substantial homogeneity of viewpoint among
the behavioralist cluster and among several subclusters of the conventional
group.
B. Classifying the Nonrespondents
Although five persons in the sample did not reply to either question,
it was inherent in the research design that these persons nevertheless
would remain a part of the project, at least in the status of items whom
the respondents ranked along with themselves and each other. As in the
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calculation of W, we shall use the means of the columns of the raw data
matrix for purposes of the present analysis. These average rankings, for
each column, are reported in Table 39, which ranks all persons in the sam-
ple accordingly from lowest to highest. If one analyzes the upper and lower
halves of this ranking, in relation to ideological groupings, then we can
observe the relationship shown in Table 40. Persons in the conventional
group are “in the middle” (as in Figure 16), and therefore tend to seem
closer to persons in both of the other two groups than do the latter to each
other. The traditional group, as it appears in Figure 16, is the most iso-
lated, as evidenced by the fact that all seven of its members had average
rankings (as items, it will be recalled) in the bottom half of the sample.
Another approach to these data is to consider the rankings, of each of
the nonrespondents and by each of the respondents, by ideological groups.
As before, we are precluded from reporting the raw data, but we can report
the averages, after describing more precisely how they were derived. A new
Table 39. Average Rankings
Rank Subject Ranking
1 Danelski 9.24
2 Murphy 10.00
3 Schmidhauser 10.65
4 Grossman 10.92
5 Pritchett 11.34
6 Peltason 11.50
7 Schubert 12.14
8 Krislov 13.15
9 Tanenhaus 13.24
10 Jacob 13.36
11 Vose 13.68
12 Vines 14.34
13 Shapiro 15.24
14 Rosenblum 15.52
15 Westin 15.55
16 Lasswell 15.60
17 Abraham 15.69
18 Ulmer 15.69
19 Nagel 16.34
20 Chase 16.41
21 Spaeth 17.08
22 McCloskey 17.37
23 Scigliano 17.58
24 Becker 18.20
25 Horn 18.64
26 Fellman 19.55
27 Kort 19.61
28 Tresolini 21.00
29 Mendelson 21.11
30 Roche 21.73
31 Bartholomew 23.08
32 Berns 24.52
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Table 40. Rankings according to Ideolog-
ical Types
RankingsTypes*
1–16 17–32
Conventional 9 2
Behavioral 3 4
Traditional 0 7
*See Figure 16
data matrix was established, with five columns (one for each of the nonre-
spondents.) The twenty-five respondents who fit the types then were listed in
column to designate the rows of the matrix. The respondents were grouped ex-
actly as they appear in Figure 16: first the seven behavioralists, and an extra
row in which to accumulate totals and averages for them; then, similarly, the
eleven conventionalists; and then the seven traditionalists. The cell entries
were the ranks assigned, in their responses to Question 1, by each respondent
to each nonrespondent. Thus, there were a total of 125 cells, grouped into fif-
teen subcolumns. There were only five double zero entries in the entire matrix,
which suggests that the visibility of these five nonrespondents was excellent,
albeit their accessibility was poor. These five omitted ranks occasioned no
problem for the analysis, which is based upon the average rankings for each
of the fifteen subcolumns (i.e., for each nonrespondent by each ideological
group). The resulting data are reported in Table 41.
The pattern of consistency seems very high; the only intransitivity in
the table is the slight difference by which Horn’s average ranking, by the
conventional group, exceeds Westin’s. The table shows clearly that Fellman
is ranked lowest (i.e., perceived as being most exemplary of the type) by
the traditionalists, followed by Westin and Horn. Jacob, on the other hand,
is clearly preferred by the conventional group, and Lasswell is clearly pre-
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ferred by the behavioralists. Indeed, it goes further: Fellman, Westin, and
Horn are ranked least by the traditionalists, next by the conventionalists,
and highest by (indicating they are perceived as being furthest away from)
the behavioralists. This is just what we should expect, on the basis of Fig-
ure 16. Similarly, Jacob is ranked least by the conventionalists, next by the
behavioralists, and highest by the traditionalists; and Lasswell is preferred
most by the behavioralists, next by the conventionalists, and least by the
traditionalists. All these findings are in perfect accord with the scale of pref-
erences that we ought to expect from these three groups, for these five
persons, assuming that Fellman, Westin, and Horn are consensually per-
ceived by all three groups to be traditionalists, that Jacob is consensually
perceived to be a conventionalist, and that Lasswell is consensually per-
ceived to be a behavioralist. It does appear to be so; and my sampling
assumption, which classified Horn with the conventional group, must be con-
sidered to have been erroneous.
VI. SUMMARY
The purpose of this investigation was to collect and analyze empirical
evidence which would make it possible to test my a priori hypothesis about
the structure and content of the approaches of different persons in the field
of public law-judicial process-judicial behavior, to the study of their subject.
The hypothesis is that there are three distinctive ideological standpoints,
and that these ideological positions are commonly recognized, to the extent
that a sample of persons chosen from the field would correspond to these
standpoints.
The major findings are that there are three such ideological groupings:
the traditional, the conventional, and the behavioral. Most persons in the sam-
ple identified with the latter two groups, which are much closer to each other
than to the traditional group. Factor analysis suggested that the three groups
are arrayed, in scalar order, upon two dimensions. The first is a major fac-
tor of academic liberalism and conservatism, which is concerned with how
to do research, the scientific versus the philosophical approach. The second
factor is empiricism versus rationalism, and it relates to what to study, the
empirical field data of political action versus legal norms. The interpretation
made of the position of the groups, in relation to these two factors, is that
the traditional group consists of academic conservatives, who strongly favor
the philosophical approach but who take no particular position on the second
dimension. The conventional group consists of empiricists who strongly favor
political analysis of judicial acts but are much more diverse and moderate in
regard to methodology, and who therefore assume a more neutral position
on the first dimension. The behavioral group strongly supports a scientific
approach with systematic theory and explicitly quantitative methods, and fa-
vors, but is less strongly committed than is the conventional group to, the
analysis of data based upon field observations. The sample did not include
persons who strongly favored the rationalist position of legal norm study,
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and it was inferred that it would have been necessary to have included law
school professors in the sample in order to have been likely to have obtained
representation, in the study, for that point of view.
The analysis also showed that there is a close correspondence between
persons’ self-perceptions, and their perceptions of the ideological positions of
others working in the field—and this irrespective of whether the others are
persons with whom the persons making the evaluation are in close agreement
or in substantial disagreement about the proper approach to the augmentation
of knowledge in the field. The close correspondence between the relationships
that were hypothesized and those that are observed on the basis of these field
data lead to the conclusion that there is a considerable degree of consen-
sual understanding of the standpoints common to the field today; and that, in
substantive terms, the conventional academic ideology is the modal one, the
behavioral ideology is the most cohesive, and the traditional ideology is the
least cohesive and most isolated.
So far as is known, there is no precedent for this study, and therefore
no body of related knowledge to which comparisons might be made. It is tan-
talizing to speculate whether similar ideological groupings of persons—not
necessarily, of course, in the same proportions as are suggested by this single
sampling of this single field—would be observed in related sub-fields of politi-
cal science. It would certainly be of interest if the three basic ideological types
hold for the political science profession in general, and indeed, conceivably,
for other of the social sciences as well. Further scientific research may make
it possible either to confirm or to refute such conjectures, and should in either
event help us to comprehend better how (and how much) our academic ideolo-
gies bias our professional inquiries.
APPENDIX A
November 22, 1965
Dear——————:
I am writing to you in the hope that you will be willing to aid me in making an explor-
atory study of academic ideologies toward the study of judicial decision-making. An
enclosure to this letter lists the other persons to whom I am writing at this time. I se-
lected this group because of my assumption that (1) all of these persons know each
other; (2) they represent collectively a variety of orientations toward adjudication;
and (3) they all are sufficiently interested in contemporary pedagogical and research
trends, in relation to adjudication processes, to want to participate.
The first enclosure (Fig. 14) suggests one possible hypothesis about the latent struc-
ture which underlies our disparate attitudinal similarities and differences. Although it
is crude and doubtless much over-simplified, this model might be used as a basis for
attempting to scale a set of respondents, or selections from among their writings. By
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making the present empirical investigation, I propose to substitute, for my own intu-
itions about our conjoint relationships in regard to the question of academic ideology,
your own replies to the enclosed two questions.
The first question asks you to rank yourself as number 1 (indicating that you are in
closest agreement with your own point of view), and to rank as last (i.e., # 32, if you
rank all) the person whose approach is most different from your own. The others on
the list should be ranked from 2–31, depending upon your perception of how closely
the view of each toward the subject of adjudication processes is similar or dissimilar
to your own. It will be much more helpful if you are able to rank everybody; if you feel
that the list includes a person (or persons) whom you simply do not know, assign him
(or them) the rank of # 0.
The second question asks you to specify your own relative position on the perimeter
of the circle depicted in Fig. 14. Using a clock metric, please specify as closely as you
can a point that approximates “where you are.” The sequence of academic disciplines
which is apparent in the space between the two circles is intended only to be sugges-
tive of the content of the three approaches, and not to specify directly positions on
the perimeter. Therefore, you should orient yourself in relation to the three major ap-
proaches: the traditional at 6:00 o’clock, the conventional at 10:00 o’clock, and the
behavioral at 2:00 o’clock. The hour hand of the imaginary clock is capable of denoting
position to the nearest minute as well as marking the hours, and therefore you should
feel free to make your designation either roughly (to the nearest hour) or more pre-
cisely as a point between two hour-loci.
It is possible that the replies to the first question could be used in a manner that might
prove to be embarrassing to some individuals. There is no way of assuring that respon-
dents will remain anonymous to the analyst, for the structure of the answers provides a
quick identification. However, I will not publish nor otherwise reveal to any other per-
son the individual responses to the first question; and the sample size is sufficiently
small that I can code these raw data myself. We happen to have a recently debugged
tau program for our computer, so I shall use it to calculate a matrix of rank correlation
coefficients, which will measure the extent to which each pair of respondents agree
in their evaluation of the psychological distance separating them from each other and
from the other persons in the sample. Only these correlation coefficients and measures
based upon them (and explicitly not the individual sets of rankings) will be used and
reported in the published analysis.
The replies to the second question will, of course, be reported; and I plan to compare
the findings with those which result from the analysis of the first question. This will
make it possible to compare self-perceptions with others’ perceptions. Conclusions
based thereon should contribute to a much better common understanding of whatever
degree of cognitive structure may obtain in our orientations towards the substantive
professional field in which we labor. It will then be possible to base our future discourse
upon more valid and reliable knowledge than the idiosyncratic and unsystematized in-
tuitions of individuals (including my own present intuitions).
With luck, I hope to be able to complete the analysis and write the research report
early next winter, and then after revision (see below) to submit the ms. for possible
publication in the Law and Society Bulletin, the new journal of the Law and Society
Association, which is perhaps a particularly appropriate forum. At the bottom of the
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second enclosure you will note a place which you should check if you would like to have
me send you a copy of the draft paper, thereby providing you with an opportunity to com-
ment critically upon, and suggest revision in, the ms. before I do submit it for publication.
I have tried to include in the sample persons representing a variety of different points
of view. It is of course my hope that everyone replies to both questions, so that the
sample available for analysis does not become biased by either the over-representation
or the under-representation of persons who represent any of the major perspectives
which characterize our field today.
Please use the stamped and addressed envelope that is enclosed for your reply. Now
that you have read the letter, only a few more minutes will be required to answer the
two questions.
With my sincere appreciation,
Glendon Schubert
APPENDIX B
PLEASE RETURN THIS SHEET IN THE ENCLOSED REPLY ENVELOPE
QUESTION #1. Rank the following individuals from 1 to 32. Place the number “1” af-
ter your own name, the number “2” after the name of the person
whose point of view (concerning how to study law, courts, and judges)
is most similar to your own, and so on with the person whose view-
point is most different from yours ranked last.
Abraham ____ Jacob ____ Nagel ____ Shapiro ____
Bartholomew ____ Horn ____ Peltason ____ Spaeth ____
Becker ____ Kort ____ Pritchett ____ Tanenhaus ____
Berns ____ Krislov ____ Roche ____ Tresolini ____
Chase ____ Lasswell ____ Rosenblum ____ Ulmer ____
Danelski ____ McCloseky ____ Schmidhauser ____ Vines ____
Fellman ____ Mendelson ____ Schubert ____ Vose ____
Grossman ____ Murphy ____ Scigliano ____ Westin ____
QUESTION
#2.
Your own position on the perimeter of Figure [14] is best approxi-
mated by a point at about ——:— o’clock.
Check here __ if you would like to receive a copy of the draft of the report.
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Ideological Distance
This is a report of a secondary analysis of data on social and political
ideology. The data variously were collected, through field questionnaire sur-
veys, by other scholars who supervised their administration to samples of
elite respondents in England, the United States, and Japan. The initial study
was made (apparently in the middle 1940s) by an English psychologist,
Hans J. Eysenck (1947), with a sample of 750 persons, students and their
friends at the University of London. The second study was made in 1960
by an American lawyer-political scientist, Stuart S. Nagel (1963), with a
United States sample of state supreme court judges, of whom 101 replied to
all questions in such a manner that their answers could be intercorrelated.
The third study was made in 1964 by an American political scientist, James
Dator (1967)—then a resident of Tokyo—of a national sample of Japanese
high courts judges, of whom sixty-eight provided replies that could be used
This chapter was originally published, in slightly different form, as “Ideological Dis-
tance: A Smallest Space Analysis across Three Cultures,” and is reprinted from Comparative
Political Studies Vol. 1, No. 3(Oct. 1968) pp. 319–350 by permission of the publisher. Sage
Publications, Inc. This article was presented as a paper, to a conference on “Mathematical
Theory of Committees and Elections,” organized by Professor Oskar Morgenstern and di-
rected by Professor Doctor Ernst F. Winter, at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna,
Austria, June 26–27, 1968. Much of the work upon which this report is based stems from two
seminars: one in judicial behavior, convened by the Inter-University Consortium for Political
Research at Ann Arbor, Michigan, during the summer of 1963; and the other, in compar-
ative judicial behavior, convened by the Institute of Advanced Projects of the Center for
Cultural and Technical Interchange between East and West at the University of Hawaii in
Honolulu, during the late spring and summer of 1965. For previously unpublished data ana-
lyzed herein, I am indebted to James A. Dator of Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and to Stuart
S. Nagel of the University of Illinois. All three of us participated in the 1963 conference
in Ann Arbor, and Professor Nagel and I were participants in the 1965 conference at the
East-West Center. I thank also Dr. Forrest R. Pitts, associate director of the Social Science
Research Institute of the University of Hawaii, for making possible computer facilities for
the smallest space analyses upon which this paper relies.
in the present analysis. From one point of view, each of these three studies is
independent of the others, in that the samples (and their responses) are
not in any sense dependent upon each other. However, Nagel (1963: 33,
Table 2) patterned his study directly upon Eysenck’s, utilized a modified
version of the Eysenck questionnaire, and undertook explicit comparisons
between his findings and those that Eysenck had reported; and Dator,
who in turn patterned his work upon Nagel’s and employed a modified
version (Dator 1967: 422, Table 10) of the Nagel-Eysenck questionnaire,
has interpreted his own data in relation to both the Eysenck and Nagel
samples described above, and to other attempts (Eysenck 1953; Tanaka
and Matsuyama 1954; Dator 1969) to base surveys upon the Eysenck
questionnaire, in Germany, Sweden, and Japan. Hence, from the points
of view of the structure and content of the survey instrument, and the
design of the research, it was the intent of the later investigators to
make their inquiries as similar as possible to those that had preceded;
and it was their hope that the studies would be substantially the same,
to the extent at least that their respective findings would be properly
comparable. We shall turn presently to a consideration of certain prob-
lems involved in the comparability of the three studies; but, for present
purposes, I wish to note the unusual opportunity that the availability of
these data presents, to the student of comparative political ideology, to
undertake an experimental investigation, utilizing relatively sophisticated
theory and methods, of the effect of cultural differences upon the cogni-
tive structure of political thinking.
It is pertinent to observe certain differences in the goals and interests
of the three scholars who collected the data. Dr. Eysenck, long an antagonist
of both American and Israeli social psychologists,1 was interested primarily
in the use of his data to advance understanding of psychometric theory and
techniques, as is suggested by his dedication of one of his books, The Psychol-
ogy of Politics, to his son “in the hope that he will grow up in a society more
interested in psychology than politics.” Nagel, quite to the contrary, viewed
his own study in instrumental terms, and his explicit hope was that his data
might serve the social engineering purpose of contributing to the reform of
the American judiciary along more “objective” lines by “decreasing the effect
of judicial attitudes.” And Dator was primarily interested in neither the promo-
tion of psychometry nor judicial reform; as a student of comparative politics,
his interest is (like my own) in theory construction about political behavior. In-
deed, the only justification for my having undertaken the present study, which
is best seen as an extension of Dator’s work, lies in the differences in our re-
spective methodologies.
Eysenck based his interpretation of his data upon Burt’s “Summation
Method” of factor analysis, a desk calculator routine which, appraised by
1. See, for example: Eysenck 1951, 1956a, 1956b; Guttman 1951; Christie 1956a, 1956b;
Rokeach and Hanley 1956; and Hanley and Rokeach 1956.
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contemporary standards of computer technology, could provide only a rel-
atively rough approximation of the findings that one would reach on the
basis of a modern principal axes factor analysis. His analysis was limited
to two factors. Nagel did not extend his own analysis beyond the observa-
tion of percentage differences in response categories. Dator used the BMD
principal axes computer program (see W. Dixon 1964 and continuations)
to analyze both his own and Nagel’s samples of data, but his analysis
is restricted to the first two unrotated factors, in each instance; and for
comparison with Eysenck, Dator used Eysenck’s own factors. In carrying
through his comparison of the British, American, and Japanese samples, uti-
lizing a bi-factorial model, Dator (1969) has made what I consider to be an
important contribution to the advancement of understanding in comparative
politics. In the present study, my objective is to carry the work of Eysenck
and Nagel and Dator one step further than any of them has as yet seen fit to
take it.
Mathematical psychology is beginning to have a much more important in-
fluence upon work in American political science (cf. Kaiser 1968). One of the
most exciting developments in contemporary mathematical psychology is the
development of a series of computer programs2 by Louis Guttman, director
of the Israeli Institute of Applied Social Research, in Jerusalem, and James
Lingoes, professor of Psychology at the University of Michigan, for multivari-
ate analysis of ordinal-level data which fail to meet the strict assumptions (of
normally distributed variables that are rectilinearly related to each other and
which have been measured at the interval level) that underlie, in principle,
the use of factor analysis (see Stephenson 1953 and Guilford 1956). SSA-I, the
initial program in the series, is a method for nonparametric “smallest space
analysis” which requires no assumptions about the shape of frequency distri-
butions, nor that correlation be linear, nor even that the indices of association
be correlation coefficients. Assuming that data have been measured at the or-
dinal level, smallest space analysis makes interpoint distances embedded in
Euclidean space a monotonic function of rank order differences, using a sta-
tistical criterion based on Guttman’s rank-image principle to determine the
smallest possible space. SSA-I is designed for analyzing any complete, real,
symmetric matrix of coefficients—which can represent similarities, dissimilar-
ities, proximities, or distances—without solving for communalities.3 Although
factor analysis can be used to support an interpretation in terms of social or
psychological distance, it is necessary to standardize factor scores prior to
computing distances (Rummel 1970: chap. 22). SSA-I, however, provides a di-
2. Published and periodically revised in the “Computer Abstracts” section of Behavioral Sci-
ences beginning in vol. 10 (1965), and now available on tape in Fortran IV upon application to
the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. See Torgerson 1965; Lingoes 1967;
and Guttman 1968.
3. For an explanation of the algorithm for SSA-I and some examples of its use, see Lingoes
1966a; and Lingoes and Guttman 1967.
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rect distance interpretation of spatial interrelationships, in the sense that
points closest together in the smallest space are most alike in terms of
the dimensions that define that space. My own previous experience in the
use of smallest space analysis indicated that, in addition to the advantage
of assuming only the cruder level of observation and measurement4 that
usually is achieved by political scientists, smallest space analysis may
identify a third dimension for matrices which would be adjudged two-di-
mensional when examined by principal axes factor analysis (see Schubert
1966b, 1967b, 1968g). Comparisons of both factor analytic and smallest
space solutions for the same matrices, and also of both two-and three-
dimensional smallest space solutions for these matrices, indicated that
the second factor (or second dimension of a two-dimensional smallest
space analysis) is differentiated into the second and third dimensions of a
three-dimensional smallest space analysis; and in the latter three-space,
it is the second dimension which is novel.5 Of the three earlier studies,
Nagel’s measurement was at the level of aggregate descriptive statistics
of the manifest survey response data, and therefore his interpretation
had to be confined to the level of the first dimension. Eysenck and Dator
were enabled, by their invocation of factor analytic techniques, to make
interpretations at the two-dimensional level. By taking advantage of the
recently developed method of smallest space analysis, I sought to inves-
tigate the hypothesis that the matrices of attitudinal interagreement, for
all three cultures, were of a higher rank (i.e., were more complicated)
than two, and therefore a three-dimensional analysis would support find-
ings and an interpretation more appropriate to the cognitive structure of
the respondents, to the extent that that phenomenon had been replicated
in their responses to the Eysenck-Nagel questionnaire.
In moving from one-space to three-space, there are both advantages and
disadvantages, of course. The functions of either psychological or statisti-
cal complexity, for such a transition, are harmonic rather than arithmetic.
No doubt, crude observations and measurement produce data that are least
strained by one-dimensional methods of analysis; and there is no doubt in
my own mind that the data analyzed in the present study are subjected to
substantial stress by the demands made upon them even by the relatively
minimal requirements of smallest space analysis. Neither am I insensitive
to the reinforcing strains, superimposed upon at least the Nagel and Da-
tor samples of the data, by both the linguistic and ideological variance that
stem from the cross-cultural design of this research. What the satisficing
(see Simon 1957: 204) social scientist seeks to achieve is that level of analy-
sis which asks neither too much, nor too little, of his data; and one who
works within the ethos of a profession which has been, at least until very re-
4. See, especially, the introduction to Lingoes 1967; Baggaley 1964: chap. 1; and
Siegel 1956: 26.
5. See Schubert 1967a, Fig. 4; 1966b, Fig. 2; and 1968g, Fig. 1.
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cently, noteworthy for its characteristic failure better to exploit what might
have been learned from the impressive aggregates of empirical observations
that it laboriously collected perhaps may be pardoned for committing the
error (if such it be) of trying to squeeze too much out of the data available.
At least one possible by-product of such endeavors may be a heightened
sensitivity to the importance of improving the quality of our empirical obser-
vations, and of the measurements that we make of them, so that what are
mathematically and statistically more elegant investigations of our data can
be justified.6
The earlier Japanese replication7 using the full Eysenck questionnaire
could not be included in the present study, because the correlation matrix was
not published in the report of the research and attempts to obtain a copy of the
matrix through correspondence with the senior author were unsuccessful. If
these data had been accessible for smallest space reanalysis, the Tanaka and
Matsuyama findings might have (1) helped to clarify how much difference it
makes to employ the twenty-four-item (infra) rather than the complete forty-
item survey instrument; and (2) made possible an infra-cultural longitudinal
comparison (with Dator’s findings) of different elite groups within Japanese
society.
I. THE SURVEY INSTRUMENTS
According to Eysenck:
From a total of some 500 items, all those were selected which had been shown to be of
importance or relevance in any previous research. When pruned of duplications, it was
found that these items did not suffice to make up the mininum [sic] number considered
requisite, and others were added by random selection until 40 items altogether had been
chosen. (1954: 121–122)
In adapting this questionnaire (Eysenck 1947: appendix, and 1954: 122–124)
for purposes of his doctoral research, Nagel reduced the number of items from
40 “to 24 in order to have a less bulky questionnaire and thereby presumably
a higher rate of response.” Moreover:
The particular 24 items selected were chosen in such a way that there would be three
items for describing each of the eight sub-attitudes [which Nagel inferred to have been
identified by sociopsychological research], anticipating that correlations would be made
between each sub-attitude and the decisional behavior of the judges (as well as between
the over-all attitude of liberalism and their decisional behavior.) The particular three items
chosen to represent each sub-attitude were those three items which had the highest cor-
relation with [Eysenck’s first] factor [,] of liberalism. (Nagel 1963a: 30)
Consequently, the Nagel version might be expected to include the items
which would discriminate best between liberal and conservative differences
in the attitudes of American, and of Japanese, judges—providing, that is,
6. See Coombs 1964; Blalock 1968: chap. 1, and Alker 1965, 1966.
7. See Tanaka and Matsuyama 1954, and the discussion in section IV in Dator 1969.
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that American and Japanese judicial concepts of liberalism-conservatism are
structured similarly to those of English university students and their friends,
and provided further that the judges understood the questions to signify the
same meaning as these items conveyed to the Englishmen. On the other
hand, and ceteris paribus (especially communalities), the price paid for ex-
ceptionally high factor loadings on one dimension inescapably is relatively
low factor loadings on other dimensions. Of course, Nagel was not thinking
in terms of a factorial model when he designed his adaptation, else he might
have selected items (as Eysenck had attempted to do) so as to be able bet-
ter to discriminate differences among his respondents in relation to other
dimensions than liberalism-conservatism; and Dator, similarly, had no goals
of factor (or other multivariate) analysis in view when he coopted the Nagel
version of Eysenck’s questionnaire.
In using Eysenck’s correlation matrix, I abstracted the submatrix which
includes intercorrelations among the twenty-four items chosen by Nagel;8 and
this explains, of course, why all twenty-four items load so highly—not, to be
sure, why they load relatively higher for the British than for the Americans or
the Japanese, but rather why the metric value of the coordinates is high—for
the British sample, on the first dimension: Nagel had picked them this way.
The other major innovation that Nagel introduced was his a priori
clustering of items, by triads, according to what he considered to be the
“sub-attitudes of liberalism.” We can treat these eight clusters as a set of
subhypotheses concerning the homogeneity and integration of the semantic
components9 of liberalism-conservatism for persons socialized in the British
culture. If multivariate analysis should indicate that Nagel’s a priori clusters
do correspond to the empirical clusters that would be denoted for Eysenck’s
reduced correlation data matrix, then we should expect to observe poorer
cohesion within, and differentiation among, these same clusters for either
the American or the Japanese data. Indeed, taking into consideration even
grossly the relative degrees of affinity among the British, the American, and
the Japanese cultures (see Schubert 1967c), we ought to posit the following
hypothesis: that the spatial clusters for the item triads10 are most cohesive
and best discriminated for the British data; that the corresponding clusters
will be less well defined, in terms of both criteria, for the American data;
and that they will be least well defined for the Japanese data. This hypoth-
esis (although not explicitly articulated by Dator) certainly is supported by
Dator’s two-dimensional factor analysis which includes plots of the following
8. The appropriate row and column numbers, which also identify the corresponding items
in Eysenck’s questionnaire, are denoted parenthetically in Table 42.
9. See Guttman 1954: chaps. 5, 6 at 216, 258; and Schubert 1965c: chaps. 5, 6 at 39–40.
10. Spatial clustering could be measured precisely as the mean interpoint distance for
each triad (see Schubert 1963e: 135–137), but the degree of apparent measurement error in
the data analyzed here precluded, in my opinion, recourse to such an elegant criterion; in-
stead, I shall rely upon what I presume will be consensual reader visual inference from the
figures below, as no close judgments seem to be called for.
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samples: Eysenck’s British, Eysenck’s German, Nagel’s American, Tanaka
and Matsuyama’s Japanese, and Dator’s Japanese.11 We shall test the same
hypothesis for our three samples in three-dimensional space.
One further aspect of the format of the survey instruments, as employed
by the three investigators, requires comment. One can readily sympathize, of
course, with the feeling of an American investigator that questions originally
phrased for a British audience need to be rephrased, to some extent, in or-
der to communicate well with an American audience. (I pick deliberately the
weaker example; it is hardly necessary to observe that this problem is vastly
intensified—and extended—for translation from either the Queen’s or Amer-
ican English into the Japanese language, to say nothing of translation into
accustomed Japanese modes of thought, for reasons that have been very well
stated by Dator [1967, 1969] who is exceptionally well qualified to explicate
this syndrome of problems.) But we cannot yield to such temptations, or even
felt necessities, with impunity: each bit of tinkering with the language of the
original entails the cost, and to an unspecifiable degree, of loss in stimulus
identity, and therefore in comparability. What is worse, retention of the orig-
inal language may entail even greater stimulus change than does linguistic
variation; this probably happened when Tanaka and Matsuyama proffered to
their Japanese subjects a literal translation of Eysenck’s first item (“Colored
people are innately inferior to white people”), thereby perplexing respondents
“who, while vaguely recognizing that they are ‘colored,’ generally consider
themselves to be a superior people” (see Dator 1969). This particular item, on
the other hand, doubtless was perceived with at least equal clarity by Ameri-
can as by British respondents. What clearly must be avoided, as entailing not
an exchange of value but rather a net loss with no gain, is what we might call
“elegant variation” (after Fowler 1965: 148–151) in the phrasing of question-
naire items.
Nagel made changes in five of the twenty-four items that he selected
from Eysenck, including one reversal in the direction of an item. Dator, in
turn, changed the substance of seven items (e.g., as in substituting “Korean”
for “colored,” and “Japanese” for “white,” in term 1) so that these items
became different from the versions used by both (or either) Eysenck and
Nagel; he retained Eysenck’s version of two items, thereby differing from
Nagel’s; and he retained Nagel’s version of two other items (including the
one that Nagel reversed), thereby differing from Eysenck’s, and accepting
Nagel’s reversal of the one item. Dator himself reversed another item from
the form in which both Eysenck and Nagel had used it.12 Therefore, in half
11. See Dator (1969: Figs. 2–6). In Fig. 7 Dator presents what he designates as the
“General Position of the Eight Subcategories of Progressive-Conservative Ideology in Four
Countries”; these ideal clusters correspond almost precisely to the observed empirical clus-
ters of Eysenck’s British sample, which provide the criterion in terms of which one observes
the extent of deviation of the other four samples.
12. Dator (1969: secs. 3–5) comments upon the details of these changes.
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of the twenty-four items, Dator used language that differed in substance
from that of Eysenck, or Nagel, or both of them.13 Of course, in all twenty-
four items Dator differed from them in that he used the Japanese rather than
the English language.
Table 42 is a retranslation from Japanese back into English of the
Dator version of the inventory. This table arranges the items in clusters, for
the convenience of readers of this paper; as administered to respondents,
however, all three versions of the instrument followed Eysenck’s original
sequence of the items, which proffers an aspect of seeming randomness.
Moreover, Eysenck’s own forty-item original version was partitioned into
what were presumed, on a priori grounds, to be equal numbers of state-
ments that were on the one hand liberal, and on the other conservative,
in direction. This balance is preserved in the subsample of twenty-four
items selected by Nagel, so that for the present British inventory twelve
items were worded in a liberal direction, and twelve in a conservative di-
rection. However, when Nagel reversed the direction of item 7 of Table
42, he changed the balance to eleven liberal and thirteen conservatively
worded statements, for his own sample; and when Dator subsequently re-
versed item 14 also, he created an even more unfavorable balance of ten
liberal and fourteen conservative statements, for the Japanese sample. The
effect of both changes necessarily was to build response set bias into the
interview schedule. The bias becomes, of course, more conservative as we
move from the British through the American to the Japanese versions of
the instrument; and as we shall soon observe in Table 43 and in the figures
the direction of the bias coincides with the observable increase in appar-
ent conservatism in responses, as we move from the British through the
American to the Japanese sample. No doubt the degree of this instrument
bias is much too small to provide a sufficient explanation for the latter
phenomenon. Neither, however, will we be able to give full credence to
an explanation keyed to substantive cultural variables, when it is probable
that a small but evident and systematic response set error also was opera-
tive. An even more serious problem posed by the item reversals, however,
is the consideration that agreement with a liberally worded question, and
disagreement with a conservatively worded one, readily can be scored as
statistically equivalent; but by no means does this assure that they function,
in fact, as psychologically equivalent stimuli.
Table 43 reports the average percentage of approval, by the various
samples, of the clusters of items. In order to calculate these cluster means,
it was of course necessary to reverse the direction of response categories for
conservatively worded questions (i.e., the percentage who disagree strongly
with a conservative statement was considered to be the same as the per-
centage who would strongly agree with the statement had its wording been
13. For Eysenck’s questionnaire, see Eysenck 1954; for Nagel’s version, see Nagel
1963a: 52–53; and for Dator’s version, see Dator 1967: 439.
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Table 42. Back-Translation (from Japanese to English) of the Ques-
tionnaire Dator Used for a Sample of Japanese Judges
SEXUAL FREEDOM
14 (23). Divorce laws should be altered to make divorce harder [easier]. (C)
17 (29). Men and women have the right to find out whether they are sexually suited be-
fore marriage (e.g., by companionate marriage). (L)
22 (35). Birth control, except when medically indicated, should be made illegal. (C)
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
6 (9). Religious [Sunday] observance is old-fashioned, and should cease to govern our
behavior. (L)
11 (16). Only by going back to religion can civilization hope to survive. (C)
16 (28). It is right and proper that ethical [religious] education in schools should be com-
pulsory. (C)
ECONOMIC EQUALITY
2 (2). Present laws favor the rich as against the poor. (L)
9 (12). Ultimately, private property should be abolished, and complete socialism intro-
duced. (L)
15 (27). The nationalization of the great industries is likely to lead to inefficiency, bu-
reaucracy, and stagnation. (C)
HUMANITARIANISM
4 (6). Our treatment of criminals is too harsh; we should try to cure, not to punish
them. (L)
18 (30). The principle “It is bad to pamper your child” [Spare the rod and spoil the child]
has much truth in it, and should govern our methods of bringing up children. (C)
23 (36). The death penalty is barbaric, and should be abolished. (L)
POLITICAL FREEDOM
8 (11). Unrestricted freedom of discussion on every topic is desirable in the press, in
literature, on the stage, etc. (L)
13 (20). There should be far more controversial and political discussion over the radio
and television. (L)
24 (40). Only people with a definite minimum of intelligence and education should be al-
lowed to vote. (C)
INTERNATIONALISM
3 (3). War is inherent in human nature. (C)
5 (8). In the interest of peace, we must give up part of our national sovereignty. (L)
10 (13). A person who refuses to defend his country cannot be called a patriot. [Consci-
entious objectors are traitors to their country, and should be treated ac-
cordingly.] (C)
ETHNIC EQUALITY
1 (1). Koreans [colored people] are innately inferior to Japanese [white people]. (C)
12 (17). Marriages between Japanese [white] and Koreans [colored people] shoul be
strongly discouraged. (C)
20 (33). Foreigners [the Jews] have too much power and influence in this country. (C)
SEXUAL EQUALITY
7 (10). It is right [wrong] that men should be permitted greater sexual freedom than
women by society. (C)
19 (31). Women are not the equals of men in intelligence, organizing ability, etc. (C)
21 (34). Differences in pay between men and women doing the same work should be
abolished. (L)
NOTE: The bracketed words are the language of Eysenck’s original inventory. The
symbols in parentheses, following items, denote their presumed directionality, liberal or
conservative. On Item 7, the direction is L for Eysenck; on Item 14, the direction is L for
both Eysenck and Nagel.
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opposite). It might seem that this procedure immediately raises the very
problem to which I just have directed attention, namely, concerning the psy-
chological equivalence of reversed and nonreversed items, as stimuli; but
there is an important difference. So long as the statements are aligned in
the same direction for all samples, no matter which the direction may be,
differences in averages will be uniformly biased for all three samples, which
is to say that mean differences will remain meaningful. It is the reversal of
an item so that it differs in one sample from its direction in the other two
that creates difficulties.
Table 43. Average Percentage of Liberal Approval, by
Attitude Clusters
Cluster
Sample
British American Japanese
Sexual equality 72 (80) 64
Political freedom (68) 50 44
Internationalism 62 (66) 39
Ethnic equality 51 (55) 49
Sexual freedom (58) 39 42
Religious freedom (49) 38 33
Humanitarianism (51) 28 31
Economic equality (38) 12 27
NOTE: The highest percentage for each row is placed within paren-
theses; the lowest is underscored.
Examination of the table shows that the British nonjudges tended to
respond most liberally on five of the eight clusters, and least so on none;
the American judges were most liberal on three clusters, and also least lib-
eral on three; while the Japanese judges were most liberal on none, and
least liberal on five. Evidently, the aggregate response data may be inter-
preted to indicate that the young British academics tended to give more
liberal replies than did the elderly judges in either of the other samples;
and as between the latter, the Americans expressed more liberal (or, at
least, less conservative) sentiments than did the Japanese. But was this
because Eysenck’s sample was British; or because they were younger; or
because they were not judges; or because they were asked in the mid-for-
ties, rather than in the late fifties or mid-sixties? Obviously, there are just
too many degrees of freedom among the samples for us ever to have con-
fidence in steps to move beyond the sample differences per se, and in the
direction of causal analysis. To do that, it would clearly be necessary to de-
sign a project of comparative research which would assure equivalence by
stratification of the various country samples in regard to such attributes as
age‚ professional role, sample size, the structure and substance of the sur-
vey instrument, measurement procedures, and time of observation, so that
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everything that possibly could be controlled would be, leaving (presumably)
nothing relevant except culture to vary. Clearly, that ideal situation is not
the one that confronts us in the present secondary analysis.
The American sample differs from the other two in one other respect:
the extremes of variation in liberal support, for the differing types of clusters.
The range of liberal approval—although at a higher level for the British than
for the Japanese—is confined to a difference of only 34 percent in the case
of the British and also the Japanese sample; for the Americans, it is 68 per-
cent, exactly twice as great. Only the American sample includes about equal
numbers of all three support positions: maximal, modal, and minimal. More-
over, the differences in degrees of support seem to make intuitive sense. The
American judges, for example, are well parsed in their cultural heritage: they
are most supportive of the ideals of feminism (Momism?), internationalism (sic
semper the League!), and ethnic egalitarianism (with Brown v. Board of Ed-
ucation barely a half-dozen years in the past). Conversely, their 12 percent
support rate for economic egalitarianism testifies to the extent of their convic-
tion about the virtues of capitalism as a way of life; and their tendency to reject
both humanitarianism and sexual freedom bears witness to the continuing vi-
tality of the Puritan ethic among those in whom it is imbued at an early age.
Or so, at least, one might infer, reasoning strictly in intuitive terms. Similarly,
lack of great support among Japanese judges for such Anglo-American ideas
as sexual equality, free speech, pacifism, racial heterogeneity, and functional
agnosticism will come as no great surprise even to Western readers whose
familiarity with Japanese culture goes little beyond The Chrysanthemum and
the Sword (Benedict 1946). In the matter of religion, incidentally, it seems
doubtful that these Japanese judges were more sanguine about the prospects
for social Buddhism than were their American counterpart enthusiasts for a
Christian society;14 they differed much more on item 16, concerning public
education, which for the Japanese sample had nothing to do with religion. Two-
thirds of the British respondents, but only one-third of the American judges,
endorsed the proposal for compulsory integration of church and school; 94
percent of the Japanese judges, however, favored a compulsory system of
“ethical education” which, as Dator (1967: 429) has pointed out, “was the
backbone of Japanese militarism before and during the [Second World] War.”
If this inference is correct, we ought to expect to find that in the empirical
clusters for the responses of the Japanese sample, item 16 should lie closer to
the points in the “internationalism” cluster than it does to the other two points
in the “religious” cluster. A glance ahead at Figure 20 shows that ethical edu-
14. Dator reports that only one of the eight High Court judges in his sample professed mem-
bership in the Nichiren Buddhist sect; and none claimed affiliation with the Soka Gakkai, a lay
Buddhist organization (with a political wing, the Komei-to) which has been mushrooming in im-
portance during the past five years, both in Japan proper and in overseas concentrates such as
the Japanese-American population in Hawaii. See Dator 1967: 411, 416–417 and 1966: 27; Ward
1967; and J. White 1967.
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cation consistently is closer to the conscientious objectors’ point than it is to
the other items which do relate to religion.
One further aspect of Table 43 should be noted. There is a reciprocal re-
lationship between the directionality of the extent of liberal approval, and the
extremity of claims to liberal support. In terms of scale theory, the British re-
spondents manifest a higher rate of liberal approval precisely because (as they
perceive these issues) the claims raised by the questionnaire statements are less
extreme than they seem to be to the Japanese judges. That is to say, it is much eas-
ier for a Briton raised on Areopagitica to indicate assent to the notion that what
his society needs is more controversial discussion over the mass media, than it
is for the Japanese whose childhood training emphasized the avoidance of open
social conflict and the virtue of acquiesence in what are at least manifestly con-
sensual decision-making processes. Hence, a low rate of liberal support can be
interpreted to imply a perception of an extreme liberal claim.
II. THE CORRELATION MATRICES
The Eysenck correlation matrix (1947: 79–80) is not reproduced here
because it already has been published. From the vantage points of both
the wisdom of hindsight and contemporary statistical opinion, it is unfortu-
nate that Eysenck relied upon tetrachoric correlation coefficients, because
tetrachorics tend to provide exaggerated estimates of the magnitude of cor-
relations, particularly when any cell of the contingency table is empty.15
Dator calculated the Pearsonian correlation16 matrices for both his own
15. See the discussions in Schubert 1965c: 67–68; and Guilford 1956: 310–311.
16. The calculation of a Pearsonian r from data that have been observed ordinally, and
in only the five categories of a Likert scale, results of course in a not inconsiderable amount
of measurement error which can be attributed to the (doubtless, false) statistical presump-
tion that intervals between categories on the scale are metrically equal. And the problem is
compounded when nonresponsive answers are coded in with the modal (“don’t know”) Likert
category. Dator attempted to minimize the latter defect by eliminating respondents whose
sum of NA + DK (i.e., modal category) responses was greater than four (out of the twenty-four
items comprising the inventory), thereby incurring the alternative cost of reducing the size
of his sample from eighty to sixty-eight. (Eysenck, in calculating his tetrachorics, had simply
partitioned his NA/DK answers approximately equally between the two response categories
[“agree” and “disagree”] which entered into his correlations, thereby preserving his sample
size and avoiding artifactually any computational problems of “missing data,” but at the same
time impaling himself on the other [measurement error] horn of the dilemma posed by re-
spondents who did not make choices for certain questions.) Dator’s only other correlational
alternative would have been to calculate phi coefficients; and apart from other problems (e.g.,
regarding both theoretical assumptions about the data, and empirical restrictions upon the
range of correlational variation) that using this would have involved, it is most doubtful that
enfolding five categories into two would have done less violence to the data than did treating
them as intervals. No doubt it would have been much better if both Eysenck and Dator had
used either rho or tau (both of which are explicitly measures of rank) correlation, either of
which would have been much more suitable both to their data, and to the assumptions under-
lying the use of smallest space analysis. Neither did, because both undertook correlation with
factor analysis explicitly in prospect. Hopefully, future workers who tread the same path will
profit from the example—including what hindsight wisdom indicates to have been the mis-
takes—of those who blazed the trail.
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sample and that of Nagel, using the computer facilities of Virginia Polytech-
nic Institute. Nagel kindly had made available to Dator the response data
for his survey of American judges. Neither the Nagel nor the Dator sam-
ple matrix has been previously published, so both are reproduced here in
Table 44. Observation of that table (cf. Borgatta 1958–1959) indicates that
the level of magnitude of neither of these Pearsonian correlation matrices
is very high, but they do appear to be rather similar. In fact, the average
absolute values are .13 for the American sample, and .14 for the Japanese.
The corresponding coefficient for the British sample is, however, .22, about
two-thirds higher than for the other two. Hence, when we discuss differ-
ences in the smallest space configurational patterns for the three samples,
we should keep in mind that at least in part, the more extreme positions that
we observe for the British sample are certainly a statistical artifact due to
Eysenck’s use of tetrachoric correlation.
III. THE SMALLEST SPACES
Table 45 reports the dimensional coordinates for each of the three sam-
ples, in three-space configuration. These coordinates are the data plotted in
Table 45. Smallest Space Coordinates
Sample English American Japanese
Dimensions 1 2 3 1 2 3* 1* 2* 3*
Variables 01* 75 –50 –35 35 –34 –44 41 –13 –01
02 79 35 –12 44 –52 –25 34 –02 29
03* 93 –61 –07 27 44 –39 57 –44 –19
04 93 –43 30 37 –35 –53 27 33 51
05 101 –43 08 75 04 –34 61 10 –36
06 91 35 32 58 01 17 19 63 14
07 31 –95 –48 –29* –07* –50* 47* –44* 47*
08 62 60 –46 36 28 –35 47 37 –31
09 106 –09 19 32 –52 09 62 40 19
10* 69 –57 07 –01 09 –79 48 43 23
11* 77 62 53 79 –19 37 16 65 –04
12* 93 –23 –01 42 –56 –17 33 14 –38
13 76 –15 –57 10 28 –62 31 –24 –65
14 79 27 40 40 13 –27 12* 39* –10*
15* 107 –04 –01 61 –40 08 21 01 48
16* 101 12 38 46 31 06 55 28 30
17 93 32 42 55 –25 01 –12 48 –25
18* 79 –48 42 71 06 03 11 26 –48
19* 45 –57 –78 –08 02 –21 46 15 –04
20* 90 –01 –38 27 06 –37 26 –02 –32
21 60 –54 –55 02 72 –14 75 –13 19
22* 81 78 54 48 67 11 –49 64 11
23 99 –30 20 20 –22 –52 76 28 08
24* 62 51 –62 10 –49 –52 57 29 –20
NOTE: All coordinates are two-placed decimals
*Dimension or variable reversed
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Figures 18a–20c, which focus upon the British, American, and Japanese sam-
ples, respectively. In these figures a cluster defines a sector of the space that
encloses a triad of points representing particular items of the questionnaire.
All items have been aligned in what is for the British the liberal direction, and
items are individually identified. It must be remembered, however, that these
are two-dimensional perspectives of three-dimensional configurations; hence,
even points that seem contiguous, as perceived in a plane, can be widely sep-
arated on the third dimension—and, therefore, in the space.
In general, our working hypothesis seems to be supported by these data.
The clusters of Figures 18a-c are relatively smallest (viz., occupy the least
space, on the average) and best differentiated (viz., there tends, on the aver-
age, to be greater space between clusters);17 by these same criteria, the
clusters of Figures 20a-c clearly are worst. This impression is confirmed by a
crude but convenient guide to observation of these planes: for the British con-
figuration, all clusters are differentiated in Figure 18c, all except one (SEX F)
are so differentiated in Figure 18a, and all except two (SEX F and ETHNIC) in
Figure 18b. The corresponding observations for the other two samples show
that their best differentiation is, in either instance, no better than the poorest
view of differentiation for the British: there are two undifferentiated clusters
in Figure 19c, and also on 20a and 20c; in both Figures 19a and 20b, only half
of the clusters are separated; and in Figure 19b three clusters are undifferen-
tiated. I interpret this to mean that, even after full allowance has been given to
the various sources and degrees of measurement variance already discussed,
there remains considerable support for the hypothesis that these questions
about liberalism were best understood (as well as, relatively at least, most en-
thusiastically endorsed) by the British respondents (see Minogue 1964). The
simulated cognitive structure of the Eysenck survey instruments had maximal
isomorphism with the cognitive structure of respondents who had been so-
cially conditioned and culturally reinforced to think in these terms. Of course,
such a finding, and at this level of abstraction, is not very surprising. What is
surprising is that the Japanese cluster differentiation seems to be at least as
good as that of the American.
In the three-dimensional spaces of Figures 18a–20c, liberalism/conser-
vatism is a vector, the position of which is determined (and differently,
in the three spaces) by the dimensional parameters. In view of Nagel’s
procedure for selecting the questionnaire items that were used (subject, of
course, to the exceptions noted above) in all three samples, it comes as no
surprise to discover that in Figures 18a-c the liberalism vector is fully loaded
on all three dimensions, pointing toward the upper right-hand corner of the
spatial perspective in each of Figures 18a, 18b, and 18c. The three dimen-
17. Those familiar with Guttman’s earlier work will recognize this description as a multidi-
mensional generalization of his definition of the first principal component of a simplex matrix,
and an application of the least squares principle of minimal point separation within, and maxi-
mal separation between, sets (clusters). See Guttman 1954: 225.
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Figure 18a. Political-Psychological Smallest Space Dimen-
sions of Liberal Ideology (British Sample)
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Figure 18b. Social-Political Smallest Space Dimensions of Liberal
Ideology (British Sample)
sions are (as I hypothesize) political, psychological, and social respectively.
The first (political) dimension measures the cultural heterogeneity of the
sample, so that items with a high positive loading have provoked maximal dis-
agreement among the respondents in the particular sample: such items are
designated as “controversial,” while those with lower positive loadings—there
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Figure 19a. Political-Psychological Smallest Space Dimensions of Liberal
Ideology (American Sample)
being none with negative coordinates in the British sample—are at least rel-
atively “consensual.” For the British respondents, therefore, the most contro-
versial questions were those relating to nationalization of industry, socialism,
internationalism, religious instruction in schools, and the elimination of the
death penalty. Only 3 percent of the British Tories, but 56 percent of the La-
borites, for example, agreed with the socialism item, while 86 percent of the
Tories, but only 16 percent of the Laborites, agreed with the nationalization
item (in its original conservative direction). In contrast to these ranges of
infra-sample differences of 70 percent and 53 percent for items that load high
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Figure 19b. Social-Political Smallest Space Dimensions of Liberal
Ideology (American Sample)
and positive on the first dimension, the equivalent differences for the three
items that comprise the SEX E cluster are 12 percent, 14 percent, and 15
percent. Clearly, there is much greater homogeneity in the structuring of the
attitudes of the British sample toward questions of sexual equality than there
is toward questions of economic equality.
The second (psychological) dimension is a measure of closure, although
I have attributed that meaning to the negative direction on the dimension.
Items that load highly on the positive direction represent issues in regard
to which the minds of the respondents were (relatively speaking) open to
discussion and counterargument, and to “facts” concerning the consequences
of decisions bearing upon the value in question; conversely, the minds of
respondents were relatively closed in regard to the issues with negative load-
ings on the second dimension. The pragmatic position implies an open stance
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Figure 20a. Political-Psychological Smallest Space Dimensions of Liberal
Ideology (Japanese Sample)
toward the merits of birth control, the relevance of religion to social salva-
tion, the postulation of an absolute right of freedom of speech, and universal
suffrage. Equivalently dogmatic, however, was the orientation of this British
sample toward issues of internationalism and sexual equality, and especially
noteworthy is the extremely dogmatic attachment, of these British respon-
dents, to the (liberal) “single standard” for sexual promiscuity, as between
males and females. In general, the pragmatically perceived issues include sex-
ual, religious, and political freedom; while the dogmatically perceived issues
include sexual equality, internationalism, humanitarianism, and ethnic equal-
ity.
The third (social) dimension is a measure of the perceived novelty of
issues, with the positive direction assigned to contemporary, emerging ques-
tions; and the negative to familiar, traditional problems. In relation to British
cultural history, the descent of this scale of issues is akin to an archaeological
excavation, with the ongoing concerns of British liberalism at the top, and
those of an older liberalism (indeed of another century) at the bottom. Stated
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Figure 20c. Social-Psychological Smallest Space Dimensions of Liberal
Ideology (Japanese Sample)
otherwise, sexual equality and political freedom were more burning issues in
the days of Mills and Bentham; the clusters nearer the middle of the third di-
mension (internationalism, and economic and ethnic equality) appertain to the
turn of the century, and such cultural symbols as the Fabian Society and David
Lloyd George; and the more radical issues of post-World War II (when Eysenck
collected these data) include those of sexual and religious freedom and of hu-
manitarianism.
Those clusters of issues that are most highly positive on all three di-
mensions will be most highly and positively loaded on the liberalism vector,
and vice versa. An examination of all three perspectives of Figures 18a-c
confirms what is most clearly manifest in Figure 18c: that the most extreme
liberal issues are those of sexual and religious freedom; followed (descending
the major diagonal) by economic, ethnic, and sexual equality, in that order.
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Three clusters do not lie on this diagonal: the political cluster is not yet viewed
sufficiently dogmatically, considering its cultural age, to lie on the diagonal;
and both internationalism and humanitarianism have come (prematurely, we
might say) to be viewed too dogmatically, considering their relative novelty as
articulated issues, to lie on the diagonal. Or we might say, alternatively, that
if the political set were perceived to be of more (and the humanitarian and in-
ternationalism sets of less) contemporary relevance, then all three would fall
on the diagonal. But this is precisely why, of course, a three-dimensional solu-
tion is required. If all items of all issues were aligned upon a common vector,
that line would be all we would need to identify; and a unidimensional solu-
tion would provide us with a much more parsimonious description of a much
simpler pattern of cognitive structure as the liberal ideology of these British
respondents. As things stand, it is perhaps noteworthy that five of the eight
clusters do form, however approximately because of the measurement error, a
simplex.
Turning to the American sample, one evident difference in Figure 19a
is the relative lack of cohesion that a majority of these clusters show, in
comparison to the equivalent ones for the British sample. This tendency to-
ward cognitive diffusion is particularly noteworthy for the internationalism,
humanitarianism, sexual equality, political freedom, and religious freedom
clusters. The sexual freedom and ethnic equality clusters show about the
same cohesion, respectively, as do their British counterparts; and only in re-
gard to the set of issues toward which these American judges were most
dogmatically biased—the economic ones—do they appear more cohesive
than the Britons. The Americans do not appear to scale the clusters very dif-
ferently than do the Britons; the difference in the range of the coordinates
merits little substantive consideration, because of the correlation and other
measurement differences already discussed. More important differences are
evident in regard to the second dimension: the Americans are considerably
more open-minded toward issues of sexual equality and of international-
ism, but considerably more dogmatic on economic questions than are the
Britons. On the third dimension, the American scale of issue development
roughly agrees with the British in regard to the positioning of the clusters
for religious freedom, sexual freedom, ethnic equality, and political freedom;
economic issues and those of sexual equality tend to be perceived as more
salient by the Americans than the Britons; and only in regard to internation-
alism do the Americans seem to scale a cluster as more traditional than do
the British. A closer look reveals, however, that the latter remark applies ac-
tually to only the single item about the tolerance of conscientious objection
to compulsory military service; and here we might recall that the British had
no experience with nineteenth-century draft riots, as the United States did
during the Civil War. So with that exception, we might infer that the Ameri-
can respondents tended to perceive these issues as having either the same,
or more contemporary, relevance, than appears to have been true for the
British respondents.
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The liberalism vector is evident enough in Figure 19b, as the chain of
overlapping clusters extending from “COs” up to “religion not essential.”
The chief differences between this scale, and its British counterpart in 18b,
are that the economic and ethnic clusters are perceived by the Americans
to be higher on the vector (i.e., to be relatively more liberal), and humani-
tarianism scales lower (as more conservative). Significantly isolated from
the vector is the cluster of sexual equality, and for the reason (as we have
inferred) that these American judges viewed feminism as a relatively more
contemporary issue than did the British. In Figure 19c, two of the clusters
that were off scale in 18c—humanitarianism and political freedom—are on
scale for the Americans; and one that was on scale for the British, economic
equality, is off scale for the Americans because of their previously remarked
highly dogmatic attitude toward this set of values. Sexual equality is on
scale for the Americans, but in a considerably more advanced (liberal) posi-
tion than it occupies for the Britons. The internationalism cluster, which was
off scale in 18c, remains off scale in 19c, but for the opposite reason that
the American judges were so open minded toward these questions. Over-
all, Figures 19a-c show that the liberalism vector can be identified in all
three perspectives, but the patterning of the clusters for the American sam-
ple evinces a looser and more complex cognitive structure in comparison to
the British sample. Another way to put this might be that these questions
about British values make better sense to British than they do to American
respondents.
What is perhaps most remarkable about Figures 20a-c is that the pat-
terning of liberal ideology for the Japanese judges is not (contrary to my
hypothesis) much more complex than that which we have just observed to ob-
tain for the American judges. The most obvious difference is in the order of
the dimensions in Figures 20a-c. Instead of political-psychological-social, as it
is for both the British and American samples, for the Japanese the first dimen-
sion is social, the perceived novelty of these issues. For a culture which has
made the transition from the middle ages to a modern industrial society in less
than a century, and in which sociopolitical change has been especially rapid
since the end of World War II, it is understandable that with a single exception,
all of these clusters of issues are perceived to be recent and salient; and the
dimension of cultural change itself emerges as the most important dimension,
for these (typically elderly) Japanese judges. Only issues of sexual freedom are
viewed by them as traditional, when they are asked to evaluate questions that
bear upon liberalism as it supposedly is understood in another country and one
in which the political, social, and economic revolutions that were midwives to
the establishment of most of these liberal ideas occurred over the course of a
much longer period of time. For many, if not most, of these Japanese judges,
the seven clusters that load positively on the first dimension have become fo-
cal questions of public concern only since they assumed their professional role
as judges!
It is the second dimension in Figure 20 that represents the political com-
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ponent, and therefore corresponds to the first dimension for the British and
Americans. Most controversial, as viewed by the Japanese sample, are the is-
sues of sexual freedom and religious freedom. It should be noted that, as Dator
has pointed out, the translation of the “birth control” question into Japan-
ese evidently confused many of the respondents who interpreted it to refer
to abortion as well as to contraception. If so, it is more understandable that
the question was perceived to raise a controversial issue, inasmuch as legal
abortions are widespread in Japan, and the conservative direction of the item
proposed that sanji saigen be made illegal. Notable also is the wide spatial
range among items in several of the clusters, along this second dimension;
particularly in the case of the internationalism, political, and sexual equality
clusters. The sexual equality and ethnic equality clusters are viewed as least
controversial; and as Table 19 indicates, these are also the clusters that at-
tracted the highest percentage of liberal approval from the Japanese sample.
The third dimension is the psychological component for the Japanese;
and it is apparent that the attitude of these judges was largely openminded
toward half of these issues: economic equality, sexual equality, religious
equality, and (with the exception of one item) humanitarianism. Apart from
the birth control item, however, the respondents were dogmatic in their
attitude toward sexual freedom; and except for the conscientious objectors
item, they were even slightly more dogmatic toward internationalism. They
were particularly dogmatic on the ethnic cluster, and on the question of
disciplining children; but most dogmatic of all toward the entire cluster of
issues relating to political freedom. This is hardly surprising, however; po-
litical democracy has had a very brief existence in Japan, in comparison to
either Britain or the United States; and these respondents all were adults
during the Tojo military dictatorship before and during World War II. Post-
war decisions of the Supreme Court of Japan have been almost without
exception hostile to claims of freedom of speech;18 and 85 percent of this
sample responded conservatively on the free speech item. Moreover, the em-
phasis upon individual acquiesence in consensual decisions was certainly a
major element in the socialization of these respondents,19 which may help
to explain why they were most dogmatic of all on the question of whether
policy issues ought to be debated publicly in the mass media. Alternatively,
as Dator has pointed out, almost a fourth of the respondents chose neither a
liberal nor a conservative response to this question, many of them explain-
ing that they did not understand the phrase that was used to attempt to
translate “controversy” into the Japanese language. Consequently, the ex-
18. In a group of cases chosen to illustrate the typical patterning of values in the
Japanese Supreme Court’s decisions during 1948–1960, only one (involving a claim of police
brutality and coerced confession) out of seventeen civil liberties cases was decided liberally.
Of these cases, half dealt with fair procedure, and the other half with political freedom (see
Maki 1964).
19. See Kawashima 1968a; Chie 1964; and De Vos 1954.
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tremely low loading of the “debate issues” item on the third dimension, like
the extremely low loading of “birth control” on the first, may be due at least
in part to response set error arising out of the linguistic complication.
In general, however, the issues deemed most liberal by these Japanese
judges were those raised by the clusters of economic equality, humanitar-
ianism, and religious freedom; these were also the most difficult questions
of liberalism, from the points of view of the British and the American
samples. The political and internationalism clusters would be in the same
position, were it not for the rigid way in which they are viewed by these
Japanese, reflecting, perhaps, the authoritarian manner in which the val-
ues which these clusters represent were imposed upon Japanese society
by means of a process for which these respondents necessarily functioned
as participant-observers. The issue of sexual equality raised the least de-
manding liberal claims, for the Japanese as also for the other two samples.
In regard to the ethnic cluster, one can only speculate whether Japanese
attitudes toward Koreans and foreigners are properly comparable to Anglo-
American attitudes toward Negroes and Jews, respectively; but if they are,
then the ethnic cluster raised somewhat less extreme liberal claims for
the Japanese than it did for the British and American respondents. Both
Britons and Americans perceived the sexual freedom cluster to be in a
more advanced liberal position than did the Japanese, but primarily be-
cause of the extraordinarily puritanical stance (Dator 1966) adopted by
these Japanese judges, in response to any suggestions of extramarital sex-
ual intercourse.
IV. THE COMPOSITE SPACE
In order to facilitate comparative analysis at an even more general
level, one further step was taken in the direction of summarizing the data.
Of course, the more refined our analysis, the further removed do we be-
come from the empirical observations; hence the more tenuous are findings
which can be supported only by the studies surveyed here. By calculating
the simple arithmetic means for each triad, one derives the set of coordi-
nates that are plotted in Figure 21. Because of the mass of overlapping
detail that would appear in a single set of planar perspectives for the space
including all eight cluster means, each of which would be represented by
a triad of points for the three samples, I have chosen instead to present a
separate set of perspectives for each cluster mean. It should be understood,
however, that there is only one common three-dimensional space which con-
tains, in theory, all eight triads (representing, in each instance, the English,
American, and Japanese cluster mean for the attitudinal triad of question-
naire item responses).
Instead of designating the reference dimensions by numbers and seman-
tic content, as was done for Figures 18a–20c, I have identified the dimensions
by type—political, psychological, and social. These types correspond, of
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course, to their referents in the previous figures (e.g., political = controver-
sial = English 1, American 1, Japanese 3; etc.) We can define precisely an
ideal cluster: such a cluster would be represented by a single point on the
boundary parameter with a vectorial bearing of 45° in all of the plots. This
would imply complete agreement among the English, American, and Japanese
samples upon a perception of the issue as entailing simultaneously maximal
controversiality, pragmatism, and novelty. Such a point, in other words, would
be consensually understood, in all three cultures, to involve the most ex-
treme possible liberal demand; such a point would represent the cross-cultural
paragon of liberalism. We could hardly expect to observe in our present em-
pirical data a triad that conforms to this ideal, but the ideal point, which is
plotted as a small “o” in each subfigure, can serve as a criterion against which
to measure the extent of deviation of the empirical triads.
As a matter of fact, the triads for religious freedom appear to come re-
markably close to the approximation of our ideal point; and the triads for
sexual freedom are not very much worse. These are relatively cohesive sets
of points in the three-space, and it should also be noted that the two triads
are located quite near each other in that space. This shows that, of all the
facets of liberalism measured by the questionnaires, the perception of reli-
gious and of sexual freedom was most consensual and most similar; and of
course these are also the issues perceived to be most extremely liberal, at
least by the English and American samples. On ethnic equality, the Japanese
are just as dogmatic as the Westerners, but the Japanese view ethnic issues
as at once more novel and controversial than do the Britons and Americans.
The triads for economic equality and humanitarianism show less agreement
among the three samples; and in both of these triads of what for these data
is average cohesion, the Japanese judges are consistently highest on both
the social and the psychological dimensions. The issues in regard to which
there were least perceptual agreement among the three samples are po-
litical freedom, internationalism, and sexual equality. With the conspicuous
exception of the virtually identical position taken by the Japanese and the
American judges,20 viewing the issue of sexual equality from a psychological
point of view (in which respect they were considerably less dogmatic than
the British), the American sample is almost as widely separated from the
British on these issues of political freedom and internationalism and sexual
equality, as the Japanese sample is separated from both of the other two.
20. There are several other perspectives in which the points for the Japanese and for
the American samples are very close; but in only one instance (ethnic equality in the social
and psychological plane) are the English and American points close. It is, of course, not with-
out interest that Englishmen and Americans should take what appears to be a similar view
of the white man’s burden; but we must recall that the closeness of a pair of points on two
dimensions does not mean that they are necessarily close together in the three-space. In this
instance, the pair of points are not at all close on the first dimension, with the English sample
seeing the race issue as a much more controversial one than did these American judges in
the mid-fifties. Little did they suspect!
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Table 46. Plotting Coordinates for Figure 21
Political Social Psychological
A E J A E J A E J
REL 61 90 52 20 41 30 04 36 13
SEX F 48 84 50 –05 45 –16 18 46 –08
HUM 43 90 29 –34 31 38 –17 –40 04
ECON 46 97 13 –03 02 39 –48 07 32
ETHNIC 35 86 00 –33 –25 33 –28 –25 –24
SEX E –12 45 –14 –28 –60 56 22 –69 21
POL 19 67 14 –50 –55 45 02 32 –39
INT 34 88 03 –51 03 55 19 –54 –11
NOTE: Plotting coordinates for Figures 18a–20c are given in Table 45.
Least cohesive of all are sexual equality as measured by the social and psy-
chological dimensions, and internationalism in the context of the political
and social dimensions. In addition to looking at the figure from the point
of view of the rows (triads), we can do so also from that of the columns
(dimensional pairs). The English are the most liberal for all clusters on the
political dimension (reflecting, perhaps in part, the effect of those tetra-
choric coefficients); the Americans rank second and the Japanese third, for
five clusters; and the Americans and Japanese are tied on the other three.
It does seem justifiable to infer that in perceptions of these issues of lib-
eralism, the British see them as most controversial, the Americans next so,
and the Japanese least so. There is no such clearcut scale for the psycho-
logical dimension, however: the English are in the most extreme position
for issues of sexual, religious, and political freedom (signifying that they
are most pragmatic in their orientation toward these issues); but the Japan-
ese are the most pragmatic toward economic equality and humanitarianism.
As previously noted, all three samples were equivalently dogmatic on the
ethnic triad; and the Japanese and the American judges were tied in their
pragmatic stance toward sexual equality. Only in regard to international-
ism do the Americans appear to be the most open-minded of the three sets
of respondents. On the social dimension, the Japanese clearly rank high-
est, perceiving greater novelty than either the British or the Americans in
regard to political freedom, internationalism, ethnic equality, sexual equal-
ity, and economic equality. Only in regard to sexual freedom and religious
freedom are the English the most positive on this dimension; and they and
the Japanese are tied concerning issues of humanitarianism. The Americans
rank third on this dimension on a majority of the issues, signifying, presum-
ably, that at least in regard to internationalism and humanitarianism—the
differences between the Americans and the British being much smaller on
the other three cluster means—these are recognized as being older and
more familiar as social issues in the American than in the British culture.
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Figure 21. Ideological Distance between Cultures in Smallest Space
V. CONCLUSIONS
The principal findings of this study relate to the comparison of the dis-
tances in multidimensional space separating points that represent the ideo-
logical positions of English, American and Japanese respondents, in regard to
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Figure 21 (cont.)
eight hypothesized semantic components of liberalism/conservatism. Previ-
ous research based upon all or part of these data, though cumulative in its
objectives and design, had focused upon two-dimensional (or, in the case
of Nagel, one-dimensional) analysis. The two dimensions identified in the
earlier studies were first a political dimension, and second a psychologi-
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cal dimension; these dimensions were, in general, confirmed as findings of
the present study, although the interpretation given here to their substantive
content and psychological implications differs from that attributed to these di-
mensions by the previous writers. The new dimension discussed for the first
time here, as a consequence of the invocation of a more complex three-dimen-
sional method of smallest space analysis, is identified as a social dimension
which measures the novelty of a set of issues in relation to its emergence as
a question of public policy in the cultural setting of a particular country. The
empirical evidence clearly supports the finding that the issues of liberalism
to which these data relate are most novel in the context of the Japanese cul-
ture, which has confronted most of them only since the end of World War II.
Somewhat less intuitively obvious, perhaps, is the related finding that most
of what were ex hypothesi issues of British liberalism tend to be viewed as
somewhat more novel by British than by American respondents. Analysis of
the issues by regrouping the data, as triads of points representing each of the
three cultures on the semantic cluster means, showed that there appeared to
be greater homogeneity in the cross-cultural patterning of ideological struc-
tures of liberalism than would be anticipated on a priori grounds. The latter
conclusion from these data, although so tentative that it is better looked upon
as a hypothesis to guide future research rather than as a clearly substanti-
ated finding based upon past research, is particularly impressive when one
takes into consideration the considerable degree to which both the data and
the computations based upon them, in the present study, evidently were cont-
aminated with measurement error variance of various types. But the effect of
such error variance must always be, in general, toward precluding the possi-
bility of discerning meaningful patterns and relationships; the error variance
always tends to work in the direction of entropy. With better data, one would
expect to discriminate more sharply both the communalities, and the differ-
ences, in the patterning of the ideologies of both Western and non-Western
political man.
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PART IV
Toward a Dynamic
Jurisprudence
of Human Behavior
IN THIS CONCLUDING part, we turn to the theory of legal change, as a func-
tion of individual and social behavior and as an aspect of the life sciences.
My own thinking along these lines is very greatly indebted to the bril-
liant theorizing and meticulous craftsmanship of Martin Landau, and most
particularly to a series of his essays (1961, 1965b, 1968; and cf. James A.
Robinson 1957) that were collected (together with other of his writings)
in a volume (Landau 1972) whose purpose is not very dissimilar from my
own in the present work. Landau distinguished, with considerable force
and clarity, the implications for political theorizing of the acceptance or
rejection of the premises underlying two of the principal cosmologies (or,
in his words, “metaphors”) that presently are invoked—at least, among
many social scientists—as a basis for ordering one’s comprehension of the
universe, life within it, and one’s own role in relationship to it. (Landau
discusses also the implications for political theory of the [typically, un-
witting] mixing of metaphors with consequent ambiguity and confusion;
but that is a technical matter that need not concern us here.) The two
metaphors that Landau discusses are both based upon systems of meta-
scientific logic developed out of human experience in recent but earlier
centuries: the mechanical, based on seventeenth-century classical physics;
and the organismic, evolving from nineteenth-century biology. There are,
of course, other and competing cosmologies that can be traced to leading
thinkers besides Newton and Darwin: theological (Aquinas), to take an
even earlier example, or one based upon modern twentieth-century bio-
physics and biochemistry, to take a more recent example. Evidently there
are many persons today, including some social scientists, whose cosmol-
ogy is theological; but Landau does not deal with them for purposes of
his own critique of theoretical stances, nor shall I undertake to do so
here, other than to note that one who sought to comprehend the estab-
lishment of American separatism (and its symbolization in the Declaration
of Independence) could hardly afford to ignore the theological model as
one (however partial) interpretation of that sequence of events. But nei-
ther does Landau undertake to discuss the model that derives from the
cosmology of modern science, and in this respect I have attempted to
adumbrate some traces of what such a model might be. Consensus long
since has come to rest concerning the intellectual significance of classical
mechanics, and so the model of law-making and legal change that flows
logically from the mechanical metaphor is clear, concise, and indisputable.
Similarly, the biological metaphor—which is now clearly dominant in social
science theory in the United States—so pervades thinking in the life sci-
ences that it is generally understood at a somatic, if not a semantic, level
by judges (see Cardozo 1921, 1924), lawyers, and political scientists today.
It is the Einsteinian model that, in its social implications, creates problems
for us to comprehend and for me to explicate as a cosmology relevant to
understanding law-making processes. Because there is little explicit recog-
nition of its relevance, there is not only a lack of consensus concerning its
form and content, there is not even an obvious name that should be used
to describe the idea. In what follows below I have vacillated (in denoting
it), from “cultural” (in chapter 11) to “configurational” (chapter 13), while
in chapter 12 (which was the one most recently written) I avoid calling
it anything other than a model based upon “modern physics.” Evidently I
haven’t achieved a personal consensus about it either; but that does not
mean that it cannot (or should not) be discussed.
The models themselves are described, together with some of their im-
plications, in the three chapters that follow. Here I should like to explain
how and why these papers came to be written. All three of them were orig-
inally prepared for oral presentation; all were contributions to symposia
organized and defined by other persons, who specified the general topic
that (in each case) I agreed to discuss; all three forums were multidisci-
plinary, with political science playing a distinctly minority role in relation
to persons representing such other fields as philosophy and law; and, not
least, in each instance my remarks turned out to be sufficiently displeasing
to the organizer of the conference that he attempted (in one instance) or
succeeded in (in the other two) the repudiation of the agreement, made at
the time the invitation to participate was extended, to include the paper in
a planned publication of the symposium proceedings. It may well be, there-
fore, that an iconoclastic stance is common to all three of these chapters;
and indeed, it may well be that the attempt to discuss jurisprudential-
social relationships from a relativistic-atomic point of view could not be
perceived as anything other than a form of radical dissent, by organiz-
ers of conferences who had their own (and invariably, conventional) ideas
about the most appropriate solutions to the problems that they had posed
for discussion.
A
Naturally I was intrigued when one of FDR’s original “brain trusters”
asked me to sit in on a colloquium at the Center for the Study of Democratic
Institutions on “The Emerging Constitution,” and not least because this
would entail spending a month or so during the middle of the winter of 1966
in Santa Barbara, California, instead of in East Lansing, Michigan. But I mis-
perceived completely what he was up to: I had presumed, from the title and
its prospectus, that we would be concerned with an evolutionary model of
constitutional change; and I thought that might be a worthwhile endeavor
intellectually. It was with genuine surprise, to say nothing of disbelief, that
I confronted upon arrival the shocking truth: that what Rex Tugwell and his
patron (Robert Hutchins, who had been dean of the Yale Law School and
chancellor of the University of Chicago, during the respective heydays of
those institutions) wanted to do was to draft a new and substitute docu-
ment for the Constitution of the United States (see Tugwell 1970b; and cf.
Crosskey 1953; and Baldwin 1972). Indeed, the role that Tugwell seemed to
have in mind for himself was not that of James Madison, but was more akin
to that of Moses (Boyd 1971; Davidson 1969)—forcing me, ultimately, to the
conclusion that creatorship must be a pretty heady business.
Part of the customary processing of visitors to the Center for Demo-
cratic Institutions involves a taped interview, by one of the Center
regulars, concerning the subject of one’s supposed competence in re-
lation to the topic for which he has been cast as a discussant for the
Center. In my case this took the form of Harvey (Fail-Safe) Wheeler
pressing me to give up my hopelessly conservative posture—which was
the gloss that he had put upon my criticism of Tugwell’s “new docu-
ment” approach—and to admit that there was at least some part of the
Constitution, in its present form, that I would like to see changed; and
it was in response to this sort of insistence that I came up with the
idea that if something had to go, the Second Amendment would be an
excellent place to begin. Nothing that has happened during the past
seven years has shaken in the least my confidence that my choice was a
good one, and that an armed citizenry has no place in twentieth-century
America—or rather, that it defines a place in which no civilized person
wants to live.
My remarks at the Center took the form of an analysis of
constitution-making and constitution-changing from the points of view of
three explicit models: Landau’s mechanical and biological models, and
the more contemporary atomic model (in the formulation of which I re-
ceived some help from the work of Karl Deutsch [1951 and 1963]). These
models are used also to analyze and interpret three sectors of Constitu-
tional policy-making by the Warren Court: racial, representational, and
procedural equality (viz., desegregation, reapportionment, and criminal
justice). Finally, the proposal for change in the Second Amendment also
is examined from the perspective of all three models, in order to con-
sider the logical implications of each model as a guide to the behavior of
persons who might wish to take seriously a plea for civil disarmament.
After having read the extended and documented written version of
the paper that I prepared for publication and mailed to him, Tugwell
informed me that it had been decided not to publish the symposium
on “The Emerging Constitution” after all—with the exception, of course,
of his own paper presenting one of the versions of his draft docu-
ment (Tugwell 1970a). So I sent my paper off to the Journal of Public
Law, publication in which would assure it much wider dissemination,
and among a considerably more relevant academic audience, than would
have been the case if Tugwell had carried through with his original pub-
lication plans.
B
Chapter 12 was a by-product of my having joined the faculty of the Uni-
versity of Hawaii. Shortly after my arrival Chief Justice William Richardson
of the Supreme Court of Hawaii was engaged in drawing up the agenda for
what would be his second quinquennial Citizens’ Conference on the Adminis-
tration of Justice; and because the president of the university had told him that
I am supposed to know something about courts and constitutions, Richardson
asked me to speak to the conference on such questions as “whether the state
system of justice, as structured and operating, was prepared to cope with the
future?” and “What is the function, role, and purpose of the judiciary—past,
present, and future?” I felt that such a definition of the subject left me free
to discuss virtually anything; so I said I’d do it, and what “it” became was an
endeavor to take seriously the implications of the biological metaphor, if one
invoked that as a model to guide predictions about the probable impact of so-
cioenvironmental change upon the present system of courts in Hawaii. The
result of that analysis was sufficiently foreboding that I attempted also, though
briefly and at the very end of the lecture, to speculate upon what differing re-
sults (if any) might be produced were one to undertake an equivalent analysis
with the guidance of the relativistic-atomic model?
A few of the local allusions in the lecture should perhaps be explained.
At the time the conference was meeting the state legislature had under
consideration a proposal to establish, beginning only a few months later
in that same year, a law school to be funded by the state and affiliated
with the University of Hawaii. This was a matter in which Chief Justice
Richardson and the president of the university and I all had deep interests;
and among the questions that remained unresolved at the time I spoke was
whether it would be primarily a trade school or an integral part of the uni-
versity; and consequently, whether it should be located downtown in the
Capitol complex or on the main university campus; and whether the law
school should build its own relatively autonomous library, or be attached
to the main university library, or be integrated with the only existing law
library in the entire state—that of the Supreme Court (which was open to
use by local lawyers, and by sufferance to a few professors from the uni-
versity).
James Dator, my by this time colleague at the University of Hawaii
had then recently completed starring in a fairly widely viewed (for educa-
tional TV) program. That show was sponsored by the extension division of
the university and offered as a course for credit. It was on the subject of
“Futuristics,” and much of its thrust was upon how residents of the state
could and should adapt to the increasingly pernicious effects of a rapidly
deteriorating environment. (The general approach was that not much could
be done about the environment, so humans should increase their satisfac-
tions by redefining their own attitudes in an acquiescent mood—“Love that
concrete!” as some wags put it.) Dator’s multimedia presentation on the
morning of May 25, 1972, was entitled “Dowager in a Hurricane: Law in a
Charging Hawaiian Society.” The second speaker was Alvin Toffler, whose
address was on “The Future of Law and Order.” I came after lunch, and
was introduced by Mrs. Winona Rubin. My intent in the introductory para-
graph of chapter 12 is to refer to Professor Dator’s presentation as “Future
Shock,” and to Mr. Toffler’s as “Future Joy.” I am not unaware of the titles
of Mr. Toffler’s recent best sellers.
C
Chapter 13, the last of these three lectures, was written for a symposium
at which I was the political scientist participant, together with several phi-
losophers of law and legal philosophers, including Chaim Perelman, a distin-
guished Belgian scholar, and Ronald Dworkin, a leading legal positivist who
at that time was in the process of leaving Yale in order to replace H. L. A.
Hart as Dicey Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford. The host was the De-
partment of Philosophy of the State University of New York at Buffalo, at
whose campus we convened. I decided that the most useful thing for me to
do would be to attempt to direct the attention, of the assembled philosophers
and law professors, to the body of recent research that defines an empirical
jurisprudence in contemporary political science. In order to organize this re-
search for purposes of presentation, I sketched a static empirical model of
judicial decision-making; and in order to discuss that dynamically, I considered
but rejected the possibility of analyzing it through the aegis of the biological
metaphor. Instead, I attempted to employ the relativistic-atomic model, which
in this lecture I called “configurational.” I attempted also to appraise the im-
plications of this analysis, for the appropriate education of persons who would
be qualified to carry forward related research in the future. But primarily the
article provides an overview of the on-going and recent research in the field of
judicial process and behavior, from the perspective of the late sixties, as seen
by a behaviorally oriented political scientist.1 The emphasis that I strove to
give in the lecture was not to dwell upon what had been learned in the past,
or even what was being learned in the then present; instead, I attempted to
use such events as benchmarks which could and should be used primarily as
guideposts to what might and needed to be done in the future. And that, it
seems to me, is an appropriate note upon which to bring the present discus-
sion to a close.
1. For a more detailed exposition, see my bibliography and bibliographical essay (1972c),
the concluding chapter of which is also available as an article (1972b).
11
Three Models
of Constitutional
Change
“[A]” constitution … continually
change[s], and … conform[s] in every
age to the level of culture attained.”
(Pargellis 1938: 49)
“The logic of events [i]s always in com-
mand of a doctrine headed for parts un-
known.” (Hamilton 1938b: 168)
I. MODELS OF CHANGEThe usual American government textbook statement about change in the
Constitution of the United States correctly identifies three principal modes
of change, but is inverted in its discussion of the relative difficulty and im-
portance of the different types. The typical textbook statement is that the
three methods of constitutional change are: (1) formal amendment; (2) inter-
pretation by the Supreme Court, the Congress, and the President; and (3)
custom and usage. The method of formal amendment is said to be the least
This chapter was originally published, in slightly different form, as “The Rhetoric of Consti-
tutional Change” in Journal of Public Law 16 (Spring 1967): 16–50. Reprinted with permission of
the Journal of Public Law of Emory University.
I am indebted to Dr. Rexford Tugwell for having invited me to participate in a series of dis-
cussions on “The Emerging Constitution,” which were sponsored by and convened at the Center
for the Study of Democratic Institutions (at Santa Barbara, California) during January and Feb-
ruary 1966. I am grateful to the members and to the other (then) guests of the Center for their
comments on my oral presentation of an earlier draft of the present paper; much of the revision
constitutes a direct response on my own part to the stimulus provided by the discussions that
took place at the Center.
The Social Science Research Institute of the University of Hawaii generously aided me in
the typing of the revised draft of the paper.
frequently used because it is the most difficult to employ, but also the most
fundamental in importance and, at least by implication, in terms of effects.
Custom and usage, it is indicated, is in some unspecified sense “easier” to
employ, and more common, but of lesser importance because it relates essen-
tially to interstitial matters that are not dealt with in the formal text of the
Constitution. In the concluding section of this paper, my analysis of proposed
change in the Second Amendment will suggest that the change of the literal
language of the Constitution would probably be by far the easiest of the three
approaches, in the sense that the costs for a protagonist of accomplishing
this kind of change would be relatively minimal in terms of time, labor, and
money. The same kinds of costs would be maximal in order successfully to
bring about the necessary degree of what I shall call cultural change; while
the costs of proceeding along a broad array of institutional fronts would be
medial, in comparison to the other two approaches. Our analysis also will in-
dicate that cultural change would be most likely to be the most effective, and
amendment of the document the least effective, of these three approaches to
civil disarmament.1
The probable reason why the textbooks scale importance and impact in
the reverse direction is that their authors—whose task, after all, is to repli-
cate rather than to create what is accepted as political theory in the profession
of political science—orient their own thinking primarily in terms of hierarchi-
cal structure and of a mechanical model of the Constitution, even though they
base substantial portions of other parts of their texts upon analyses keyed
to what I shall shortly define as the biological model, and even though they
increasingly have come to accept some of the implications and findings of re-
search stemming from a cultural model of the Constitution.
To begin a discussion of constitutional change with—as usually is pro-
posed—consideration of such constitutional principles as the separation of
powers, federalism, and civil liberties drastically delimits the scope and
range of possible constitutional change, because of the narrowness and
rigidity of the terms of reference that have been accepted—the mechanistic
conceptualism of the eighteenth century. From either of the other two points
of view (the biological and the cultural), such constitutional principles have
no particular claim to sanctity, to say nothing of any preordained right to
survival in perpetuity; political concepts such as these are not themselves
goals for contemporary political society, and they are relevant to a discus-
sion of constitutional change only insofar as they serve to define the status
quo to constitute the boundary parameters for decision-making about the
Constitution.2
The document itself necessarily is a poor description of empirical reality
(the on-going political, social, and economic systems), and from a normative
1. By “civil disarmament” I mean the negation of the constitutional right to bear arms.
2. These very same political ideas were thought of in instrumental terms by the Founding
Fathers, and we might well follow their preeminent example in this regard.
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point of view, the document long since has ceased to contain language that
bears directly upon more than a small residue of our most pressing contempo-
rary constitutional ideals. Such ideals are posited for us by elite political ac-
tors, but only most obliquely by the constitutional text. Consider, for example,
the constitutional bases for each of the following aspects of the constitutional
culture today:
(1) private-institutional due process
(2) the right to privacy
(3) one man, one vote
(4) freedom from want
(5) political equality for blacks
(6) social equality for blacks
(7) economic equality for blacks
(8) a nationalized “bill of rights”
(9) the right to counsel at public expense
It has taken the intermediation of some conspicuously human “constitutional
storks” (Lerner 1941: 259) to relate any of these ideals to the document, a fact
which is inexplicable under the mechanical model, although one that could
readily be predicted under either of the other two models.
Constitutions probably are best not conceptualized as “frameworks for
governmental systems” or as “blueprints.” They are more like dictionaries,
recording the standards of political, as well as of linguistic, preference of the
generation most recently buried—or, characteristically, of even earlier gener-
ations. Proposals to change institutional structures, because of anxiety about
possible future contingencies3 doubtless, for many advocates, stem from no-
tions that constitutional law ought to be a “seamless web,” and the related
desire to plug up suspected holes. Such a posture readily can be interpreted
as a compulsion for premature closure (Rokeach 1960), and it certainly is that
from the point of view of either the biological or the cultural model. Concern
about the electoral college probably does no good and little harm, except to
the extent that it diverts attention from more important matters; and such
apprehensive preoccupation with institutional structure can appropriately be
viewed as dilettantish escapism, or, alternatively, as a conservative ploy for
distracting public attention from alternative possibilities for making signifi-
cant political changes. From both the biological and the cultural points of view,
constitutional structures will be modified as and when they get in the way of
significant policy change4—that is to say, as functional prerequisites shift or
as attitudes change.
3. E.g., the twenty-second (anti-third term) amendment, or the suggested direct election of
the president.
4. Under the biological model, for example, the states will be abolished only if they have
ceased to perform politically (or other) important functions. Even then they may continue for
some time as administrative districts because of the custom, of various departments of the na-
tional government, of using them for such a purpose. See generally Miller 1963.
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From the perspective that is now at least conventional among most
political scientists, it is better to use all of the political instruments
at hand in order to attempt to bring about a posited policy change.
The objects (and the objectives) of such an approach typically are
institutional functions: legislation, judicial decisions, administrative reg-
ulations, political-party platforms, and interest-group programs. Most
political scientists today would think it also of importance to affect pub-
lic opinion, and in doing that they are accepting the implications of the
cultural model.
If, however, preoccupation with the manipulation of the document is to
be rejected as the sole, or even as the primary, objective of constitutional
change, then we need to distinguish other aspects of constitutionalism
which are more appropriate for consideration. A distinction must be made
between the constitutional document, constitutional institutions, and the
constitutional culture, akin to that suggested by three concentric circles,
with the document imbedded in the set of relevant institutions, which in
turn are enveloped by the culture. The document is central not because
it is most but rather because it is least important, and is a subset of the
set of constitutional institutions; similarly, constitutional institutions are a
subset of the constitutional culture. Each of these is, in turn, also a subset
of the broader series of parallel sets of political documents, political insti-
tutions, and political culture.
Even to speak of “the emerging Constitution” is to express a prefer-
ence among alternative concepts of constitutionalism. From some points of
view it is arrant nonsense—that is to say, it is a contradiction of the basic
logic of the model of political reality which is assumed by a given point
of view—to talk about emergence as a possible attribute of a constitution;
from other points of view only a constitution in metamorphosis—one which
continuously is in the process of emerging from one state to assume a dif-
ferent relationship of accommodation to another state—makes any sense at
all to discuss. The most critical dimension on which we can compare such
differing perspectives is that of constitutional change, which has widely
varying implications and meaning in relation to different models of consti-
tutionalism. Given the same universe of empirical events, one’s perception
of “constitutional change,” either in descriptive or in normative terms, nec-
essarily will vary with his underlying conception of what a “constitution” is
(Hamilton 1938a: vii), and of how “change” takes place in government and
society, and the kind of action that this involves.
I have selected for consideration three models which are conceptually
isomorphic with the typology: the constitutional document, constitutional in-
stitutions, and constitutional culture.5 Each model is a modal representation
5. Of course, men have guided their political thinking with many other, and with simpler,
models than the three upon which our attention will focus in this paper. One such older and sim-
pler model, for example, is the scales (so dear to the unimaginative designers of dust jackets
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of an important and enduring perspective toward the relationship between
mankind and its milieu, including, of course, the political sets of relation-
ships that are involved in notions about constitutions. Associated with each
model is a distinctive mode, and vocabulary, of discourse, as Landau has
explained:
Any model, as any theory, is a linguistic system. Accordingly, it has its own
grammar and vocabulary and it points its user toward special types of observations,
evaluations, and interpretations. The more developed (formal) the language (model),
the clearer are its concepts, the more explicit and certain are its rules. Where unde-
veloped, it is largely metaphorical but even here (if used as a frame of reference) it
structures inquiry and establishes relevance. Models and metaphors, thus, are logics:
they constitute methodologies—rules by which we analyze, make inferences, and do
research. The logic of a model is very strict: it is expressed in the precise vocabulary
(operational) of a scientific language. The logic or program of a metaphor is pre-sci-
entific: it retains the relative ambiguity of the natural language in which it is stated.
The transformation of a metaphor into a scientific model requires the elimination of
this ambiguity, the formulation of an ordered set of rules, and the clarification of its
basic properties and relationships: the movement here is from a natural to a scientific
language. (1965b: 7)
The first of our three models is the mechanical one of classical physics
which fits so well the ideas explicit in the document, the Constitution of
the United States, constructed and approved by Americans of the late eigh-
teenth century. A second model appeared during the nineteenth century,
emphasizing the evolutionary development of organic forms and biological
processes, in sharp distinction from the fixed and completely determin-
istic relationships posited by Newtonian mechanics and optics. The third
model is cultural and is that of the network of social communications and
decision-making produced by modern social and behavioral science, very
largely during the past three decades. Our models are derived, therefore,
from the dominant scientific metaphors of the past three centuries, a pe-
riod that pretty well encompasses American constitutional experience, no
matter how it is to be conceptualized.
The purpose of positing any model is, of course, to focus attention upon
selected characteristics of some aspects of reality. As Deutsch has explained,
Men think in terms of models. Their sense organs abstract the events which
touch them; their memories store traces of these events as coded symbols; and
for books on the subject of law) grasped by a blindfolded but voluptuous female adorned with
a free-flowing tunic. Comparing it to the social implications of another primitive but powerful
model, the wheel, Deutsch has remarked: “The other of these models is the balance, the pair of
scales which yields the concept of stable equilibrium, with its implications that the adverse re-
action must be the greater, the more the true position of balance has been disturbed. The notion
of dike, of ‘nothing too much,’ of the golden mean, and the statue holding the scales of justice
in front of many Western lawcourts, all testify to its suggestive power. Both wheel and balance
suggest movement which eventually returns to the original position. ‘The more it changes, the
more it stays the same.’” (1951: 233)
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they may recall them according to patterns which they learned earlier, or recom-
bine them in patterns that are new. In all this, we may think of our thought as
consisting of symbols which are put in relations or sequences according to oper-
ating rules. Both symbols and operating rules are acquired, in part directly from
interaction with the outside world, and in part from elaboration of this material
through internal recombination. Together, a set of symbols and a set of rules may
constitute what we may call a calculus, a logic, a game or a model. Whatever we
call it, it will have some structure, i.e., some patterns of distribution of relative
discontinuities, and some “laws” of operation.
If this pattern and these laws resemble, to any relevant extent, any particular situa-
tion or class of situations in the outside world, then, to that extent, these outside situations
can be “understood,” i.e., predicted—and perhaps even controlled—with the aid of this
model. Whether any such resemblance exists cannot be discovered from the model, but
only from a physical process of verification, that is, physical operations for matching some
of the structure of the outside situation—this we might call “taking information off” the
outside situation—followed by some critical process, i.e., further physical operations which
depend in their outcome on the degree of correspondence between the structure proposed
from the model and the structure derived from the outside facts. (1951: 230)
Table 47. Attributes of Models
Attribute Mechanical Model Biological Model Cultural Model
Dominant
metaphor
Machine Organism Community
Century of
predominance
17th-18tha 19th 20th
constitutional
change
The constitutional
document
Constitutional
institutions
Constitutional
culture
Jurisprudential
orientation
Analytical positivism Sociological Realism
Branch of science Physical Biological Social
Cognate academic
discipline
Classical
physics
Biology Anthropology and
social psychology
Social science
research orientationb
Traditional Conventional Behavioral
Animation status of
basic particles
Inanimate Animate
wholes
Animate
aggregates
Social objects
of inquiry
Institutions Groups Individuals
Relationships
examined
Interaction Transactions Decision-making
Processes
investigated
Formalc Informal Internal
Concept of change Obsolescence Growth Rejuvenation
Effect of change Negative Ambivalent Positive
a I.e., the “Age of Reason” (c. 1650–1790 A.D.) (Deutsch 1951: 232).
b For further discussion of these research orientations, see Schubert 1967a, 1967b.
c By “formal,” I mean officially sanctioned (legitimate) and organized.
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Some of the more important attributes, in terms of which we can dis-
tinguish among the three models, are summarized in Table 47. Necessarily,
to give emphasis requires that attention be diverted away from other as-
pects of reality. Consequently, each of the models abstracts from reality and
underscores certain differences that can be observed to have occurred in
the flow of the relevant manifold of human events over the course of a third
of a millennium. But this does not mean that there were not, and are not,
many similarities, and broad areas of overlap and intersection, which could
be emphasized in the alternative—but with a different set of models—by one
entertaining different objectives than mine in this paper. Therefore, for ex-
ample, the table’s indication that the biological model predominated during
the nineteenth century does not imply that neither mechanical nor biolog-
ical models are important today, in which case the present paper would
be of interest primarily as a study in history. Neither does the table im-
ply that the cultural model has no empirical referents (at least in terms of
attributes) prior to the year 1900, which would ignore the work of social
theorists such as Auguste Comte and William James. But Social Darwinism
best exemplifies the political and constitutional thinking of the age of enter-
prise, notwithstanding that some of its better-known legal proponents, such
as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Roscoe Pound, remained professionally
active, and politically visible, well into the middle decades of the present
century; note, however, that both Holmes and Pound were nonagenarians,
each living to the age of ninety-three years.
Similarly, the table does not suggest that the American Constitution
was formerly a machine, then an organism, and that today it is a com-
munity. The purpose of a metaphor is to aid in the apprehension of the
relationships important to the model; thus, the function of the metaphor is
to limit the kinds of questions that are appropriate to ask about constitu-
tional change. If we think of the Constitution as though it were a machine,
or an organism, or a community, what then? Of course we know and ought
to remember that a constitution is none of these, but analogical thinking
may help us better to understand both what a constitution is, and what it
can become.
The effect of change is necessarily destructive for a machine, since the
interaction of all component parts is limited by their respective capacities
of strength, durability, and so forth. Assuming that the machine is well de-
signed and constructed, either slow change (obsolescence) or rapid change
(breakdown) has the effect, later or sooner, of destroying the machine’s ca-
pacity to perform its function. If we think of the Constitution as if it is a
machine, and if we approve its design and function, we logically ought to
assume a conservative position against “tinkering with the machinery of
government” and our social task is limited to routine maintenance in or-
der to keep the equipment in operation. For most organisms, orderly and
usually slow growth is a requisite of living, but uncontrolled and too rapid
growth is pathological and typically results in either impairment of nor-
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mal function or death of the entire organism. In constitutional terms, this
implies that evolutionary—but not revolutionary—adaptation to the shifting
requirements of the political environment is to be anticipated, and indeed,
encouraged; and there is a correspondingly ambivalent standpoint toward
such methods of constitutional change as formal amendments, judicial
interpretation, and custom and usage. For a community, however, continu-
ing change is a correlate of the exchange of information, and is therefore
a predominant characteristic of the communication process. When the Con-
stitution is viewed as the legal manifestation of a community, there is
(relative to the other two models) maximal empathy for change. Indeed, the
Constitution, a patterning of the values of many living people, is itself in
continuous flux because of the information-producing and -transmitting ac-
tivities of elites who seek to reinforce or modify the constitutional values of
the masses of other persons who comprise the bulk of the community.
Neither is Table 47 intended to suggest that each new model has tended
to displace its predecessors; to the contrary, their interrelationship is comple-
mentary, since each helps to explain certain phenomena better than its alter-
natives. The Newtonian universe defines nature as it is ordinarily perceived
in human experience; the developmental organisms of Darwinian evolution
populate and inhabit the apparent Newtonian environment, but the social re-
lationships among these human organisms are better understood in terms of a
more open model of structure and change than either of the older two is capa-
ble of providing.
In the social sciences in general, and in political science in particular,
most of the classical literature which is accepted as constituting the stock-
pile of substantive knowledge about the subject of the discipline relates to
a society (including a polity) that is molded upon the mechanical model.
However, this does not mean that the mechanical approach is the one which
dominates inquiry in the social sciences today. Rather, it is the organic
concept of society which, after having become established as the prevail-
ing mood in general sociological theory, now appears to have achieved the
status of orthodoxy as the conventional temper (under a variety of aliases
and in the form of such isotopes as structural-functionalism, transactional-
ism, systems analysis, etc.) in the political science of the nineteen-sixties.
Behavioral theory has made much greater headway in psychology and an-
thropology than in political science, although this need not preclude us from
asking what it might have to offer to us in our attempt to enhance our un-
derstanding of development and change in the emerging Constitution in the
United States at the present time.
In the discussion that follows, I should like first to sketch more fully
each of the three models, as these might relate to constitutional change.
Next I shall attempt to exemplify the different kinds of questions which
one would deduce as appropriate for investigation under each of the three
models, using for empirical data the events associated with three forms
of equality which have been important as contemporary issues of constitu-
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tional policy. Finally, I shall discuss the differential implications of the three
models for action programs of constitutional change in relation to civil dis-
armament, an emerging issue of public policy, thereby exploring in greater
depth these varying perspectives of the emerging Constitution.
II. MODES OF DISCOURSE
A
The United States Constitution necessarily was a by-product of the sci-
entific metaphor of its age,6 and the science of the eighteenth century was
one which hypothesized a determinate world in which all bodies moved in-
exorably in accordance with the vectorial pressures of universal force. The
Constitution is a blueprint for a machine. To be more explicit, and following
Landau:
In physics a system is called mechanical, as with Newton, “if and only if its basic
entities are particles that move in orbit.” That is, it must be a closed system consisting
of discrete bodies, each possessing a specific set of properties (such as mass and posi-
tion) that act over space and time in accordance with fixed law. The motion of a body
is unequivocally determined by the action of other bodies in the system. Changes in
position are always and solely a function of the masses of the system members and the
distances between them. In such a system there is only lawful behavior: from a defi-
nite configuration of particles there will always follow the same results; there are no
alternatives, and there is nothing any part of the system can do about it. It is possible,
therefore, to build a completely predictable structure. Since the state of the system at
any one time determines its state at another, one may predict the future if one knows
the present. Hence the method of analysis is to reduce any process to its irreducible
elements or parts, and to treat process as the resultant of these separate parts acting
externally on one another. (1961: 337)
Deutsch has provided an alternative description of the mechanical model:
The classical concept or model of mechanism implied the notion of a whole which
was completely equal to the sum of its parts; which could be run in reverse; and which
would behave in exactly identical fashion no matter how often those parts were disassem-
bled and put together again, and irrespective of the sequence in which the disassembling
or re-assembling would take place. It implied consequently the notion that the parts were
never significantly modified by each other, nor by their own past, and that each part once
placed into its appropriate position with its appropriate momentum, would stay exactly
there and continue to fulfill its completely and uniquely determined function.
This classical notion of mechanism was a strictly metaphysical concept. No
thing completely fulfilling these conditions has ever been on land, or sea, or
even, as our cosmologists have told us, among the stars. The more complicated a
modern mechanical device becomes in practice, the more important becomes the
interdependence and mutual interaction of its parts through wear and friction,
6. For a contrary view, see James A. Robinson 1957; for a supporting view, see Pargellis
1938: 46.
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and the interdependence of all those parts with their environment, as to temperature,
moisture, magnetic, and electrical and other influences. The more exacting we make the
standards for the performance of a real “mechanism,” the less “mechanical” in the clas-
sical sense does it become. Even an automobile engine must be “broken in,” and a highly
accurate timing device depends so much on its environment that it must be assembled in
air-conditioned workrooms by workers with dry fingertips. (1951: 234)
The fundamental elements of the Constitution are familiar to us all: the
national vis-à-vis the individual state governments, and each of the states vis-
à-vis each other; the Congress, the president, and the Supreme Court; and
in either direct or indirect apposition to these engines, under the federal di-
vision and the separation of powers, we the people of the United States are
massed. Each of the major elements is subdivided into constituent parts. Thus,
the Congress consists of the Senate and the House; the president is distin-
guished from the executive departments, the principal officers of which must
report to him in writing upon his request; and it is presumed that the Supreme
Court will review the decisions of inferior courts.7 The ultimate particles of
the Constitution—what a less respectful person than I might call the nuts and
bolts of the machine—are the individual incumbents of the public offices for
which it provides, such as president, elector, senator, representative, judge,
ambassador, juror, and citizen.
The manifest purpose of the Constitution is to define, allocate, and re-
strain the transmission of power throughout the machinery of government.
The president, for example, moves within an orbit defined by the federal di-
vision of powers, the separation of powers, and the Bill of Rights. It would
be banal to recount the checks and balances that restrain him; I shall instead
simply suggest their image by mentioning legislation, appropriations, confir-
mation of appointments, impeachment, and judicial review. As recently as a
generation ago we find an exceptionally sophisticated, as well as articulate,
associate justice of the United States Supreme Court invoking the explicitly
mechanical metaphor of hydrodynamics first to support8 and then to restrain9
the exercise of presidential-congressional power in the heyday of the New
Deal. Certainly for most lawyers, and probably also for most political scientists
and other commentators upon constitutional change, classical physics contin-
ues to provide the orientation, the vocabulary, and the criteria deemed most
relevant for analyses—even today as we enter the latter third of the twenti-
eth century—of the meaning of “the contemporary constitutional situation,” as
well as of prescriptions for its betterment.
7. Further compartmentalization into such structural components as legislative committees
and subcommittees, or bureaus and offices, although not explicitly mentioned in the document,
certainly is consistent with the grosser pattern that is specified.
8. “Discretion is not unconfined and vagrant. It is canalized within banks to keep it from
overflowing.” Cardozo, dissenting in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan.
9. “The delegated power of legislation which has found expression in this code is not canal-
ized within banks that keep if from overflowing. It is unconfined and vagrant…. This is delegation
running riot.” Cardozo, concurring in Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States.
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We find, for example, that traditionally oriented lawyers and political sci-
entists typically propose to bring about changes in function (i.e., in future
outcomes which they deem desirable) by accomplishing ad hoc modifications
in the machinery of government, such as by changing the structural parts
assumed to be the “cause” of the unwanted present outcomes. The shortest
way with political dissenters is to require them to confess their crimes by
changing the text of the constitutional document10; the best way to control a
zealous bureacracy is to change the carburetor of the administrative engine
from down-draft to up-draft, and add a governor.11
The persistence of the mechanistic mode of thought is demonstrated also
by the contemporary writings of a leading political theorist, David Easton. In
an influential earlier book, Easton defined policy-making, the characteristic
and principal task of government, to be “the authoritative allocation of values
for a society” (Easton 1953: 129–134, emphasis added). A problem of his con-
tinuing attempts to discuss a biological model of political systems is Easton’s
relentless endeavor to square the circle by retaining his mechanical definition
of policy-making as the deus ex machina of his biological systems theory.12
Even if one is going to insist upon the efficacy of biological patterns for the
understanding of political action, it may be more efficient, as Landau persua-
sively has argued (1961: 332–333), to eschew mixed metaphors, and to work
with an organic rather than a mechanical analogy as one’s central concept13
to explain systemic change.
B
One peculiarity of this age [wrote Walter Bagehot a century ago] is the sudden acqui-
sition of much physical knowledge. There is scarcely a department of science or art which
is the same, or at all the same, as it was fifty years ago. A new world of inventions … has
grown up around us which we cannot help seeing; a new world of ideas is in the air and
affects us, though we do not see it. A full estimate of these effects would require a great
book, and I am sure I could not write it; but I think I may usefully … show how … the new
ideas are modifying two old sciences—politics and political economy. (1908 edition: 1)
And only last year, we find a political scientist proclaiming that “we are wit-
nessing the greatest breakthrough in science of all time. Every generation
invariably believes that its own time is the most revolutionary, but never in
man’s history have so many new discoveries in so many fields been made in
10. See Mayers 1959. For a contrasting behavioral approach to this problem, see Stouffer
1955.
11. See Abraham 1965. Cf. Edward S. Corwin’s proposal to substitute the British for the
American cabinet system (1957).
12. Easton 1965a: 50, 96–97. “[I]ts characteristic mode of behaving as a political system …
[is] the capacity of the system to allocate values for the society and assure their acceptance” (p.
96). Cf. Easton 1965b: 349–350. For an earlier but similar endeavor, see McBain 1927.
13. “[The outputs of interest to our analysis] are closely associated with those who hold the
positions of authority in the system and thereby set the goals toward which the energies and
resources of the system may be directed. This is why I have called them authoritative allocations
of values. They are central to our analysis….” (Easton 1965b: 350)
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such a short span of time” (Thorbecke 1965: 17). Although somewhat widely
separated in space and time, these two authors share the objective of urging
that biological and, explicitly, evolutionary theory be made the model for po-
litical analysis, in both descriptive and normative terms. They differ in that
Bagehot was perhaps ahead of his own era and Thorbecke most certainly lags
behind ours.
But explicitly what does it mean to suggest that we should pattern politi-
cal life upon a biological model? Deutsch says that:
According to the classical view, an “organism” is unanalyzable, at least in part.
It cannot be taken apart and put together again without damage. As Wordsworth put
it, “We murder to dissect.” The parts of a classical organism, in so far as they can be
identified at all, not only retain the functions which they have been assigned but in
fact cannot be put to any other functions (except within narrow limits of “de-differ-
entiation” which were often ignored), without destroying the organism. The classical
organism’s behavior is irreversible. It has a significant past and a history—two things
which the classical mechanism lacks—but it is only half historical because it was be-
lieved to follow its own peculiar “organic law” which governs its birth, maturity, and
death, and which cannot be analyzed in terms of clearly identifiable “mechanical”
causes.
Attempts have been frequent to apply this classical concept of organism to
biology and to human society. On the whole they have been unsuccessful. While “or-
ganismic” models might sometimes help to balance the onesidedness of a “mechanical”
approach, biologists have failed to derive significant predictions or experiments from
the supposed “life force” of nineteenth-century “vitalists,” and the inadequacies of
organismic theories of society or history have been even more conspicuous. In one
aspect organismic notions could be used to draw attention to processes of growth: or-
ganisms, after all, were supposed to grow before they reached maturity, though not
afterwards. (1951: 236)
Moreover, as Landau has pointed out:
A biological system never is: it is always happening. It is in continuous inter-
change with its environment. Accordingly … a statement of the biological form “not
only relates to the organism but takes in a part of the environment.” Which is to
state that things and entities, organs and parts are not the essentials of the system:
rather, the essentials are specified relationships of a structural-functional nature. Here
structure is not a “sum” of the separate parts acting on each other, of the separate
organs adding up to a unit, as it is a slow relational process of long duration, the
description of which presupposes a stoppage of time and constitutes a momentary
glimpse of what is happening. It is only relative to function, a fast process of short
duration, that a structure appears constant. Constancy, thus, is not a matter of ma-
terial substance as it is a matter of form of relationship—relationships that we know
as boundary exchanges, mutual interdependence, self-regulation, adaptation to distur-
bance, approaches to steady states. And by the logic of the system, to speak of one
is to “take in” the others. That is, boundary exchange is defined in terms of mutual
interdependence which is defined in terms of self-regulation which is defined in terms
of adaptation which is defined in terms of steady states. One presupposes the other.
The logic of this system is of the order of “transactionalism” as Dewey and Bentley
formulated it. What it requires is a close attention to relationship not to things. What
it requires is that we minimize nouns. That we see politics as a set of relationships
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in a stated environment; that a political leader is not a noun, that a leader is defined
in terms of a follower, that it presupposes follower, that you cannot conceive of a
leader without a follower, that to speak of one is to speak of the other. That there is
no noun federalism but there is a federative relationship such that a statement about
the central government is a statement about the states. And so on. The unit of analy-
sis is always a relationship of transactional character and comprehends context and
process.14 (1965b: 8–9)
Since the end of World War II, American political science has moved away
from the traditional, mechanistic approach to the study of politics to such an
extent that the biological metaphor is now the conventional one. We know it,
generally, under the rubric “The Political Process” approach; and we associate
with it what already has become a classical literature, including such names
as Bentley (1955), Herring (1929), and Truman (1951). The shift has been
from formal interaction between institutions to informal transactions among
groups; and although the political process approach came initially to other
sectors of political research, it has now been over a decade since Peltason is-
sued a call for a jurisprudence based upon the group struggle among interest
groups.15 The judicial process approach, as it tends to be called, is now the
modal position for research and teaching in American political science today
in the field traditionally known as public law.16
The biological metaphor requires that we analogize sets of political
events to series of life processes. If we are interested in constitutional
change, we must seek to observe a vast array of activities that are taking
place at and within the boundaries of a manifold of events that we delimit
conceptually, for analytical purposes, as the political system (Mitchell 1962).
The political system—or polity—is, on the one hand, a subsystem of an even
more general social system, while at the same time the political system
subsumes a set of subsystems, of which the judicial system is one. Thus con-
ceived, the judicial system includes both federal and state courts as so-called
concrete structures, and attention focuses primarily upon functional relation-
ships within the system.17 In order to discuss constitutional change, however,
we must be concerned with the broader field of action encompassed by the
political system, since only a part of the relevant activities will be confined in
scope to the judicial system.18 It seems altogether likely that, with regard to
any particular policy issue, the findings and conclusions that we might reach
about constitutional change, when we have analyzed it in relationship to the
14. “The application of a biological model to politics,” he adds, “is no easy task.” (1965b: 9)
15. Peltason 1953: 51–56. Peltason was anticipated some two decades earlier by the preco-
cious Karl N. Llewellyn, whose “rediscovery” of Bentley (1934) proved to be abortive, since he
wrote for the wrong audience (i.e., lawyers).
16. For recent articulations of this point of view, see Jacob 1965; Shapiro 1964a.
17. For a more explicit articulation of structural-functional theory as a conceptual frame-
work for analyzing the judicial process, see Schubert 1965d.
18. For an excellent example of such an analysis, see Danelski 1964, and especially Part
Three, in which the author interprets his empirical data in terms of transactional theory.
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political system, may differ markedly from those that we would derive from an
appraisal of constitutional change in the machinery of government.
In the mechanistic model, the Constitution is a blueprint—a design for the
construction of institutional structures. The Constitution defines the pattern
which determines the structure of the institutions. In the biological model,
however, the opposite is true. Change in institutional structure is slow, but it is
also inexorable. Nature, not the Constitution, is the cause of institutional evo-
lution; and the function of the Constitution in an organic model of the polity is
to maintain a reasonably up-to-date “Restatement” (to borrow a legal concept)
of both the contemporary institutional structures of government and of their
functional relationships. In the idiom of John Marshall, “the prolixity of a legal
code” (McCulloch v. Maryland, at p. 407) is precisely what is required of the
Constitution, as the following sketch of the opening clauses of a draft of the
Constitution (but in the organic mode) may suggest:
Article I. Section 1. Legislation is a function which consists of the concurrence of both
houses of the Congress in proposals which previously have been agreed to by the Admin-
istration.
2. Administrative participation in legislation is a function of several subprocesses,
two of which involve executive clearance of proposals:
A. Executive bill clearance.
(1) A member of the classified civil service, usually in cooperation with
other civil servants and with representatives of various organiza-
tions of persons who are not governmental employees, will suggest
a proposal.
(2) [Administrative review, by the agency, of the proposal]
(3) [Consultation with legislative subcommittees and staff]
(4) [Consultation with other clientele groups]
(5) [Budget Bureau clearance with other agencies]
B. Enrolled bill clearance.
[Etc.]
The possibility of planned change is not precluded by the biological
model, but it becomes a very much more complicated matter than it is for
mechanists. Instead of focusing upon linguistic change in the document and
letting the institutional chips fall where they may,19 the social engineer
must, under the biological model, make predictions concerning how changes
in the practices of one subsystem are likely to affect practices in many other
related subsystems. For example, suppose it were proposed that the seniority
system for committee assignments and status in Congress ought to be abol-
ished.20 The biological metaphor requires that to recommend change in the
19. Cf. the consequences of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
20. For a variety of what may seem to most political scientists to be very good reasons: it
leads to too much overspecialization among congressmen; it fails to select the best men for posi-
tions of functional leadership; it results in overrepresentation of minority segments of the public;
it encourages too-detailed congressional surveillance of administration; it fosters the overcon-
centration of authority in committee chairmen; it gives too much weight to the Southern political
culture; etc.
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seniority system, it is necessary to attempt to predict at least the range of vari-
ation in the processes of a large number of related subsystems.21 Otherwise
there would be no basis for being able to conclude whether the balance of ben-
eficial and of deleterious side effects of the proposed change would be more
or less desirable than the anticipated direct benefits expected to result from
the abolition of the seniority system.
The biological approach to politics puts flesh upon the endoskeleton of
mechanically motivated political structures; but both the conventional and the
traditional approaches leave political behavior unexamined at the level of the
discrete, individual human being. To the extent that the mechanical approach
is concerned with the motivations of individual humans, it imputes these as
rational inferences from the natural order—that is to say, as commonsensical
rather than as scientific observations. Thus we have the sweeping majesty of
the generalizations about human behavior to be found in such relevant sources
as The Federalist or John Marshall’s opinions.22 In such sources the function
of assertions about human behavior is rhetorical, since the operations of the
machinery of government depend, not upon what goes on inside individuals,
but rather upon the relationships between institutions, “to the end,” in the lan-
guage of Article XXX of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, “that it be a
government of laws, and not of men.”
It is perhaps not surprising that the mechanical orientation tends to de-
fine individuals as automata; but we might not have anticipated that a political
metaphor which emulates life processes would define political action not as
political behavioralism, but rather as Watsonian behaviorism. A leading con-
ventional thinker tells us, for example, that
Judicial activities are … reflections of the legal rules which have the support of the most
powerful interests of society….
It is questionable … if [the] search for “mind-stuff” is … a fruitful endeavor for polit-
ical scientists.
… [T]he notion [persists] that the extent to which a judge makes policy is an attribute
of his personality, that a judge may choose to enter or refrain from entering the group
struggle that we call politics. But a judge cannot avoid taking sides. The judiciary is in pol-
itics not because of the desire of the individual justice but because it makes decisions….
[I]f we turn our attention to the judiciary as a facet in the group struggle and
21. E.g., programmatic and personnel changes in: executive agencies cognate to particular
congressional committees and subcommittees; state and local political party organizations; the
probable content of policy norms embodied in legislation; the presidency, due to the differing
character of the Congress with which presidents will have to interact; the federal district courts,
in particular, and judicial patronage; etc.
22. E.g., “That the power to tax involves the power to destroy” in McCulloch v. Maryland,
at p. 431. Nor is it surprising to find, again in the same opinion in the same case, at least an
equally famous dictum in the organic mode: “we must never forget that it is a constitution we
are expounding,” and one which is “intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to
be adapted to the various crises of human affairs” (pp. 407, 415). Marshall, as usual, was inter-
ested in political effect, rather than in the consistency of his metaphors
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relate the activities of judges to that of other groups, we can begin to develop
a political science of public law without trying to “out-history” the historian,
“out-law” the lawyer, or “out-psychology” the psychologist. (Peltason 1953: 53,
55, 56)
We are advised, in short, to confine our attention, as analysts of constitutional
(or any other kind of political) change, to empirical descriptions, letting others
worry about why we observe what is manifestly there to see.
C
It is entirely possible, however, to derive from the underlying biological
metaphor theories of communication which emphasize human psychology and
physiology, and indeed which posit political systems modeled in part upon
the biological processes of human beings (Deutsch 1963; Wiener 1954). As
explained by Deutsch the model of the communications network integrates
selected characteristics of both machines and organisms, which results in a
much less rigid and more flexible view of reality than is provided by either of
the two older models:
[W]e may derive from them [cybernetics, the science of communication and con-
trol], a generalized concept of a self-modifying communications network or “learning
net.”
… [C]ommunications engineering transfers information. It does not transfer events;
it transfers a patterned relationship between events….
… From the amount of information transmitted as against the information lost,
we may derive a measure for the efficiency of a channel, as well as of the relative
efficiency or complementarity of any parts or stages of the channel in relation to the
others.
These patterns of information can be measured in quantitative terms, described in
mathematical language, analyzed by science, and transmitted or operated on a practical
industrial scale.
… By a society we may designate a group of persons who “have learned to work to-
gether,” that is, persons tied together by some division of labor, some exchange of goods
and services, with only as much communication essential to its functioning as is required
to get these goods or services exchanged. By a community we mean a group of persons
united by their ability to exchange information. A society can carry on economic processes
as studied by economics but only a community can carry a culture as studied by cultural
anthropology. Society and community, or therefore, society and culture, may or may not
coincide for the same set of persons….
The complementarity of the parts of any communications channel or sys-
tem may be defined as their capacity of transmitting information to each other.
It can be tested and even measured by suitable operations. This is true not
only for the parts of a mechanical or electrical communication system but
also of the members of a communications system made up of human beings.
We may use, therefore, complementarity as a measure for the unity and inner
cohesion of a group.
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In particular, we may define therefore a people as a larger group of persons linked
by complementary habits and facilities of communication, or more briefly, as a community
of both internal and social communications equipment….
With the aid of these models, we may recognize a basic pattern which minds, so-
cieties, and self-modifying communications networks have in common. Engineers have
called this pattern the “feedback.”
… [B]y feedback is meant a communications network which produces action in re-
sponse to an input of information and includes the results of its own action in the new
information by which it modifies its subsequent behavior….
Values have material reality in any such communications system: we may think of
them as the operating preferences according to which certain messages rather than oth-
ers are transmitted, or transmitted first….
A “machine” has been defined as an “apparatus for applying mechanical power, hav-
ing several parts each with definite function”; and an organism as a “body with connected
interdependent parts sharing common life”; and an “organ” as a “part of animal or veg-
etable body adapted for special vital functions.” Both machines and organisms are …
characterized by a high degree of permanence in the functions assigned to each part, be it
a cog in the wheel or an organ grown permanently in its place in the body. Learning nets
may conform to these limitations, if they are of mechanical or organic construction, but
their functions as learning nets may point beyond these limits, to the different character-
istics of societies.
… [T]his possibility of relatively free transfer and recombination, not only of the
symbols treated, but of the very physical elements of a learning net for the perfor-
mance of new operations, is the critical property which makes a given learning net
into a society.
A learning net functions as a society, in this view, to the extent that its constituent
physical parts are capable of regrouping themselves into new patterns of activity in re-
sponse to changes in the net’s surroundings, or in response to the internally accumulating
results of their own or the net’s past.
The twin tests by which we can tell a society from an organism or a machine,
on this showing, would be the freedom of its parts to regroup themselves; and the
nature of the regroupings, which must imply new coherent patterns of activity—in
contrast to the mere wearing of a machine or the aging of an organism, which are
marked by relatively few degrees of freedom and by the gradual disappearance of
coherent patterns of activity….
The difference between organisms and societies rests, then, in the degree of freedom
of their parts, and the degree of effectiveness of their recombinations to new coherent pat-
terns of activity.
This in turn may rest on specific properties of their members: their capacity for read-
justment to new configurations, with renewed complementarity and sustained or removed
communication.
The degree of complementarity between the members of a society may de-
termine its capacity for sustained coherence, while their degree of freedom—and
their range of readjustments available without loss of complementarity—may de-
termine the society’s capacity for sustained growth…. The more complex and
readjustable the constituent parts of a society become, the greater the coherence
and freedom of each of its subassemblies, the greater should be the society’s
possibilities of itself achieving greater coherence and freedom in the course of
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its history. Learning nets and societies do not grow best by simplifying or rigidly
subordinating their parts or members, but rather with the complexity and freedom
of these members, so long as they succeed in maintaining or increasing com-
munication, both with each other and with the outside world—communication of
increasing variety, richness, precision, and freedom for new kinds of intake and
new recombinations. (Deutsch 1963: 240–252 passim; emphasis in the original)
The model of many contemporary communications systems, such as a
modern electronic computer installation or Telstar, suggests not only a world
but also a universe in continual flux and with elementary particles of sub-
atomic dimensions. The behavior of these elementary particles is governed to
a considerable extent by chance (Aubert 1959; Moore and Sussman 1932), as
distinguished from the structure of organic particles, which are affected less
conspicuously by chance (through mutation and in reproduction) and in sharp
contradistinction from the completely determined behavior of mechanical par-
ticles.
From the cultural point of view, the individual is the atom of political ac-
tion, and the small group is the molecule of political interaction (Pritchett
1948; Schubert 1965c). But behavioral analysis, unlike nuclear physics, in-
evitably involves working within the framework of the biological metaphor,
since these particles of social action and interaction are clusterings of living
persons. However, a major difference between the cultural and the organic
approaches is that behavioral analysis goes beyond large group theory by
viewing social clusters as aggregations of individual behaviors rather than as
(e.g., for purposes of sociological analysis) entities having an independent ex-
istence.
But what do such physical attributes—indeterminacy, unrestricted
growth and development,23 chance occurrence, and autogenous learning
(i.e., feedback)—imply for the modeling of social relationships? These are
the very qualities which many social psychologists and other behavioral
scientists have stressed as the hallmark of a democratic constitutional
polity (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950: esp. xvii–xviii; Rokeach 1960). It may
be, therefore, that what we seek is the concept of constitutionalism sug-
gested by the political behavioral point of view, under which what counts
most directly in initiating constitutional change is the “political wisdom”
(i.e., the values, attitudes, ideologies, information, experience, socializa-
tion, and skill in predicting probable consequences for alternative outcome
possibilities) of a majority of the incumbent set of most relevant political
decision-makers.
From a behavioral point of view, decision-makers such as voters, legis-
lators, judges, administrators, and chief executives act in socially defined
roles in relation to policy issues of contemporary importance. Decision-mak-
ing roles become “socially defined” as a consequence of more or less con-
23. And often in response to serendipity (another name for expediency and oppor-
tunism) rather than to genetic or vectorial combinations.
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sensual expectations about how persons in particular relationships to others
ought to act; these norms relate to both the procedures by which they make
decisions and the substantive content of such decisions. Issues become rec-
ognized as important as a consequence of the attempts of decision-makers to
anticipate what are likely to be recognized (either at moderate to high inten-
sity by many sectors of their relevant clientele, or at high intensity by a few
sectors) as allocations of goods and values that affect their clientele’s needs,
wants, goals, beliefs, and so forth. The study of political behavior is there-
fore the analysis of how, why, and with what effects decisions are made that
affect public policy and political action. Public policy consists of patterns of
norms which articulate ideals of behavior; political action consists of what-
ever men do in their attempts to influence either the statement of norms or
behavior that is the subject of norms. From this point of view, public policy
norms are metaphors, in the figurative sense, since they are assertions that
people are behaving in ways that they never are universally behaving.
Let us consider a few examples of public policy norms:
(1) All men are created free and equal.
(2) We the People of the United States … do ordain and establish this Con-
stitution.
(3) No State shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
(4) The opportunity for an education is a right available to all on equal
terms.
(5) One man, one vote.
(6) Equal justice under law, for rich and poor alike.
One characteristic shared by the above propositions is that they are relatively
abstract norms; all are at the level of generality (vacuity) characteristic of con-
stitutional documentary norms. Other more explicit norm statements might
be:
(1) Speed limit: 20 m.p.h.
(2) Keep off the grass.
(3) Stop.
But in the case of either the constitutional or the traffic norms, the focus
of interest for political analysis is upon: (1) the factors underlying the de-
cisions to establish the norms in their past, present, and probable future
form—what Lasswell calls developmental analysis; (2) the degree and
causes of the gap between the ideal behaviors posited by the norm and
the behaviors that empirically can be observed; and (3) the probable conse-
quences that alternative proposals to restate norms are most likely to have
in terms of present and future political behavior. From a cultural (relativis-
tic) point of view, constitutional norms are only a special and limited case
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of political norms. They are important because, at least in many parts of
the American culture, the Constitution (in either a literal or in an extensive
sense of its authoritatively expounded “true” meaning) is invested with an
aura of prestige which makes its manipulation in support of or in opposition
to preferred political values a question of great political significance.
Lawyers generally, judges more particularly, and the United States
Supreme Court par excellence, are accepted in most parts of the American cul-
ture as the legitimate expositors of constitutional doctrine. In analogical (as
distinguished from metaphorical) terms we might say that just as the pope is
the infallible expositor of Christian truth for Roman Catholics, so the Supreme
Court expounds constitutional truth for the faithful members of the Ameri-
can body politic.24 The Supreme Court’s most important political function is
to legitimate (or to illegitimate) the decisions of actors in the American polit-
ical system, and the Court’s manipulation of the meaning of the Constitution
(e.g., of constitutional doctrine) is a quantitatively lesser but qualitatively ma-
jor instrument for providing such legitimations and illegitimations (Hamilton
1938b: 167–190).
The Court states constitutional norms in opinions that are written to
accompany its decisions. But the Court makes decisions through the delib-
eration and voting and opinion writing of nine individual justices, who act
under the procedural norm of majority rule. Therefore, from a behavioral point
of view, “the Constitution” is, in a narrow but important sense, whatever at
least a majority of the incumbent justices are willing to agree, for purposes of
decision-making, that it ought to be said to mean. In the same sense, the Con-
stitution is what the incumbent president (or those who speak in his name) or
what various members of Congress (in relation to their sectors of functional
expertise) may proclaim by word or by deed. A Harry Truman who recalls a
MacArthur or who directs the use of nuclear weapons is, like a Thomas Jeffer-
son purchasing the Louisiana Territory, interpreting the Constitution; but so
is an Adam Clayton Powell, who from extraterritorial hideaways presided over
both his Harlem fief and the House Education and Labor Committee, in the
first instance as an absentee political landlord and in the second as a chairman
in absentia, all in the name of the combined sacrosanctity of congressional im-
munity and seniority.
In a broader sense of the cultural standpoint, however, neither the jus-
tices of the Supreme Court nor the president nor congressmen nor members
of other or affiliated political elites can interpret the Constitution. What these
24. It has been barely a dozen or so years since John F. Kennedy, as an American citizen and
Catholic layman who was then also a potential president, felt compelled to confess his differenti-
ation between his obligation to the pope and his obligations to the Constitution, and, at least by
strong implication, to the justices of the Supreme Court, who are (metaphorically speaking) the
vestal virgins of the sacred meaning to be associated with it. By the same metaphor, the Judicial
Conference of the United States is the Court’s College of Cardinals, and the American judiciary
is its hierocracy.
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elites can (and do) do is to influence the beliefs and thereby the actions of
each other and of their publics; and it is there, in the consensually dominant
patterns of values that constitute American political ideologies, that “the Con-
stitution” is to be found. Like the very foremost of the Founding Fathers, the
Constitution lives on in the hearts of his countrymen.
III. FORMS OF EQUALITY
In an attempt further to sharpen the differing implications of our three
models of constitutional change, let us consider the kinds of questions that
one ought logically to infer, as a means of guiding inquiry into what the model
would suggest is significant, about several contemporary issues of constitu-
tional policy. For such exemplification, I have selected three major aspects of
the ideological dimension of egalitarianism: racial, representational, and pro-
cedural.
A. Racial Equality
1. TRADITIONAL.25 In its decision in Brown v. Board of Education, did the
Supreme Court follow stare decisis?
Did the Court substitute social psychology, or the philosophic beliefs of in-
dividual justices, for law and legal authority?
Did the Court engage in judicial activism in the Brown case?
Was the Court’s decision politically irresponsible and subversive of the
constitutional separation of powers, since the power to make any such deci-
sion rightfully belonged to the Congress?26
Is the Court’s decision a threat to the maintenance of our federal division
of powers by arrogating to the federal government control over public edu-
cation, a subject which the Constitution has reserved for state control?
Is the pattern of the Court’s decisions dealing with racial integration, es-
pecially during the decade of the nineteen-fifties, a real threat to civil liberties,
since the use of federal troops to enforce individual claims to civil rights cre-
ates a dangerous kind of “police state” precedent, which is contrary to the
basic premises of our democratic system?
2. CONVENTIONAL. What was the effect upon the recent change in national pol-
icy toward racial integration, of the realignment of interest groups in the two
major political parties, consequent upon the defeat of both the Dixiecrats and
the Progressive party in the 1948 presidential election?
To what extent was the decision in the Brown case due to the growth of
an urban Negro electorate? To the increasing strength of organized labor?
25. Since we are here concerned with orientations toward research, I shall identify each of
the sets of questions by the model’s corresponding academic ideology (mechanical = traditional;
biological = conventional; cultural = behavioral). See Table 47 and note b to Table 47.
26. Cf. Crosskey 1953; Schwartz 1963.
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To the activities of the NAACP, the Urban League, the ACLU, the American
Jewish Congress? What was the effect upon the development of integration
policy, of groups which were fostered by it (i.e., CORE, Black Muslims, White
Citizens Councils, the resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan)?
How are the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 196527 an outgrowth of the
continuing interaction between Congress and the Court, and hence related to
the Court’s earlier interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil
Rights Acts of the Reconstruction era?
How is the Court’s decision in the Brown case related to Franklin Roose-
velt’s failure to purge the Democratic party, with the consequent resurgence
of Southern influence in both houses?
3. BEHAVIORAL. What have been the individual ideologies of Supreme Court Jus-
tices since 1937?
What kind of skills, as a lawyer and political organizer, does Thurgood
Marshall have? What will be the effect upon future integration policy of his ap-
pointment to the Supreme Court?
What role did Howard University play in the socialization of plaintiffs
and counsel in the early generation of court cases to raise the issue? In
the socialization, at a later time, of Freedom Riders and voting registration
assistants? How was the emergence of this issue affected by changes in
the international cultural milieu (i.e., the rise of new nations in Africa and
Asia)?
How is national integration policy related to urbanization and mass edu-
cation?
To what extent, and how, was the Court’s decision, and its implemen-
tation, influenced by the prior establishment of consensus within the scientific
community that available evidence required the rejection of deterministic ra-
tionales for the justification of racial inequality?
B. Representational Equality
1. TRADITIONAL. Can we reconcile, with the constitutional separation of
powers, having federal judges thrust into the activist role of deciding the
basis upon which the people will choose their representatives in Con-
gress?
How can the states remain laboratories of socioeconomic experimentation
if they no longer are free to experiment?
Does Baker v. Carr violate the Tenth Amendment?
Is the interference of judges with “politics of the people” incompatible
with the basic premises of our democratic system?
Is Baker v. Carr (like Swift v. Tyson) an unconstitutional usurpation of
power by the national government?
27. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28, 42
U.S.C.); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (Supp. I, 1965).
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Does the Supreme Court’s reapportionment policy violate the due process
clauses of both the Fifth and the Fourteenth amendments by sacrificing, to
the overriding interests of merely numerical majorities, minority rights to “lib-
erty” and “property”?
2. CONVENTIONAL.28 To what extent was the timing of the Supreme Court’s an-
nouncement of a new policy on legislative reapportionment a function of the
increasing urban proportion of the national population?
How is reapportionment related to the finding of the Kestnbaum Commis-
sion’s Report (1955; and cf. Gottman 1961) that megalopolitan regions—not
states—are now the key units in the intergovernmental complex?
How is the persistence of the constitutional structure of federalism re-
lated to the extraconstitutional and decentralized structure of the American
political party system?
Is Baker v. Carr leading to centralization of political parties, first at the
state and then at the national level? To what extent will the national cen-
tralization of political parties (as recommended a decade and a half ago by
the American Political Science Association’s Committee on Political Parties
[1950]) function as a catalyst to hasten the atrophy of the states as units of
governmental structure?
Does Baker v. Carr fulfill the basic function of closing the gap between the
political party system and the functional requisites of the American polity in
the mid-twentieth century?
How does reapportionment policy relate to the urbanization of state poli-
tics?
Has American federalism been important primarily in an instrumental
sense by bridging the gap between the autonomous colonies of the Revolu-
tionary era and the nation of today?
3. BEHAVIORAL. Is Colegrove v. Green best explained on the basis of chance
considerations (i.e., Stone’s death, Jackson’s absence in Europe, Rutledge’s
concern for idiosyncratic [procedural] aspects of this particular case)?
If Colegrove v. Green (instead of Baker v. Carr) had become the instru-
ment for announcing the new reapportionment policy, what effect would this
have had upon the Court’s capacity to develop a new policy for racial integra-
tion?
If Colegrove had been the instrument, what would have been the effect
upon the structuring of compliance, of the loss of the favorable majority within
three years due to the deaths of Murphy and Rutledge? What would have been
the effect of having Truman president instead of Eisenhower?
On what bases can we explain Frankfurter’s intense opposition to the
Court’s reapportionment policy, as distinguished from his reluctant acquies-
cence in the Court’s integration policy?
28. I am particularly indebted, for the questions in this section, to Landau 1965a.
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How was the implementation of Baker v. Carr affected by President
Kennedy’s appointment of over a hundred new federal judges (over a fourth
of the total federal judiciary) in the same year that the decision was an-
nounced?
How is Baker v. Carr related to the coming of age of the older immigrant
classes (i.e., to the ideological and political integration of their children)?29
C. Procedural Equality
1. TRADITIONAL. Do recent changes in the interpretation of the Constitution
demonstrate that the elder John Marshall Harlan was correct about the proper
construction of the procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights?
Should the Supreme Court have followed its precedents in Barron v. Bal-
timore, Betts v. Brady, and Wolf v. Colorado, instead of disregarding the intent
of the framers of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment by distort-
ing the Constitution to make it limit the powers of the states to protect the
rights of the majority to life, liberty, and property?
Are the Court’s recent decisions in cases such as Gideon v. Wainwright,
Mapp v. Ohio, and Douglas v. California a departure from the concept of “or-
dered liberty,” as enunciated for an almost unanimous Court by Mr. Justice
Cardozo nearly thirty years ago?
2. CONVENTIONAL. To what extent are the Court’s recent decisions, expanding
the right to counsel in both trials and appeals before state courts, consequent
upon the efforts of the American Bar Association and related lawyers’ organi-
zations to expand the employment opportunities for lawyers? From the point
of view of local compliance with the Supreme Court’s policy directives, is the
recent expansion of the right to counsel possible now only because of the rel-
ative affluence today of local communities (i.e., their capacity to pay for the
considerable increase in the public costs for providing legal services to indi-
gent defendants)?
How has the Court been influenced in its development of more ex-
tensive civil rights and liberties for criminal defendants, by the explicitly
relevant activities of the American Civil Liberties Union and similar
groups? By the more diffuse political activities of civic action and prose-
lyting carried out by the complex of groups and interests associated with
the civil rights movement in recent years? In other words, to what extent
has the Court been responsive to feedback from its own racial integration
decisions?
Have the Court and the community been, at least to some extent, re-
29. We might hypothesize that such persons would be particularly sensitive to the gap be-
tween democratic ideology, in relation to representation theory in particular, and prevailing
political practices, in view of the high correlation between immigrant concentrations and urban-
rural differences.
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sponsive to what might be conceptualized as the political demands of an
expanded clientele (i.e., growth in the size and political influence of the
criminal population)?
To what extent is the redefinition of Fourteenth Amendment due pro-
cess of law in Gideon v. Wainwright and Douglas v. California, to extend
the right to counsel for indigent criminal defendants before state courts,
a satisfactory accommodation, for the time being, of the conflicting and
overlapping interests of lawyers and their vocational development, the civil
rights movement, taxpayers, “our convict population” (to borrow the late
Mr. Justice Robert Jackson’s colorful and characteristic phrase), the general
population who are actual or potential victims of criminals, the police, et
alia?
3. BEHAVIORAL. Is the most proximate explanation for the recent liberalization
of constitutional policy in this field to be found in Kennedy’s appointment of
Goldberg (and Johnson’s of Fortas), thereby providing, for the first time in our
history, a solid majority of justices who are sympathetic to civil rights and lib-
erties?
To what extent are the recent policy changes responsive to the influence
of the national law schools, which provide the law clerks, supply through their
reviews a continuing critical literature, and entertain Supreme Court justices,
thereby providing a direct conversational link between them and distinguished
members of law faculties?
Are the recent policy changes a reflection of the much better education,
both university and legal, that contemporary justices have had, as compared
to their predecessors of even a generation ago?
Is the recent expansion of civil liberties (as one sociologist has hypothe-
sized [Snyder 1958: 236–238]) a function of the increasingly liberal progres-
sion in the thrust of the development of the beliefs and attitudes of Americans?
Are Watts and Hough examples of popular response to the stimulus pro-
vided by the Court’s decisions in racial and procedural equality cases of the
past decade?
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR CIVIL DISARMAMENT
Let us turn, finally, to the instrumental implications of the three models as
a source of strategic and tactical prescriptions for any persons who might be
interested, from an engineering point of view, in constitutional reform. What
should they do? How can the models guide them?
In order to make the discussion more explicit, we need to assume a
particular goal as the object of constitutional change. Both a worthy and
a timely objective would be to propose a program of political action that
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would have the effect not of repealing but of reversing the Second Amend-
ment.30 In favor of such a proposal, on the merits, we may note the following
considerations,31 inter alia:
(1) “A well regulated Militia,” armed with privately owned weapons,
does not exist in the United States; it has not existed for over a cen-
tury and a half; and if such a militia did exist in twentieth-century
America, its chief political significance almost certainly would be not
as a guarantee of the security of the government, but quite to the con-
trary as a major threat of subversion. It was through the use of such
“well regulated Militia” that Hitler came to power in Nazi Germany;
and today any organized private body of armed men would have to be
viewed, in this country, as an incipient threat of extremist aggression
against the presently prevailing constitutional order.
(2) Modern wars, other than civil, do not require the services of militia;
neither do the skills of the gunfighter bulk large in the repertoire of ex-
pertises of the Defense Department today. (It is even possible that this
point is related to the first point, above.)
(3) The Constitution does not include a guarantee of the right to duel (i.e.,
a guarantee as a civil liberty of the right to conduct private warfare). But
this is strictly a matter of timing; duels were becoming illegal as well as
unfashionable by the end of the eighteenth century, as Burr’s shooting of
Hamilton exemplifies. A constitution adopted in 1690 might well have in-
cluded a constitutional right to duel, just as one adopted in 1890 almost
certainly would not have contained the second amendment.
(4) Universal civil disarmament is probably a condition precedent to suc-
cessful disarming of criminals, lunatics, children, and sportsmen.
(a) It seems likely that criminals of all ages will continue to gain
access to weapons, both homemade and imported from countries
whose citizens live under less enlightened constitutions. Incarcer-
ated criminals get their weapons by these means, and it must be
assumed that those with relatively greater freedom of maneuver
will not do less. But it will be less convenient than it is now,32
and considerably more expensive for the average criminal (who is
not wealthy) to equip himself with guns.
30. “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” United States Constitution, amendment
II.
31. See also Bakal 1966; Editorial 1966; Buchwald 1966, 1967.
32. According to an Associated Press newswire emanating from New York City in August
1966, the United States Department of Commerce estimated annual domestic production of
firearms to be about two million weapons, plus over three-fourths of a million presently legal
imports from abroad. For other estimates of the latter datum, see Hearings 1965 and Editorial
1967.
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(b) The use of guns by lunatics to assassinate both extraordinary
and ordinary targets who happen to fall within the scope of their
sights has been particularly noteworthy in recent years. Such
names as Lee Harvey Oswald, Jack Ruby, and Charles Whitman
come readily to mind; and in each locality there are many other
psychotics who fail to achieve national repute only because they
kill smaller numbers of ordinary people. In Hawaii, for example,
one would think of the Pali hunter, who perched near the spot
where Kamehameha I pushed the remnants of the local Oahu
militia over a sheer cliff of several hundred feet, one which still
affords for tourists a spectacular view of the windward coast.
Michael Patrick Moeller, a young man recently in and out of the
local mental hospital, and with a previous police and psychiatric
record of shooting at people, armed himself with a department
store rifle and shot with some little success at tourists and police
until he was persuaded to surrender in fear that the police were
about to shoot him.
(c) Children, a not inconsiderable number of whom shoot each other,
their parents, and friends of the family each year, typically with
“unloaded” revolvers found under pillows and in bureau drawers,
doubtless can be disarmed once their most convenient source of sup-
ply of weapons—in the master bedroom at home—is removed.
(d) This leaves the sportsmen, and they doubtless will constitute
the most vocal and best organized opposition to the proposal.
Their need for weapons to accomplish their nominal purposes is
clear. Among the great areas for hunting is Michigan, a state
which grows its deer as a crop, and in which the Department of
Conservation manipulates a complex set of regulations in order
to assure a harvest of animals that will be within the critical
range required for the planned ecological balance. There is also
an unplanned—but hardly unanticipated—harvest of humans each
autumn, as a veritable army of not very well regulated militiamen
march through the woods, fields, and farmyards, shooting at any-
thing that moves. An inevitable consequence of what one might
loosely call this shotgun approach to the problem of eradicat-
ing wildlife is that many hunters shoot themselves or each other,
along with sundry cows, dogs, and other game. An almost equal
number die of heart attacks, as middle-aged men whose routine
way of life does not include strenuous physical exercise attempt
to bring out of the woods the quarries which (or whom) they have
bagged. Although social Darwinists will not agree, there is proba-
bly a more humane way than this of providing recreational outlets
for urban sportsmen; and it is conceivable that a determined elite
of opinion-molders might be able to identify, for these imitators
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of eighteenth-century American food-gathering practices,33 a set
of substitute leisure activities which would be socially acceptable
without necessitating the use of weapons.
Undoubtedly there are appealing arguments in support of the status quo
(Hearings 1965; Kilpatrick 1967), but they will not be canvassed here, as
my purpose is not to weigh the evidence, but rather to suggest a few of the
reasons why some persons might favor such a proposal, and some of the ar-
guments which they might advance in support of their position. Instead of
debating the merits, let us turn to the question of how our group should pro-
ceed to accomplish their goal, which is to negate the constitutional right to
bear arms.
The proper course to follow, under the mechanistic model, is easiest to de-
scribe: all that is required is another amendment to the Constitution, intruding
the prefix “un” before “necessary,” and deleting the word “infringed.” Such
a course of action would have the advantage of keeping de minimus the lit-
eral modifications of constitutional language, and this in itself is a result that
should be pleasing to most lawyers (for technical reasons) and to most polit-
ical conservatives (for substantive ones). It is, of course, doubtful that such
an amendment could be adopted at this time; indeed, it appears doubtful that
proposed legislation tied to the commerce clause can get through the Senate
judiciary committee, although if by chance the next few years should witness
the assassination of more senior senators than of presidents, the odds in favor
of the bill getting the approval of the venerable James Eastland of Mississippi
might be greatly enhanced.
Assuming that the document has been changed as specified above,
it is clear from a normative point of view what the next steps should be.
The presumption (under the model) is that Congress and state legisla-
tures will do their duty and enact legislation to back up the prohibition on
private arms, and that the Executive and the courts will enforce such legis-
lation. Quod erat demonstrandum. But from an empirical point of view, what
will happen remains uncertain. A canvass of previous amendments shows that
their effects have been quite variable. Most (the first ten, 14th, 15th, 18th,
21st, 22nd) have functioned as symbolic resolutions of political conflict with
but slight empirical consequences, at least for the disputes from which they
emerged. Others (13th, 24th) have ratified the terms of political decisions al-
ready made by other means. Some (11th, 16th) have precluded constitutional
change that otherwise already had begun. A few (12th, 20th) have been precur-
sors of institutional change in the structure of government. Finally, three (the
17th, 19th, and 23rd) have been instrumental in bringing about substantive
33. Perhaps, as anthropologist John Greenway has suggested, the imitation is of much ear-
lier progenitors: “The bow and arrow was obsolescent as a weapon in the Middle Ages and
obsolete in the Renaissance, but it still hangs around as a toy, not only among children, but
among adults as well, just as the activity with which it is associated—hunting—is itself a meta-
tactic toy, left over from Paleolithic times, like many of its practitioners” (1964: 21).
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constitutional change. The most likely outcome for the proposed amendment
would be the first category of symbolic resolution of the issue, leaving inde-
terminate the empirical consequences in terms of the subsequent political
behavior of gunlovers.
Under the organic model, proponents of civil disarmament must proceed
on a much broader front than is required for modification of the documen-
tary language. They must simultaneously work to get appropriate legislation
through Congress and the state legislatures. They will undertake the spon-
sorship of litigation in order to evoke, at all levels of the judiciary, court
decisions which increase the sanctions against private users of weapons. They
will attempt to get the Supreme Court to announce a modernizing, liberal34 in-
terpretation of the Second Amendment which concludes that the right to bear
arms, like the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship through-
out the past century, is from a legal point of view a dead-letter clause of the
Constitution.35 They will lobby with the national administration and also with
the hundreds of counterpart administrative authorities at various levels of
state and local government, in order to try to suppress access to weapons and
familiarization with their use, in such policy program fields as conservation,
amusements (shooting galleries), toy manufacturing (“G.I. Joe, complete with
bazooka, grenades, and dum-dum bullets”), education (compulsory R.O.T.C.
programs in high schools and colleges), and police (auxiliaries). They will or-
ganize pressure groups of their own36 in order to attempt to neutralize the
activities of such organizations as The National Rifle Association and the De-
fense Department’s National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice. They
will work within both political parties, and press for the adoption of planks
and individual candidacies committed to the goal of civil disarmament. They
will be concerned with amending the document only after the policy change
already has occurred, since the function of the Constitution, under the organic
model, is not to foreshadow or produce changes in the relevant political, so-
cial, and economic systems, but rather it is to describe or annotate the current
state of the constitutional system. Our past experience, to this extent, tends to
support the assumption of the organic model: that it is much easier, and more
34. “Liberal” in the sense of policy outcome as defined by this sentence, and as distin-
guished from a liberal or expansive construction of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As J. A. C. Grant has pointed out, “it seems fairly certain that the ‘full incorporation’
asked by four Justices in Adamson v. California will not be accomplished. At least it is devoutly to
be hoped so…. [W]e need a liberally construed second amendment as a limitation on the states
about as badly as a hole in the head—indeed the two might go together.” (1965: 1037–1038.)
35. Fortunately, there are no stare decisis problems, because the only relevant precedents
all point in the right direction. United States v. Miller, Presser v. Illinois, and United States v.
Cruikshank are the only precedent decisions cited in the late Edwin S. Corwin’s definitive anno-
tation of the document (1953).
36. In Honolulu, and doubtless in many other communities as well, a group of mothers has
formed an organization to combat the widespread indulgence in and propagation of war toys for
children.
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fruitful in terms of results, to change first the way of political life, and then to
bring the letter of the Constitution up to date, rather than to attempt, as under
the mechanical model, to bring political life into accord with the literal text of
the Constitution.
The cultural model requires our protagonists to shift their objective from
attempts to redesign the structure and functioning of political and other insti-
tutions to the even broader task of replacing in part the substantive content
of the values consensually shared by the community (in Deutsch’s sense of the
word).
Evidently, to remap the constitutional culture it is necessary to proselyte
with selected audiences in order to influence their beliefs concerning the pro-
posed subject of change. It is necessary, in other words, to change what many
Americans presently believe about the wisdom and the feasibility of maintain-
ing other values appropriate to an industrialized, megalopolitan nation, in a
populace living in a (privately) armed camp. Images of Dr. Gocbbels and of
Orwell’s Goodthink may spring to mind, but the suggestion here is not that
the cultural change deemed desirable by our protagonist group can or will
be imposed authoritatively by a totalitarian monopoly of control over the rel-
evant network systems. Quite to the contrary, our group can succeed only
by persuading millions of individual Americans that the right of private ac-
cess to weapons is an anachronism, just as much as the code duello and the
wearing of swords as a customary item of dress in public. Most Americans no
longer believe in, say, witches, or imprisonment for debt; but the rational argu-
ments in support of our present toleration of semiuniversal private armament
have little more, and perhaps less, intellectual compulsion—in relation to the
other predominant components in contemporary American culture and mode
of life—than did the toleration of beliefs in demonism in seventeenth-century
Massachusetts. The task of our protagonist group is, therefore, predominantly
one of educational propaganda: to increase the enlightenment of Americans
generally on this subject and thereby to induce them to want to change their
own behavior. Once the time comes when most Americans believe that civil
armament is a vice (i.e., that the human costs of tolerating private access to
weapons are, for most people, very much greater than any benefits that can be
derived from continuing to permit them), then the relevant changes in political
institutions will also be made. Greater tolerance for ambiguity can be expected
to accompany greater enlightenment; and although no change necessarily will
be made in the document, it may be that there will be circumstances in which
it will fortuitously be convenient, or expedient, to modify the constitutional
language. Perhaps this will occur when critical stages of decision-making are
reached, in order to provide reinforcement for those elites who seek to bring
about the necessary institutional changes.
Thus to change public attitudes toward political (including constitutional)
values is, ipso facto, to reshape the emerging Constitution of today and tomor-
row.
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Future Stress
Mrs. Rubin, Mr. Chief Justice, Ladies and Gentlemen:
We have now reached the point in our program where you will be regaled
by the last of the three graces of the future. Although I think there was some
reversal of roles during the middle hours of the morning, you have already
heard from both Future Shock and Future Joy. Now comes Future Sorrow.
Although I am to blame for my own title, I must give the chief justice
credit for having suggested the questions to which I am supposed to address
my remarks. His very first question asks whether our system of justice, as
structured and operating, is prepared to cope with the future? I’m sure you
all know how longwinded and theoretical professors are supposed to be, and
I’m not likely to disappoint you in either of those expectations; but by the
same token we’re going to be lucky to get beyond that first question. Of
course one way out would be to counter with the gambit: Which future? but
I am going to take a more forthright stance than that. Instead, I’ll say: No,
it is not prepared—unless the future is going to be very like what our life
was like a generation ago, back at a time when Hawaii was still a territory,
Earl Warren was not yet chief justice of the United States, Richard Nixon
was not yet cast in the role that in more recent times has been played by
Spiro Agnew, and there was still room for doubt (at least in Harry Truman’s
mind) whether or not General Eisenhower was a Democrat or a Republican.
But my negative reply implies no derogation of the Hawaiian judiciary; a
similar negative reply would be necessary for any other American judiciary
(or indeed, for any other judiciary), or for any other American governmental
structure. All complex institutions are organized to solve problems that they
no longer confront; and the lag between present capacity and even present
This chapter was originally published, in slightly different form, as “Future Stress, Constitu-
tional Strain, and the American Judicial System” in Citizens’ Conference on the Administration
of Justice, Proceedings (Supreme Court of Hawaii, Judiciary Building, Honolulu, Hawaii; Febru-
ary 1973). The speech was delivered orally on May 25, 1972.
needs is always substantial. I cannot imagine how it could be otherwise in a
political society that purports to be more or less responsive to popular control,
to say nothing of a polity that in fact so functions after a fashion. So the realis-
tic question is not how to avoid lag, but rather it is how to organize processes
for institutional change—in this instance, judicial systems reform—so that lag
can be subjected to continuing and systematic audit and review.
There are five additional questions, including a few easy ones, such as
“What of the function, role and purpose of the judiciary—past, present, and
future?” but instead of discussing them now, I’d like to explain to you what I
mean by my topic.
To speak of “stress” and “strain” and a “system” is immediately to in-
voke a particular of view toward the nature of reality; and the metaphor
that I have consciously chosen is biological in its overtones and under-
tones, as well as in its manifest concepts. On the one hand, this has the
advantage of putting me on the side of the angels, because biological
models have clearly become the predominant basis for theorizing in the
field of political science, for more than a generation; and at least at the
level of macrotheory, the idea of legal system as an organizing concept
for classification purposes has been common throughout this century in
the thinking of such influential lawmen as Roscoe Pound—whose doctor-
ate of philosophy and initial university teaching, we might recall, lay in
the academic discipline of botany. On the other hand, my invocation of
the biological metaphor has the disadvantage of involving us in the mixing
of metaphors, and indeed doubly so. Our courts, our constitutional docu-
ments, our statutes, and our institutions of government generally reflect
a set of theoretical premises that are distinctively and characteristically
Newtonian rather than Darwinian; and what little evidence we have indi-
cates that public opinion accepts without question the culturally approved
image which analogizes government to an inanimate machine rather than
a living organism. But the physical universe in which our social—including
political and legal—institutions are so precariously imbedded is neither
Newtonian nor Darwinian but Einsteinian: our model of ultimate reality is
the atomic nucleus undergoing fission, with matter being converted into
energy by means of a process that we can both predict and (at least in
one sense) control. I am only proposing that we substitute, at least as an
initial step, a nineteenth-century point of view for the seventeenth-century
perspective that otherwise would almost certainly serve as our premise in
talking about law and social change, either in Hawaii or any place else
in the world. I am aware that a twentieth-century model for the analysis
of contemporary sociolegal relationships probably proffers an even more
appropriate approach; but the hiatus between that kind of theory and our
customary ways of thinking about the relevant relationships is so traumatic
that I think it may be advisable to stake out a more modest and moderate
position, and explore with you what the biological theory forecasts as our
constitutional future.
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We can be fairly explicit about why it makes a difference, in endeav-
oring to respond to questions concerning the role of the judiciary in a
changing Hawaii, whether our implicit assumption is that courts are part
of the machinery of government, or that courts function as a vital organ
of the body politic, or that (if I may borrow the title of what I believe
to have been Roscoe Pound’s last article [1963]) we deal with “Runaway
Courts in the Runaway World” in which change is the only constant, truth
is a probability statement about culturally shared consensual perceptions,
and chance has a greater influence than social purpose does in controlling
human behavior. If courts are component parts of some larger mecha-
nism of government, then the implication for judicial reform is clear: let
well enough alone. A well-running machine will often benefit from periodic
lubrication and occasional first-echelon maintenance, but in general, tin-
kering is bound to cause more harm than good. Change is either slowly
deleterious, in which case it is the consequence of friction and results in
the gradual impairment of function due to excessive tolerances, or else it
is rapidly destructive in the form of breakdown accompanying either the
complete loss of function or else the complete loss of control over func-
tioning.
Change is viewed very differently, if we think of the courts as an organic
part of a governmental system that is vitalized by political life. Any organism
must undergo continuous, albeit genetically programmed and incremental,
change if it is to grow and develop according to its natural potential and
the environment in which it dwells. Any organism that is not in the process
of changing itself is already dead. But at the same time the organism is a
complex combination of interacting subsystems (including various subordinate
but independently vital organs), each operating within specific sets of criti-
cal limits, and functioning in homeostasis upon which its survival depends.
Consequently, either too much change (as in loss of a vital organ, whether by
disease or accidental injury) or too rapid change (as in uncontrolled growth) is
almost always fatal. The clear implication of such a model is that slow, gradual,
planned change—and one would naturally say “evolutionary” change, were it
not for the special meaning reserved for the concept of evolution in biolog-
ical theory—is healthful and a good and desirable thing for the body politic
to experience, including its judicial parts; but rapid, drastic, and unscheduled
change is inherently dangerous and destructive, and hence to be avoided if
possible.
Hence mild stresses are beneficial because they stimulate the organism in
ways that make it possible for life to go on; but severe stresses are invariably
harmful, because they strain subsystems of the organism beyond the limits
that homeostasis can tolerate. The difference between music and a ruptured
drum can be measured in decibels, and forecast with acceptable precision for
most human ears.
Turning now to the empirical forum provided by the local courts, I’d
like to suggest first a couple of examples of mild, beneficial stress that
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we can expect to experience, I think it is apparent, in the relatively short-
run future. The establishment of a law school here in Honolulu is going to
be such a stimulating event. At the moment the legal profession in Hawaii
can be partitioned into two principal groups: judges and practicing attor-
neys. The role of law faculty member is different in important ways from
either of the two presently entrenched law-roles in the state; and indeed law
professors are probably going to act more like other professors than like
other local lawyers. One consequence of that orientation is going to be a
much greater degree of integration between legal study and the rest of the
university (but the social sciences in particular) than prevails in the custom-
ary relationship between legal practice (including judicial decision-making)
and the practice of the social sciences (i.e., mostly applied sociology, in the
form of social work, and applied clinical psychology). Thus the theoretical
and methodological—and no longer merely the so-called practical—facets of
social and behavioral science are going to impinge, through the institution-
alization of the law school, upon legal work in Hawaii, and in novel and
unexpected ways. Indeed, it would be possible to interpret my own appear-
ance on your program today, to say nothing of that of my colleague James
Dator this morning, as intimations of the kind of cross-fertilization that is
apt to become more common in the future.
But the coming of the law school will certainly entail in a variety of ways
some strain for the local court and bar systems. One obvious example will
be the extension of a continuing, articulate, and by no means necessarily
favorable critique of local judicial and other legal work. And even the most
open-minded of us enjoy criticism much more in principle than in practice.
Another example can be found in the storage and retrieval of legal informa-
tion. Recent reports indicate that current thinking on this subject tends to
focus upon some sort of bootstrapping (or maybe “face-lifting” is a better
chosen simile) of the evidently ancient quarters (nestled away in the second-
floor Ewa wing of Hale Aliiolani) where the state’s only quasi-public law
library reposes, so that its lawbook collections can be beefed up to double in
buckram, as it were, for law students and faculty alike in addition to its pre-
sent clientele. (Incidently, these same reports suggest that current thinking
would locate the new law school, in precise accord with the tenor of main-
land thought prior to the First World War, but squarely in the teeth of all
relevant mainland experience during the past quarter of a century since the
end of the Second World War, downtown where the action is instead of in
Manoa where the rest of the relevant part of the University is.) I cannot say
whose nest the law school will be feathering if indeed it is put, temporar-
ily or permanently, in a downtown instead of a campus location; although
I doubt that such a location will be in the interests of either the university
or the law school itself. But I can say a word about current thought regard-
ing the legal information problem: it is on all fours with Thomas Jefferson’s
ideas for the University of Virginia library that he both planned and founded.
My assumption is that within a decade, electronic data storage will have
322 . TOWARD A DYNAMIC JURISPRUDENCE OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
accelerated to such a point that conventional books, which will continue to
be used for archival purposes for a while longer, will have been largely dis-
placed for legal search and research concerning then contemporary legal
issues and problem-solving. In order to be getting ready for the 1980s a new
law school ought to be hiring a computer specialist and legal data-bank ex-
pert, to complement the conventional law librarian whose interim services
will also be needed; but I have little expectation that what I think wise is
likely to happen. Apart from the very slight and transient irritant effect of
my having made this remark, the state political system is going to feel un-
stressed by future law school informational requirements; and feeling no
strain, it’s going to go right ahead and add a few more books to the present
collection. The result, however, is not a favorable example of how the system
of justice—of which the law school certainly will become a part—is prepared
to cope with future needs.
Another example of educational stress is found in the counterpart
development, for the federal judiciary, of the seminars (beginning about a
dozen years ago) to socialize new federal judges into their roles, and more
recently to provide retraining for more experienced federal judges as well
(Fish 1973; Carp and Wheeler 1972; Cook 1971). I shall be surprised if our
own Federal District Judge-designate King does not spend a week or two
in the District of Columbia, before the present year is out, in attendance
at such a seminar. One effect of the seminars is to reinforce the complex
of other centralizing and bureaucratizing vectors, already impinging upon
what used to be the relatively individualistic role of the federal district
judge. Such organizational vectors include circuit conferences, other pro-
grams of the Federal Judicial Center, the Administrative Office of United
States Courts, and the expansion of federal judicial personnel to the point
where virtually all federal district benches are occupied by groups of
judges—even two years ago there were only four single-judge districts left
in the country. As in our experience with similar institutional developments
such as judicial councils and state court administrators, a sufficient lag has
ensued so that like most other states Hawaii now participates in a variety
of counterpart training programs for state judges, in addition to the state’s
own biennial judicial seminars. In the future we can expect such endeavors
to involve the cooperation of the law school in interaction with the court
and bar systems, including of course the court administrator and judicial
council. This may not provide a very good example of the judicial system’s
capacity to cope with the future, but it at least does suggest a way in which
the system is becoming better adapted to cope with the present.
Third, I’ll venture a somewhat involuted prediction: that when another
conference like the present one is held, perhaps around 1977, it may well
meet at (unless the school is then still in temporary downtown quarters),
and in any event will be convened under the joint auspices of, the law school.
Incidentally, we might well note that the very assembling of a conference
such as this is evidence of faith, on the part of at least many of those who
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planned as well as those who are attending this meeting, in the power and
pertinence of the biological model as a theory in terms of which to organize
both thought and action about judicial behavior in Hawaii. We meet firm in
the conviction that our courts can and should be brought up to date; that
rational discussion can and likely will suggest both the direction and the pa-
rameter values of desirable modifications; and that the enlightened views of
a public-spirited civic group such as this will stimulate an appropriate re-
sponse from the other relevant subsystems that are (like the judicial system)
a part of political life in Hawaii. So we too are an example of mild stress on
the local courts.
So much for pleasant stress. You will have observed, no doubt, that the
chief reason I was able to keep it relatively pleasant was that the environment
to which my remarks related was the supporting legal environment, including
such components as the state university and some aspects of the state political
system. But once we leave the security of that cozy setting, the prospects for
life—including judicial life—are more foreboding.
Let me begin by ticking off a few examples of what I think are inescapably
going to be future characteristics of the general environment, the effects of
which are going to be experienced by the local courts as painfully stressing.
By “inescapably” I mean assuming what I suppose should be called the best:
that neither nuclear warfare nor nuclear disease eliminates (I was going to say
“liquidates,” but I decided that that was just too literal a word to employ when
speaking of the more direct and immediate effects of thermonuclear fission
upon target populations) some substantial number (and for present purposes,
I think a good round number such as a billion will suffice) of human beings
during the brief interim between the present and the arrival of my postulated
stressing future. One more caveat: most of my examples will be problems that,
although global in their incidence, are particularly exacerbated in their appli-
cation to Hawaii.
Future stress will include (but by no means be limited to):
• crowding (and I speak here in the strict ethological sense);
• competition for air, water, and food (which will soon result in the extermination
of all nonhuman animal species);
• mass poisoning from industrial and human waste products (and note that there
are already several large civil judgments by courts in Japan, levying monetary
damages against chemical polluters of waterways [for mercury and cadmium poi-
soning of otherwise edible fish that were in fact consumed by a—is the word
gullible?—public] and of the atmosphere [thereby causing widespread asthma]);
• competition for space and shelter;
• the disappearance of nonsolar energy sources;
• the deterioration of natural esthetic values (the astronauts who drink their
own—and each other’s—recycled urine have blazed a trail that the entire species
will be following before long);
• plus chronic and worsening breakdowns in transportation, communications, and
health/medical facilities.
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The principal cause of these conditions is going to be overpopulation, operat-
ing both directly, and also through the medium of its two principal helpmeets:
industrialization and urbanization.
Overpopulation of any species is a result of the more or less temporary
occurrence of an environment favorable to its survival and breeding. The ten-
dency for any breeding population is always to expand up to the limits of
support (of such essential values as water, food, and security). The human
species long since has eliminated serious competition from visible vertebrate
competitors, and we are now in the process of selectively exterminating many
of the quantitatively most significant of our microscopic predators. Hence
some of the natural limits to human overpopulation no longer can nor do op-
erate; and now that we consistently kill many more persons with automobiles
than with wars, we must conclude that war also no longer has much effect
upon population levels, except in the case of idiosyncratic token or scapegoat
subpopulations (like Nigerian Biafrans, or East Pakistani, or Vietnamese on
both sides of the 17th parallel).
Of course, the effect of future stress components such as crowding, mass
starvation, species poisoning with utterly unpredictable genetic spinoffs, and
other universal psychophysical as well as chemically generated stresses on the
physiology of surviving human individuals will soon—indeed, already has be-
gun to—inhibit further breeding on anything approaching the scale to which
we have become accustomed. But that feedback loop may well take effect too
late to prevent irreversibly deleterious effects that will preclude species sur-
vival; and even if that does not happen, human life even as we know it now
will have become impossible for our own grandchildren; and conversely, what
is possible in the early decades of the twenty-first century will probably not
be tolerable for any adult human socialized prior to, say—to pick an arbitrary
benchmark—1972.
But before we examine some examples of what I think are going to
be the consequent strains upon our constitutional system, I think that we
should take notice of some of the major component strands of what I’m go-
ing to call the “New Egalitarianism,” by which I mean a cluster of recently
evolved and still evolving rights, none of which counted for or amounted to
much, as recently as two decades ago—and I look back now to that same
turning point that I mentioned earlier, immediately before so many Americans
discovered that they liked Ike. But these same rights, as actualized and poten-
tialized today, have emerged in the span of a single generation as the cutting
edge of both legal and social change in our society. In the hands of the War-
ren Court, which functioned as a principal protagonist in their development,1
1. Mayor John V. Lindsay bestowed upon Earl Warren, in token recognition of his achieve-
ments as chief justice of the United States, the Gold Medal of the City of New York, on Law Day
(May 1) 1973, remarking at the time he announced the award that “Justice Warren has become a
worldwide symbol for individual liberty, social justice, and human equality.” (Honolulu Star-Bul-
letin, April 17, 1973, p. A-5).
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the evolving ideology was strictly within the historic confines of nineteenth-
century English liberalism, and it in no sense purported to be futuristic in
its orientation. In posting national ideals of racial equality, civic equality, and
voting equality, the Warren Court was redressing long-standing wrongs and
recognizing the legitimacy of legal rights that had been cast in constitutional
language for a minimum of eighty years—and that had taken that long or
longer to obtain the imprimatur of the Supreme Court of the United States. A
fourth right, that of indigent equality, in the courts and under the law, began
to gain recognition at about the same time as the other three, but it is still in
the process of being formulated (see my Bacon Lectures [Schubert 1970a] for
details). But there are at least two other facets of the New Egalitarianism, sex-
ual equality and generational equality, claims in behalf of which are presently
being widely pressed throughout our legal system. Sexual and generational
equality owe much less to the Supreme Court, partly because their proponents
have chosen to push them by relying upon more overtly political approaches
than litigation; and it seems unlikely now that either can look forward to get-
ting much support from the Burger Court during the seventies. Furthermore,
if we are willing to concede that racial, civic, voting, and indigent equality are
liberal rights, then sexual and generational equality are widely perceived to
be claims in behalf of radical rights. Partly this may be because they raise the
issues that burn more brightly today, but partly it is doubtless due also to the
fact that the claims they advance are more fundamental, and therefore more
stressing, to the homeostasis that defines (among other things) the status quo
of the war between the sexes, and the credibility gap between one generation
and another.
Because both are still in process of being worked out, let me specify
a few of their explications as components of a newer and more radical as-
pect of egalitarian ideology. Sexual equality of course involves changes in
what are legally recognized to be acceptable sexual (including of course
homosexual) behaviors, plus associated rhetoric and other communications
about such acts; and the general thrust of consequent legal changes clearly
has been in the direction of tolerating a great deal of variance in human
behavior that only a decade ago was deemed intolerable. But other ex-
plications concerning the variety of modes of cohabitation between and
among consenting persons, which are taking their place as alternatives to
monogamous marriage, are perhaps more important; and certainly present
and prospective changes affecting human reproduction are of considerably
greater social significance than the closing of the gap between private
sexual practices and their image in public law. There are also associated
problems relating to abortion, divorce, and the rearing of children: and you
will note that I haven’t yet even mentioned women’s lib, although I hasten
to so now.
Generational equality has perhaps even greater importance for the
practice of politics than for the practice of law, although we have hardly be-
gun to start recasting our theories of political behavior so as to bring them
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to closer accord with empirical changes that are already well advanced. The
old civic competence, as I am going to call it, could be pretty well described
by what statisticians call a normal (or bell-shaped) curve, with age as the
ordinate and the number of persons who are politically competent as the
abscissa, although there was some skewness toward old age because the ter-
mination of political competence was natural rather than legal; whereas we
used to have lots of infants but none who could vote or hold office. The new
civic competence looks much more like a rectangle than a bell-shaped curve:
we now have a front-end load by having co-opted youths in their late teens,
while at the same time, the combined successes of public health, geriatrics,
and social security have imposed what we might, for the sake of symmetry if
nothing else, call the rear-end load, with a considerable increase in the pro-
portion and absolute number of senior civic participants. Politics is thus no
longer a middle-aged man’s game to nearly the extent that it used to be; and
attempts to appeal to this more heterogeneous electorate will certainly re-
sult in further legal changes, involving a constellation of new constitutional
rights such as those to which I now turn.
My hypothesis concerning constitutional strain is that the severe environ-
mental stresses (already noted above) are going to continue to receive cultural
reinforcement from the expanding ideology of egalitarianism, and that this
will result in demands for the recognition of a panoply of novel constitutional
rights to facets of the human condition that seemed less precious heretofore,
precisely because they were—literally—less precious. The new Bill of Rights
will include:
• the right to privacy (which was prototyped by the Warren Court, but with nothing
like the critical intensity that it will embody in another twenty years);
• the right to mobility (which also has experienced some judicial encouragement
in recent years, but with the sharp difference that it has been claimed mostly by
people for whom movement was relatively easy);
• the right to reproduce (in the face of various sorts of limits, which may range
from moratoria, selective nonsterilization, exclusively artificial insemination of
stratified samples of females, and more sophisticated controls that geneticists
may devise);
• the right to individuality (in the face of crushing pressures, toward stereotyping
and behavioral conformity, that will make normal adolescence look like what I
understand is now called a good trip);
• the right to physical security (upon which I shall expound in a moment);
• and ultimately, the right to physical survival (which, insofar as concerns individ-
ual humans, is apt to come into increasing conflict with claims to the survival
rights of particular social groups, and eventually of course with overriding claims
advanced in behalf of the species).
I have left the right to physical security for slightly more detailed exposition
because it has for so long been such a major preoccupation of judicial work,
concerned as it is with what I am loosely going to call the field of criminal
law. Everyone here understands, and most of you probably much better than
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I, the sweeping changes that are in process in the handling, by courts
and associated governmental and private agencies, of persons who at
least in recent history have been categorized as criminal offenders. The
ideal of punishment has been displaced by the ideal of rehabilitation;
and the rejection of punishment as a goal has entailed the repudiation
of a host of correlated ethical norms, such as the notion that crime
or law-breaking is evil. Indeed, a transposition of roles is evolving so
that the previous projection of societal pity for the victims of crimi-
nal acts is becoming displaced by feelings of contempt for the socially
(or psychologically) inadequate—and therefore, the really guilty—victims
who are now conceived to invite mugging, rape, and even—perhaps es-
pecially—murder; while the defendant (that is, the mugger, rapist, or
murderer) becomes perceived as the real victim, of society’s failure to
educate, shelter, love, or otherwise to have supplied whatever he may
have lacked; and hence the defendant needs to be neither forgiven nor
punished, but rather provided with better information, guidance, emo-
tional releases or satisfactions, or whatever.
If I may suggest a crude scale of vanishing modes of punishment, I
would denote first PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT, which has been virtually abol-
ished as a form of punishment awarded in judicial sentences in the
United States, although it remains of course common in some countries
with similar legal systems (e.g., the Republic of South Africa) and is in
general use throughout most of the world today. Second, I would point
to CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, which is on the way out in the United States,
the United States Supreme Court to the contrary notwithstanding,2 in
accordance with a fairly widespread trend, particularly among the indus-
tralized societies of Western Europe. Third comes INSTITUTIONALIZATION,
the effects of the elimination of which are just beginning to be felt,
as illustrated by California’s contemporary embarrassment in having re-
cently completed the construction of two modern custodial institutions
(including one that is, as I am told, a maximum security facility) which
had become surplus and unneeded during the time between when they
were planned and built. Prisons are no longer needed any more than
mental hospitals or churches, unless they are to be filled with a con-
tinuing supply of—clients (?) [I never could find the right generic to
fit here.] (Nor is it difficult to imagine that universities might well be-
come surplus, too, if current tendencies toward antiintellectualism are
exacerbated by severe environmental stress, as I fully expect they will
be; and so far as that goes, the elimination of prisons may have more
than passing consequences for the seeming indispensability of courts.)
The prisons grow emptier (while crime rates go up) because of the
substitution of out-patient services under circumstances where formerly
2. This comment was, by implication, a failure to anticipate the outcome of Furman
v. Georgia, which the Supreme Court decided five weeks later on June 29, 1972.
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institutional treatment was deemed essential. And so we come to the
fourth point in my scale: GUILT. That, too, is on the way out; sin requires
free will as well as choice, and when concepts of social responsibility
and community treatment supplant sin, it makes no sense for society’s
pawns to feel guilty about their victimization. This is clearly how we are
headed, and so I ask only the slight additional question: What will be
the consequences for individual physical security? In the world—and I
mean the physical as well as the social world—of Jeremy Bentham and
James Mill, one might conceivably contemplate with equanimity the so-
cialization of antisocial behavior. But by 1984, the institutionalization of
persons who continue to commit mugging, rape, and murder, and social
condemnation for their acts, alike will have disappeared; and along with
them will have gone the cultural ideals which led a more primitive age
to socialize such primeval responses to aggression as self-and extended-
self-help in the form of direct retaliation, vendettas, blood feuds, tribal
warfare, and so forth. But our more civilized modern trend will certainly
militate against the already slim chances for mass disarmament of the
civilian population, a step that otherwise might be expected to make
some contribution to general physical security; and perhaps also by 1984
the Second Amendment will have taken the place of the First in the most
preferred position in the liturgy of our federal constitutional rights. But
while we await the generalization of Tombstone and Gunsmoke as the
American way of life, or to vary somewhat the time and place, the re-
turn to conditions under which the skills of a Tybalt are more important
than those of a Portia, courts are increasingly going to be confronted
with claims to the right to physical security. And since their criminal law
function seems likely to atrophy, perhaps ingenious judges will contrive
ways to substitute civil remedies for claimants who no longer can expect
to receive what used to be thought of as public vindication in the crimi-
nal courts.
It is explicitly these emerging claims to constitutional right that seem
certain to produce constitutional strain upon the American judicial system, be-
cause they are going to be pressed with increasing vigor and vehemence while
the possibility of their satisfaction continues to diminish. So what, under these
circumstances, are we to do? More specifically, what can and should judges
in Hawaii do, if it should be my scenario (rather than one of the more pleas-
ing ones with which other speakers have beguiled you) that proves only too
true? Even more urgently, what can and should court personnel in Hawaii do
to delay, to mitigate, to attenuate, and even conceivably (though I doubt it) to
attempt to avoid such a grim constitutional future?
For reasons of both expedience and prudence, I leave the answers to
you to deliberate in the workshops to which we shall presently repair. But
not without a parting suggestion: The biological model clearly is a prophet
of doom, probably because doom is impending, but possibly also because
of this model’s confinement to controlled gradualism as a means of protect-
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ing interests that have already become vested. The third model, based upon
modern physics, subsumes (you will recall) among its defining parameters
such liberating characteristics as:
• basic entities in continual flux;
• free transfer and recombination among such entities;
• the assignment of a major causative role to chance;
• autogenous learning;
• indeterminism;
• and unrestricted growth and development.
It would seem prima facie that none of these is an apt descriptor of either
law or courts as we know them now, and are accustomed to thinking about ei-
ther. But that may be because we are used to looking at both law and courts
with blinders on—the blinders of outmoded theories. Perhaps we should dare
to imagine a legal order, including a role for courts, that assigns much more
importance to the theory of chaos (cf. Aubert 1959), to which the above fac-
tors seem likely to contribute. But that I do leave to your imagination.
And I thank you all for your patience.
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Justice and
Reasoning
Jesting Pilate,1 the title of a recently published collection of the public
papers of “the greatest Judge in the English-speaking world,”2 can serve to
remind us of both the normative and the empirical dimensions of inquiry
into the effect of justice upon reasoning, and of reasoning upon justice. And
if Caesar’s magistrate mocked Jesus’ claim to bear witness unto the truth,
he did so (however unwittingly) with excellent precedent: four centuries
earlier (if Plato’s Reports are to be credited), Sophists had anticipated so-
phisticates by scoffing an older martyr’s dialectic quest for justice and
truth. Interest in the trial and judgment of the defendant upon whose cross
Pontius Pilate personally had emblazoned—and in three languages—the leg-
end JESUS OF NAZARETH THE KING OF THE JEWS3 might Well focus, of course,
upon the normative question whether the decision was just, in relation to the
various sets of criteria (the law of God, the law of the Hebrews, and the law
of the Romans) that might be deemed relevant to that determination. One
This chapter was originally published, in slightly different form, as “Justice and Reasoning:
A Political Science Perspective” in Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto 46 (October –
December 1969): 474–496. Reprinted with permission of Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del
Diritto.
This paper was presented initially as a lecture at the Symposium on Justice and Reasoning,
sponsored by the Department of Philosophy of the State University of New York at Buffalo, 3
December 1968. For their comments upon the lecture, I wish to thank my colleagues in the
symposium: Chaim Perelman, professor of Philosophy, University of Brussels; Ronald Dworkin,
professor of Jurisprudence, Oxford University; and Thomas Perry, professor of Philosophy, State
University of New York at Buffalo. I thank Torstein Eckhoff, professor of Law, University of Oslo,
for his advice and assistance.
1. Sir Owen Dixon, quoting Bacon’s Essay on Truth: “‘What is truth?’ said jesting Pilate, and
would not stay for an answer” (1965: 10).
2. Sydney Morning Herald, April 2, 1964, p. 2.
3. John 19: 19.
might also, or alternatively, be concerned with the empirical questions how
and why the decision was made, and with what effects.4 In this regard, it is no-
table that although the New Testament tends to be valued for, and evaluated
in terms of, its normative content, the interest in the event of the trial, mani-
fested by the four commentators upon whose accounts we largely rely for our
knowledge concerning that affair, is strictly empirical. It is notable because it
illustrates the extent to which there is no simple one-to-one correspondence
between justice and reasoning, on the one hand, and the standpoints of ethics
and empiricism, on the other. In adjudicatory decision-making, the effects of
justice upon reasoning, and of reasoning upon justice, alike are amenable to
inquiry as either normative or empirical questions.
The development of academic disciplines during the present century
has resulted, at least in the United States, in certain general tendencies in
the specialization of labor, for purposes of allocating research endeavors
among (and also within certain of) the fields of social science. By and
large, professors of philosophy and of law continue to concentrate their
attention upon the normative aspects of judicial decision-making, as a
facet of their concern for the extension of wisdom and rationality in
the choice of policy alternatives, particularly in regard to issues of con-
temporary controversiality in the society, economy, and polity (and at
all levels—community, state, national, international, regional, and global).
To the extent that they have been concerned with the matter, most
other social scientists—and I speak here particularly of political scientists,
historians, ethnographers, sociologists, and psychologists of the present
generation—have concentrated instead upon the empirical side of adjudica-
tion. Of course, there have been differences in the degrees of involvement
of these various professions, with political scientists and ethnographers
relatively most, and with historians and psychologists relatively least, en-
gaged in the study of decision-making by courts and judges. Moreover,
there have been at least two countervailing infraprofessional positions,
within law and within political science. American legal realism (vide
Rumble 1968; Hayakawa 1964; Ingersoll 1966) most certainly has been
empirical in its orientation, and it constitutes an important (and con-
spicuous) albeit minority point of view among academic lawyers, and an
exception to the generalizations stated above. Contrariwise, until very re-
cently, hardly more than a dozen years ago, public lawyers in the tradition
of Edward S. Corwin, Robert F. Cushman, and Thomas Reed Powell dom-
inated political science inquiry; and for these scholars not only was the
subject normative but so also was their own social function, as each sought
actively to guide the United States Supreme Court (in particular) along
directions of social retrenchment or reform that he deemed beneficial for
the body politic. Public law remains the prevailing subject of undergrad-
uate instruction in political science curricula, especially among the large
4. Cf. the case studies in Becker 1970. See Winter 1961; and also Cohn 1967.
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majority of the profession who teach but undertake little or no research;
but clearly it now represents a minority, and a diminishing, influence in
graduate instruction and in contemporary scholarship (e.g., see chap. 2,
part 2, “The Ghost of Public Law Present”; Schubert 1968b; and Eulau
1969). The focus of political science research today is upon the empirical
parameters of adjudicatory decision-making; and it is that perspective that
I wish to present in this discussion. In particular, I shall attempt to focus
upon a contemporary model of judicial reasoning, as this is hypothesized
to relate to observed (or, at least potentially, observable) processes of ju-
dicial decision-making.
Judicial reasoning can be understood to signify two very different as-
pects of the adjudication process. The first, most difficult to observe (even
indirectly), and by far the more complicated (and important) meaning of
judicial reasoning is the set of psychological, and of social interaction,
processes that configure, for a particular group of individuals during a dis-
crete segment of time in a relatively determinate institutional milieu, to
discriminate a preferred choice among a highly stylized subset of cultur-
ally approved decisional alternatives. The empirical questions about this
proposition relate to certain events, hypothesized to be relevant, that occur
within individuals and within groups (i.e., in the relationships of individu-
als to each other). These are the kinds of questions with which we shall
be concerned in the research to be described below. Beyond these em-
pirical questions lie an even more complicated set of normative questions
that relate to the construction of an ideal model of individual, group, and
institutional decision-making processes, presumably (in most instances) in-
volving the postulation of severely restricted subsets of behaviors that have
been selected from within the range of what can be imagined to be, what
can be, or what has been, observed in past and present human experi-
ence. Stated otherwise, the range of variation of the variables that interact
in the normative model will tend to be much smaller than the range of
these same variables in the empirical model; or again, the normative mul-
tidimensional space will be a subspace of the empirical multidimensional
space. The construction of the normative model can be deemed even more
difficult than the empirical task, for two reasons. First, really exhaus-
tive knowledge about the relationships analyzed in the empirical model
would seem to be a condition prerequisite to the rational justification of
restricting the range of the empirical variables, and particularly in their
interaction effects—unless, that is, one is prepared to justify such prefer-
ences exclusively on deductive grounds, in either disregard or ignorance of
the apparent empirical consequences of such deduced behavioral norms;
otherwise deduced norms remain hypotheses unless and until their em-
pirical consequences have been measured. Second, the implementation of
even an empirically justified normative model will necessitate the engi-
neering of more or less drastic changes in the behaviors—physiological,
psychological, and social—of many (if not, to some extent, all) persons in
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the subject population; and although the extent of human adaptability in
some respects is impressive (Berelson and Steiner 1964: 44), the prospect
of genetic manipulation (for example) seems likely to entail a relatively pro-
longed temporal dimension (Hirsch 1963; Erlenmeyer-Kimling and Jarvik
1963; Lindzey 1964; Paul 1968; Davies 1969; Somit 1969; Hildebrand 1968:
220–249; Corning 1971). I do not doubt the desirability of attempting to uti-
lize the best of our present state of empirical knowledge, however limited
and fragmentary that may be, as a guide to the construction of normative
models of judicial decision-making for our own day and age. But if at least
for the short-range future such knowledge is likely to remain the product
of something that resembles the present structure of our professional aca-
demic disciplines, the importance of continuing work upon the empirical
model may be apparent.
The second signification of judicial reasoning, as an aspect of the ad-
judication process, is much narrower and less complicated, but it is also
considerably more common, than the first. Judicial reasoning, in almost all
lay and journalistic and historians’ discussion, and also as understood by
both the lawyer and political science wings of the public law fraternity,
means the oral or written statements of judicial opinions whose purpose
and function is both to explain the intellectual process by means of which
the author (judge or court) reached a normative conclusion about the dis-
position of the subject case, and also to justify that conclusion as the
optimal decision for this case. If one is content to accept the prima facie
validity of this proposition, without bothering to inquire into the extent
to which judges do in fact behave according to these prescriptions, then
the function of the normative theorist appropriately can be confined to
two tasks. The first is to criticize the optimality of the announced deci-
sion, by reconsidering the propriety of the author’s selection and weighting
of values postulated to be relevant to the making of the decision. (The
usual form taken by this type of critical discourse is praise or blame of
the judicial author, depending upon the degree of disjunction between the
values stated by the judge and those preferred by his critic.) The sec-
ond normative task is to appraise the rationality of the structure of the
argument proffered by the judicial author; and the quest of the critic is
for evidence of internal consistency (or the lack thereof) in the logic and
rhetoric of the verbal content of the opinion. Most discussion of judicial
reasoning assumes what I consider to be the superficial and only trivially
germane form of normative critique of judicial reasoning in this secondary
sense of the manifest content of judicial opinions. It is also possible, how-
ever, to analyze the content of opinion language from an empirical point
of view, hypothesizing that the opinion itself is a form of judicial behav-
ior, and seeking to relate opinion behavior to other empirical facets of the
decision (Schubert 1965b, 1969a). The pursuit of this empirical approach
usually entails the viewing of judicial opinions as either primarily or (at
least) predominantly rationalizations for decisions that have been made
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(consciously or not) on other grounds, in lieu of (or at least in addition to)
the ones denominated by the judicial author. The hypothesis that judicial
opinions are “rationales”—the word officially used to denote certain for-
mal administrative adjudications during the Second World War (Thompson
1950)—constitutes, of course, no novelty (Schroeder 1918; J. H. Robinson
1921; Jerome Frank 1930; E. Robinson 1935; Lasswell 1948; Rumble 1968:
79–83). Freudian quests for the latent content of the manifest reasoning
of judicial opinions have been, however, conspicuously sterile. The paucity
of analyzed judges whose clinical records have been made available for
systematic study—or who have written postanalysis Freudian books on law
and judges—may well constitute a reinforcing explanation for the dearth
of empirical data either to confirm or disconfirm the many stimulating hy-
potheses that have been engendered by the Freudian tack. For present
purposes, I shall treat non-Freudian empirical research into the rationaliza-
tion function of judicial opinions as an aspect of the sociopsychological
dimension of the adjudicative process. I shall employ the point of view of
empirical research to deal with judicial reasoning in this secondary sense
(of opinion behavior) as only a particular case of judicial reasoning in the
primary sense.
I. AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF JUDICIAL REASONING
In order to organize and systematize my discussion of empirical re-
search on judicial reasoning, it will be helpful to suggest a paradigm
of judicial reasoning, one which for reasons of both convenience and
parsimony I choose from a more extended but recent discussion of
the paradigm as a model behavioral conception of adjudicative systems
(Schubert 1968a). This model can be represented diagramatically as a
set of three mutually intersecting circles, with a fourth circle that inter-
sects only one of the others, as shown in Figure 22. Each of the circles
(A, B, C, and D) defines a space that symbolizes an analytical field of
behavioral inquiry; the segments of joint intersection (1, 2, 3, and 4)
represent overlap between pairs of fields; and the smallest segment (5)
of mutual intersection among fields (and also, of course, among inter-
disciplinary fields) represents the area of decision-making. According to
this paradigm, therefore, from the most general point of view judicial
decision-making is a function of the interrelationships among processes
that can be denoted, for purposes of analysis, as within the domain of
study of the fields of psychology, sociology, and anthropology; while more
proximately, judicial reasoning (which results in judicial decision-mak-
ing) can be defined as the interrelationship among sociopsychological,
psychocultural, and sociocultural components, subject to whatever dis-
traints, upon the “normal” functioning of judicial personality, there may
ensue as a consequence of the effects of psychophysiological factors that
are themselves a direct product of physiological variables. Of course,
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Figure 22. A Behavioral View of the Judicial System.
standing alone such a paradigm specifies only some names for relation-
ships; it remains essential to indicate with greater specificity both the
kinds of empirical variables that purport to be subsumed among these
analytical categories and processes, and a theory of how these processes
interrelate.
The cosmology that continues to supply the philosophical (in the sense
of philosophy of science) foundation for the traditional approach of public
law (and, more generally, of legal “positivism”) is Newtonian: a mechanical
set of “power” relationships in which forces act upon and react to each other
(Landau 1961; and [contra] J. A. Robinson 1957). Characteristic examples
of such thinking are found in contemporary scholarly notions about stare
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decisis, neutral constitutional principles, judicial activism and restraint, and
in proposals to change the language of constitutional documents in order
to bring about societal change.5 A much more radical cosmology, which
finds its best expression in American sociological and realist jurisprudence
(ranging from Holmes, through Pound, Cardozo, Felix Cohen, Frank, and
Llewellyn, to A. S. Miller6 is the biological approach of Darwinism, which
conceptualizes law as the functional result of a subsystem of interdependent
processes and institutional structures (Landau 1965b, 1968). It is typical of
the realist approach in law, which finds its counterpart in what I have called
the conventional approach in political science (Schubert 1967a, 1967b),7 to
conceptualize law as a matrix of social behaviors, which can be understood
or explained only in the context of the overlapping social, economic, and
political systems with which the legal system interacts. From this point of
view, law is a “seamless web”; there is a “living body” of law; law is “in so-
ciety” and/or it is (like judges)8 a “vital part” of the political process; and
the judicial system converts social, economic, and political inputs into legal
outputs, which in turn affect social, economic, and political interests and re-
lationships, which in turn affect judges and courts, and so forth.
From the point of view of historical development in Western civilization,
mechanism is a seventeenth-and eighteenth-century cosmology, and organ-
ism is a product of the nineteenth century. Much more radical than either of
these is, of course, the cosmology that has arisen (at least, in the more devel-
oped fields of natural science) during the present century: relativity. Instead
of the completely determined relationships of mechanism, or the highly com-
plex functional interrelationships postulated to obtain among the structures
of an organism, the cosmology of modern physical science implies a config-
urational approach to the analysis of social relationships, in which chance
operates as a much more important consideration than in either of the older
metaphors. The elementary particles of the modern physical universe are in
5. For more extended discussion, and for other examples of the legal implications of the
Newtonian and of the other two cosmologies discussed in the text, see chap. 11.
6. On the biological premises of Holmes’ cosmology of society, see White 1947: chap. 5;
and Hofstadter 1944; on that of Pound (whose Ph. D. was in botany) and Cardozo, see Cahill
1952: chap. 4; in regard to the realists see particularly Cohen 1935; Llewellyn 1934; and
Miller 1963.
7. For an extended discussion of the realist/conventional approach, in both law and polit-
ical science, see Weiler 1968.
8. According to Jack Peltason, “When a judge makes a decision he gives his support to
one pattern or activity as against another. He becomes … an important member of an inter-
est group…. Judicial decision-making is one stage, not the only nor necessarily the final one,
in the process of determining which of several conflicting activities shall be favored…. But a
judge cannot avoid taking sides. The judiciary is in politics not because of the desire of the
individual justice but because it makes decisions…. [W]e [should] turn our attention to the
judiciary as a facet in the group struggle and relate the activities of judges to that of other
groups….” (1953: 51, 55, 56)
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continual flux, in structures that range from the relatively stable (such as ig-
neous rock, or a statue) to the relatively unstable (such as the emissions of
X-ray photography, or those of a detonating H-bomb). We are compelled to
use mathematical and statistical modes of expression to describe and to pre-
dict the behavior of such particles, in part because of limits to our capacity
to observe them discretely and in part because of the large extent to which
what happens to individual particles can best be explained by laws of chance
variation. If we ask the question: what is the paradigm for law in the config-
urational cosmology of relativity, we can only speculate, because the social
sciences are still largely engaged in the task of catching up (from the theo-
retical point of view) with the nineteenth century; and none of them, I think
it is warranted to say, has as yet progressed to the point such that its fun-
damental theory is cast in configurational rather than in biological form. (In
political science, for example, it is only within the past few years that biolog-
ical theories of politics—which can readily be traced, of course, back to such
progenitors as Woodrow Wilson—have become widely accepted throughout
the profession, as exemplified by the current vogue for the writings of Gabriel
Almond, the president of the American Political Science Association four years
ago, and of David Easton, the president last year.) Moreover, the current mood
of reform within the profession is overwhelmingly in the direction of empir-
ical redevelopment—social, psychological, political, and economic—and away
from theoretical and methodological work (McCoy and Playford 1967; Haas
and Kariel 1970). The prospect seems excellent for an extended period of hos-
tility to the development of scientific method in social science research. So it
may be quite a while before it will be possible to speak with any assurance
about a configurational theory of law, from an empirical point of view. But it is
possible to speculate; and one possible line of development would be to build
upon the premises of methodological individualism, according to which the
fundamental legal particles of a configurational theory of law would be the dis-
crete behaviors of human individuals.
One set of such behaviors, that would be of particular interest to a more
general theory of law, would be the decision-making behaviors of humans act-
ing in the role of judges. Of course, there is no technical reason why many
adjudicative tasks could not be allocated for computer determination (Lass-
well 1955; Lawlor 1963; Schubert 1968d); and certainly it would be possible to
program for a much higher degree of rationality than appears to obtain in the
processing by human adjudicators of large quantities of stereotyped offenses
(such as intoxication, or speeding) that are now tried in magistrate courts
(Somit et al. 1960). That is one solution to the problem of judicial reasoning;
and just as the maturation of industrial society has witnessed an increasing
substitution of administrative for adjudicatory processes of decision-mak-
ing (Hewart 1929; Jerome Frank 1942), so the atomic age, in whose
infancy we dwell, may find it both necessary and desirable to automate
judicial reasoning, for the resolution of many types of interest conflict. But
before that can be done satisfactorily, we shall doubtless need to acquire
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a better understanding of how human adjudicators decide such questions.
In the discussion that follows, I shall assume that the cosmology that
underlies the paradigm of judicial decision-making portrayed in Figure 22 is
neither mechanical nor biological, but that what it suggests represents an en-
deavor to move in the direction that a configurational approach would imply.
Consequently, although any individual judge, whose decision-making (= judi-
cial reasoning) is represented by the paradigm, is himself the embodiment
of a living, biological system in the most literal sense, the only part of Fig-
ure 22 that is systemic in this organismic sense is A, the set of his relevant
physiological characteristics. His personality, set B, includes the universe of
his previously experienced and potential dispositions (motor, affective, cogni-
tive, perceptive, and motive) to respond to his environment. The social set,
C, includes all of the other individuals with whom our subject judge comes,
or might come, into contact; and the sociopsychological space of intersection
between his personality set and the social set contains the interactions be-
tween him and other persons. The set of cultural elements, D, includes the
customs of the social group that comprises the society that includes B and C;
the norms, beliefs, and cognitions common to one or more of the individuals
in C constitute the content of the segment of sociocultural overlap; and those
peculiar to our subject judge define the psychocultural segment of his own
area of overlap with D. Our judge’s reasoning is defined, therefore, as a con-
figuration of personality components (involving motor responses such as facial
expression,9 voice, hearing, and gesture; also his affective experiences, includ-
ing physiological feedback processes; his motivations; his cognitions; and his
perceptions) that are continuously undergoing actual or potential modification
as a consequence of his interactions with other persons and his transactions
with the culture that he experiences and in part shares with these other per-
sons. An explicit function of the psychocultural elements is to supply an at
least crude system of weights for his evaluation of the relative relevance and
importance of both his internalized reactions and his responses to interactions
with other persons. But his affective responses to social interactions can also
(for example) supply a system of weights for his evaluation of how much rel-
evance and importance to attach to explicit elements of the psychocultural
content (such as the norm of stare decisis, in an explicit situational context);
only empirical knowledge will inform us which type of personality component
tends to dominate what, for whom, when,—and maybe—how.
II. SOME EXAMPLES OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH INTO
JUDICIAL REASONING
Age, health, race, and sex are examples of the kinds of empirical phy-
siological indicators that have been hypothesized to be relevant to judicial
9. Tomkins 1962: esp., vol. 1, The Positive Affects, chap. 7, “The Primary Site of the Affects:
The Face”; Tomkins and Izard 1965: pt. 6, “Affect and Facial Responses”; and Osgood 1966.
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behavior. The hypothesis touted by FDR himself was, as we all know, that
advanced age breeds conservatism; and not long after the “court-packing”
proposal was rejected one political scientist supplied some relevant descrip-
tive empirical data, with a chapter on “Age Qualifications” in what is one of
the first studies to rely upon quantification as an approach to historical gener-
alizations about American judges.10
The most comprehensive investigation of the relationship between
chronological age and judicial voting behavior is found in Don Bowen’s
Yale doctoral dissertation (1965). Working with an 89 percent sample
of all federal courts of appeals judges and state supreme court judges,
for 1960, and a nominal scale for age (with the fulcrum at sixty
years), Bowen found that younger judges were consistently and with
statistical significance more liberal, on all half-dozen policy scales
that he examined (1965: 187). However the simple (first-order) corre-
lations tended to be low, and the proportion of variance explained by
age, when regression analysis was used to examine the conjoint effect
of age in association with other background characteristics, was very
small. Bowen’s work tends to show that chronological age is causally
correlated with judicial decision-making, but in complicated associa-
tion with other variables and varying in strength as well, according
to the kind of policy issue. A contemporaneous Harvard dissertation
by Sheldon Goldman (1965), working with a much smaller sample of
under a hundred judges (less than a fourth of the size of Bowen’s
sample), failed to discover statistically significant simple correlations,
except in the two instances of labor and fiscal policy; but there are
so many differences between the two studies, relating to design and
methodology in addition to the matter of sample content and size,
that Goldman’s findings cannot be said to contradict Bowen’s; indeed,
they tend, if anything to reinforce one another.
Recent cross-cultural work is suggestive of the widely differing kinds
of significance that age can have in various cultures. In the United States
Supreme Court, for instance, there is no recognized relationship between
age and either formal or informal status. In the Supreme Court of India,
however, the combined effect of compulsory retirement at age sixty-five
plus a seniority rule for promotion to the chief justiceship makes it possible
for any person offered an appointment to the supreme court to calculate the
probabilities, subject to the intervention of a variable representing his own
and his colleagues’ health, of whether and when he would become chief jus-
tice himself, if he accepted the appointment (Gadbois 1969: 227). Clearly,
the system in which age is the better predictor of filling the role of chief
justice is also the one in which that role appears to have less institutional
10. Ewing 1938: chap. 4. For an even earlier quantitative analysis of the attributes of Amer-
ican judges (both state and federal), see Mott et al. 1933; and for the best-known recent study,
see Schmidhauser 1959. The best study of age and judicial behavior is Schmidhauser 1962a.
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and symbolic importance as a component affecting policy outcomes, an ob-
servation that might lead some critics of quantification to conclude that the
better a variable predicts, the less its substantive importance. Moreover,
sophisticates might remark that intimations of cultural variation coming
rather late in the century after the major work of Maine and of Frazer can
hardly be looked upon as news. The point, however, is that most of the
empirical work that has been done on judicial decision-making (as distin-
guished from the descriptions of prescriptions, with which comparative law
remains preoccupied) has been culture-bound; and one possible advantage
of the paradigm invoked here is the attention that it focuses upon cultural
(and subcultural) variation as a principal component of judicial reasoning.
Both Bowen and Goldman treated age as an indicator of ideology, test-
ing the hypothesis that judges (like, presumably, other humans) become
more conservative (in both relative and absolute terms) as they grow older.
It is possible, however, to test a very different, and potentially often incon-
sistent, hypothesis that Danelski has suggested: that age is an indicator
of acculturation, and that the degree of liberalism or conservatism that
one ought to expect to find correlated with it will be that of the prevail-
ing mood of the political culture at the time a judge is socialized into his
civic and professional roles (1969: 149). In explicit application to Japan-
ese Supreme Court justices, therefore, Danelski proposed the hypothesis
(that had been suggested to him by several retired judges whom he had
interviewed) that older justices, who had been reared during the relatively
liberal era (within domestic Japan) of Taisho democracy (which enveloped
the first World War), would be more liberal in their decision-making than
younger judges who came of age during the rising tide of militarism during
the late twenties and thirties. I have attempted to test a similar hypoth-
esis about justices of the Australian High Court, in a causal analysis of
decision-making by that court during the fifties (1969g). My empirical data
indicate that the direction of liberalism is clearly that specified by my hy-
pothesis, but that the causal paths are very complex, involving both direct
and indirect effects upon dependent decisional variables, and in patterns
that appear unstable (because they differ for changes in the composition of
the court). So the existing empirical studies conclude, though with no very
great assurance, that age (as an index to ideology) is weakly but positively
linked with liberal policy outputs in the American culture, and somewhat
more strongly but negatively linked with similar outputs in the Australian
culture. Perhaps the most that one ought to conclude from such findings
is that age is an empirical indicator that invites more extensive and inten-
sive study, and in a cross-cultural way, before we can presume to speak
with much confidence about its importance as an influence upon judicial
reasoning. This may seem, to some, a disappointingly tenuous summary of
the product of the admittedly fragmentary empirical work on judicial age
that has been reported to date; but it may bear recalling that we toddle
(or, perhaps better said, totter) at the threshold of social scientific inquiry,
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to say nothing of the very tiny domain of behavioral jurisprudence.
We might expect a low negative correlation between the age and health
of judges; but whether such a relationship can be observed to obtain is
not, so far as I am aware, known, because it has not been investigated. It
may come as a mild surprise to be apprised that no systematic research on
judicial health appears to have been published, especially when one takes
into consideration the considerable effect that the state of health of one
person can have upon the work of any really small group. Felix Cohen, the
philosopher-of-law son of a philosopher of law, is correct in pointing out
that law is more (although I would add, at least, “usually”) than “the prod-
uct of judicial bellyaches”; but in any population whose average age is sixty
years, bellyaches of one form or another can be expected to play some part
in affecting both the quantity and the quality of judicial decision-making.
How much of a part nobody knows. Nonrandomly chosen examples abound;
consider the impact, upon the Supreme Court’s policy output, of the health
component as it affected the lives of Frank Murphy, Wiley Rutledge, and
William Douglas, during the brief span of the latter two summer months
of 1949: during the following term, the Court’s liberal bloc was reduced
from four to one (Black), with traumatic consequent effects upon both the
selection of the Court’s workload (Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Schubert 1962c)
and its policy output (Schubert 1965c: 210, 226–227. The development of
the medical speciality of geriatrics has been accompanied by no corre-
sponding focusing of interest in judicial senescence (but, see Schmidhauser
1962c); so we remain equally ignorant of both the possible physiological
and psychological—and, need I add, philosophical?—effects of aging, upon
the reasoning processes of elderly judges. After a quarter-century on the
Supreme Court, for example, Hugo Black remained a staunch political, so-
cial, and economic liberal (Schubert 1965c: 112, 138, 217); but since 1963,
as the Court’s senior associate justice and oldest member has undergone
the metamorphosis from septa- to octogenarianism, Black has led the Court
in conservative—and many would claim reactionary—opposition to most
contemporary claims of civil rights and liberties, ranging from whether li-
brarians ought to feel frightened at the mere presence of well-behaved but
black patrons, to his vote to affirm, on June 10, 1968, the second conviction
of a robber-murderer. In the latter case Black dissented in company with
his latter-day compatriots (Harlan and White), indulging in such now typi-
cal statements for him as that “I agree that holdings like this [viz., that of
the majority] make it far more difficult to protect society ‘against those who
have made it impossible to live today in safety’” (Black, dissenting in Harri-
son v. United States, at p. 226). Shades of Robert Jackson! Has Hugo Black
“changed his mind” in the quite literal sense that synaptic deterioration
has changed it for him? Of course, no one knows, and least of all perhaps
does Mr. Justice Black; but the issue raised by the question seems suffi-
ciently common to the field of judicial behavior that it warrants scientific
investigation. Certainly, the interests, the methodology, and increasingly the
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language of discourse of environmental and other public health scientists
overlap with the concerns of political scientists (Knutson 1965; Rogers and
Messinger 1967); and the time may be at hand when we ought to take se-
riously the hypothesis, that senility may have an important enough effect
upon judicial behavior, that we ought to try to understand it better. Con-
ceivably, FDR’s attack upon the “nine old men”—the conventional view of
which now is that the president was right for the wrong reasons—may have
been right for the right reason: that American society has more to gain than
to lose, even at the cost of the loss of the services of an occasional Holmes
or Brandeis, from a system of compulsory retirement of Supreme Court jus-
tices, thereby precluding at least most of the predictable irrationality in
judicial reasoning that may result from senescence.11
In speaking of race as a physiological indicator that might be
deemed relevant to judicial behavior, I select it as one that evidently
is important in the structuring of political relationships in the United
States today. I assume that, although the manifest basis for classifying
individuals on this indicator will be observable physiological charac-
teristics (Nagel 1962a), its relevance to judicial behavior may consist
primarily (as in the instance of the socialization hypothesis concerning
judicial age) of its function as a discriminator of what many today assert
to be major differences between two American cultures, one black and
one white, involving of course complex social, psychological, economic,
and political components. Presumably one would wish to investigate
whether there are any significant differences between the behavior of
black judges and of white judges, that can be attributed to the racial
(cultural) differences between them. No doubt, any such research in
the United States during the proximate future would have to focus (as
would, perhaps, be more appropriate in any case) upon local courts in
metropolitan areas, because of sampling problems that can be antici-
pated to rise in attempts to work with federal judges, or with state
appellate court judges. Thurgood Marshall’s appointment to the United
States Supreme Court is both unprecedented and barely two years old.
The other physiological indicator, sex, should perhaps be taken to sub-
sume primarily what are physiological differences, with associated psycho-
logical and social components. The likelihood that sampling problems would
be at least as difficult, in endeavors to discriminate the effect of sex upon
judicial behavior (e.g., Lasswell 1930, and 1948: 65–88 [on judges X, Y, and
Z]). As they will be in efforts to deal with race as either an independent
or an intervening variable, suggests that sex still involves—at least in the
field of judicial behavior—important political correlates; and this may still
be true of its economic implications as well. Indeed, male chauvinists may
well assert that any present concern for the sexual implications of judi-
11. For a more extended treatment of this argument and the supporting evidence, see
Schubert 1970a: chap. 2.
JUSTICE AND REASONING . 343
cial behavior—symbolic or literal—must constitute a fey preoccupation with
triviality. But the possibility of sexual differences in judicial behavior can
hardly be dismissed as immaterial in other societies that, at least in some
respects, are more egalitarian than the American; and from the perspective
of democratic ideology, the question of the possible opening up of access to
judicial office, irrespective of either race or sex, is not a trivial one. It might,
therefore, be relevant for students of judicial behavior to attempt to under-
stand better both the behavior of female judges, and the female behavior
of judges. And with regard to the latter matter, I should perhaps point out
that none of these physiological indicators needs to be—and perhaps none
should be—treated as a nominal scale. Age we are accustomed to think of as
an interval (indeed as a ratio) scale; health we ordinarily speak of in ordinal
terms; and only our cultural bias and empirical ignorance make it possible
for any of us to speak of either race or sex as though they constitute natural
dichotomies.
I have discussed the physiological indicators at this length, not because
I believe they are either the most important causes or the best predictors
of judicial behavior, but rather because they clearly have been the most ne-
glected. It is easy to see why this is true; what one might term “orthodox”
behavioralism has been demanding enough, with its insistence that stu-
dents of judicial behavior should become educated as psychologists, so-
ciologists, anthropologists, statisticians, and mathematicians, as well as
political scientists, lawyers, historians, economists, and philosophers. Now
comes the suggestion that this is by no means enough; the judicial—and
really, I believe, political—behavioralist of the next generation ought to be
trained also in physiological biology, genetics, mental health, and public
health. The prospect may well seem foreboding, and especially so, I should
think (now that some of the sociopsychological implications of our noble
experiment in mass education at the university level are becoming more
obvious) to the adolescent habitués of our undergraduate colleges, many
of whom now claim the right to be deemed educated as a consequence of
their engagement in informal small group experiments in oral masturbation,
thus avoiding the more onerous traditional workways to the acquisition of
knowledge. The point seems relevant because these undergraduates are
the persons who need to be trained in this broader concept of behavioral-
ism, to include the health sciences as well as both the newer and the older
social sciences.12 Calling themselves “niggers,” sucking their thumbs in
public orgies of self-pity, and lobbying to define college curricula primarily,
if not exclusively, in terms of bull sessions—and I trust that the etymological
root of that expression will not have been forgotten by the present audi-
ence—seem unlikely to imbue in them either the required knowledge and
12. The Mental Health Research Institute of the University of Michigan and the National
Institutes of Mental Health (Washington, D.C.) are examples of research organizations that
do embrace the concept.
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skills or the orientation toward scientific inquiry that are needed to get the
job done, if such work is ever to be done.
The explicit design and the findings of previous empirical research on
the effect of social and of personality components upon judicial reasoning
have been reviewed, both by others and by myself, so often and so recently
(Pritchett 1968; Shapiro 1964b; Schubert 1963a, 1968e, and 1964a: intro.
essay and chap. intros.) that I thought it would be less valuable, for pre-
sent purposes, to replow those furrows than it might be to discuss, even
though speculatively, the possible breaking of new ground. Moreover, the
field of judicial behavior has been subjected, throughout the entire period
of its existence, to a running cross-fire of critique, emanating particularly
from law or philosophy-trained professors of law or of public law (Fisher
1958; Roche 1958; Berns 1963, 1968; Becker 1963a, 1963b, 1964; Mendel-
son 1963, 1964; Shapiro 1964a: chap. 1; Blawie and Blawie 1965; Krislov
1966; Fuller 1966; Stone 1966a), although there is increasing evidence that
the most relevant members of both professions, law and political science,
have begun to tire of the logomachy, and to favor allocating a larger share
of the field’s resources to what I have called giving “greater attention to
how we can learn from each other, and less to the contemplation of our
respective ideological umbilici”; and for which Herman Pritchett has sub-
stituted the more currently fashionable quotation from the chairman, “Let
a hundred flowers bloom”.13
It is fair, I believe, to summarize earlier work in the field by stating that
the consistency of judicial voting behavior, by judges in courts at all levels and
in a variety of different cultural settings, with consistency measured in rela-
tion to a small number of public policy (viz., attitudinal) dimensions, appears
to be well established (Schubert 1965c, 1968g; Fair 1967; Gadbois 1969;
Hayakawa 1962; Peck, 1967b). Moreover, this research, far from rejecting the
possible importance of variables that lawyers tend to call “stare decisis” or
“activism versus passivism” or “judicial role,” explicitly has attempted to op-
erationalize the legal hypothesis by redefining stare decisis as a psychological
variable. In that form, it appears to have an important, but secondary, ef-
fect upon judicial reasoning (Schubert 1963c, 1965c: 266–272, 1972f; Shapiro
1965, 1972b): most supreme court judges, that is to say, are influenced primar-
ily by their substantive attitudes toward issues of public policy—their policy
biases, if you will—and only to a lesser degree by the extent to which their
psychological orientation is pragmatic or dogmatic (Eysenck 1954; Schubert
1968c), that is, by the extent to which they have an open or a closed judi-
cial mind (Rokeach 1960). But this research has focused upon the highest
courts within the polities examined; whether, as some have hypothesized,
13. Pritchett 1968: 509. Cf.: “Letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools
of thought contend is the policy for promoting the progress of the arts and the sciences and
a flourishing socialist culture in our land. Different forms and styles in art should develop
freely and different schools in science should contend freely.” (Schram 1967: 174)
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the psychological dimension of dogmatism is weighted more heavily for lower,
and particularly for trial, court judges, remains an open question in the light of
the available empirical work, although some recent reports indicate that the
importance of policy attitudes is no less for trial, than it is for appellate, court
judges (Dolbeare 1967b).
There is, moreover, another attitudinal dimension that thus far remains
too inadequately explored to permit an appraisal of how relatively impor-
tant it may be, in relation to the other two dimensions of attitude, policy
and institutional, just discussed. The relations of judges with each other,
in the small groups that appellate courts define, almost certainly pro-
duce a sociometric dimension of their attitudes toward each other, which
also enters into judicial decision-making, and not infrequently into judicial
reasoning even in the sense of the manifest content of judicial opinions.
Such notorious examples of antipathy as Jackson-Black, Jackson-Murphy,
and McReynolds-Brandeis, or of empathy as Taft-Butler, Taft-VanDevanter,
and Clark-Vinson, suggest that neither type of relationship is necessarily
symmetrical; nor do the voting data which have been used for the study
of policy attitudes necessarily provide the most fruitful source of data for
studying sociometric attitudes: probably either opinion interagreement (Ul-
mer 1963; Schubert 1968f) or the private papers of judges (Murphy 1966)
proffer better bets.
The hypothesis that the beliefs, and therefore the voting and opinion
behavior, of judges can be explained substantially on the basis of their
social, economic, and political background experiences is as old as the
United States Supreme Court—if one is willing to accept Jefferson’s letters
as evidence on this point (Myers 1912; Haines 1922; Rodell 1955). Sev-
eral of the earliest quantitative studies of the Supreme Court attempted
to assemble descriptive data on the background characteristics of the jus-
tices; and more recently several doctoral dissertations and other writings
have attempted to test the relationship between background characteris-
tics and decisional behavior (Nagel 1962b; Schmidhauser 1962b; Bowen
1965; Goldman 1966). The one correlation that does seem to be fairly well
established is that between political party affiliation and judicial voting,
with Democrats (except in the South) favoring liberal outcomes. Nagel’s
earlier finding, that the probable scale of liberalism is Jewish-Catholic-
Protestant, for justices classified by major religious groupings, was not
confirmed by Goldman in a subsequent study (using a differently drawn
sample) (Nagel 1962a; Goldman 1966); and Bowen found that only a very
small amount of variance could be attributed to any single background
variable as a decisional predictor, even when the sample size produced
statistically significant—although characteristically low—first-order corre-
lations (1965). Of course, none of this suggests that the life experiences of
judges have no impact upon their attitudes and decisional behavior. But it
does indicate that the relationships involved appear to be too complicated
to be discovered by the relatively crude use of simple linear correlation,
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poorly defined and highly correlated (viz., nonindependent) “independent”
variables, and inadequate samples.
Little can or should be said at this time concerning the empirical work
on cultural differences, because most of the relevant work with which I am
familiar is either just out or else still in press or in process, and appraisal of
it at this time would be both premature and presumptuous (Schubert 1967c,
1968c; Grossman and Tanenhaus 1969; Schubert and Danelski 1969).
I should like, however, to make one or two concluding remarks about the
importance of guiding future work with a well-developed theoretical model, if
not one that builds upon the paradigm of Figure 22, at least (hopefully) one
that focuses attention upon the interrelationships among variables likely to be
selected for study by scholars working from several different disciplinary ori-
entations, one that directs attention to the possible relevance of physiological
dimensions, and one that posits a multidimensional space that can accommo-
date the variety of empirical findings likely to be generated, over the course
of the next decade, by lawyer, sociologist, political scientist, anthropologist,
psychologist, and other possible researchers in the field. Such a model should
be so constructed as to facilitate its being translated into the scientific di-
alects of these several disciplines (Cohen 1950), because work upon filling in
the interstices of what presently can readily enough be perceived as gaping
voids can proceed parsimoniously only to the extent that scholars can become
timely aware of, and can more fully understand, each other’s contributions.
Only in a minimal way do such conditions obtain today, in my opinion. But this
very symposium should help to bring about a better common understanding,
among philosophers and law professors and political scientists, concerning the
present state of our conjoint knowledge concerning judicial reasoning. The
Constitution may not be what the justices say it is; but neither can the rest
of us, who do define the Constitution, project too close an image of what the
Supreme Court says it is not. To that extent, at least, our quest for justice is
confined by judicial reasoning.
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